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Daily Daf Dose
Rabbi Elozar’s Reasoning
The Mishna had stated: If they were married by yibum, and the yevamim died, they are prohibited from marrying (any stranger; though the evidence of each woman was valid to enable herself to be taken for yibum, it is not valid to exempt her sister-in-law- from the zikah-attachment, and the possibility that their absent yavam’s (the first husbands) were still alive must he taken into consideration). Rabbi Elozar says: Since they were permitted to the yevamim, they are permitted to any man.
Rava inquires: What is Rabbi Elozar’s reason? Is it because he is of the opinion that a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart? Or, is it because he maintains that she would not ruin herself (for the sake of ruining her counterpart)?
The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between the two reasons?
The Gemora answers: The practical difference between the two reasons would be if we would allow her co-wife to marry before herself. If it is granted that a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart, her co-wife may be permitted to marry even if she herself did not remarry. If, however, it be maintained that the reason is because she would not ruin herself, the co-wife would be permitted to marry only if she herself had married again, but if she herself did not remarry, her co-wife also would not be permitted to remarry.
The Gemora asks: So, what is his reason?
The Gemora says: Come and hear from our Mishna. Rabbi Elozar said: Since they were permitted to the yevamim, they are permitted to any man. Now, if it be granted that the reason is because she would not ruin herself, one can well see the reason why only when the one married again is the other permitted to remarry. If it be maintained, however, that the reason is because a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart, the co-wife should be permitted to marry again even if the co-wife did not remarry. Consequently it must be concluded that Rabbi Elozar's reason is because she herself had married again and she would not ruin herself!
The Gemora deflects this proof: Rabbi Elozar is not offering his own opinion in the Mishna, but rather, he was arguing even in accordance with the Rabbi’s opinion. This is what he was saying: According to me, a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart, and even if she herself did not remarry, the other may be allowed to marry again. According to your view (that a co-wife is disqualified to testify for her counterpart, even when the counterpart’s permit emerges incidentally), however, you must at least agree with me that where she herself remarried, the other also should be allowed to marry again, since she (the woman who testified) would naturally not ruin herself!
And would the Rabbis respond to this argument? She might be acting in the spirit of let me die with the Philistines (in order to inflict injury upon her counterpart, she is willing to ruin herself).
The Gemora attempts to resolve the inquiry from the following braisa: If a woman went with her husband overseas, and she came and said, “My husband died,” she may marry and she takes her kesuvah, but her co-wife is forbidden. Rabbi Elozar says: Since she is permitted to remarry, her co-wife may also remarry. (This proves that, on the evidence of a co-wife, her counterpart is always permitted to marry again whether the co-wife who gave the evidence did or did not herself marry again.)
The Gemora rejects the proof: The braisa should be emended to say the following: Rabbi Elozar says: Since she is permitted to remarry and she married, her co-wife may also remarry.
The Gemora asks: But let us be concerned that she may have returned from overseas with a letter of divorce and that the reason why she made her statement (that her husband was dead) is because it was her intention to ruin her co-wife (but she herself would not be ruined since she is in any case divorced from her husband)?
The Gemora answers: We are referring to a case where she married a Kohen (which she may not do if she was indeed divorced). (119b – 120a)
The Mishna had stated: If they were married by yibum, and the yevamim died, they are prohibited from marrying (any stranger; though the evidence of each woman was valid to enable herself to be taken for yibum, it is not valid to exempt her sister-in-law- from the zikah-attachment, and the possibility that their absent yavam’s (the first husbands) were still alive must he taken into consideration). Rabbi Elozar says: Since they were permitted to the yevamim, they are permitted to any man.
Rava inquires: What is Rabbi Elozar’s reason? Is it because he is of the opinion that a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart? Or, is it because he maintains that she would not ruin herself (for the sake of ruining her counterpart)?
The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between the two reasons?
The Gemora answers: The practical difference between the two reasons would be if we would allow her co-wife to marry before herself. If it is granted that a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart, her co-wife may be permitted to marry even if she herself did not remarry. If, however, it be maintained that the reason is because she would not ruin herself, the co-wife would be permitted to marry only if she herself had married again, but if she herself did not remarry, her co-wife also would not be permitted to remarry.
The Gemora asks: So, what is his reason?
