Undercutting the Price

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By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

There is a dispute in the Mishna whether a seller is allowed to undercut and sell below market price so that people will buy in his store. The Gemora seems to ask why the Chachamim permit this type of price setting. The Gemora answers that ultimately it will have a positive result on the market because it will force the market price to be lower. The implication of the Gemora is that one can only undercut the market in this way when it will in fact be beneficial to consumers by lowering the market price. However, in a situation where it will not result in actually lowering the market price (perhaps because the market is too large to be lowered by one merchant, such as the case nowadays with internet sales), the seller would be forbidden to undercut the market to encourage consumers to buy in his shop.

However, R’ Shlomo Kluger (Chochmas Shlomo C.M. 228) makes a beautiful diyuk from Rashi that perhaps that is not the halachah.. When the Gemora asks – what is the Chachamim’s reason? Rashi comments: Why is the seller favorably remembered? Meaning, the Gemora isn’t asking why the Chachamim permit to sell for cheap, rather the Gemora is asking why is it considered so positive and even a blessing. To that the Gemora answers that the seller is remembered for good because he helps consumers by lowering the market price. This rationale is only necessary to explain why it is a good thing for the seller to do, but even without this rationale, the Chachamim hold that it is permitted. Based on this, R’ Shlomo Kluger justifies why the Shulchan Aruch fails to limit this permission in any way, and rules that one can always undercut the market price even in a situation where they are selling to a different city and their sales won’t have a positive effect on the market.

It would seem that it is permitted for one to undercut his competitors to provide incentive to the consumers to shop by him, put them out of business, and then raise the price (within the confines of ona’ah). But perhaps we can be medayek from Rashi on the Mishna that this type of devious behavior is not permitted. Rashi, when explaining the Tanna Kamma who holds that it is forbidden to do this, comments: מפני שמרגיל לבא אצלו ומקפח מזונות חבירו. Rashi indicates that the case we are discussing is when he is harming the other merchants only by luring their customers to his store. This is similar to distributing candies where you would not be putting the other merchants out of business, just “stealing” their customers. Since the other merchants can also distribute candy and/or lower their price to compete - it is fair capitalistic business practice, so the Chachamim permit it. However, in a situation where one merchant is wealthier than the rest and can afford to literally sell at a loss for six months to force his competitors out of business, it is very possible that even the Chachamim would agree to the Tanna Kamma that it is forbidden, since the other merchants don’t have the ability to compete.

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Heavenly Voice

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The Gemora states that a Heavenly voice declared that the halachah follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemora cites the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua: He maintains that we do not pay attention to a Heavenly voice dictating who the halachah should follow.

The Gemora in Yevamos (122a) states: A woman can get married on account of a heavenly voice. This means that if her husband went overseas and a Heavenly voice declares that her husband died, she is permitted to get married.

The Tosfos Yom Tov states that this is not referring to a Heavenly voice since we rule that one does not pay halachic attention to a voice emanating from heaven.

Reb Elchonon explains differently: We do not pay attention to a Heavenly voice regarding halachic matters because Torah is not in the heavens; it was given to human beings. The Sages of Klal Yisroel have the authority to resolve all halachic matters, not the heavens. However, a Heavenly voice can resolve a factual doubt. We would not rely on a Heavenly voice in regards to something that requires two witnesses. The Chachamim were lenient in regards to the testimony of a woman and they relied on the words of even one witness; that is why a Heavenly voice can be believed in this matter.

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the Righteous and the Scoffers

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By: Reb Binyomin Adler

Rava expounded: What is the meaning of that which is written: But when I limped they rejoiced and gathered … they tore [at me] and would not be silenced? Dovid said before The Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe! It is revealed and known to You that if my enemies were to tear my flesh, my blood would not flow out (for it has drained from the surface of my body because of their taunts about my sin). And not only that, but when they were engrossed in the studying the tractates of Negaim and Oholos (difficult tractates in the order of Taharos), they interrupt their studies and say to me (tauntingly): Dovid! If one cohabits with another man’s wife, what is his prescribed form of execution? I said to them: If one cohabits with another man’s wife, his execution is by strangulation, but he has a share in the World to Come. However, one who makes his fellow’s face turn white from shame in public (as you are doing to me), has no share in the World to Come.

This dialogue appears somewhat strange. Were Dovid’s tormentors really serious in their accusations against him regarding his taking Bathsheva? If they were, should they have not summoned him to trial? Although the Gemora states that a king cannot be judged, certainly the Sages of the time would have at least incriminated Dovid. How can we understand their accusations?

There is a constant struggle in the world between the righteous and the wicked. Thus struggle has manifested itself throughout history, as evidenced in the incident where Avraham and Sara miraculously conceived a child, yet there were still those who scoffed and said that Avimelech impregnated Sara. Hashem always allows room for the wicked to interpret events in their own way. When Dovid committed the act with Bathsheva, Hashem allowed for the wicked to lose their share in the World to Come by scoffing at Dovid. They were not seeking justice at all. Rather, they were looking for someone to mock, and scoffers will mock anyone, even the great Dovid, King of Israel.

The Maharsha notes that one who speaks evil slander incurs tzaraas, and even still their study of those laws did not prevent them from slandering Dovid. One has to guard his speech, but equally important, one must inspect his actions to ensure that he is not from the scoffers, but from those who defend and respect the righteous.

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Verbally Paining a Rasha

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

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The Mishna tells us that just as there is a prohibition of ona’ah to cheat someone through money, there is also a prohibition to cause them pain verbally.

The Mordechai (306) says that based on the Gemora that considers ona’as devarim to be “not returnable,” it would follow that one receives malkus (lashes) for violating ona’as devarim.

The obvious difficulty with this is that ona’as devarim is a la'av she'ein bo ma'aseh (a prohibition without an action) which one does not receive malkus for violating.

The Sefer Hachinuch explicitly argues with this Mordechai and says that since it is a la'av she'ein bo ma'aseh, there isn't any punishment of malkus.

