Daf Yomi - Yevamos 14 - Highlights

Rish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan: The Mishna in Megillah (2a) states: The Megillah is read on the eleventh, on the twelfth, on thirteenth, on the fourteenth and on fifteenth of Adar, not earlier than the eleventh and not later than the fifteenth. It is written [Devarim 14:1]: Lo sisgodedu, which teaches us that you should not form separate groups. Why did they allow five different days to read the Megillah; they should have established one day for everyone?

The Gemora interrupts this discussion: Doesn’t the verse Lo sisgodedu teach us the prohibition against wounding oneself while grieving for a dead person? The Gemora explains how both halachos are derived from this passuk.

Rabbi Yochanan responded to Rish Lakish with a question of his own: Why didn’t you ask from the Mishna in Pesachim (50a)? The Mishna states: A place where the custom was to do work on Erev Pesach until midday, one is permitted to do work; a place where the custom was not to do work on Erev Pesach until midday, one should not do work. Shouldn’t there be a concern here on account of forming two separate groups?

Rish Lakish replied: I was referring to cases which involve prohibitions and you are asking me form cases dependent on customs.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t engaging in labor on Erev Pesach a halachic dispute as well? The Mishna in Pesachim (55a) cites a disagreement between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel; Beis Shamai maintains that it is forbidden to do work and Beis Hillel allows it.

Rish Lakish answers: It does not appear like two separate groups because one who observes a person not working will say that he doesn’t have any work to do right now, but he will not think that it is based on his religious observance.

Rabbi Yochanan asked Rish Lakish from our Mishna: Beis Shamai permits the co-wives to the brothers, but Beis Hillel prohibits them. Shouldn’t this be a violation of this prohibition?

Rish Lakish answers: Beis Shamai did not follow their own opinion in practice. They did not allow the yavam to perform a yibum with the co-wife of an ervah.

Rabbi Yochanan maintains that Beis Shamai did follow their own opinion.

The Gemora cites a dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding this same issue. Rav said: Beis Shamai did not follow their own opinion in practice. Shmuel said: that Beis Shamai did follow their own opinion.

The Gemora asks: We have learned in the Gemora Eruvin (13a) that a heavenly voice declared that whenever Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel argue, the halacha follows Beis Hillel. What point in time were these Amoraim referring to when they argued if Beis Shamai acted according to their own opinion or not? If it was prior to the heavenly voice, why would Rav and Rish Lakish maintain that Beis Shamai did not practice according to their opinion? If it was after the heavenly voice, why would Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan state that Beis Shamai did follow their own opinion?

The Gemora presents two answers: Either they were referring to the time period prior to the heavenly voice and at that time; Beis Hillel had a clear majority. Rav and Rish Lakish maintain that Beis Shamai did not practice according to their opinion because the ruling followed Beis Hillel since they were in the majority. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan stated that Beis Shamai followed their own opinion because the academy of Bais Shammai were sharper in their studies, they were not required to follow the majority.

Alternatively, they were referring to the time period after the heavenly voice; Rav and Rish Lakish maintain that Beis Shamai did not practice according to their opinion because they were instructed to follow Beis Hillel (through the heavenly voice). The opinion that maintains that Beis Shamai did not practice like Beis Hillel followed the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua who held that one does not pay attention to the dictates of the Heavenly Voice. (13b – 14a)

The Gemora asks: How can Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan hold that Beis Shamai practiced in accordance with their own opinion; there is a prohibition of forming separate groups (lo sisgodedu)?

Abaye answers: There is only a concern for lo sisgodedu when there are two courts in one town, but when they are two courts in two different cities, we are not concerned.

Rava asked: But Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel were in the same town, as well, and yet they each followed their respective opinions.

Rava answers: The prohibition applies only when the court is divided, but regarding two courts in one city, when one follows Beis Shamai and the other follows Beis Hillel, we are not concerned. (14a)

The Gemora asks from the following braisa: Where Rabbi Eliezer resided, they would cut down trees on Shabbos to make the charcoal that was required for fashioning the circumcision knife made out of iron. Where Rabbi Yosi Haglili resided, they would eat the meat of fowl together with milk. Rabbi Yosi Haglili is of the opinion that although the Torah forbids one to eat meat and milk together, this prohibition only applies to eating the meat of any kosher domestic animal with milk. Eating the meat of fowl with milk, however, is permitted.

The Gemora infers from here that they did not practice like this in the locale of Rabbi Akiva since he disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer and maintains that any act of labor that could have been performed before Shabbos and was not performed does not override the injunction of performing labor on Shabbos. Shouldn’t this be a problem of lo sisgodedu?

The Gemora answers that we have already learned that two different locations are not subject to the prohibition of lo sisgodedu. (14a)

When Rabbi Abahu went to the area where Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi resided, he would move a lamp that had been extinguished on Shabbos. When Rabbi Abahu went to the area where Rabbi Yochanan resided, he did not move the lamp on Shabbos. Although Rabbi Abahu held like Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that one may move a lamp on Shabbos, Rabbi Abahu did not move the lamp out of respect for Rabbi Yochanan who held like Rabbi Yehudah that one may not move the lamp on Shabbos. (14a)

The Gemora cites our Mishna: Although Beis Hillel prohibits the co-wives and Beis Shamai permits them; these declared certain women ineligible to a kohen and these declared them eligible, Beis Shamai did not refrain from marrying women of Beis Hillel, nor Beis Hillel from Beis Shamai.

The Gemora asks: If Beis Shamai followed their own opinion, why didn’t they refrain from marrying into each other’s families?

The Gemora answers that they would keep records and inform each other if the woman under consideration was permitted for them or not.

The Gemora proves that they would inform each other of any halachic concerns that the other might encounter from the last part of our Mishna. The Mishna had stated: So, too, in regards to tumah and tahara, they did not refrain from lending each other utensils.

The Gemora asks: How could Beis Hillel borrow utensils from Beis Shamai; those utensils had a distinct possibility of being tamei according to Beis Hillel?

The Gemora answers: It was evident that they kept records and Beis Shamai would inform Beis Hillel of any potential problems. (14a – 14b)

The Gemora states that Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that a mamzer (an illegitimate child) can only descend from a union prohibited under penalty of death or kares. (14b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 12 - HASHEM PROTECTS THE FOOLS IS SMOKING INCLUDED?

The Gemora states: Three types of women are permitted to insert a wad into their bodies prior to engaging in marital relations in order to prevent conception. They are: A minor, a pregnant woman and a nursing woman. A minor is permitted because otherwise, she may become pregnant and die. A pregnant woman is permitted because otherwise, she might become pregnant again, and the second fetus will crush the first one. A nursing woman is permitted because otherwise, she might be compelled to wean her child, resulting in his death.

The braisa continues: What age minor are we referring to? We are concerned when the minor is between eleven and twelve years old. If she is younger or older than that, she is not permitted to cohabit in that manner; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

The Chachamim disagree with the entire ruling and state that these women should cohabit in the regular manner and Heaven will have compassion on them (becoming pregnant in these situations is highly unusual and therefore we prohibit them from utilizing and type of contraceptive measures) as it is written [Tehillim 116:6]: Hashem protects the fools.

Rabbi Winston (Rabbi Winston) discusses the statement of "G-d protects the fools." It is often used in situations of halachically- reasonable risk (Shabbos 129b; Yevamos 12b). For example, when many people do something that may be somewhat risky for one's health, but statistically, nothing has become conclusive, then halachically, one can continue to perform the act and not worry about the consequences. Even should there be some latent danger in the act, G-d will intercede on the person's behalf and protect the "fool."

For a long time, cigarette smoking fell into this category. Though the Torah is against all kinds of physical addiction for obvious reasons, as long as there wasn't conclusive proof that the risk factor wasn't as great as we now know it to be, and many people smoked without negative results, it remained halachically permissible to do so; G-d protects the fools.

However, cigarette smoking is now known to be the number one man-made killer of human beings, and this consciousness has made its way into the Torah world, albeit somewhat late. We are no longer "fools" with respect to the effects of cigarette smoking, and, the Poskim (those who decide Torah-law) have now posted signs asking those who still smoke to begin weaning themselves from doing so. For years already, however, they have forbid anyone to start smoking.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 12 - RELYING ON PIKUACH NEFESH L’CHATCHILAH

Reb Elchanon (Kovetz Hearos 23) discusses whether it is permitted for a person to put themselves into a situation where they will have to use the permissibility of pikuach nefesh (they are in mortal danger) to permit what otherwise would have been regarded as a prohibition.

Reb Avi Lebovitz (Hearos on the Daf/) explains Reb Elchonon: He proves from the Ba'al Hameor who forbids leaving on a ship within three days of Shabbos because it is likely that you will find yourself in a situation of pikuach nefesh and have to be desecrate the Shabbos, that it is only a Rabbinical prohibition, but not Biblical (if it would be an Biblical, it should not matter if it is within three days or more than three days). Once it is only a Rabbinical prohibition, we can permit it for shalom bayis purposes. Therefore, one would be allowed to have relations with a woman for whom it is dangerous to become pregnant, even though after relations she will use a 'moch' to prevent pregnancy (I am not sure about the statistical success rate associated with this form of birth control).

This explanation would be necessary if we learn the Gemora to be speaking about a moch (wad) after relations (Tosfos in the name of Rabbeinu Tam) and would be forbidden if not for pikuach nefesh. But, according to Tosfos who explains that these three women must use a moch, which implies that others also are allowed to because there is no prohibition for her to remove the shichvas zerah (semen) with a moch after engaging in relations, we don't need to come onto the permissibility of pikuach nefesh.

Reb Elchonon second guesses his proof, that perhaps there is a Biblical prohibition to put oneself into a situation where pikuach nefesh will have to override the prohibition and no proof can be brought from the Ba'al Hameor because he may hold that Shabbos specifically is "hutrah," (completely permitted) for pikuach nefesh (but other prohibitions which are only "dechuya," (overridden), there would be a Biblical prohibition to out rightly put oneself into a situation where they will have to rely on the license of pikuach nefesh.