The Gemora says: Come and hear from our Mishna. Rabbi Elozar said: Since they were permitted to the yevamim, they are permitted to any man. Now, if it be granted that the reason is because she would not ruin herself, one can well see the reason why only when the one married again is the other permitted to remarry. If it be maintained, however, that the reason is because a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart, the co-wife should be permitted to marry again even if the co-wife did not remarry. Consequently it must be concluded that Rabbi Elozar's reason is because she herself had married again and she would not ruin herself!
The Gemora deflects this proof: Rabbi Elozar is not offering his own opinion in the Mishna, but rather, he was arguing even in accordance with the Rabbi’s opinion. This is what he was saying: According to me, a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart, and even if she herself did not remarry, the other may be allowed to marry again. According to your view (that a co-wife is disqualified to testify for her counterpart, even when the counterpart’s permit emerges incidentally), however, you must at least agree with me that where she herself remarried, the other also should be allowed to marry again, since she (the woman who testified) would naturally not ruin herself!
And would the Rabbis respond to this argument? She might be acting in the spirit of let me die with the Philistines (in order to inflict injury upon her counterpart, she is willing to ruin herself).
The Gemora attempts to resolve the inquiry from the following braisa: If a woman went with her husband overseas, and she came and said, “My husband died,” she may marry and she takes her kesuvah, but her co-wife is forbidden. Rabbi Elozar says: Since she is permitted to remarry, her co-wife may also remarry. (This proves that, on the evidence of a co-wife, her counterpart is always permitted to marry again whether the co-wife who gave the evidence did or did not herself marry again.)
The Gemora rejects the proof: The braisa should be emended to say the following: Rabbi Elozar says: Since she is permitted to remarry and she married, her co-wife may also remarry.
The Gemora asks: But let us be concerned that she may have returned from overseas with a letter of divorce and that the reason why she made her statement (that her husband was dead) is because it was her intention to ruin her co-wife (but she herself would not be ruined since she is in any case divorced from her husband)?
The Gemora answers: We are referring to a case where she married a Kohen (which she may not do if she was indeed divorced). (119b – 120a)
Mishna
The Mishnayos from here until the end discuss the laws of testimony regarding death.
The Mishna states: One may only testify to the identity of a dead man on the basis of the face with the nose, even though there are identifying marks on his body and on his garments. One may not testify unless his soul has actually departed, and even if they saw him mortally wounded, or hanging from the gallows, or being devoured by a beast. One may testify only if he observed the corpse within three days of the man’s death. Rabbi Yehudah ben Bava says: Not every man, and not all places, and not all times are alike. (120a)
Gemora
The Rabbis taught in a braisa: Evidence of identification may be tendered if the witnesses see the corpse’s forehead without the form of his face or the form of his face without the forehead. Both together with the nose must be present.
The Gemora cites Scriptural proof for this.
The Gemora records a related incident: Abba bar Marta, who is known as Abba bar Manyumi, owed money to the people of the Exilarch's house. Taking some wax, he smeared it on a piece of rag and stuck it upon his forehead. He passed before them and they did not recognize him. (120a)
Identifying Marks
The Mishna had stated: One may only testify to the identity of a dead man on the basis of the face with the nose, even though there are identifying marks on his body and on his garments.
The Gemora asks: Does this imply that identification marks are not Biblically valid? A contradiction, certainly, may be pointed out from the following braisa: If he (an agent who was carrying a letter of divorce from a husband to his wife) found it tied to his bag, purse or a signet ring, or if it was found among his utensils, even after a long time, it is valid! (This is provided that he is able to identify the bag, or any of the other objects mentioned, as the original object to which the letter of divorce had been tied. Though the assumed validity of the document affects a Biblical law (permitting a married woman to marry a stranger) it is nevertheless permitted to rely upon the identification marks, contrary to the implication of our Mishna.)
Abaye responded: This is no difficulty. The braisa is reflecting the viewpoint of Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai while the Mishna is reflecting the opinion of the Rabbis. For it was taught in the following braisa: No evidence of identification by a mole (on the same limb where the husband had one) may he legally tendered. Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai says: Such evidence may be legally tendered. Do they not disagree regarding the following point; Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai is of the opinion that identification marks are Biblically valid, while the Rabbis hold that identification marks are only Rabbinically valid?