The Nimukei Yosef explains based on the Gemora (59a) that only עם שאתך בתורה ובמצוות are included in ona’as devarim, that the prohibition of ona’as devarim doesn't apply when one speaks harshly about one who does not fear Heaven (ya’arei shamayim).

Although the Gemora excludes an evil person from this prohibition (meaning that it is permitted to offend him), it seems a little strange why the Nimukei Yosef raises the bar so high, and insists that there isn't a violation to speak against someone who is not a ya’arei shamayim.

We find that the Gemora expounds in Bava Metzia 48b and 62a - ונשיא בעמך לא תאור, בעושה מעשה עמך, to the exclusion of an evil person.

We also find in the Hagahos Maimon (deios 6:1) on the mitzvah of לא תשנא את אחיך בלבבך וכו' ואהבת לרעך כמוך that we expound - דוקא שהוא רעך בתורה ובמצות אבל אדם רשע שאינו מקבל תוכחה מצוה לשנאותו. It is permitted to hate a wicked person. The source that one can hate such a person is in Pesachim 113b - that one can hate someone who commits transgressions.

We also find in the Rambam (Rotzeiach end of perek 4) who expounds - לא תעמוד על דם רעך, ואין זה ריעך and learns from here that shepherds who are considered thieves are not included in this mitzvah to save them.

All these sources that use the terms “amcha,” “rei'acha” or “achicha” seem to exclude only real wicked people. But the Nimukei Yosef seems to understand that the term “amisecha” in the context of ona’ah excludes anyone who is not a ya’arei shamayim. The term implies a higher standard than the other terms.

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Land and Slaves

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The Mishna says that slaves share the status of land regarding the exclusions listed. Therefore, a sale of a slave is not subject to the rules of ona’ah. Abaye says that a rental is subject to the rules of ona’ah, since it is equivalent to a temporary sale.

The Rishonim explain that Abaye is only referring to rental of items whose regular sale is subject to ona’ah, but rental of land is not subject to ona’ah, similar to a permanent sale of land.

The Rishonim discuss whether hiring a worker is subject to ona’ah. The Ramban and Rashba say that hiring a worker is not subject to ona’ah, since the Torah states that ona’ah applies when buying or selling a “mimkar” - a sale item. When hiring a worker, there is no sale item per se, and therefore no ona’ah.

The Rambam (Mechira 13:15, 17) says that hiring a worker is not subject to ona’ah, since it is akin to renting a slave. Since buying a slave is not subject to ona’ah, renting one – which is a temporary sale – is also not subject to ona’ah. However, the Rambam says that when hiring a worker for a project, as opposed to hourly work, ona’ah does apply, since such a transaction is not considered a temporary sale of a slave, but a proper transaction of merchandise.

The Drisha (227:47) explains that a slave is defined by his time being owned by his owner. Therefore, an hourly worker can be considered temporarily enslaved, since during his employment period, his time is owned by the employer, while a project worker is not even temporarily enslaved, since his time is always only his. Since the Rambam exempted employment as a function of a slave’s exclusion, project work, which is not similar to a slave’s work, is not exempted. However, the Ramban and Rashba offer a more fundamental reason to exempt employment from ona’ah, and therefore apply this to all types of employment, including project work.

This dispute among the Rishonim would seem to depend on a general dispute among the Rishonim about exclusions of slaves. Rashi (Kiddushin 7a, 28a) and Tosfos (Megilla 23b Shamin) say that whenever the Gemora makes halachic statements about slaves, this applies to any person, even if he is free. Therefore, the Gemora (Kiddushin 7a) considers a wife being betrothed to be equivalent to real estate (as far as modes of acquisition), and the Gemora (Kiddushin 28a) treats someone’s claim that one is his Jewish slave to be equivalent to a dispute over land (as far as swearing). Tosfos (Kiddushin 7a, 28a) and the Ritva (Kiddushin 28a), however, say that the categorization of slaves as equivalent to land only applies to Kena’ani slaves, and not to free people, or even to Jewish slaves. The Tur and Shulchan Aruch (HM 227:33,36) rule like the Rambam.

The Shach (HM 95:18) rules that the halachic rules of a slave apply to all people, since the Torah is simply using slaves as a vehicle to explain that human acquisition is equivalent to land acquisition. In general, only Kena’ani slaves are acquired, which is why the Torah used them to teach this rule.This is consistent with the position of the Shulchan Aruch.

The Kovetz Shiurim (Bava Basra 310) suggests that the Rambam may not rule that the laws of slaves apply to all people. However, this is because only a slave can be truly permanently acquired, while other situations (e.g., a wife or Jewish slave), are only temporary, and cannot be compared to land. However, in regard to ona’ah, the exclusion of a slave also excludes hourly employment. Abaye explained that ona’ah applies to rental, only since it is considered a temporary sale. Therefore, a rental is subject to ona’ah where an equivalent permanent sale is subject to ona’ah. Although the employee does not have the rules of a slave, and cannot be permanently bought, employment’s theoretical permanent counterpart would be enslavement, which is not subject to ona’ah. Therefore, the temporary sale of employment cannot be subject to ona’ah, since ona’ah derives from considering a rental as a temporary sale, as Abaye stated.

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Perutah in Media

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The Mishna had stated: One who steals from his fellow something worth a perutah and swears falsely is obligated to bring it to him, even to Media.

What is the significance of Media?

The Vilna Gaon (Kol Eliyahu; Kiddushin 12a) explains based on the following verse [Yeshaya 13:17]: Behold I stir up Media against them, who do not value silver, and do not desire gold. The thief must travel even to Media, a place where a perutah is completely insignificant because of the abundance of gold and silver that is found there. Nevertheless, the thief must go there and return the money that he stole.

This is why Shmuel (Kiddushin 12a) ruled that if someone betroths a woman with a date, even if a kur of dates is only worth a dinar, we say that she is betrothed, as a single date might be worth a perutah in (the country of) Media. Precisely in Media, where money is insignificant, that is where it is possible that one will receive a perutah in exchange of one date.

