RABBINICAL OFFENSE IS MORE SEVERE - Yevamos 36 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that the Rabbis were stricter and strengthened their enactments more than for those of the Torah.

The Gemora in Shabbos (110a) cites the verse in Koheles [10:8]: One who breaks through a stone wall will be bitten by a snake. This is referring to someone who does not heed the words of the Sages. One is not permitted to scoff at the decrees of the Rabbis. The Gemora in Eruvin states that one who transgresses the words of the Chachamim is liable to death at the hand of Heaven.

Rashi in Avoda Zarah (27b) states that even if he will be given medicine for this snake bite and will be healed, other snakes will come and he will eventually die.

The Maharal explains: The Rabbis goal was to erect a fence to safeguard the commandments of the Torah. One who negates these decrees is causing a breakdown for the mitzvos of the Torah. This is why we deal with him so harshly.

Rabbeinu Yonah explains why one who violates a Rabbinical decree is dealt with in a stricter manner than one who transgressed a Torah commandment. One who violates a Biblical prohibition respects the law, but he is motivated by his physical desires to sin. He is not rebuffing his obligation, rather it can be regarded as a momentary slip in his observance. One who violates a Rabbinical enactment does so because of a lack of regard for their decrees. He belittles them on account that they were not written in the Torah and there is no real necessity to keep them. He is rejecting his obligation and therefore deserving of death.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 36 - Highlights

The Gemora asks on Rabbi Yochanan (who maintains that one who performed chalitzah or yibum with his pregnant yevamah and subsequently she miscarries, she is not required to have a chalitzah from the brothers) from a braisa: One who performed a yibum with his yevamah, and it was found that she was pregnant; the yevamah’s co-wife may not marry because the child might be viable.

The Gemora emends the braisa to say as follows: One who performed a yibum with his yevamah, and it was found that she was pregnant; the yevamah’s co-wife may not marry because the child might not be viable.

According to Rabbi Yochanan that the yibum performed with a pregnant yevamah is considered valid, why don’t we allow the co-wife to marry?

Abaye answers: Rabbi Yochanan never meant to dispute that a yibum performed with a pregnant yevamah is considered valid (since this is a forbidden action, it is deemed to be invalid); he only argued regarding a chalitzah performed with a pregnant yevamah.

Rava objects to Abaye’s answer: If the yibum performed with a pregnant yevamah is not considered valid, the chalitzah cannot be valid either; for we have learned that whoever is subject to yibum is subject to chalitzah and whoever is not subject to yibum is not subject to chalitzah?

Rava answers Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion differently: This is what the braisa means: One who performed a yibum with his yevamah, and it was found that she was pregnant; the yevamah’s co-wife may not marry because the child might be viable, and a yibum or chalitzah with one’s yevamah who is pregnant with a viable child is certainly not valid, and the child does not release the co-wife until he enters into the world.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rava’s position. (35b – 36a)

Rish Lakish explains the braisa as follows: A yibum or chalitzah performed with a pregnant yevamah is not considered valid, but perhaps the co-wife can be released because the majority of women give birth to viable children; the braisa teaches us that a child does not release the yevamah from her attachment to the yavam until the child enters into the world. (36a)

Rabbi Elozar attempts to cite support to Rish Lakish from a Mishna. The Mishna (119a) states: If a woman’s husband and her co-wife went overseas and they informed her that her husband has died (based on the report, she would be free to remarry, however, it is uncertain if she falls for yibum), she should not marry or be taken in yibum until she determines if her co-wife is pregnant or not. Rish Lakish asks: It is understandable why we do not permit her to be taken in yibum for perhaps the co-wife will have a viable child and the yavam will have transgressed the Biblical prohibition of taking his brother’s wife (when there is no mitzvah of yibum); however, why can’t she perform chalitzah with the yavam during the nine months of her husband’s death and get married afterwards? (By the fact that this option is not permitted, it would indicate that a chalitzah with a pregnant yevamah (or the co-wife) has no legitimacy.)

The Gemora rejects this proof: Even according to Rish Lakish, why don’t we permit her to perform a chalitzah after the nine months, which certainly would be valid?

Abaye bar Abba and Rav Chin’na bar Abaye both say that chalitzah is not an option, for if the child is viable, we will require an announcement that she is permitted to marry a Kohen (since the chalitzah was invalid).

The Gemora asks: So, why don’t we make the announcement?

The Gemora answers: Perhaps someone will be present by the chalitzah and will not hear of the announcement; he will be under the false impression that a chalutzah is permitted to a Kohen.

The Gemora cites a braisa: One who performed chalitzah with his pregnant yevamah and subsequently she miscarries; she would require chalitzah from the brothers. This is a proof to Rish Lakish. (36a)

The Mishna had stated: One who performs yibum with his yevamah and she was found to be pregnant and later gave birth; if the child is not viable, he may keep her as a wife.

Rabbi Eliezer is cited in a braisa: He is required to divorce her. (Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Tanna of the Mishna and maintains that he must divorce her as a penalty for taking a risk of violating the prohibition against taking one’s brother’s wife when yibum would not apply.) (36b)

Rava says: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer said the same thing. Rabbi Eliezer; we mentioned above. Rabbi Meir; it was taught in a braisa: (The Rabbis decreed that one should wait twenty-four months for otherwise she might become pregnant from her new husband and will be compelled to wean her previous child.) One should not marry a pregnant or nursing woman, and if he did marry her, he must divorce her and he is prohibited from marrying her again; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Chachamim say: He must divorce her, but he may remarry her at the appropriate time (after the twenty-four months). (It emerges that both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer hold that one who marries a woman prematurely is required to divorce her forever.)