At the end he cites a Magen Avrohom (O.C. 248) who questions whether one, who intentionally put themselves into a situation of pikuach nefesh should rely on it to override Shabbos. Reb Elchonon explains that by not relying on this permissibility, it comes out retroactively that he did not do a prohibition by placing himself in that situation. Reb Moshe has a teshuva where he adamantly disagrees and says that one must use the permissibility of pikuach nefesh to override Shabbos and save their life.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 12 - Highlights

Rav Lili bar Mammal said in the name of Mar Ukvah, who said in the name of Shmuel: The co-wife of a wife who refused the yavam is forbidden. (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively. Our Gemora follows the opinion cited later (107a) that a minor, whose husband had died childless, may refuse the yavam, as well, which retroactively nullifies the original brother’s marriage.)

The Gemora explains: Although the wife who refused the yavam is not prohibited to the other brothers, her co-wife is forbidden to the one who refused. This is because we are concerned that this co-wife might be confused with the co-wife of one’s own daughter who refused him. (12a)

Rav Assi rules: The co-wife of an aylonis (an adult woman who did not develop any signs of female puberty and is incapable of bearing children) is forbidden to be taken in yibum. It is written regarding yibum [Devarim 25:6]: It shall be the firstborn – if she can bear. This excludes an aylonis since she cannot bear children.

Rav Sheishes asks: The Mishna (31b) states: There were three brothers who were married to three unrelated women, and one of them, Reuven died. The second brother, Shimon married the yevamah by ma'amar (Biblically, the yavam cohabits with the yevamah, thus acquiring her. The Rabbis established ma’amar, the betrothal of a yevamah as a prelude to yibum.), and he died. Reuven’s original wife falls for yibum to the third remaining brother, Levi. Levi must perform chalitzah, but he cannot perform a yibum. This is derived from a Scriptural verse which states that a yevamah can be taken in yibum only if there was a zikah (an attachment on the account of yibum) from one brother; not when there is a zikah from two brothers. (The yevamah is doubly subject to yibum, on account of her Biblical marriage with Reuven and her Rabbinical marriage with Shimon.)

Rav Yosef said: This is a case where the co-wife of a paternal brother’s wife is exempt from yibum only because the wife fell to yibum and we do not find anything similar to this in the entire Torah. What is this coming to exclude? Is it not excluding the case of a co-wife of an aylonis that she will be permitted to the yavam? (These are both examples where a yevamah is forbidden because of her falling to yibum and not on account of being an ervah.)

The Gemora states that the inference is slightly different. It is excluding the case of a co-wife of an aylonis but the distinction between the two cases is as follows: The co-wife of the double widow requires a chalitzah, whereas the co-wife of an aylonis does not even require chalitzah. This is because an aylonis is Biblically prohibited, whereas the double widow is only Rabbinically prohibited. (12a)

Ravin said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The co-wife of a wife who refused the yavam, the co-wife of an aylonis and the co-wife of an illegally remarried divorcee are all permitted to the yavam. (12b)

Rav Bibi cites the following braisa in front of Rav Nachman: Three types of women are permitted to insert a wad into their bodies prior to engaging in marital relations in order to prevent conception. They are: A minor, a pregnant woman and a nursing woman. A minor is permitted because otherwise, she may become pregnant and die. A pregnant woman is permitted because otherwise, she might become pregnant again, and the second fetus will crush the first one. A nursing woman is permitted because otherwise, she might be compelled to wean her child, resulting in his death.

The braisa continues: What age minor are we referring to? We are concerned when the minor is between eleven and twelve years old. If she is younger or older than that, she is not permitted to cohabit in that manner; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Chachamim disagree with the entire ruling and state that these women should cohabit in the regular manner and Heaven will have compassion on them (becoming pregnant in these situations is highly unusual and therefore we prohibit them from utilizing and type of contraceptive measures) as it is written [Tehillim 116:6]: Hashem protects the fools.

The Gemora asks on our Mishna from the braisa: The braisa stated: A minor is permitted because otherwise, she may become pregnant and die. We can infer that a minor can become pregnant and not die. This would be inconsistent with our Mishna which stated that you cannot say of his mother-in-law or his mother-in-law's mother or his father-in-law's mother that they refused (since only a minor can refuse). Perhaps she is a minor and nevertheless, she can be a mother-in-law because it can happen that a minor will give birth and live?

The Gemora attempts to answer that a minor will certainly die if she becomes pregnant; however the Gemora proves from a different braisa that this cannot be correct.

Rav Safra answers that having children is similar to the signs of puberty. Just as a girl with two pubic hairs after twelve years old indicates that she is an adult, so too, conceiving a child at any age signifies that she is an adult. This is why the Mishna stated that a mother-in-law cannot refuse her husband any longer. Although a minor can give birth and survive, she cannot refuse her husband since she is regarded as an adult.

Rav Zevid answers: We assume that a woman who gives birth developed the signs of puberty. We cannot examine her for the two pubic hairs because there is a legitimate possibility that the hairs fell out due to the pains of childbirth. (12b – 13a)

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Finals Have Commenced - TODAY IS THE LAST DAY TO VOTE

IT'S DOWN TO THE WIRE IN A FEW CATEGORIES. YOU CAN MAKE THE DIFFERENCE - THANKS!!!!
Voting has commenced in the JIB Blog Awards. Daf Notes was nominated in three categories and on the account of our dedicated readers, we have reached the finals in all three categories. If you would like to vote for Daf Notes in the Best Torah Blog category, please CLICK HERE. If you want to vote in the Jewish Blog that has made the Greatest Contribution, please CLICK HERE. You can vote for the Best New Jewish Blog HERE. We thank you in advance and remind you that this is your way of assisting us accomplish our mission of enhancing the learning of Daf HaYomi with insights, highlights, comments, questions and responses. Thank you.

UPDATE: CLICK HERE AND YOU CAN SEE THE REAL TIME RESULTS. WE CAN USE YOUR ONE VOTE IN EACH OF THE THREE CATEGORIES. THANK YOU.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 11 - When The Maps of Countries Are Being Redrawn -- Hold Your Breath! - Scriptural verses do not leave their simple interpretation

Rabbi Frand on Parshas Ha'azinu

Scriptural verses do not leave their simple interpretation

When The Maps of Countries Are Being Redrawn -- Hold Your Breath!

The Torah states "Remember the days of old, understand the years of generation and generation. Ask your father and he will relate it to you, your elders and they will tell you." [Devorim 32:7]. Rash"i does not explain this pasuk [verse] according to the simple reading. Rather, Rash"i explains the pasuk as a warning: "Look at what happened to other people who came before you, when they angered Me." "Understand the years of generation _after_ generation" refers to the era of Enosh upon whom HaShem [G-d] poured forth the waters of the Ocean and to the era of the (people of the) Flood, whom HaShem washed away.

The next pasuk continues, "When the Supreme One distributed to nations their portions, when He separated the children of man, He set the borders of nations according to the number of the Children of Israel." [32:8]. Rash"i similarly interprets this pasuk: "when He separated the children of man" refers to the Dor Haflaga [Generation of the Dispersion]. This is what happens to those who anger HaShem.

However, we have a long-standing tradition that "Scriptural verses [pasukim] do not leave their simple interpretation" [Shabbos 63a; Yevamos 11b; 24a]. Rash"i himself says in a number of places that even though at times he is providing a Midrashic interpretation, the simple interpretation of the pasuk remains. The simple interpretation of these pasukim is an admonition to us to understand history and learn its lessons.

The traditional Jewish belief is that HaShem is not only the Creator of Heaven and Earth, but that He is the G-d of history. The historical events that we witness are the means by which HaShem is continuously directing His world. Simply stated, these pasukim are teaching us that when HaShem establishes the boundaries of the world, it is ultimately because of the Children of Israel. The different wars and conflicts that take place in the world and the different border changes that occur -- according to the simple reading of our pasukim -- all occur because of their ultimate impact on the Jewish nation.

There is a quote from the writings of Rav Elchanon Wasserman (who himself was killed by the Nazis at the beginning of World War II): The Torah gave us a great key to understand the hinge upon which all historical events revolve -- Devorim 32:8 (the previously quoted pasuk). HaShem sets the borders of nations and causes nations to inherit for the sake of the Jews. History revolves around the Jews. "For Hashem's share is His people; Yaakov is the portion of His possession" [32:9].

Rav Elchanon continued (regarding the Peace Treaty ending World War I), "when the map of Europe was drawn up in Versailles, the borders were already set in Heaven". Sometimes it takes us years, decades, or centuries to put the pieces together. Sometimes, in the interval, the activities seem to have nothing to do with the Jewish people. But the great lesson of history that we are taught in the opening pasukim of this week's parsha is that when HaShem sets up the borders of nations, it is for the sake of the Children of Israel.

I recently read (1993) that the people in MacMillan and Company -- the mapmakers -- are having a very hard time these days. We think that we have hard jobs! -- Imagine the job of mapmakers! -- It has been a very difficult couple of years for them. They had just finished their latest edition of the Atlas, in which they printed East Germany and West Germany. Bonn and Berlin were the respective capitals. All of a sudden, they had to reprint the map. OK, done. Now they think that now they are set. Then, all of a sudden, Yugoslavia divides -- Serbia, Croatia, we can not even pronounce all these names! When we are talking maps or when we discuss borders -- ultimately we are talking Klal Yisroel.

One does not have to be a politically astute individual to realize the momentousness of the breakup of the Soviet Union. The mapmakers do not know from day to day whether they should draw 15 republics or 12 republics. We ask ourselves what difference does it make if Azerbaijan decides to become independent or not. What is the meaning of all these changes?

This is the lesson of history that we should never forget. These events -- the placement of national boundaries -- have an impact on Klal Yisroel.

At the beginning of World War I, the Ottoman Empire chose the wrong side and allied themselves with the Germans. At that time, one would have had to be exceedingly insightful to have realized that this decision would have a major impact on Jewish history in the twentieth century. Our tendency would have been to think, "Who cares? What's the difference?" But that single event -- coupled with the fact that there was this little country called "Palestine" under the rule of the Ottoman Turks -- had major ramifications.