The Nitzotzei Ohr adds on his words: This is why the Gemora there mentions dates, for dates there were very expensive. That is why beer there was made from barley and not from dates, as we find the Gemora discusses the beer from Media. For this reason, one was prepared to pay a perutah for one date.

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Paying for Terumah

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The Gemora cites a braisa: If someone steals terumah but did not eat it, he pays keifel (double) the value of the terumah. If he ate it (accidentally after he stole it), he pays twice the principle plus one fifth. The value of one principle plus one fifth is from chulin produce, and one principle is paid with money according to the value of terumah.

The gemora in Pesachim (32a) is uncertain what the halachah is if one steals terumah from a Kohen and he eats it. Does he pay according to the measure – that is, he pays with unconsecrated produce in the amount of terumah produce that he stole – even if the produce went up in value? Or perhaps he pays according to the value which he stole, and therefore, if the produce price went up in value, he can give less produce which equals the value in which he stole. The Gemora does not resolve this.

The Mishnah Lamelech wonders how it would be evaluated according to value. Do we evaluated how much the stolen terumah itself is worth (which would be less than chulin), or do we view it as if it would have been chulin produce? He cites an opinion of the Ra”sh that it is evaluated as if it would have been chulin produce.

The Tosfos Yom Tov derives from Rashi in our sugya that he pays according to the value of terumah.

The Minchas Chinuch makes the following distinction: If a non-Kohen eats terumah that belongs to him (it was inherited from his mother’s father), he can pay according to the value of terumah, for the payment is not on account of stealing; rather, it is to receive atonement for his sin. However, a non-Kohen who steals terumah and eats it, he must pay according to its value as if it would be chulin produce. This is because of the following: If he would pay a lesser amount of chulin produce, immediately after he designates the produce for payment, which serves as his atonement, the produce becomes terumah. This would cause the price to drop, and it would emerge that he is paying less than the value of terumah in which he stole.

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Pigs in the Future

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Our Gemora states that ma’aser sheini produce is regarded as something that will otherwise become permitted (since it may be eaten in Yerushalayim, or it can be redeemed), and there is a principle that any item that will eventually become permitted is not nullified even when intermingled with a thousand items of its like.

The Rishonim disagree regarding a food item that the Gemora is uncertain if it is forbidden or not and it remains unresolved. The inquiry will remain in that state until Eliyahu Hanavi clarifies it for us. The Ohr Zarua maintains that this is regarded as “something which can become permitted,” since there is a possibility that Eliyahu will say that it is permitted. The Rashba disagrees and he explains: If Eliyahu will decide that the food is forbidden, it will emerge that this item will never be permitted. If he will rule that it is permitted, it actually was never forbidden. Either way, he argues, it cannot be labeled as “something which can become permitted.” The Bach cites a Mordechai that it is not considered “something which can become permitted,” for by the time Eliyahu will permit it, the food will be already ruined.

The Chasam Sofer cites the following question from the Rav in Frankfurt: Chazal write that a pig is called a “chazir,” for in the future, Hashem will reverse the prohibition of the pig and it will be permitted. If so, according to those Rishonim, pig should be regarded as “something which can become permitted”?

The Chasam Sofer answers based upon that which was written in the Toldos Yitzchak: The Torah forbids animals that do not have split hooves, or those that do not chew their cud because those animals are naturally conceited; they trample with their feet and they have a poison inside of them, which is extremely dangerous for a Jew to eat. The animals that do not digest their food easily and they are compelled to chew their cud; those animals are permitted to eat.

If so, explains the Chasam Sofer, there will be no change in halacha regarding the pig. It was forbidden and will remain forbidden. Rather, Hashem will change the nature of the pig and it will begin to chew its cud. That is why it will be permitted then. Accordingly, the only pigs that will be permitted then, are those that will be born after this change occurs; however, the pigs that were in existence prior to that will remain forbidden. This is why a pig is not classified as “something which can become permitted.”

Something that can become Permitted
(Davar she’yeish lo Matirin)
The Mishna states: If one makes a neder prohibiting himself from wine, he is permitted in cooked food which has in it the taste of wine. However, if he said, “Konam this wine that I will not taste,” and it fell into a cooked dish, if it contains enough to impart flavor to the entire mixture, it is forbidden.

This would imply that if there is not enough to give flavor, it would be permitted. The Ra”n quotes his teachers who ask the following: Something which is forbidden on account of a neder is “something that can become permitted” (davar she’yeish lo matirin), and we have established that anything that can become permitted is not nullified even in a thousand!?

They answer that when we say that it is not nullified even in a thousand, that refers to something that has been mixed with its own kind. But here, when it says, “and it became mixed,” it is referring to something else that is not the same kind, like the case of eggs that were cooked with it. Anything that is mixed with something else that is not its kind is permitted, provided that it does not give flavor, even if it is “something that can become permitted.” The Ra”n cites proof to this from a Mishna in Chalah and a Yerushalmi.

They, therefore, objected to the statement of the Ri”f in Meseches Chulin concerning bread that was baked in an oven with roasted meat. The Gemora states that it is forbidden to eat it with a dairy sauce even though it has been established that we are not halachically concerned with vapors. The reason it is forbidden is because the bread is “something that can be permitted,” since one may eat it together with meat. For that reason, it is not nullified, even in a thousand. It is evident from the Ri”f that he maintains that “something that can be permitted” is not nullified even in something that is not its kind.

The Ra”n, however, agrees to the Ri”f. When the Mishna here says that “something can become permitted” becomes nullified in something that is not its own kind, that is referring to something that is forbidden now, but will become permitted in the future, like nedarim. For the Ra”n has the following question: Since according to the Chachamim, all forbidden things become nullified in their own kind just as in a different kind, why did the Chachamim make a distinction in the case of “something that can become permitted,” between its own kind and a different kind? The reason is as follows: The Chachamim and Rabbi Yehudah disagree whether or not something can be nullified in its own kind. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a forbidden item is not nullified in its own kind, because anything that is similar to another thing does not weaken and nullify it; rather, it preserves it and strengthens it.