Rava objects to this explanation: All agree that identification marks are Biblically valid, but here they disagree regarding whether it is common for the same kind of mole to he found on persons of simultaneous birth (persons born at the same hour of the day are assumed to be physically and morally subject to the same planetary influences for good and for evil). The Rabbis hold that it is common for the same kind of mole to be found on persons of simultaneous birth, and Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai is of the opinion that it is not common for the same kind of mole to be found on persons of simultaneous birth (and therefore a mole could be used as an identifying mark).
Others explain Rava as follows: They argue whether a mole usually undergoes a change after one's death. The Rabbis are of the opinion that it usually undergoes a change after one's death and Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai is of the opinion that it does not usually undergo a change after one's death.
Others maintain that Rava said: All agree that identification marks are only Rabbinically valid, but here they argue whether a mole constitutes a distinct identification mark. Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai is of the opinion that it constitutes a distinct identification mark, and the Rabbis maintain that it does not constitute a distinct identification mark. (120a – 120b)
The Consideration for Borrowing
The Gemora asks: According to the version which Rava stated that everyone agrees that identification marks are Biblically valid, wasn’t the following taught in our Mishna: One may only testify to the identity of a dead man on the basis of the face with the nose, even though there are identifying marks on his body and on his garments?
The Gemora answers: As to the body, the marks indicated by the witnesses were only that the corpse was long or short (which cannot be regarded as reliable marks of identification) and as to one's garments, no reliability can be placed upon their identification since we are concerned that one man borrowed someone else’s clothing.
The Gemora asks: If, however, borrowing is to be taken into consideration, how could we allow the return of a lost donkey on one providing the identification marks of a saddle?
The Gemora answers: People do not borrow a saddle because it makes the back of the donkey sore (due to the incorrect size).
The Gemora asks: Where one found it tied to his bag, purse or a signet ring, or if it was found among his utensils, how do we allow its return?
The Gemora answers: As to a signet ring, one is afraid of forgery (and he will not lend it out). And as to one's bag and purse, people are superstitious and do not lend such objects.
Alternatively, you can answer the original question by saying that the identification marks of the garments mentioned in the Mishna is referring to their color, if they were white or red (many people wear garments of red and white, and the colors therefore, cannot be regarded as a reliable mark of identification). (120b)
Mortally Wounded
The Mishna had stated: One may not testify unless his soul has actually departed, and even if they saw him mortally wounded, or hanging from the gallows, or being devoured by a beast.
The Gemora states: This implies that a man whose arteries have been cut may live; but this is apparently inconsistent with the following Mishna: A person does not transmit corpse-tumah before his soul has departed, even though his arteries had been cut and even though he is in a dying condition. The Mishna seems to indicate that it is only tumah that he does not cause, but he certainly will not live in such a situation?
Abaye answered: This is no difficulty. Our Mishna represents the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar; the other Mishna follows the opinion of the Rabbis. For it was taught in the following braisa: Evidence may be legally tendered regarding the death of a person whose arteries were cut, but no such evidence may be tendered concerning one who was hung. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar said: No such evidence may be legally tendered even concerning one whose arteries were cut, because the wounds might be cauterized and the man may survive.
The Gemora asks: Can our Mishna be following the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar? But the latter part of our Mishna states: It once happened at Asya that a man was lowered into the sea and only his leg was brought up, and the Rabbis ruled: If the recovered leg contained the part above the knee, the man's wife may marry again, but if it contained only the part below the knee, she may not remarry (because a man may survive even in such circumstances; the drowning also cannot be regarded as a certainty since the waters may have thrown the body up on another shore where the man's life may have been saved)? (Now, if our Mishna represents the view of Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar, remarriage should be forbidden even in the case where the part above the knee was also torn away?)
The Gemora answers: Waters are different since they irritate the wound.
The Gemora asks: But, surely, Rabbah bar bar Chanah related: I myself have seen an Arab merchant who took hold of a sword and cut open the leg of his camel above his knee, but this did not cause it to cease its cry until it died?
Abaye replied: That camel was a weak animal.
Rava replied: Our Mishna is discussing a case where the person was wounded with a glowing hot knife, and this is in agreement with everyone (that he will not survive). (120b)
[END]
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