When Germany (and the Ottoman Empire) eventually lost World War I; their empires were disassembled. Part of the price that the Ottoman Empire paid for "picking the wrong horse" was that they lost their empire. Their little protectorate called "Palestine" became the British Mandate of Palestine. Not long after that there was a proclamation called the Balfour Declaration. Who would have thought that the Ottoman Turk's poor decision would lead toward the Jews attaining an independent homeland in the Land of Israel?

When we see maps changing -- we need to hold our breaths. This has to do with us. Somehow or another, we will be in the center of this. Sometimes it is for our benefit. Sometimes, G-d forbid, it is to our detriment. But we are always on center stage because "Yaakov chevel nachalos" [Jacob is the portion of His possession]. We are the protectorate of the Master of the Universe.

Rabbi Frand @ Torah.org

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 11 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a dispute between Rav Acha and Ravina: If one of the brothers performs a yibum and another brother lives with her co-wife; one of them maintains that he is liable to kares and the other one holds that he is transgressing a positive commandment.

The Gemora explains: The one who maintains that he is liable to kares follows the opinion of Rish Lakish (who holds that the brother who performed the yibum is acting for himself and he is subject to the prohibition of not building two houses, but the other brothers are still subject to the prohibition of their brother’s wife). The one who holds that the brother has transgressed a positive commandment is in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan (who maintains that all the brothers are subject to a mere positive prohibition and not the kares prohibition of their brother’s wife since the brother who performed the yibum or chalitzah acted as an agent for all the brothers). (11a)

Rav Yehudah says in the name of Rav: The co-wife of a sotah, an adulteress (witnesses testified that she committed adultery) is forbidden to the yavam and is therefore exempt from chalitzah. (The sotah herself is also forbidden to the yavam.) He explains: The term tumah, defilement is mentioned in regards to the sotah just as it is mentioned by arayos. Just as an ervah is exempt from chalitzah and yibum, so too, a sotah and her co-wife are exempt from chalitzah and yibum.

The Gemora distinguishes between a sotah under Biblical law and one that is regarded as a sotah under Rabbinical law. (A man went overseas and a witness testified that he had died. The woman married another man and subsequently, the husband returned. The Rabbis regarded her as an adulteress because she did not investigate the matter thoroughly (although she was permitted to marry based on the testimony) and decreed that she is forbidden to return to her initial husband.) The Mishna later ruled that a woman who is regarded as a sotah under Rabbinical law must have chalitzah and her co-wife could be taken in yibum or chalitzah.

The Gemora makes a distinction between a woman who is a confirmed sotah and one who is an uncertain sotah (she had secluded herself with another man, but we have not ascertained if she had been defiled). If the husband of the uncertain sotah would die childless (prior to resolving the situation through the drinking of the bitter waters), she would be subject to chalitzah. The Gemora explains the distinction: The term tumah is only mentioned in reference to a confirmed sotah and not in regards to an uncertain sotah. (11a – 11b)

Rav Yehudah inquired of Rav Sheishes: If a person remarries his divorcee unlawfully after she had been married to another man, and he then dies childless, what is the law regarding this woman’s co-wife? Can the brother perform a yibum with her or not?

The Gemora elaborates: According to Rabbi Yosi the son of Keifar, there is no inquiry at all. He maintains that the term tumah is used in reference to the remarried divorcee, and therefore the halacha would be that she and her co-wife are exempt from yibum.

The inquiry would only be applicable according to the Chachamim who maintain that the term tumah written in the Torah portion regarding the remarried divorcee is referring to a sotah. Do we say that the verse never departs from its literal meaning and since the term tumah is written in the Torah portion regarding the remarried divorcee, she and her co-wife will be excluded from the yibum obligation? Or perhaps, since we expound the term tumah to be referring to a sotah and not to the remarried divorcee, she is not regarded as an ervah and her co-wife is available to be taken for yibum?

The Gemora presents an alternative explanation for this inquiry: According to the Chachamim, there is no inquiry at all. They maintain that the term tumah written in the Torah portion regarding the remarried divorcee is referring to a sotah and not to the remarried divorcee, she is not regarded as an ervah and her co-wife is available to be taken for yibum.

The inquiry would only be applicable according to
Rabbi Yosi the son of Keifar, who maintains that the term tumah is used in reference to the remarried divorcee. Do we say that although the term tumah is used in reference to the remarried divorcee, there is another verse which indicates that she is an abomination, but not the co-wife? Or perhaps, the verse is teaching us that she is an abomination, but her children are not (the co-wife would thus be eligible for yibum)? (11b)

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said: Rabbi Yochanan inquired as follows: If a person remarries his divorcee unlawfully after she had been married to another man, and he then dies childless, what is the law regarding this woman’s co-wife? Can the brother perform a yibum with her or not?

Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Yochanan: Why don’t you inquire regarding the woman herself?

Rabbi Yochanan replied: Regarding the remarried divorcee, I do not inquire at all. She cannot be taken for yibum on account of the following kal vachomer: If to the one she was permitted to initially (her husband), she became forbidden (after her marriage to another man), certainly in regards to the man that she was always forbidden to (her husband’s brother), she should be forbidden. The inquiry is only regarding her co-wife. Is the kal vachomer strong enough to exempt the co-wife from yibum?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak learned as follows: Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said: Rabbi Yochanan inquired: If a person remarries his divorcee unlawfully after she had been married to another man, and he then dies childless, what is the law regarding this woman? Can the brother perform a yibum with her or not?

Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Yochanan: Why don’t you inquire regarding the co-wife?

Rabbi Yochanan replied: The co-wife can certainly be taken for yibum since the kal vachomer is not strong enough to exclude her; the inquiry is only regarding the remarried divorcee herself.

The Gemora cites various braisos attempting to resolve these inquiries. (11b – 12a)

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THE STATUS OF THE WIVES AFTER ONE OF THEM PERFORMS CHALITZAH presented by: Kollel Iyun HaDaf

Kollel Iyun HaDaf

QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the status of the surviving brothers and the wives (Tzaros) of the deceased brother after Chalitzah is performed by one of the brothers with one of the Tzaros. Reish Lakish maintains that all of the brothers are prohibited to all of the Tzaros with an Isur Kares (the Isur of "Eshes Ach"), with the exception of the brother and the woman who did Chalitzah, who are prohibited to each other only with a Lav (the Isur of "Lo Yivneh"). Rebbi Yochanan maintains that they are all prohibited to each other with only a Lav and not with Kares.

The Gemara explains Rebbi Yochanan's reasoning. It does not make sense that one brother (the one who did Chalitzah) should be prohibited to the woman with only a Lav while the other brothers are prohibited to her with an Isur Kares, since they were all equally entitled to do Chalitzah. Rather, the brother who did Chalitzah acted as a Shali'ach on behalf of all the other brothers, and the woman who did Chalitzah acted as a Shali'ach on behalf of all the Tzaros.

It is clear that Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the Isur Kares of "Eshes Ach" disappears completely in a situation of Yibum, when one brother dies and his wives fall to Yibum (or Chalitzah) to the other brothers. According to Rebbi Yochanan, at exactly what point does the Isur Kares of "Eshes Ach" of all the wives disappear? Is it removed as soon as the brother dies or only when a surviving brother performs Chalitzah? The words of the Gemara provide apparently conflicting implications.

The first part of Rebbi Yochanan's reasoning (that the Isur Kares should be removed from all of the brothers because initially any one of them could do Chalitzah or Yibum) implies that even before any brother performs Chalitzah, the Isur Kares is removed. On the other hand, the second part of his reasoning (that the Yavam and Yevamah who perform Chalitzah (or Yibum) act as Shelichim for the others) implies that it is the act of Chalitzah which removes the Isur Kares, and until that act is done the Isur remains in force.

ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS (10b, DH Ihu) implies that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" remains in force until Chalitzah is performed, at which time the act of Chalitzah removes the prohibition. Rebbi Yochanan -- who says that when the wife falls to Yibum any brother may perform Chalitzah -- does not mean that there is no prohibition of "Eshes Ach," but rather that it is logical that the Torah would not give a Mitzvah to the brothers from which they could excuse themselves and pass on to another brother. Rather, the brothers never actually remove themselves from the obligation. Whichever brother performs Chalitzah (or Yibum) does so on behalf of all of the other brothers.

This also seems to be the opinion of RASHI (52a, DH Nasan), who calls the Yevamah an "Eshes Ach" even during the period of Zikah.

Support for this approach may be adduced from the opinion of Aba Shaul (39b). Aba Shaul disagrees with the Rabanan and maintains that performing Chalitzah is preferable over performing Yibum, because one who performs Yibum with impure intentions "is considered as though he lives with an Ervah, and the child is virtually a Mamzer." If the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed at the time the woman falls to Yibum and before Yibum is done, there should be no prohibition of Ervah whatsoever and no reason to say that the child is close to being a Mamzer. (See also Insights to Yevamos 7:1:b.)

(b) However, the RASHBA (41a, end of DH Shomeres Yavam) writes that Rebbi Yochanan's statement, "If this [brother] wants to do Chalitzah, then he may do it, and if this one wants to do Chalitzah, then he may do it," implies that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" actually falls away as soon as the brothers become permitted to perform Yibum.

According to the Rashba, why does Rebbi Yochanan add that the brother acts as a Shali'ach on behalf of the other brothers? Even if he does not perform Chalitzah or Yibum on their behalf, the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" has already been removed from them!

Moreover, how does the Rashba understand the opinion of Reish Lakish who says that all of the other brothers are prohibited to the woman with an Isur Kares when one brother performs Yibum with her? The Rashba cannot explain that the Isur Kares falls away and then returns to the other brothers when one brother performs Yibum, because the Rashba himself asserts that once the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed it cannot return.