The Chachamim disagree and hold that a forbidden item and something which is permitted are not similar to each other, even if they are the same kind. This is because one is forbidden and one is permitted. For it is not fitting to follow the similarity of their substance, but rather the difference in their being forbidden and permitted. It is for this reason that the Chachamim learned concerning “something that can be permitted” for the sake of being strict towards the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. For since the forbidden item is not completely different from the permitted one, because the forbidden one will eventually become permitted, we say that it is not nullified in its own kind. It will only become nullified when mixed with a different kind, for the difference that exists between one kind and another will make up for the equality that is added here because it is “something that can be permitted.” It is the difference between kinds that is the cause of nullification, and equality interferes with nullification.

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Is it Mutar to Cheat (just a little)?

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The braisa had stated: If it is an issar less, it is forbidden.

Abaye explains this to mean that the coins cannot be used at its face value if the sela became lacking by an issar more than its price fraud limit.

Rava challenges this interpretation, for if it is even a little more than the limit, it cannot be used at its face value!?

Rather, Rava understands it to mean that if the sela became deficient by an issar to a dinar, it cannot be used any longer at its face value. This would be an anonymous ruling which follows Rabbi Meir’s viewpoint.

Tosfos understands in Rashi that one would be permitted to defraud his fellow if it is less than a sixth, even in a case where he does not intend to return the overcharge. This is because the defrauded party, because it is insignificant, is immediately mochel the “cheater.” It would be permitted to charge exactly a sixth more than its price only if he intends to return the overchatge within the time it would take the other party to show the purchase to a merchant.

The Ritva writes that it is forbidden to defraud your fellow in cases where it is precisely a sixth. This is because people are generally particular regarding these things.

The Ramban maintains that it is forbidden even if it is less than a sixth, for one is not allowed to defraud his fellow whatsoever. If it was less than a sixth, the sages ruled that he is exempt from paying it back. That does not make it permitted.

The Chinuch holds that there is no Biblical prohibition when one defrauds his fellow less than a sixth.

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Stipulation regarding Marital Relations

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The Gemora cited a braisa: If someone says to a woman that she is betrothed to him on condition that he does not owe her support, clothes, or marital relations, the kiddushin is valid, but the conditions are invalid; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah says: In monetary matters, the condition is upheld.

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Yehudah holds that one can make a condition modifying the obligations stipulated by the Torah regarding monetary law.

This would explain why Rabbi Yehudah holds that the condition is valid when he stipulated that he does not owe her support or clothing; however, why is it valid when he stipulates that he will not have marital relations with her? This is not a monetary law!?

Rashi, because of this, writes that the husband remains obligated to have marital relations with her, for this is not a financial right. Depriving a wife from relations would cause her physical distress and therefore the condition is void.

The Mishnah Lamelech challenges this from a Gemora which states that one can say to his fellow, “Hit me and you will be exempt.” Evidently, one can waive physical anguish! Furthermore, we find that a woman can release the husband from his marital relations!?

Some answer that Rashi himself, cited in the Shitah Mikubetzes in Kesuvos (56a), states that the condition is void, for we assume that a woman will not waive her rights regarding anything which causes physical anguish; however, if she explicitly forfeits those rights, they are forfeited.

Rabbeinu Chananel holds that a man may stipulate on marital relations, and a wife can waive her rights to it as well. This is because the pleasure of relations belongs to her and it would be regarded as a financial right.

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Torah is for Jews

The נצי“ב used to say over the following story. In Russia, there was a certain Education Minister who became friendly with a משכיל named Dr. Lilinthel. In their conversations, this משכיל used to quote to the Minister from משניות and גמ‘. The Minister developed a desire to learn גמ' and asked Lilinthel to teach some גמ' to him. Lilinthel and two other משכילים chose a גמ' in בבא מציעא דף נ' to learn with him. This was the סוגיא called תגרי לוד which they figured since it was a גמ' with only סברא and one didn’t need too much background information, the Minister would be able to understand it. They prepared it extremely well and began to teach it to him. After they finished the גמ' one time, the Minister appeared exhausted and extremely tired. He asked them to repeat the גמ' to him. They learned it with him again. After the second time, he closed the גמ' in exasperation and proclaimed that he didn’t understand one word that they taught him. When they told this over to the נצי“ב, everyone was amazed that this brilliant Minister couldn’t understand a simple גמ‘. The נצי“ב said that there is a clear גמ' in סנהדרין that says ”תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה קהלות יעקב - לנו מורשה ולא להם מורשה“. תורה is only for כלל ישראל and not for the גוי.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FROM YESTERDAY’S DAF
to refresh your memory

Q: How is one obligated to sustain his workers?

A: Like a feast from Shlomo Hamelech.

Q: When does R’ Yochanan allow a person to retract from his words?

A: By a large gift.

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Merchants of Lod

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Merchants of Lod
The Gemora inquires: According to the view of the Rabbis (who hold that ona’ah is a sixth), is a price fraud of less than a sixth immediately waived, or is it waived only after the buyer has had time to show the item to a merchant or his relative?

The Gemora asks: And if you will conclude that it is only after he has had time to show the item to a merchant or his relative, what would be the difference between a sixth (where the Mishna above rules that one may return such an item until the time it would take to show it to a merchant or his relative) and less than a sixth?

The Gemora answers: There still would be a difference, for in the case of a sixth, he (the one who was defrauded) has the upper hand, and can either withdraw or retain the ownership but have the overcharge returned; whereas in the case of less than a sixth, he must retain ownership and have the overcharge refunded. What then is the halachah?

