Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 59 - Highlights

Earnings

The Gemora asks (on Rav Ada who says that “mezonos” – “support” given by a husband gives him the right to his wife’s “mosar” – “extra money earned”) from a Beraisa. The Beraisa states that the mezonos of a husband gives him the right to the “masei yadayim” – “basic earnings” of his wife (not to the “mosar”).

The Gemora answers that the Beraisa is referring to the “mosar masei yadeha” – “extra earnings of his wife’s hands.”

The Gemora asks from another Beraisa. The Beraisa states that if he doesn’t give her a silver me’ah for needs, she gets to keep her earnings. The Gemora answers that this too refers to “mosar masei yadeha.”

The Gemora asks, but doesn’t this Beraisa continue by saying “and how much does she earn for him? The amount of five Sela’im in Yehuda (implying it is talking about basic earnings).”

The Gemora answers that this is what the continuation of the Beraisa means: How much is her basic earnings so that we should know what is extra? The amount of five Sela’im in Yehuda, which is the weight of ten Sela’im in the Galil.

Shmuel’s Halachic Ruling

Shmuel states that the halachah follows Rabbi Yochanan Ha’Sandlar (who stated on 58b that if a man is makdish his wife’s extra earnings the money does not become consecrated).

The Gemora asks: Did Shmuel really say this? The Mishna states that if a woman says that she forbids her husband to benefit from what she earns, her husband does not have to be “meifer” – “deny” the vow. The Mishna states that Rabbi Akiva says he should make sure to be meifer, as she might make more than her basic earnings (and that amount would be forbidden to him). Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri says that he should deny the vow, as he might end up divorcing her and would be unable to remarry, as her earnings would be forbidden to him. Shmuel ruled in this matter that the halachah is according to Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri! [This implies that a vow can be binding even when it is currently inapplicable, the opposite of Rabbi Yochanan Ha’Sandlar who says such a vow is void!]

The Gemora answers that when Shmuel said that the halachah was like Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri in the above case, he meant due to the extra earnings, not Rabbi Yochanan’s reasoning of the basic earnings.

The Gemora asks: In that case he should have clarified that he only rules like Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri regarding the extra earnings! Alternatively, he should have said merely that the halachah does not follow the Tanna Kama! Alternatively, he should have said the halachah follows Rabbi Akiva (who is only concerned about extra earnings in this case)!

Rav Yosef therefore gives a different answer. “Aren’t we discussing forbidding benefit? This type of law is different. Just as a person can forbid his friend’s fruits on himself, a person could similarly consecrate (forbidding from himself and dedicating to the Beis Hamikdosh) something which has not yet come to this world (and is currently inapplicable).”

The Comparison to a Field
Abaye said to him: It is understandable that someone can forbid his friend’s fruit upon himself, just as he has the rights to forbid his fruit from the other person. However, he should not be allowed to forbid fruit that has not yet come into existence on his friend just like he cannot forbid his friend’s fruits from being used by a third friend!

Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua therefore answers that the case (in the Mishna above) is where the woman said that her hands should be dedicated to the One Who made them. Being that her hands are in the world, it is not considered a thing that is not yet in existence.

The Gemora asks, just because she said this does the dedication work? Her hands are already indebted to her husband! The Gemora answers that the case is where she says this should take effect when she gets divorced.

The Gemora asks, is there such an effective dedication that although it does not take effect now it takes effect at a later date? Rabbi Ilai answers, why not? If someone says to his friend that the field I am now selling you should become consecrated when I buy it back from you, isn’t it valid?

Rabbi Yirmiyah asked him that the cases are incomparable. In the case of the field he currently has the ability to consecrate it. In the case of the woman, she has no ability to ensure she gets a divorce (it is up to the husband)! It is more like the case of a person who states that the field that I have already sold you should become consecrated when I buy it back from you, which is an invalid consecration.