The Acharonim offer two approaches to answer these questions. The simple approach is that the reason why Rebbi Yochanan says that one brother acts as a Shali'ach for the others is not to explain why the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed (because it is not removed when the brother performs Yibum, but earlier, at the time the woman falls to Yibum). Rather, when Rebbi Yochanan says that one brother acts as a Shali'ach for the others his intent is to explain why the prohibition of "Lo Yivneh" takes effect for the other brothers. Although the verse implies that the prohibition of "Lo Yivneh" applies only to the brother who performed Chalitzah (and prohibits him from attempting to "rebuild" his brother's family), Rebbi Yochanan says that the prohibition of "Lo Yivneh" applies to all of the brothers (and Tzaros) because of the Shelichus. (This approach is difficult to read into the words of the Gemara.)

How does the Rashba understand the opinion of Reish Lakish? The Rashba apparently understands that Reish Lakish indeed maintains that the prohibition of "Eshes Ish" could return even if it was removed at the time the Yevamah fell to Yibum. Therefore, when one brother performs Chalitzah or Yibum, the prohibition returns to the other brothers. (This also appears to be the intention of the Rashba to 44a, DH v'Nachlotz, as printed in the Mosad ha'Rav Kook edition.)

A second approach is suggested by RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN Hy'd in KOVETZ HE'OROS (4:9 and 1:7). From various sources it seems that when one brother performs Yibum or Chalitzah, his act determines retroactively that the other brothers were not involved with the Zikah at all (see Insights to Yevamos 18:1, 24:1, and Imrei Moshe, end of #5). Perhaps this is Reish Lakish's intention when he says that the other brothers are prohibited to the Yevamah with an Isur Kares. Once one brother has performed Yibum, it becomes determined retroactively that he was the only one who was permitted to her. To which brother the Heter applies becomes known only after the Heter is actually utilized by one of the brothers.

Rebbi Yochanan also agrees that, in theory, the Zikah would be retroactively removed from any brothers and Tzaros not involved in the Chalitzah. However, he maintains that because of the Shelichus, they are all considered to be involved in the Zikah even retroactively, and thus the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed from all of them. (According to the proposal that Rebbi Yochanan agrees that Zikah can be removed retroactively, it is not clear what he tries to prove from the words, "If this [brother] wants to do Chalitzah, then he may do it." How does Rebbi Yochanan prove from those words that the Zikah applies retroactively to all of them? Also, the Rashba clearly states that even when one brother can no longer do Yibum, the Yevamah is still permitted to him. This is contrary to the logic which Rav Elchanan applies to Reish Lakish's opinion.)

Another problem with the opinion of the Rashba is why the Gemara needs a verse to prove that the brother may remarry the Yevamah (with whom Yibum has been performed) after he divorced her (8b). His allowance to remarry her should be obvious if the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" can never return to the Yavam. Perhaps the Rashba maintains that it is only after the above verse is expounded that the Gemara understands that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed permanently once the Yevamah falls to Yibum.

Another possible explanation is that the Rashba accedes that after Yibum (or Chalitzah) is performed, the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" can return. Since the prohibition can return, a verse is necessary to teach that the Yavam may remarry the Yevamah (with whom Yibum was performed) after he divorced her. If this indeed is the view of the Rashba, it also explains why Reish Lakish can posit that the brothers become prohibited to the Yevamah with an Isur Kares, and why Rebbi Yochanan needs to introduce the concept of Shelichus.

As for how the Rashba adduces support for his opinion from the Gemara, perhaps he merely intends to show that there is a logical reason to assume that once the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed, it remains permitted as long as possible (until Yibum according to Reish Lakish, and even after Yibum according to Rebbi Yochanan).

How does the Rashba understand Aba Shaul's statement (that it is better to do Chalitzah than Yibum because Yibum with impure intentions "is considered as though he lives with an Ervah")? The Kovetz He'oros explains that either the Rashba discusses only the opinion of the Rabanan, or he understands that Aba Shaul's statement expresses only a Halachah d'Rabanan and not a Halachah d'Oraisa.

In conclusion, there is a basic difference in understanding among the Rishonim with regard to whether the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed at the moment the woman falls to Yibum (RASHI and TOSFOS) or whether it is removed only at the time of Chalitzah or Yibum (RASHBA). (See also Insights to Yevamos 20:2 and 20:3.)

This dispute may have other Halachic implications. For example, the Gemara (54a) states that if the Yavam unknowingly has relations -- before he has performed Yibum -- with his deceased brother's wife (for example, he was asleep during the act), no Kinyan takes effect. According to Rashi and Tosfos, she should become disqualified from eating Terumah since she has had a forbidden relationship with an Ervah. According to the Rashba, the act was not forbidden at all, and thus she should remain permitted to eat Terumah and to marry a Kohen. (See, however, Insights to Yevamos 35:2.)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 10 - Highlights (there's always more by the "click more")

Rav Adda Karchina said in front of Rav Kahana, in the name of Rava: Rebbe in fact agrees with Rabbi Chiya’s rules, but this is what he answered Levi: Regarding the case where one’s mother was violated by his father will only be in accordance with one of Rabbi Chiya’s rules, but not both.

The Gemora explains: If the father violated two sisters and had two sons. His two other sons married the two women who were violated by the father. Subsequently, they died childless and the two sisters fall for yibum to their sons. Each one of the women is a sister to a yevamah, but we cannot say that one who is forbidden to one brother will be permitted to the other brother because they are both prohibited to each of the brothers. One woman is the mother of the brother and the other woman is his aunt.

If the father violated two women who are unrelated to each other, we can say that one who is forbidden to one brother will be permitted to the other brother, but we cannot say that they are sisters of a yevamah. (10a)

Rav Ashi offers an alternative answer: The Mishna is following the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that a man is forbidden from marrying a woman who has been violated by his father; hence, this case is not possible.

Ravina asked Rav Ashi: Perhaps the Mishna is referring to a case where the brother transgressed and married the woman who was violated by his father; he then died childless. His widow is falling for yibum to her son. Why didn’t the Mishna include this case?

Rav Ashi responded: The Mishna does not want to discuss a case which can only occur “if” there is an illegal marriage.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: The Mishna can state a case even without the brother marrying his wife illegally. The case is: Yaakov violated his daughter-in-law, the wife of Reuven and had a son. Reuven dies childless and his wife falls for yibum to Reuven’s brothers; they cannot perform a yibum with her because she is their father’s violated woman.

Rav Kahana replied: The Mishna does not want to deal with cases that involve a prohibition.

Although Rebbe rebuked Levi’s question, Levi nevertheless included this case in his collection of braisos. (10a – 10b)

Rish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan: According to Levi, who includes in the Mishna cases where the brother had married his wife illegally, let the Mishna teach the following case: A man performed a chalitzah with his yevamah and then married her (this is prohibited) and then died childless. The yevamah will be forbidden to the brothers on account of her being the original brother’s wife. She is an ervah, subject to the penalty of kares and shall thus exempt her co-wife, as well.

Rabbi Yochanan answered: This case is not mentioned because this yevamah would not be included in the case of a co-wife’s co-wife (since she is forbidden to each of the brothers).

Rish Lakish could have answered that the yevamah is only forbidden to the brothers by a mere negative commandment (unlike Rabbi Yochanan, who maintains that she is subject to the penalty of kares) and thus would be eligible for chalitzah and yibum. (10b)

The Gemora presents the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish. A man performed a chalitzah with his yevamah and then married her; Rish Lakish said that he is not liable for kares for marrying the chalutzah (the one with whom the chalitzah was performed), but the brothers will be liable to kares for taking her. He (the one who performed the chalitzah) and his brothers will be liable to kares for taking the co-wife. Rabbi Yochanan says: Both he and the brothers will not be liable to kares for taking the chalutzah or her co-wife.

The Gemora cites the sources for their respective opinions. (10b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 9 - SHAMING A STUDENT

Levi asked of Rebbe: Why did the Mishna list only fifteen cases of women who exempt themselves and their co-wives from yibum and chalitzah; the Mishna should have listed sixteen? Rebbe said: It would seem to me that he doesn’t have any brains in his head.

The commentators ask: How could Rebbe talk to Levi in such a demeaning way? Doesn’t it say in Koheles [9:17]: The words of the wise are heard when spoken softly, more than the shout of a ruler of fools? The Mishna in Pirkei Avos [2:10] says: Rabbi Eliezer said: Let the honor of your fellow be as precious to you as your own. Why did Rebbe degrade Levi in such a manner?

The Chavos Yair (152) answers: Levi was the student of Rebbe and since Rebbe understood that Levi was a tremendous Torah scholar, it wasn’t possible for him to err unless he did not thoroughly examine the matter prior to his question. Rebbe did not talk this way out of anger or haughtiness; as a matter of fact, the Gemora in Sotah (49a) states that when Rebbe died, humbleness was lost. Rebbe was instructing his student Levi that one must always scrutinize all relative material on any subject before openly discussing it.

This is the source for the following Rambam in Hilchos Talmud Torah (4:5) and cited in Shulchan Aruch (Y”D 246:11) as well (Torah.org): The student should not be embarrassed because his peers grasped [the lesson] after one or two times and he learned it only after many times. If he is embarrassed from this matter, he will end up coming in and going out of the Beit Midrash without learning anything. Therefore, the early sages said: "The shy one does not learn and the short-tempered one cannot teach" (Avot 2:5). When does this apply? If they didn't understand because of the depth of the Halakha or their limited abilities. However, if it became apparent to the teacher that they were not applying themselves to the words of Torah and were being lax about them - and therefore, they did not understand - , he is obligated to become angry with them and to shame them with words in order to sharpen them. In this context, the sages said: "Cast fear into the students." (BT Ketubot 103b).

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 9 - Highlights

Levi asked of Rebbe: Why did the Mishna list only fifteen cases of women who exempt themselves and their co-wives from yibum and chalitzah; the Mishna should have listed sixteen? Rebbe said: It would seem to me that he doesn’t have any brains in his head.