The Gemora says: Let us resolve this from our Mishna [When the merchants of Lod heard this (that Rabbi Tarfon ruled that a third of the price is regarded as ona’ah), they were happy, since it allowed them a larger margin above the fair price. However, when Rabbi Tarfon told them that he also allowed a day for the buyer to return the item,]: They went back to following the Rabbis opinion. Now, it was thought that less than a third according to Rabbi Tarfon’s view (the sale would still be valid) is identical in halachah with less than a sixth according to the Rabbis. Now, it is well if you would say that an overcharge of less than a sixth, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, (it is only) when the buyer has had enough time to show the item to a merchant or his relative (where he can demand a refund; afterwards, he forfeits that right), whereas according to Rabbi Tarfon, (it is only after) the whole day (passes before he forfeits the rights of demanding a refund). It was on this account that the merchants reverted to the ruling of the Rabbis. [Assuming that the Rabbis allowed the buyer to demand a refund when he was overcharged by less than a sixth – the original excitement of the merchants can be understood, as well as their ultimate rejection. They were not pleased that a buyer could void the sale if he was overcharged by more than a sixth. When they heard that Rabbi Tarfon ruled that a sale cannot be voided unless there was an overcharge of more than a third, they were excited, for now, if they overcharged a buyer by more than a sixth, but less than a third, the buyer could not void the sale; the buyer would have a short amount of time (the time it took to show it to a merchant or his relatives) to demand a refund of the overcharge. However, when Rabbi Tarfon proclaimed that the time limit would be the entire day (and not within the time it took to show it to a merchant or his relatives), they realized that they would lose out with this method. For in cases where the overcharge was less than a sixth, the buyers would only have a short amount of time to demand a refund according to the Rabbis, whereas Rabbi Tarfon allowed them the entire day. This advantage outweighed the fact that if the overcharge was a sixth or more than a sixth (but less than a third), the sale could be voided according to the Rabbis, but according to Rabbi Tarfon, the buyer could only claim a refund for the overcharged amount.
More than a sixth, but less than a third:
Rabbis - Sale could be voided, but only in a short amount of time.
Rabbi Tarfon - Sale cannot be voided; buyer has the entire day to demand a return of the overcharge.] But if you would say according to the Rabbis that when the buyer is overcharged by less than a sixth, he immediately waives his right to demand a refund, and similarly according to Rabbi Tarfon (when the buyer is overcharged by less than a third), he immediately waives his right to demand a refund, why did the merchants revert to the Rabbis opinion? Rabbi Tarfon’s viewpoint would be more advantageous to them! For that which the Rabbis regarded as price fraud (either to void the sale or to demand a refund of the overcharge), Rabbi Tarfon would rule that the buyer waives his right immediately!?
[Less than a third:
Rabbis – Buyer could demand a refund or void the sale.
Rabbi Tarfon – Buyer waives rights immediately – sale is final!]

[The Gemora demonstrates that the story still makes sense – even if the buyer immediately waives his rights when he was overcharged by less than a sixth.] Do you think that less than a third according to Rabbi Tarfon’s view is identical in halachah with less than a sixth according to the Rabbis? No, it is not! From a sixth to a third according to Rabbi Tarfon is the same as exactly a sixth according to the Rabbis. [The halachah of exactly a sixth according to the Rabbis is this: The buyer can either void the entire sale or he can demand a refund of the overcharge. (If the price fraud was more than a sixth, both the buyer and the seller can void the sale.) The following will explain why the merchants reverted to the opinion of the Rabbis:
Exactly a sixth:
Rabbis - Buyer can either void the sale or demand a refund of the overcharge, but only in a short amount of time.
Rabbi Tarfon - Buyer can either void the sale or demand a refund of the overcharge, but he has the entire day to do so.
More than a sixth, but less than a third:
Rabbis - Sale could be voided by either party (there is a question if there is a deadline for this).
Rabbi Tarfon – The buyer (but not the seller) has the entire day to either void the sale or demand a refund of the overcharge.]

The Gemora asks: If so (that the only argument by more than a sixth is if the seller can also void the sale), why were they pleased in the beginning (the buyer anyway can void the sale if he pleases)?

[In order to answer this question…] We should prove from this fact (that they initially were pleased with Rabbi Tarfon’s opinion) that according to the view of the Rabbis, in a case where the sale is voided, one can always retract. They thus rejoiced when Rabbi Tarfon told them that an overcharge (from a sixth to a third) constitutes price fraud (for they thought that the buyers would have a very short time limit to make such a claim). But then when he told them that the time for withdrawing is the entire day, they reverted back to the Rabbis.
[More than a sixth, but less than a third:
Rabbis - Sale could be voided by either party forever.
Rabbi Tarfon – The buyer (but not the seller) has the entire day to either void the sale or demand a refund of the overcharge.
(The fact that Rabbi Tarfon imposed a limit of one day was not so advantageous for them, for once the buyer has one day to void the sale, he will probably find time to do so. Furthermore, price fraud more than a sixth was not such a common occurrence.)
Exactly a sixth:
Rabbis - Buyer can either void the sale or demand a refund of the overcharge, but only in a short amount of time.
Rabbi Tarfon - Buyer can either void the sale or demand a refund of the overcharge, but he has the entire day to do so.
(Here, it would be a big loss for them if they would follow Rabbi Tarfon’s opinion, for in the common case of precisely a sixth, the buyers would have the entire day to void the purchase; whereas according to the Rabbis, they would only have a short amount of time.)]

For if you should think, continues the Gemora, that according to the view of the Rabbis, in a case where the sale is voided, it is only within the time that the buyer can show it to a merchant or to his relative, why did they rejoice in the first place?
[More than a sixth, but less than a third:
Rabbis - Sale could be voided by either party, but only in a short amount of time.
Rabbi Tarfon – The buyer (but not the seller) has a short amount of time to either void the sale or demand a refund of the overcharge.]

The Gemora answers: They rejoiced in respect of a sixth itself. For according to Rabbi Tarfon, there would be no claim at all, whereas according to the Rabbis, it would be a case of price fraud.

