Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 55 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: Even though they said that a virgin collects two hundred and a widow a maneh, the husband may add even one hundred maneh. A woman who was widowed or divorced, either after marriage or after betrothal, is entitled to collect everything (the basic obligations of the kesuvah, plus any additions that the husband included). Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah ruled: Only a woman widowed or divorced after nisuin collects everything, but if it is only after her betrothal, a virgin collects only two hundred zuz and a widow only one maneh, for the husband wrote the addition for her with the sole objective of marrying her (and since he did not marry her, she may not claim it).

Rabbi Yehudah says: The husband may write for his wife a kesuvah of two hundred and she writes to him a receipt which states, “I received from you a hundred” (she is forfeiting a portion of the kesuvah), or he writes to a widow a kesuvah of one hundred and she writes to him a receipt which states, “I received from you fifty.” Rabbi Meir says: anyone who undertakes to give his virgin wife less than two hundred zuz or for his widow less than a maneh, it is regarded as if the husband is cohabiting promiscuously. (54b)

Embarrassing Someone Without Sufficient Resources

The Gemora asks: Isn’t it obvious that a husband may increase the amount of the kesuvah?

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that since there is a standard amount, one may not exceed that amount, for it would embarrass another man who cannot afford to increase the kesuvah amount. The Mishna teaches us that it is nevertheless permitted to increase the kesuvah amount. (54b)

The Addition is Part of the Kesuvah

The Gemora comments: By the fact that the Mishna said, “the husband may add,” and not that “the husband may write,” this would indicate that the extra amount becomes a part of the kesuvah. This would support that which Rabbi Avyu said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: Any kesuvah condition (including the extra amount) is deemed to be part of the kesuvah.

The Gemora states that there are many practical differences because of this. They are: 1) A woman who sells her kesuvah (since the addition is part of the kesuvah; that is sold as well although only “kesuvah” was mentioned when the transaction took place); 2) one who waives her right to her kesuvah; 3) a woman who rebels against her husband (by refusing conjugal rights or work; if, in consequence, reductions are made from her kesuvah, her additional amount, like her statutory kesuvah, is subject to these deductions); 4) a woman who impairs her kesuvah (by admitting that she had already been paid the additional amount of her kesuvah; in such a case, she cannot recover the balance of the kesuvah without taking an oath); 5) a woman who demands her kesuvah (she forfeits her right to support); 6) a woman who transgresses the Law of Moshe or traditional Jewish practice (she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah); 7) appreciation of the land (she does not collect from her husband’s property for any part of the kesuvah from land that improved after the husband’s death); 8) an oath (a woman must take an oath in respect of the additional amount of the kesuvah in all cases where she takes an oath in respect of her statutory kesuvah); 9) for shemitah (the additional amount of the kesuvah is like the statutory kesuvah, and it does not get cancelled by shemitah); 10) one who writes over all of his possessions to his sons (and he left a fraction of land for his wife; she loses her kesuvah and her additional amount also); 11) collecting from land; 12) collecting from inferior land; 13) as long as she is in her father’s house (she may claim her kesuvah within twenty-five years; there is no time limit in the case of a widow who remains in her husband's house); 14) the kesuvah for the male children. (54b – 55a)

Encumbered Property for the Kesuvah for Male Children

It was stated concerning the kesuvah for the male children: In Pumbedisa they said: It is not collected from sold or mortgaged property, for the Mishna said: The male children will inherit etc.; this indicates that they collect only from free property. In Masa Mechasya they said: It is collected from sold or mortgaged property, for the Mishna said: The male children will take etc.; this indicates that it is similar to collecting a debt which may be collected from sold or mortgaged property.

The halacha is that it is not collected from sold or mortgaged property. (55a)

Collecting Moveables with an Oath

Concerning moveable items that the husband designated for the wife as payment for her kesuvah and they are still intact after the husband dies, they all agree that the widow may collect them without taking an oath. (The necessity for a widow taking an oath is they we are concerned that the husband might have deposited a package of valuables with her in order for her to collect her kesuvah from without the burden of going to the heirs; in this case, the moveable items are the package, and we do not need to be concerned that there is a second package.) However, regarding the moveable items that are not intact (they were lost); in Pumbedisa they said: She may collect the kesuvah without taking an oath. In Masa Mechasya they said: She may collect it only with an oath.