The Gemora explains Rebbe’s reaction: Which case should the Tanna have included; a man’s mother who has been violated by his father? This case is not possible according to Rabbi Yehudah who maintains that a man cannot marry a woman whom his father violated and therefore a woman cannot fall for yibum to her son. The Mishna does not list cases that involve a dispute.

The Gemora challenges the assertion that the Mishna does not discuss cases that involve a dispute: Doesn’t the Mishna later (20a) discuss cases where a woman is prohibited by mitzvah (arayos that are Rabbinically forbidden) or because of sanctity (women that would violate his innate sanctity, they are not subject to the penalty of kares) and yet, Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis dispute the halacha in these cases?

The Gemora answers that Rebbe was only referring to the cases discussed in this chapter (the next perek, chapter does discuss disputed cases).

The Gemora asks: The Mishna cites the opinion of Beis Shammai, who maintain that the co-wives of the fifteen women mentioned in the Mishna are permitted for yibum?

The Gemora answers: The viewpoint of Beis Shammai when Beis Hillel disagrees is not regarded as an authoritative opinion.

The Gemora asks: Our Mishna mentioned a case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world (this brother and the yavam were not alive at the same time), and Rabbi Shimon and the Sages disagree (Rabbi Shimon maintains that she is eligible for yibum or chalitzah)?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Shimon agrees when the brother (Levi) was born first and then Shimon performed a yibum (on Penina).


Courtesy of http://chavruta.tripod.com/

In this case, Rabbi Shimon will agree that Levi will not be able to perform a yibum on Penina or Chana if Shimon subsequently dies. This is because Levi was alive when Reuven dies and he was forbidden to perform a yibum on Penina then because he was not alive together with Reuven. Once she is forbidden to him, she remains that way and the prohibition of his brother’s wife can never be lifted. (9a – 9b)


The Gemora persists in its questioning: Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav and it was taught in the braisa of Rabbi Chiya: The following teaching can apply to the fifteen cases of the Mishna: The one who is forbidden to one brother will be permitted to the other brother, and her sister, who is also a yevamah can do chalitzah or be taken in yibum.

The case is as follows: There were four brothers; two of them, Reuven and Shimon were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. If Reuven and Shimon died, the remaining two brothers (Levi and Yehudah) cannot perform a yibum with any of them because each one of these women is attached to every potential yavam with a zikah, an attachment on the account of yibum. The Rabbis decreed that one cannot marry the sister of a zekukah (the woman who is attached to the yavam) because a zekukah is similar to a wife and one is not permitted to marry his wife’s sister.

If Rochel was an ervah to Levi (his mother-in-law) and Leah was an ervah to Yehudah; Levi can perform yibum with Leah and Yehudah can perform yibum with Rochel. In this case, the sisters are not forbidden because there is only a zikah from one man to one woman (since an ervah removes the zikah).

According to Rav Yehuda, the Tanna of the Mishna (26a) can only be referring to the last nine arayos listed in the first Mishna, but not to the first six (such as his daughter). The reason is because those six cases cannot occur unless the daughter was born through the violation of her mother (If Levi and Yehudah’s daughters are sisters, they obviously have the same mother; Levi and Yehudah could not possibly marry the same woman); and the Mishna is discussing cases of marriage, not cases of violation.

Abaye states that the Mishna can be referring to the first six cases because the Mishna has no compunctions discussing cases of violation. It is not discussing the case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world because that would involve a disagreement (Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis) and the Mishna does not involve itself with disputed cases.

Rav Safra states that the Mishna can be discussing the case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, but only in the following scenario: There were six brothers all together. Originally, there were four, and two of them, Reuven and Shimon were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless and then a fifth brother, Yissochar was born. (Rochel is forbidden to Yissochar on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world.) Levi, the third brother, performed a yibum with Rochel and subsequently, Shimon died childless. (Yissochar can perform a yibum with Leah because he was alive together with Shimon.) A sixth brother, Zevulun was now born. (Rochel is not forbidden to Zevulun on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world because when he was born she was married to Levi. Leah is forbidden to Zevulun on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world.) Yehudah performed a yibum with Leah. Levi and Yehudah then died childless. The Rabbis maintain that each one is forbidden to the surviving brothers on the account of being the wife of their brother who was not in this world (because of the initial marriage). Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that the remaining brothers can perform yibum or chalitzah (he is concerned only with the last marriage).

The Gemora concludes its question: If this halacha is included in the Mishna, it is evident that the Tanna of the Mishna is discussing cases that involve a dispute.

The Gemora answers that Rebbe would understand the Mishna to be referring to a case where the brothers (Yissochar and Zevulun) were born before the other brothers (Levi and Yehudah) performed a yibum. Even Rabbi Shimon would agree in this case that they cannot perform a yibum. (9b – 10a)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 7 - IS IT PREFERABLE TO VIOLATE A TOLDAH RATHER THAN AN AV (FOR ONE WHO IS DEATHLY ILL)?

The Tchebeiner Gaon (Dovev Meisharim, 3:82) inquires as to what the halacha would be in the following case. We are permitted to desecrate Shabbos for one who is deathly ill. Is it preferable to perform a labor which is only a toldah, a derivative of the av melocha, the primary categories of labor forbidden to do on Shabbos; or perhaps, there is no halachic difference since both are Biblically forbidden?

He ruled on this issue and cited support from our Gemora. It was taught in a braisa: A metzora whose eighth day (of purification) fell on Erev Pesach, but on that day had an emission of semen (resulting in the fact that he now cannot enter the Temple Mount to complete his purification process), and then immersed himself, the Chachamim said that although an ordinary tevul yom (one who has immersed in a mikvah but still has tumah on him until nightfall) may not enter the Temple Mount until nightfall, this one may enter in order to complete his purification process, thus enabling him to bring his pesach offering. It is preferable for a positive commandment that involves kares (pesach obligation) to override a positive commandment that does not involve kares (entering the Temple Mount while being a tevul yom).

Rabbi Yochanan maintains that it is only Rabbinically forbidden for a tevul yom to enter the Temple Mount.

Ula said: Why do we allow this tevul yom to enter? He answers: Since we would allow an ordinary metzora to enter the Temple Mount in order to complete his purification process, we allow a metzora who has had an emission of semen to enter as well.

Tosfos asks: Ula maintains that a partial entry into an area which is forbidden to enter is regarded as a full entry. If so, why do we limit this metzora, who is a tevul yom to insert his right ear, thumb and big toe into the Temple Courtyard, let him be permitted to enter entirely? What would be the distinction?

Tosfos answers: Entering completely into the Courtyard is regarded as being more severe than a partial entry. The Torah forbids a tevul yom from entering completely into the Courtyard explicitly, but a partial entry is only derived through the means of a hekesh (a Midrashic juxtaposition). Although both prohibitions are Biblical, the one that is written explicitly is stricter than the one which is merely derived from an exposition.

It emerges from here that a Biblical prohibition written explicitly is more stringent than one which is only derived through an exposition. He therefore posits that it would be preferable to engage in the labor which would only be violating a toldah rather than one which would constitute an av melocha. This is because a toldah is not written explicitly in the Torah.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 7 - Highlights

Rav Simi bar Ashi said: The Tanna who used the verse to teach us that Beis Din may not perform an execution on Shabbos did not need the verse because otherwise we would have thought that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition even though it involves kares. Rather, the verse was necessary, for otherwise we would have derived that Beis Din can execute a capital offender on Shabbos through the means of the following kal vachomer: Avodah (service in the Beis Hamikdosh) overrides Shabbos (the kohanim may perform the service on Shabbos), nevertheless, execution overrides avodah (a kohen, who has committed murder and was sentenced to death, Beis Din sends agents to bring him to be executed even if he wishes to perform the avodah); Shabbos, which is overridden by the avodah, shouldn’t an execution certainly override it (Beis Din should be permitted to perform an execution on Shabbos). This is why the verse “in any of your dwellings” was necessary; teaching us the halacha that Beis Din may not perform the execution. (6b – 7a)

The Gemora concludes that there is no source to teach us that the positive commandment of yibum will override the kares prohibition of taking his wife’s sister; nevertheless the verse aleha is required to teach us that he may not.

The Gemora explains: (One of the thirteen principles of Biblical exegesis is as follows: Something that was included in the general rule, and departed from that rule to teach something new, did not depart to teach only about itself, but rather to teach about the entire general rule.)

The Gemora cites an example where this principle is applied. It is written [Vayikra 17:20]: A person who eats flesh from the shelamim offering while his tumah is upon him, that soul shall be cut off from its people. Shelamim did not have to be mentioned separately, since they are included in the general rule of sacred offerings; why then are they mentioned separately? It is to teach us that only sacrifices brought to the altar are included in this rule, however animals dedicated to the Temple upkeep are excluded, and they are not subject to the kares penalty if eaten in a state of tumah.

The Gemora now explains how this principle is relevant to yibum. The prohibition of taking a brother’s wife was included in the general prohibition of all arayos (forbidden relations), and it was singled out in regards to yibum. This teaches us that just as this prohibition is permitted for the sake of yibum, so too all other arayos will be permitted for the sake of yibum.

The Gemora objects to this comparison between the two cases: By the halachos of tumah, both the general rule (all sacrifices) and the one singled out (shelamim) are dealing with prohibitions; whereas here by yibum, the general rule (all arayos) is dealing with the prohibition and the one which is singled out (brother’s wife) is permitted. (7a)

The Gemora states that this (the permissibility of yibum to a brother’s wife) is compared to a different principle. (One of the thirteen principles of Biblical exegesis is as follows: Something that was included in the general rule, and departed to be treated as a new case; you cannot return it to its general rule unless the Torah returns it explicitly.)