[In conclusion:
Rabbi Tarfon
Less than a sixth or a sixth – Sale is valid; no claims whatsoever.
More than a sixth, but less than a third - The buyer (but not the seller) can either void the sale or demand a refund of the overcharge.(Originally, this ruling was thought to be limited until the buyer had enough time to show it to a merchant or to his relatives; afterwards he ruled that he has the entire day.)
A third or more - Sale could be voided by either party.
Rabbis
Less than a sixth – Sale is valid; no claims whatsoever.
Exactly a sixth - The buyer (but not the seller) can either void the sale or demand a refund of the overcharge.
More than a sixth - Sale could be voided by either party, but only within a short amount of time.

Initially, the case of exactly a sixth was more advantageous according to Rabbi Tarfon, for the sale was valid immediately. However, when Rabbi Tarfon ruled that the buyer had the entire day to submit his claim, the merchants reverted back to the opinion of the Rabbis.]

The Gemora inquired: In cases where the sale is void according to the Rabbis, can the buyer retract forever, or can he retract only within the time it takes for him to show the purchase to a merchant or to his relatives? And if you will conclude that (it must be that there is no limit, for if) he can only retract within the time it takes for him to show the purchase to a merchant or to his relatives, then what difference would there be between a price fraud of a sixth and one of more than a sixth? This, the Gemora says, is not a proof, for if the price fraud was exactly a sixth, only the one who was defrauded can retract, but where the price fraud was more than a sixth, both the buyer and the seller can retract. So, what is the halachah (regarding our inquiry)?

The Gemora says: Let us resolve this from our Mishna [When the merchants of Lod heard this (that Rabbi Tarfon ruled that a third of the price is regarded as ona’ah), they were happy, since it allowed them a larger margin above the fair price. However, when Rabbi Tarfon told them that he also allowed a day for the buyer to return the item,]: They went back to following the Rabbis opinion. Now, it is well if you say that annulment of the sale according to the view of the Rabbis, is only within the time it takes to show the purchase to a merchant or a relative, whereas according to Rabbi Tarfon’s view he has the entire day, for it is on that account that they reverted to the Rabbis opinion. But if you say that in the case of annulment of sale, according to the view of the Rabbis, one can always retract, why did they revert to the opinion of the Rabbis? Surely Rabbi Tarfon’s ruling was more advantageous to them, since the buyer could only demand a refund during that day, but no more!?

[More than a sixth, but less than a third:
Rabbis – Buyer can always void the sale.
Rabbi Tarfon – The buyer (but not the seller) has the entire day to either void the sale or demand a refund of the overcharge.
(Rabbi Tarfon’s ruling is more advantageous to the merchants, for the buyers are limited to one day.)
Exactly a sixth
Rabbis - Sale could be voided, but only in a short amount of time.
Rabbi Tarfon – The buyer has the entire day to either void the sale or demand a refund of the overcharge.
(Although the Rabbis ruling seems to be more advantageous for the merchants, it is easily avoidable by selling it for slightly less than a sixth, where the buyer waives his right to demand a refund.) ]

The Gemora answers: Annulment of a sale is rare.

[It is therefore not considered advantageous to the merchants, and even if it does occur, there is no advantage to Rabbi Tarfon’s ruling, for once the buyer has one day to void the sale, he will probably find time to do so. It emerges that they reverted to the opinion of the Chachamim on account of a case where the price fraud was exactly a sixth, for according to the Chachamim, the buyers only had a short amount of time in which to demand a refund, but according to Rabbi Tarfon, they had the entire day to submit their claim.]

Rava said Raba said: The halachah is: In the case of less than a sixth, the sale is valid. If the fraud was more than a sixth, the sale can be voided (by both of them). If it was exactly a sixth, it is valid, but the overcharge must be returned. And in both of those cases, it is only if the claim was made within the time it takes to show the purchase to a merchant or his relative.

The Gemora cites a supporting braisa: In the case of price fraud less than a sixth, the sale is valid. If the fraud was more than a sixth, the sale is void. If it was exactly a sixth, it is valid, but the overcharge must be returned. These are the words of Rabbi Nassan. Rabbi Yehudah haNasi said: The seller (when he was the one defrauded) has the upper hand: if he wishes, he can say, “Return me the merchandise,” or he can say, “Pay up the amount that you defrauded me.” And in both of those cases, it is only if the claim was made within the time it takes to show the purchase to a merchant or his relative. (50a – 50b)

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What is a Sixth?

Shmuel states that ona’ah includes a case of a sixth of the sale price, even if it is not a sixth of the fair price. Shmuel also agrees that a sixth of the fair price is considered ona’ah. Therefore, according to Shmuel, all the cases below are ona’ah:
1. Item worth 70, sold for 60
2. Item worth 60, sold for 50
3. Item worth 60, sold for 70
4. Item worth 50, sold for 60

The Rambam (Mechira 12:3) says that anything less than a sixth is considered forgiven. The Rambam gives two examples:
1. Item worth 60, sold for 51
2. Item worth 60, sold for 69

The Magid Mishnah challenges the first case of the Rambam. In this case, a sixth of the fair price is 10, while a sixth of the sale price is 8.5. The difference in the sale is less than a sixth of the fair price, but is more than a sixth of the sale price (8.5), and should be ona’ah according to Shmuel!?

The Shulchan Aruch (HM 227:3) only discusses the second case, while the Rama (227:4) cites the first case.

The Sma (227:5,11) rules like the Magid Mishnah.

The Taz explains that the Rambam holds that Shmuel accepts either form of sixth, but only at a sixth. Any other deviation is evaluated based on the fair price only. See Drisha C”M 227:4 for more details.

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Commitment to an Honor (mohel or sandek)

The Rishonim discuss a case where a father committed to honor someone with part of the bris ceremony, either as a sandak or a mohel, and then changed his mind. (See Beis Yosef YD 264)

The Maharam says that since these commitments are routinely made and kept, the commitment is enforceable in court.

Rabbeinu Yechiyel limits this to a commitment made after the baby was born.

The Rosh disagrees, and says that only a standard kinyan is enforceable.