Rav Papa told Rabbi Yirmiyah that his comparison is inaccurate. In Rabbi Yirmiyah’s case of the field, both the field and its fruit are currently in the hands of the future seller. In the case of the woman, at least her body (hands) are in her possession! It is therefore more accurately compared to a case where a person says to his friend that my field that you have as a security for a loan should become consecrated when I redeem it from you, which is valid.

Rav Shisha the son of Rav Idi told Rav Papa that his comparison was inaccurate. In Rav Papa’s case of the field the person had the ability all along to redeem the field (by paying back the loan)! In the case of a married woman she has no ability to obtain her divorce (it is up to the husband)! It more comparable to a case where a person says to his friend that this field that I have given you as a security for a ten-year period should become consecrated when I redeem it, which is valid.

Rav Ashi told Rav Shisha that his comparison was inaccurate. In Rav Shisha’s case of the field the person at least will have the full rights to redeem the field after ten years, whereas as a woman never has the ability to grant herself a divorce!

Rav Ashi therefore gave a different answer. “Aren’t we discussing forbidding benefit? Forbidding benefit is different, as they involve dedicating a physical body to consecrated (not just monetary value). This is like the statement of Rava in which Rava stated that consecrated, chametz (leaven on Pesach), and freeing slaves takes precedence over prior indebtedness.

The Gemora asks that if this is true, let her hands be consecrated now (during the marriage)! The Gemora answers that the sages strengthened the indebtedness of a wife to her husband in order that the consecrated should not work during the marriage.
Mishna
These are the types of work that a woman must do for her husband: she must grind flour, bake, clean clothes, cook, nurse her son, make her husband’s bed, and knit with wool. If she brings a maid into the marriage, she does not have to grind, bake, or clean clothes. If she brought two maids, she also does not have to nurse or cook. If she brings three maids she also does not have to make his bed or knit with wool. If she brings four maids she can just sit in her special silk canopy (see Bartenura). Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brings one hundred maids into the marriage, she can force her to knit, as her having nothing to do could lead to promiscuity. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if someone vows that his wife is forbidden to do work he should divorce her and give her a kesuvah, as having nothing to do can cause her to go crazy.

Working Women
The Gemora asks: Can it really be that she has to grind (the water causes the wheel to grind)? The Gemora answers that the Mishna means that she must busy herself with the grinding work (such as loading the grain and collecting the flour). Alternatively, the Gemora answers that it is referring to hand mill (where she indeed does the grinding).

The Gemora notes that our Mishna is apparently unlike Rabbi Chiya. Rabbi Chiya taught that a woman is for the purpose of beauty, and for the purpose of having children. Another teaching of Rabbi Chiya is that a woman’s purpose is to be adorned with jewelry. Rabbi Chiya also taught that if someone wants to make his wife shine, he should buy her linen garments. Someone who wants to make his daughter’s skin lighter should feed her young chicks and give her milk when she is close to becoming an adolescent.

The Gemora notes that our Mishna is apparently unlike Beis Shamai. The Beraisa states that if a woman vowed not to nurse her son, Beis Shamai says she should can take the nipple out of his mouth. Beis Hillel says she can be forced to nurse him. If she is divorced, she cannot be forced to nurse. However, if the baby only wants to nurse from her, he pays her and she is forced to nurse, as otherwise the baby’s life is in danger!

The Gemora answers that our Mishna could even be in accordance with Beis Shamai. The Beraisa is talking about a case where she made the vow (not to nurse) and he upheld the vow. Beis Shamai therefore says that he put his finger in between her teeth (to enable her to get away without nursing), while Beis Hillel says that she put her own finger in between her teeth (it was her fault she made the vow).

The Gemora asks: Let them argue about a regular case of kesuvah? [Why did they specifically argue about nursing?] Additionally, there is a separate Beraisa where Beis Shamai says that no woman has to nurse! The Gemora therefore concludes that our Mishna is indeed unlike Beis Shamai.

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