The Gemora cites an example where this principle is applied. It is written regarding a metzora [Vayikra 14:13]: He shall slaughter the (asham) lamb in the place where one slaughters the chatas and the olah, in a holy place. For the asham is like the chatas, for the kohen. What is this verse coming to teach us? Was it not already stated regarding the law of the asham that it was required to be slaughtered in the north? The Gemora answers: Since this asham departed from other asham’s insofar as it requires the placing of its blood on the right thumb and big toe of the metzora, one might think that it should not require blood applications or the burning of its sacrificial parts on the altar. The Torah, therefore, says: For the asham is like the chatas, teaching us that just like a chatas requires blood applications and the burning of its sacrificial parts on the altar, so too, the metzora’s asham requires blood applications and the burning of its sacrificial parts on the altar.

The Gemora concludes: Here also, by yibum, all arayos were prohibited and a brother’s wife was excluded from the general rule and became permitted for the sake of yibum; only a brother’s wife should be permitted, but all other prohibitions should remain prohibited even in a case of yibum. Accordingly, why did the Torah require a verse prohibiting yibum with one’s wife’s sister? (7a – 7b)

The Gemora offers another reason why the verse aleha is required to teach us that he may not perform a yibum on his wife’s sister. Perhaps we would have made a comparison to a brother’s wife. Just like one can perform a yibum on his brother’s wife (even though, she should be forbidden, if not for the mitzvah of yibum), so too, one can perform a yibum on his wife’s sister.

The Gemora asks: How can the two cases be compared? By a regular case of yibum, there is only one prohibition, whereas here, there are two prohibitions?

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that once the prohibition of taking a brother’s wife has been lifted, so too, the prohibition of taking his wife’s sister should also be lifted. (7b)

The Gemora asks: How do you know that this (when one prohibition is lifted, so too, another one should also be lifted) is a valid principle?

The Gemora answers: It was taught in a braisa: A metzora whose eighth day (of purification) fell on Erev Pesach, but on that day had an emission of semen (resulting in the fact that he now cannot enter the Temple Mount to complete his purification process), and then immersed himself, the Chachamim said that although an ordinary tevul yom (one who has immersed in a mikvah but still has tumah on him until nightfall) may not enter the Temple Mount until nightfall, this one may enter in order to complete his purification process, thus enabling him to bring his pesach offering. It is preferable for a positive commandment that involves kares (pesach obligation) to override a positive commandment that does not involve kares (entering the Temple Mount while being a tevul yom).

Rabbi Yochanan maintains that it is only Rabbinically forbidden for a tevul yom to enter the Temple Mount.

Ula said: Why do we allow this tevul yom to enter? He answers: Since we would allow an ordinary metzora to enter the Temple Mount in order to complete his purification process, we allow a metzora who has had an emission of semen to enter as well.

This is used as support for our logic regarding yibum. We might have thought that once the prohibition of taking a brother’s wife has been lifted, so too, the prohibition of taking his wife’s sister should also be lifted. This is why the verse aleha is needed to teach us that one cannot perform a yibum with his wife’s sister. (7b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 6 - A TELEPHONE IS THE ANSWER

One might have thought that the mitzvah of honoring one’s father and mother overrides Shabbos (if a parent would instruct their son to violate the Shabbos, he would be obligated to listen); the Torah writes [Vayikra 19:3]: Every man: Your mother and father shall you revere, and My Shabbos’ shall you observe, I am HaShem your G-d. We infer from here: Everyone is obligated to honor HaShem, including the father and the mother. The Gemora assumes that the Torah is referring to a case where the parent said to his son, “Slaughter for me,” or Cook for me,” which is a kares prohibition. The reason he shouldn’t obey the father is because of the specific verse (mentioned above), but otherwise, the positive commandment of obeying one’s parent would override a prohibition, even one that consists of kares.

Tha Maharatz Chyus asks: Why should we think that the son is obligated to obey the father; the Gemora in Bava Metzia (62) teaches us that one is only obligated to honor his father if he is an “oseh ma’aseh amcha,” not if he is one that is not observing the mitzvos of HaShem?

The Ostroftzer Rebbe was once in Warsaw by one of his chasidim. The chasid proudly showed the Rebbe the new invention that was just installed in his house, a telephone.

The Rebbe took the telephone in his hands and 'sanctified' it with words of Torah.

He said: The Meiri in Yevamos asks: Why is a verse required to teach us that a son may not listen to his father when he instructs him to perform an aveira; the father is a rosha and the son is thus excluded from honoring him based on the Gemora in Bava Metzia that a father who is not "oseh ma'aseh amcha," one is not required to obey?

The Rebbe answered: It is referring to a case where the father calls the son on the telephone. The father is in one time zone, and it is already Motzei Shabbos, and the son is in a different time zone, where it is still Shabbos. One might think that the son is required to 'listen' to his father and answer the phone, the verse teaches us that everyone is obligated to honor HaShem and therefore the son should not obey the father.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 6 - Highlights

The Gemora had stated: We have successfully found a source teaching the principle that a positive commandment overrides a standard prohibition; where do we find that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition that is subject to the penalty of kares, thus requiring the verse aleha to teach that one cannot perform yibum on his wife’s sister?

The Gemora continues: Perhaps it can be derived from the mitzvah of honoring one’s father and mother. It was taught in a braisa: One might have thought that the mitzvah of honoring one’s father and mother overrides Shabbos (if a parent would instruct their son to violate the Shabbos, he would be obligated to listen); the Torah writes [Vayikra 19:3]: Every man: Your mother and father shall you revere, and My Shabbos’ shall you observe, I am HaShem your G-d. We infer from here: Everyone is obligated to honor HaShem, including the father and the mother. The Gemora assumes that the Torah is referring to a case where the parent said to his son, “Slaughter for me,” or Cook for me,” which is a kares prohibition. The reason he shouldn’t obey the father is because of the specific verse (mentioned above), but otherwise, the positive commandment of obeying one’s parent would override a prohibition, even one that consists of kares.

The Gemora objects to this proof: The Torah is referring to a case where the parent instructed him to lead a loaded animal on Shabbos, which is not a kares prohibition. (This is referred to as the prohibition of mechamer, leading an animal with a load on it on Shabbos. This prohibition does not involve a death punishment, even though all other Shabbos prohibitions do involve the death penalty.)

The Gemora objects to this interpretation: If the verse is referring to a standard prohibition and nevertheless, the positive commandment of honoring one’s parents does not override the prohibition of mechamer, let us derive from here that positive commandments cannot override a prohibition?

Perhaps you would answer that the prohibitions pertaining to Shabbos are stricter than a standard prohibition and therefore we would not be able to compare this situation with other prohibitions (a positive commandment cannot override a Shabbos prohibition, but it can override a regular prohibition).

The Gemora proves from a braisa that the prohibitions pertaining to Shabbos are similar to other prohibitions.

It was taught in a braisa: If a kohen’s father tells his son to become tamei or not to return a lost object, he should not obey him because it is written [Vayikra 19:3]: Every man: Your mother and father shall you revere, and My Shabbos’ shall you observe, I am HaShem your G-d. We infer from here: Everyone is obligated to honor HaShem, including the father and the mother. Although the verse is referring to the prohibition of Shabbos, nevertheless, we derive from there regarding all prohibitions. It is evident that the Tanna does not consider a Shabbos prohibition stricter than a regular prohibition. (5b – 6a)

The Gemora concedes that it is evident that the Torah is referring to a case where the parent instructed the son to slaughter or cook for him, which involves a kares prohibition. The fact that we needed a verse to teach us that he should not obey his parent’s command indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition that involves kares. Yet, this still will not explain why the verse aleha is required to teach us that a man cannot perform yibum on his wife’s sister. In the case where the parent instructed the son to slaughter or cook for him, the prohibited act of slaughtering or cooking is essential for the fulfillment of the commandment (and that is why one might think that it would be permitted to do); however in the case of yibum, it is not essential to violate the prohibition of living with one’s wife’s sister in order to fulfill the mitzvah since the mitzvah can be observed by performing chalitzah. Accordingly, it should never enter our mind that the mitzvah shall override the kares prohibition of his wife’s sister since the mitzvah can be fulfilled through performing a chalitzah; why is the verse aleha required? (6a)

The Gemora presents another source: Perhaps it can be derived from the mitzvah of building the Beis Hamikdosh. It was taught in a braisa: One might have thought that the mitzvah of building the Beis Hamikdosh should override Shabbos; the Torah writes [Vayikra 19:3]: My Shabbos’ shall you observe, and My Sanctuary shall you revere; I am HaShem. We infer from here: Everyone is obligated to honor HaShem, including the Sanctuary. The Gemora assumes that the Torah is referring to a case of building and destroying, which is a kares prohibition. The reason one should not violate the Shabbos is because of the specific verse (mentioned above), but otherwise, the positive commandment of building the Beis Hamikdosh would override a prohibition, even one that consists of kares.

The Gemora objects to this proof: The Torah is referring to the prohibition of leading a loaded animal on Shabbos, which is not a kares prohibition.

The Gemora objects to this interpretation: If the verse is referring to a standard prohibition and nevertheless, the positive commandment of building the Beis Hamikdosh does not override the prohibition of mechamer, let us derive from here that positive commandments cannot override a prohibition?

Perhaps you would answer that the prohibitions pertaining to Shabbos are stricter than a standard prohibition and therefore we would not be able to compare this situation with other prohibitions (a positive commandment cannot override a Shabbos prohibition, but it can override a regular prohibition).

The Gemora proves from a braisa that the prohibitions pertaining to Shabbos are similar to other prohibitions.

It was taught in a braisa: If a kohen’s father tells his son to become tamei or not to return a lost object, he should not obey him because it is written [Vayikra 19:3]: Every man: Your mother and father shall you revere, and My Shabbos’ shall you observe, I am HaShem your G-d. We infer from here: Everyone is obligated to honor HaShem, including the father and the mother. Although the verse is referring to the prohibition of Shabbos, nevertheless, we derive from there regarding all prohibitions. It is evident that the Tanna does not consider a Shabbos prohibition stricter than a regular prohibition.