Rabbeinu Tam says that if one committed to a mohel to do his son’s bris, this has the status of a verbal commitment, and one who does not keep it is considered untrustworthy.

The Pri Yitzchak says that committing to a mohel has the status of a small gift, since the father typically cannot perform the bris, and he is simply giving the right to choose the mohel. However, committing to a sandak is a large gift, since the father himself can do that, and he is giving that right to the sandak. Since it is a large gift, a verbal commitment would not be binding.

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Keepin your Word

Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether backing out of a verbal commitment is considered untrustworthy. The Halachah (C”M 204:7-9) follows Rabbi Yochanan, as he has clear support in the opinions of the Tannaim.

The Rishonim debate the parameters of their opinions.

Rashi indicates that Rav only allows one to back out of a verbal commitment when conditions changed, as in the case of Rav Kahana.

Many Rishonim, including the Rif, Ramban, Tosfos (49a Modeh) and Rashba hold that Rav and Rabbi Yochanan hold their positions regardless of whether conditions changed. In all cases, Rav says it is considered trustworthy, while Rabbi Yochanan says it is considered untrustworthy.

The Baal Hamaor and the Rosh say that both Rav and Rabbi Yochanan allow one to back out of a verbal commitment if conditions changed.

According to the Baal Hamaor, even Rabbi Yochanan would agree to the ruling Rav gave Rav Kahana, and the Gemora only used the story as a springboard for the more general debate.

In the course of the discussion, the Gemora quoted the statement that we learn that one must keep his “hin” (yes) just, by keeping his word. Abaye deflected this as a proof to Rabbi Yochanan by limiting this requirement to one meaning what he says at the time he says it. According to the Baal Hamaor, Abaye’s statement is also relevant to Rabbi Yochanan, since he allows one to violate his verbal commitment if conditions changed.

The Nimukei Yosef explains that in any case Abaye’s statement is relevant to Rabbi Yochanan, since Rabbi Yochanan agrees that one may violate a verbal commitment on which the recipient did not rely (e.g., a large gift). Therefore, the Rif quotes Abaye, although he rules like Rabbi Yochanan. Once someone is called untrustworthy, the community is allowed to employ social sanction, by calling him wicked, and announcing in public what he did.

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Benefit from Receiving

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora in Kiddushin (6a) says that if a woman would give a gift to someone who is an important person and doesn’t accepts presents from just anybody, she would be receiving enough pleasure from the fact that he receives her gift so that he can betroth her with that benefit that she receives.

The Taz (y.d. 160:8) explains that the reason that he must be an important person is because if he is just a regular person, then the benefit she receives, doesn’t have any cash value to it and therefore cannot create a kiddushin.

The Taz continues to apply this concept to the prohibition against lending with interest as well. If a lender tells a borrower, “I will lend you the money you need on condition that you receive this gift from me” - it depends. If the borrower is an important person, then the lender would be receiving real benefit from the borrower willing to receive his gift, which would create a ribbis (lending with interest) problem. But if the borrower is not an important person, there wouldn’t be any ribbis problem. The Taz clearly understands that if the receiver of the gift is not an important person, we consider the value of the pleasure that the giver has to be worth zero, and therefore it is not a ribbis problem.

However, R’ Akiva Eiger (y.d. 160 on Taz) cites a Ran in Kiddushin who asks based on Levi in our Gemora who holds that chalifin is done with the vessel of the seller, because the benefit that the seller receives by the buyer willing to accept his gift, provides enough benefit to the seller with which to sell the item. Clearly, we see that the seller receives benefit by the buyer receiving his gift even if the buyer is not an important person. This seems to contradict the Gemora in Kiddushin!?

The Ran answers that even if the receiver of the gift isn’t an important person, the giver has pleasure that the receiver was willing to accept, but the pleasure isn’t valued at a perutah. Therefore, in the context of kiddushin where her pleasure must equal a perutah, it only works when he is an important person. But, by chalifin, where the benefit received by the seller need not be worth a perutah, even if the buyer is not an important person, it will work.

R’ Akiva Eiger explains that Rav doesn’t disagree with Levi about this. Therefore, in the context of ribbis, where even a slight benefit that the lender receives from the borrower is a prohibition (although not a Biblical one), even if the borrower isn’t an important person, there would be a problem of ribbis. Based on this, the lender cannot say to the borrower, “I will lend you money on the condition that you receive this gift from me,” even if the borrower isn’t an important person, because the lender will be receiving some minor benefit which is forbidden.

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Kinyan through Admission

The Gemora struggles to figure out a way how Reuven can transfer his money that he has at home to Shimon, who will then use that money to redeem the ma’aser sheini of Reuven and avoid the additional fifth surcharge.

The Gemora suggests that if Reuven would have land to transfer to Shimon, he could transfer the money “agav” the property. Although Tosfos in Bava Kamma (12a) writes that kinyan agav is only Rabbinical, apparently Tosfos understands that even a Rabbinical kinyan would be sufficient to establish Shimon as an owner of the money to redeem the ma’aser sheini and biblically avoid the additional fifth surcharge.

Tosfos raises a question: Even without a kinyan agav or kinyan chalifin, can’t Reuven very directly transfer to Shimon the money by “admitting” that it actually belongs to Shimon?

In this question, Tosfos evidently assumes that an admission doesn’t merely allow Beis Din to act as if witnesses testified, but it actually transforms the ownership of the item to belong to Shimon and would be considered Shimon’s money for ma’aser sheini redemption purposes.

The Ketzos HaChoshen (40) answers Tosfos question by establishing a clause in this type of kinyan that it must be done in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, we can easily state that we are dealing with a case where there are no witnesses available to allow the kinyan hoda’ah (admission) to go into effect.

The Ketzos (194:4) has an elaborate discussion where he explains that this type of admitting would serve as a kinyan even for the purpose of transferring chametz that is another place to belong to a gentile. We see from the fact that it works for ma’aser sheini that it not only works for monetary purposes, but even for prohibition purposes, therefore it should work for chametz as well.