The halacha is that she may collect it without taking an oath. (55a)

Designated Land and Defined only One Border

Concerning a case where the husband designated a parcel of land and defined its four borders, they all agree that the widow may collect them without taking an oath (since it is fairly evident that he did not deposit any other package with her). However, if he designated a land, but only defined one border; in Pumbedisa they said: She may collect the kesuvah without taking an oath. In Masa Mechasya they said: She may collect it only with an oath.

The halacha is that she may collect it without taking an oath. (55a)

Dying Man

Concerning a case where a person said to a witness, “Write and sign this transfer document and give it to him,” if the witness made a kinyan sudar (with a kerchief), they all agree that the witness does not have to ask the giver if he still wishes that the transfer should be recorded (based on the principle that when a transfer is done with a kinyan sudar, it can be assumed that the giver intends that the transfer should be recorded). However, if the witness did not make a kinyan; in Pumbedisa they said: it is still not necessary to ask the giver. In Masa Mechasya they said: We are required to ask the giver if he still wants the transfer to be recorded.

The halacha is that we require the witness to ask the giver if he still wants the transfer to be recorded. (55a)

Assumption

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah ruled: Only a woman widowed or divorced after nisuin collects everything, but if it is only after her betrothal, a virgin collects only two hundred zuz and a widow only one maneh, for the husband wrote the addition for her with the sole objective of marrying her (and since he did not marry her, she may not claim it).

It was stated: Rav and Rabbi Nosson disagree; one says that the halacha follows Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah and the other says that the halacha is not in accordance with his opinion.

The Gemora attempts to prove that Rabbi Nosson is the one who holds that the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah, for Rabbi Nosson goes according to one’s assumption (the husband wrote the addition for her with the sole objective of marrying her and since he did not marry her, she may not claim it). For Rabbi Nosson said that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in respect to a seriously ill person (who gave instructions for a get to be written for his wife; the document may be delivered to the woman, even though its delivery was not mentioned in the instructions, because it is assumed that the dying man intended it for this purpose in order that his wife should not fall for yibum) and in respect to terumas ma’aser of d’mai (the Rabbis considered produce from an am ha’aretz as possible tevel because some of them did not separate ma’aser; in this case, the ma’aser was separated, and then, the terumas ma’aser, which is a tenth from the ma’aser that goes to the kohen, fell back into the produce; since there was not enough produce remaining to nullify the terumas ma’aser, which has the same halachic status as terumah, the entire mixture become forbidden for consumption by a non-kohen; Rabbi Shimon Shezuri rules that we can ask the am ha’aretz if he indeed separated ma’aser initially, and if he answers in the affirmative, we may rely on him even during the weekdays; this is because most am ha’aratzim do separate ma’aser and in cases which involve a substantial loss, we believe them).

The Gemora asks: And doesn’t Rav also follow the principle of assumption? But we learned: If a dying man (whose verbal assignment is valid and requires no deed or formal acquisition, for the Rabbis were concerned that otherwise, his anxiety would speed up his death) distributed his estate and it was written in the document that a kinyan was performed; in the Beis Medrash of Rav, they said in Rav’s name that the dying man has given his gift a double force; that of the gift of a dying man and that of legal acquisition. Shmuel said: I don’t know how to judge this case.

The Gemora explains their respective opinions: Rav maintains that this gift has the advantage of being regarded as a legal acquisition, and even if he recovers from his illness, he will not be able to retract from the transfer. It is also regarded as a gift of a dying man and he would be able to transfer a loan over to another person (which cannot be accomplished through an ordinary kinyan).

Shmuel said that he does not know how to judge this case, for perhaps, he wished to effect this transfer only through the document, and a document will not be effective as a transfer of property after his death.

(In any event, it emerges that Rav also follows the principle of assumption, and therefore, there is no proof as to which of these Amoraim hold like Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah.)

Rather, the Gemora concludes, they both follow the principle of assumption. It is understandable for one of them to maintain that the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah. The other one may hold that there is an assumption in reverse as well. A man writes an additional amount in the kesuvah because he wishes that his wife will become more closely attached to him, and that has been accomplished already; therefore, the halacha can be not like Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah, but rather, according to the Tanna Kamma, who holds that she may collect the entire amount of the kesuvah even if she is widowed or divorced prior to the nisuin. (55a – 56a)

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