The Gemora concedes that it is evident that the Torah is referring to a case of building and destroying on Shabbos, which is a kares prohibition. The fact that we needed a verse to teach us that one should not build or destroy on Shabbos indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition that involves kares. Yet, this still will not explain why the verse aleha is required to teach us that a man cannot perform yibum on his wife’s sister. In the case of building and destroying for the Beis Hamikdosh, the prohibited act of building and destroying is essential for the fulfillment of the commandment (and that is why one might think that it would be permitted to do); however in the case of yibum, it is not essential to violate the prohibition of living with one’s wife’s sister in order to fulfill the mitzvah since the mitzvah can be observed by performing chalitzah. Accordingly, it should never enter our mind that the mitzvah shall override the kares prohibition of his wife’s sister since the mitzvah can be fulfilled through performing a chalitzah; why is the verse aleha required?

The Gemora asks: We do not need a verse to teach us that the positive commandment does not override a prohibition of kares even when the prohibition is essential for the fulfillment of the commandment since we have previously derived this from the verse concerning the mitzvah of honoring one’s parents. (6a)

The Gemora states: The verse juxtaposing the observance of Shabbos with the revering of the Beis Hamikdosh is actually teaching us something entirely different (and we cannot derive from there that a positive commandment will override a kares prohibition). It was taught in a braisa: Just like one does not revere the Shabbos, but reveres the One who instructed us to observe the Shabbos, so too one is not required to revere the Beis Hamikdosh. Rather, one is required to revere the One who instructed us regarding the building of the Beis Hamikdosh.

How does one display reverence of the Beis Hamikdosh? One should not enter the Temple Mount with his stick, shoe, and money belt or with the dust upon his feet. One should not use it as a shortcut and spitting is forbidden based on a kal vachomer.

This halacha is applicable even when the Beis Hamikdosh is not in existence. This is derived from the fact that the Torah juxtaposed the observance of Shabbos to the reverence of the Beis Hamikdosh. Just as the obligation to observe Shabbos is forever, so too, the reverence of the Beis Hamikdosh is forever. (6a – 6b)

The Gemora posits another source (as to why we would think that the mitzvah of yibum overrides the prohibition of living with his wife’s sister even though it involves kares): It can be derived from the prohibition regarding kindling on Shabbos.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in a braisa: It is written [Shmos 35:3]: You shall not kindle a fire in any of your dwellings on the Shabbos day. What do we learn from here?

The Gemora asks: How can you ask what is learned from this verse? There is a braisa that presents a dispute between Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Nosson regarding this verse. It was taught in a braisa: Rabbi Yosi said that this verse teaches us that kindling on Shabbos is merely a prohibition (and incurs lashes for violating it and not kares or stoning). Rabbi Nosson said: It is to teach us that one is liable for punishment for violating one melocha (labor) on Shabbos. (Otherwise, we would have thought that one incurs a punishment only if he violates all thirty-nine melochos.)

Rava answers: The Tanna was questioning the word “dwellings.” Why was it necessary for the Torah to write that one cannot kindle in any of your dwellings, indicating that it is forbidden outside of Eretz Yisroel, as well; Shabbos is a personal obligation, and personal obligations apply even outside Eretz Yisroel (unlike a mitzvah which is dependent on land, where the obligation will only be in Eretz Yisroel)?

A student answered in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: The word “dwellings” in this verse is used for a gezeirah shavah (one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics - it links two similar words from dissimilar verses in the Torah) to teach us that this verse is referring to a Beis Din, and even a Beis Din cannot perform an execution (for example, burning) on one who committed a capital offense on Shabbos.

The Gemora assumes that this braisa is following Rabbi Nosson’s opinion, who maintains that one who kindles on Shabbos incurs the penalty of kares, and yet, we required a verse to teach us that Beis Din cannot perform an execution on one who committed a capital offense on Shabbos. Otherwise, we would have thought that the positive commandment of executing a capital offender would override the prohibition of kindling on Shabbos. We can derive from here that in other instances, a positive commandment will override a prohibition that involves kares. This is why we would have thought that one can perform yibum on his wife’s sister, if not for the verse of aleha.

The Gemora objects to this proof and states that perhaps the braisa is following Rabbi Yosi’s opinion, who holds that kindling is merely a prohibition that incurs lashes if violated, but not the penalty of kares.

The Gemora concludes: Even if the Tanna is following Rabbi Yosi’s opinion, there would still be a proof that a positive commandment overrides a kares prohibition. Rabbi Yosi only said that kindling was merely a prohibition (and not subject to kares) in regards to a regular case of kindling. Beis Din’s kindling (when it is preparing an execution by burning) involves the cooking of a lead wick (a wick of lead is heated and then the molten lead is poured down the offender’s throat). Rav Ashi had said that there is no difference between cooking this (lead) wick and cooking herbs. Cooking is obviously a melocha which is subject to kares. It emerges that even if the Tanna follows Rabbi Yosi’s viewpoint, we can see that a positive commandment overrides a kares prohibition and that is why we needed aleha to teach us that a man may not perform a yibum on his wife’s sister. (6b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 5 - A POSITIVE COMMANDMENT OVERRIDING TWO PROHIBITIONS

Reb Moshe Rozmerin in Dvar Moshe states that the Rambam maintains that one who rounds the corners of his head has violated two prohibitions; one for cutting his payos (corners), and another for following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

Our Gemora states that the positive commandment for the metzora to remove all his hair overrides the prohibition of rounding the corners on one’s head.

According to the Rambam, it is actually overriding two prohibitions.

Tosfos above (3b) discussed this issue and did not cite our Gemora as a proof. Other Rishonim maintain that a positive commandment cannot override two prohibitions.

A question is brought in the name of the Lubliner Gaon: The Gemora later (20b) states regarding a widow falling to yibum to a Kohen Gadol that it is a situation where the positive commandment of yibum can possibly override the prohibition of a Kohen Gadol marrying a widow. He asks: There are two prohibitions for a Kohen Gadol to marry a widow; one is lo yikach (he shall not take her), and the other is lo yechallel (he shall not desecrate the kehuna). How can the positive commandment of yibum override two prohibitions?

Reb Chaim Ozer in Achiezer (Even Ezer, 4) answers: The Rishonim concede when the two prohibitions are dependent on each other, that the positive commandment can override both prohibitions. The basis for the prohibition of desecrating the kehuna is because it is an illicit relationship; once the mitzvah of yibum overrides the prohibition of lo yikach, it becomes a permitted relationship and there will be no prohibition of lo yechallel.

[It would seem to me that this is dependent on how we understand that a positive commandment cannot override two prohibitions. We can explain that each prohibition strengthens one another and the positive commandment cannot override any of them; or perhaps the positive commandment does override one of the prohibitions, but it does not have the capabilities to override the second one. Reb Chaim Ozer would be in accordance with the latter explanation.]

According to the Achiezer, we can answer the Dvar Moshe’s question. The positive commandment for the metzora to cut his hair overrides the prohibition against rounding the corners of one’s head, and consequently, there will be no prohibition of following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 5 - Highlights

The Gemora seeks to find a source according to the Chachamim (who maintain that the words wool and linen are not extra and therefore the juxtaposition cannot be expounded) that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

The Gemora answers: It is derived from the word rosho, his head, which is written in the verses discussing a metzora shaving his head (part of his purification process). This is a superfluous word because the Torah had stated already that he shall shave off all his hair; why is it said? It is written elsewhere [Vayikra 19:27]: You shall not round the corners of your head (cutting the ‘payos,’ corners of the hair from his temples). I would have thought that this prohibition includes the metzora, and he cannot shave his sideburns, the possuk says rosho, teaching us that he shaves his entire head.

The Gemora explains that this Tanna maintains that one who shaves off all his hair from his head (like the metzora is required to do) has in fact violated the prohibition of rounding the corners on his head.

It emerges that we learn that the positive commandment for the metzora to remove all his hair overrides the prohibition of rounding the corners on one’s head. We derive from here that all positive commandments can override a prohibition.

The Gemora objects: Perhaps the reason the positive commandment can override this prohibition is because the prohibition against rounding the corners of one’s head is a prohibition that is not applicable to all (a woman is not subject to this prohibition). (We cannot derive from here to other instances, where the prohibition is a universal one.) (5a)

The Gemora presents another source: It was taught in a braisa: What is derived from the word rosho, his head? It is written regarding a nazir [Bamidbar 6:5]: A razor shall not pass over his head. (This prohibition forbids him to shave any part of his head with a razor.) I would have thought that one who is a metzora and a nazir would not be permitted to shave his head (even for the purification process), the Torah teaches us that the positive commandment for a metzora to shave his head overrides the prohibition of the nazir against shaving his head with a razor. We can derive from here to all instances that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

The Gemora objects: Perhaps the reason the positive commandment can override this prohibition is because the prohibition forbidding a nazir to shave is a lenient one, for a nazir can release himself from his prohibitions by imploring a sage to annul his vow. (We cannot derive from here to other instances, where the prohibition is a strict one.)

The Gemora returns to the juxtaposition of tzitzis and shatnez. The Gemora explains that there is an extra word in the verse even according to the Chachamim. The Torah could have written: You shall make yourself tzitzis (fringes); why did the Torah write gedilim, twined fringes? It is to make the verse available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: The word gedilim is not extra since it teaches us that each corner of the garment must have four threads.

The Gemora states: There is still an extra word in this verse. The Torah could have written: You shall not wear shatnez, wool and linen. Why did the torah write the word together? It is to make the verse available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: the word together is not extra since it is teaches us that if one fastens a woolen garment to a linen garment with two passes of the needle (forming a complete stitch), he may not wear the garment, but if they are fastened with only one pass of the needle, it is not regarded as a connection, and they may be worn.

The Gemora states: There is still an extra word in this verse. The Torah could have written: You shall not wear wool and linen together. Why did the torah write the word shatnez? It is to make the verse available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: The word shatnez is not extra since it teaches us that one has not violated the prohibition against wearing shatnez unless the wool and linen threads are combed, spun and woven together.