However, Tosfos in Bava Kamma (104b) implies that it would not work on a Biblical level and wouldn’t work for ma’aser sheini purposes. Nevertheless, the Ketzos argues that it should still work for chametz since one has nullified the chametz and the requirement to rid himself of the chametz is only Rabbinical. But in truth, the Ketzos points out that even if kinyan hoda’ah is only Rabbinic in origin, it shouldn’t be any worse than kinyan agav which works for ma’aser sheini.

Reb Avi Lebowitz suggests that Tosfos in Bava Kamma doesn’t necessarily contradict our Tosfos because Tosfos in Bava Kamma is speaking about a case where he is admitting that he owns property by which he will transfer the money through a kinyan agav - to which Tosfos says that it doesn’t work on a Biblical level. But our Tosfos speaks of directly transferring the money through an admission, which would work on a Biblical level.

The rationale for the distinction is that admitting to owning property would require two Rabbinical allowances - one for the kinyan hoda’ah and a second for kinyan agav. A kinyan which is based on a combination of two Rabbinical allowances is weaker and perhaps would not work on a Biblical level.

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Is a Coin a Utensil?

It was stated: Rav and Levi have the following dispute. One of them holds that a coin can be used to effect an acquisition of chalifin (the buyer gives the seller something as a token exchange to settle the transaction), and the other one says that a coin cannot be used to effect an acquisition of chalifin.

Rav Pappa explains: A coin cannot be used as chalifin for the seller focuses on the figure which is stamped on the coin, and that figure may eventually become outdated (by the government; it is therefore not regarded as “whole,” and it is different from a “shoe,” which is the torah’s model of a utensil used for chalifin).

Rashi writes that both opinions hold that one does not need to use a utensil in order to effect an acquisition of chalifin (unlike Rav Nachman), for a coin is not a utensil, and nevertheless, they argue if it may be used. And even according to the Amora who holds that it cannot be uses, maintains that way for a different reason altogether.

The Rishonim ask: How can it be that Rav Nachman (who holds that chalifin can only be accomplished with a utensil) disagrees with his predecessors (Rav and Levi)?

Tosfos answers that a coin can be regarded as a utensil, for it may be used as a weight for a scale. Alternatively, it can be used for a necklace for one’s daughter.

The Ritva writes that Rav Nachman does not require an actual utensil; as long as it is something that lasts – similar to a shoe. This would exclude produce. A coin, however, would be included.

The Rashba writes that Rav Nachman is only excluding things that are not similar at all to a shoe.

Tosfos cites an opinion who holds that a coin is a utensil, for it is used for purchasing items.

The Hagaos Mordechai answers that anything which is man-made is regarded as a utensil. This would exclude produce. A coin, however, would be included.

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B'kiyus or b'Iyun?

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The Mishna states: Gold can acquire silver, but silver cannot acquire gold.

The Pappa Rav opened the winter zman with the following thought: The Torah is likened to gold and to silver. It is compared to gold, as it is written [Tehillim 19:11]: Torah is to be desired more than gold, even more than very fine gold. It is compared to silver, as it is written [Mishlei 2:4]: If you seek it like silver. It is also written [Tehillim 119:72]: The Torah of your mouth is better for me than thousands of gold and silver.

Now, one’s primary focus should be on learning in depth, using all his full capacity of his mind and thoughts. It is through this that a person will have the ability to negate evil thoughts that might enter his mind, for the nature of man is that he cannot concentrate on two different things at the same time. Accordingly, if one delves into the depths of the holy Torah, he will most certainly be protected from all which is evil This is when the Torah is likened to gold, for gold is untainted and pure.

However, it is impossible to consistently study on such a level, and one has an obligation to learn the entire breadth of the Torah. The Gemora in Shabbos (63a) teaches us that a man should study and subsequently understand (the understanding will come eventually). Studying Torah at a quicker pace is likened to silver, for although silver is also valuable, it is nevertheless less significant than gold.

This is what our Gemora meant when it stated that Rebbe in his youth taught that silver acquires gold, but when he was older, he taught that gold acquires silver. Initially he thought that one should diligently study at a swift pace in order that he should learn the entire Torah even if he will lack understanding. However, when he aged, he came to the realization that gold acquires silver, and one’s primary learning should be focused on the depths and understanding of Torah.

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A New Thief

Rabbah ruled: If someone stole a barrel of wine from his fellow and it was worth one zuz at the time it was stolen and four zuzim at the end (when it was destroyed), the halachah is as follows: If he broke the barrel or drank the wine, he would pay four (for up until the time of destruction, it belongs to the owner; the thief would have been obligated to return the barrel which was worth four zuzim; if he directly destroys it, he pays four). If it broke by itself, he pays one (for that is what it was worth at the time it was stolen).

The Ketzos Hachoshen explains that the reason he must pay four zuzim when he breaks it or drinks it is because he is regarded as a damager, and he pays for the object’s value at the time of the damage. It cannot be considered stealing at that time, for once an object has left the possession of the owner and enters the thief’s domain, there can be no more responsibility for stealing. This is because it is written: and it was stolen from the owner’s house. The Gemora learns from there that something cannot be stolen if it is in the house of the thief. Here, where, at the time it was damaged, it was in the thief’s domain, there cannot be a new “stealing.” This would be similar to one who steals from a thief, where the halachah is that the second thief is exempt from paying the principle. Therefore, in our case, when the thief breaks it or drinks it, he can only be liable for damaging it, not for stealing it.

The Nesivos Hamishpat disagrees and holds that while it is true that one who steals from a thief is exempt from paying the principle and he is not regarded as a thief, that is only when he did not add anything to the original thievery. This is why the second person cannot be regarded as a thief. However, if he caused a change to the stolen object, he has added to the thievery and can now also be regarded as a thief. Therefore, when the thief breaks it or drinks it, he has added to the original stealing by the fact that he has destroyed the object. He is therefore responsible on account of stealing.

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