The Gemora answers: The word shatnez teaches us everything. The word is extra and therefore it is available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition. However, if this word were intended only for this teaching, the Torah could have written a more common term, such as kilayim, meaning mixture; why did the Torah use the term shatnez? It is to learn the additional halacha that one has not violated the prohibition against wearing shatnez unless the wool and linen threads are combed, spun and woven together. (5a – 5b)

The Gemora states: We have successfully found a source teaching the principle that a positive commandment overrides a standard prohibition; where do we find that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition that is subject to the penalty of kares, thus requiring the verse aleha to teach that one cannot perform yibum on his wife’s sister?

The Gemora states: Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of bris milah (circumcision), which can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the penalty of kares.

The Gemora objects: Bris milah is different because there were thirteen covenants sealed in regards to this commandment.

Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of korban pesach, which can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the penalty of kares.

The Gemora objects: Korban pesach is different because there is a penalty of kares for one who refrains from offering the korban pesach.

Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of offering the daily korban tamid, which can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the penalty of kares.

The Gemora objects: Korban tamid is different because it is a korban, which is offered constantly.

The Gemora proposes to derive this principle from all three of these mitzvos together. This is rejected because all three mitzvos existed before the Giving of the Torah. (5b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 4 - WHICH IS GREATER? A POSITIVE COMMANDMENT OR A NEGATIVE ONE

The Gemora states that a positive commandment can override a prohibition that carries with it a standard punishment.

The question is asked: Why is it that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition and yet the punishment for transgressing a prohibition is much more severe than the punishment for not fulfilling a positive commandment?

Reb Yossie Schonkopf said over a parable from his Rebbe: A trucker is hired to transport a load across the country and the owner warns him not to go beyond the speed limit, not to crash the vehicle and to follow all the road instructions. If the trucker does everything perfectly but doesn't unload the goods at his destination; rather, he arrives at the destined location and immediately turns around carrying the same load, what is accomplished by the fact that the trucker obeyed the speed limit and followed all the rules?

The meaning is as follows: Our mission in life is to accomplish in this world and 'build the love towards HaShem,’ therefore, this building overrides the transgressions. The prohibitions are only there to protect what has been built and not to suffocate the building.

This concept is elucidated by the Ramban in Parshas Yisro. He states that the fulfillment of a positive commandment is based on ahavas HaShem, loving HaShem and refraining from committing a transgression is based on yiras HaShem fearing HaShem. It is a higher level to serve HaShem through love, but it is worse to violate a prohibition, which is based upon fearing HaShem.

My brother, Reb Ben asked a similar question: The Gemora states that a positive commandment will override a negative commandment when both commandments are performed simultaneously. It is noteworthy that the Gemora in Sota states that a mitzvah cannot extinguish an aveira, a sin, yet an aveira can extinguish a mitzvah. Apparently, the principle that a positive commandment can override a negative commandment is not a contradiction to this Gemora. Perhaps the idea is that when one performs an aveira intentionally, he has rebelled against HaShem, and it is not possible for one to appease HaShem with a mitzvah when he has just committed an act of rebellion. When one is simultaneously overriding the negative commandment by performing a positive commandment, however, he is demonstrating that he is fully aware that he is performing a negative commandment, yet he is permitted by the Torah to override the negative commandment. This principle allows him to perform the positive commandment and be rewarded for its performance.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 4 - SHATNEZ BY TZITZIS

It is written [Devarim 22: 11 - 12]: You shall not wear shatnez (wool and linen together). You shall make for yourself tzitzis (twined fringes). The fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The commentators ask from the Gemora below (4b): The Gemora states: If the Torah would have only written the passuk in Vayikra: and a garment that is a mixture of shatnez shall not come upon you, we would have thought that placing shatnez upon oneself in any manner would be forbidden, and even garment sellers would be prohibited from wearing shatnez (they merely drape themselves with the garments in order to exhibit them without a specific intent for the warmth which these garments offer). This is why the Torah wrote in Devarim: You shall not wear shatnez, teaching us that it is forbidden to wear shatnez only by a wearing that offers physical pleasure (and since a garment seller does not wear the garment for that intent, it will be permitted for him).

Accordingly, what is the proof from the fact that one can wear a garment of tzitzis which contains shatnez that a positive commandment can override a prohibition; perhaps one can don a garment of tzitzis that contains shatnez because the prohibition is only when wearing a garment that provides physical pleasure and his intention is for that purpose? One who is wearing tzitzis should not be regarded as deriving pleasure because of the dictum of “mitzvot lav le’henos nitnu” – mitzvos were not given for the purpose of pleasure.

According to the Ran, this is not a question, for he says that the principle of “mitzvot lav le’henos nitnu” is not applicable when there is a physical pleasure; here, the garment is providing physical warmth and therefore, it should be prohibited if not for the fact that the positive commandment can override the prohibition.

However, the Rashba disagrees and maintains that we don’t consider any benefit that one receives during the fulfillment of a mitzvah; if so, let us say that one is permitted to wear tzitzis containing shatnez because he is not deriving any pleasure?

Reb Shmuel Rozovsky answers: The prohibition of shatnez is merely not to wear a garment containing shatnez; there is a condition that it is only regarded as wearing if he is deriving pleasure.

One who is wearing a garment of tzitzis is wearing the garment and deriving pleasure. While it’s true that the performance of the mitzvah negates the benefit he is receiving, he is still wearing the garment and it should be prohibited, if not for the fact that the positive commandment overrides this prohibition.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 4 - Highlights

The Gemora required a source to teach us that one cannot perform yibum on his wife’s sister.

The Gemora infers from here that otherwise, one would have been permitted to perform yibum on his wife’s sister.

The Gemora asks: Why would this have been allowed?

The Gemora answers: This would have been based on the principle that a positive commandment can override a prohibition. The positive commandment of yibum would have overridden the prohibition against living with ones wife’s sister.

The Gemora objects to this explanation: A positive commandment can override a prohibition that carries with it a standard punishment, whereas a positive commandment cannot override a prohibition that is punishable by kares.

Furthermore, the Gemora inquires as to where the source is that a positive commandment can override even an ordinary prohibition.

It is written [Devarim 22: 11 - 12]: You shall not wear shatnez (wool and linen together). You shall make for yourself tzitzis (twined fringes). The fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

Rabbi Elozar cites a Scriptural source demonstrating that we can expound Scriptural verses through juxtaposition. (3b – 4a)

Rav Yosef says: Even if generally, one does not expound Scriptural verses in the Torah through juxtapositions, in Sefer Devarim, he would. He proves this from Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that we do not expound juxtapositions, but in Devarim, he does.

The Gemora proceeds to prove that Rabbi Yehudah does not expound juxtapositions anywhere in the Torah except in the Book of Devarim. (4a)

The Gemora asks: Why are the verses in Devarim different than the rest of the Torah?

The Gemora answers: Either it is because it is obvious that the two verses were juxtaposed for the sake of expounding them or alternatively, it is because one of the verses is extra and thus available for exposition. (4a – 4b)

The Gemora proceeds to explain why we would be justified to expound the juxtaposition regarding tzitzis and shatnez even according to Rabbi Yehudah.

It is obvious that these two verses were juxtaposed for the sake of expounding them, for otherwise, the passage regarding tzitzis should have been written in Parashas Shelach, which is the primary source for the obligation to wear a four-cornered garment of tzitzis.

Alternatively, it is because the verse here is certainly extra and thus available for exposition. It is written [Vayikra 19:19]: and a garment that is a mixture of shatnez shall not come upon you. It is not necessary to write the verse in Devarim: You shall not wear shatnez. It is apparently extra to teach us that the positive commandment of tzitzis overrides the prohibition against wearing shatnez.

The Gemora asks: These two verses are both necessary. If the Torah would have only written the passuk in Vayikra: and a garment that is a mixture of shatnez shall not come upon you, we would have thought that placing shatnez upon oneself in any manner would be forbidden, and even garment sellers would be prohibited from wearing shatnez (they merely drape themselves with the garments in order to exhibit them without a specific intent for the warmth which these garments offer). This is why the Torah wrote in Devarim: You shall not wear shatnez, teaching us that it is forbidden to wear shatnez only by a wearing that offers physical pleasure (and since a garment seller does not wear the garment for that intent, it will be permitted for him).

If the Torah would have only written the passuk in Devarim: You shall not wear shatnez, we might have thought that there is a prohibition to wear shatnez, which provides a good deal of physical pleasure, but one would be permitted to place a garment on himself without wearing it. This is why the Torah wrote in Vayikra: and a garment that is a mixture of shatnez shall not come upon you, teaching us that even that is forbidden.

It emerges that both verses are necessary and not extra to expound the juxtaposition to tzitzis.

The Gemora answers: While it’s true that both verses are necessary, there are still superfluous words in the verse. The verse stated: You shall not wear shatnez wool and linen together. It is unnecessary to say that shatnez consists of wool and linen. The verse in Vayikra stated: and a garment that is a mixture of shatnez shall not come upon you, and it was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael that whenever the Torah refers to a garment and the Torah does not specify what type of garment we are discussing, it is referring to a garment of wool and linen. Why does the Torah find it necessary to write that shatnez is wool and linen? It is extra to indicate that we can expound the juxtaposition of tzitzis to shatnez to teach us that the positive commandment of tzitzis overrides the prohibition against wearing shatnez. (4b)

The Gemora asks: Why is it necessary to expound the juxtaposition that tzitzis overrides the prohibition against wearing shatnez according to the school of Rabbi Yishmael; they have a much better source than that? It is written regarding the obligation of tzitzis [Bamidbar 15:38]: and they shall make themselves tzitzis on the corners of their garments. The school of Rabbi Yishmael maintains that whenever the Torah says garment, it is referring to wool and linen, and we know that the Torah requires one thread of techeiles wool (blue dye from the blood of the chilazon). It emerges that the Torah is obligating us to place a woolen thread on a linen garment, which would constitute shatnez.

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that one should use a thread of techeiles wool only on a garment of wool, and one should use linen strings when he is wearing a linen garment; the juxtaposition teaches us that one can place woolen strings on a linen garment and linen strings on a woolen garment. (4b)

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