Abaye asked Rava: Why do you say that the two rulings are similar? Perhaps, Rabbi Eliezer ruled accordingly only because the yavam was risking violating a Biblical prohibition of marrying his brother’s wife, but in the other case, where he is only violating a Rabbinical decree, he would agree to the Chachamim (he may remarry her). Alternatively, perhaps Rabbi Meir issued his ruling only in a case where the man violated a Rabbinical decree, and the Rabbis were stricter and strengthened their enactments more than for those of the Torah.; however, here, when a Biblical prohibition is involved, the Chachamim did not find it necessary to penalize the yavam because people generally distance themselves from Biblical prohibitions. (36b)

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Dikduk and Chazal - Yevamos 35 - Daf Yomi

Why does the Mishna say that the yavam performs chalitzah with the yevamah; doesn’t the passuk say that the yevamah is the one that performs chalitzah by removing the yavam’s shoe?

The Nimukei Yosef writes (104b) that throughout Meseches Yevamos, the Gemora states that he is performing the chalitzah except for a case of a mute yavam.

The Noda B’Yehudah (I, E”H, 94) writes that as a child he would think that Chazal were not diligent in writing with correct grammar (because they wrote that he performed the chalitzah, when in truth, she is the one that performs the action), but afterwards he realized that their language is extremely precise.

The Gemora later (102b) states that the term chalitzah can mean the putting on of a shoe as well. This is what the Gemora means when it says that he performs the chalitzah. The yavam puts his shoe on in order to enable the yevamah to remove his shoe.

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Was Promiscuity Common? - Yevamos 35 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that it is uncommon for a minor to engage in an illicit relationship.

It can be inferred from here that it is common for an adult to engage in an illicit relationship.

This is why the Mishna in Kesuvos (2a) states that they established that marriages involving a virgin should take place on a Wednesday because of the concern that she engaged in an illicit relationship during the erusin.

The Rivash writes that in his times, it was common practice to engage in illicit relationships and they did not heed any rebuke.

The Chasam Sofer (E”H, 133) comments that the unmarried women were promiscuous and they only acted with modesty after they were married. A woman is believed after she is married that she will not cause her humble to stumble since she has “her bread in the basket.”

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 35 - Highlights

The Gemora cites two versions of Shmuel’s rulings regarding the waiting period of a woman before she gets married after cohabitating with a man.

Shmuel, according to the first version states: All women, whose husband’s died or they got divorced, are required to wait three months prior to getting married again (this is done in order to determine the paternity of the child), except for a girl who converted as a minor or a slave that was freed as a minor.

A Jewish girl who performed a mi’un (refusal) to her husband (she is obviously a minor) is not required to wait three months until getting married again. A minor who got divorced or one that had an illicit relationship is required to wait three months until getting married again. (Although minors cannot conceive, this was a precautionary decree because of adult women in a similar situation.)

Even though the Mishna rules that a minor girl is not required to wait three months before she marries again, Rav Gidel explains in the name of Rav that this was a ruling of the moment because the case was a highly uncommon one and the Rabbis did not issue their decree for this incident.

Shmuel, according to the second version states: All women, whose husband’s died or they got divorced, are required to wait three months prior to getting married again except for a girl who converted as an adult or a slave that was freed as an adult (since Shmuel follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosi who permits them to marry immediately because they utilize certain birth-control methods) and by a Jewish girl who had an illicit relationship as a minor (since it is uncommon, they didn’t decree on this).

Abaye explains the viewpoint of Rabbi Yosi: Women who engage in illicit relations invert themselves after cohabitation in order to avoid becoming pregnant. Rabbi Yehudah disagrees because he is concerned that they will not do so properly. (34b – 35a)

The Mishna had stated regarding the case where the two men inadvertently cohabitated with the wrong women that if they were daughters of Kohanim, they are disqualified from terumah.

The Gemora asks: This halacha should be the same even if they were not daughters of kohanim; they will be forbidden to their husbands if they are married to Kohanim?

The Gemora emends the Mishna to read, “If they were wives of Kohanim.”

The Gemora asks: The halacha is that even a wife of a Yisroel who has been violated and is permitted to her husband will nevertheless be forbidden to marry a Kohen in the future?

Rava answers: The Mishna is actually discussing the daughters of Kohanim. (Normally, a daughter of a Kohen who married a Yisroel, will be permitted to eat terumah after her husband dies and she has no children.) If she has been violated during the marriage, she will be disqualified from eating terumah forever. (35a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, ARBAAH ACHIN

The Mishna states: One who performed chalitzah with his yevamah and she was found to be pregnant (there is a decree against performing chalitzah with a yevamah within three months since her husband’s death) and later gave birth; if the child is viable, he will be permitted in her relatives, she will be permitted in his relatives and she is not disqualified from marring a Kohen (because the chalitzah was not valid since the brother did not die childless). If, however, the child is not viable, he will be prohibited in her relatives, she will be prohibited in his relatives and she is disqualified from marrying a Kohen.

One who performs yibum with his yevamah and she was found to be pregnant and later gave birth; if the child is viable, he must divorce her and they are required to bring a chatas offering. If, however, the child is not viable, he may keep her as a wife. If the child is viable, but we are uncertain if the child is a nine-month-old baby from the first brother or the seven-month-old child of the second brother; he must divorce her, and the child is deemed to be legitimate, and they are required to bring an asham taluy (a korban that one is required to bring if he is uncertain if he mistakenly committed a transgression). (35b)

The Gemora states: One who performed chalitzah with his pregnant yevamah and subsequently she miscarries; Rabbi Yochanan rules that she is not required to have a chalitzah from the brothers (the chalitzah has been retroactively determined to be valid). Rish Lakish says: She would require chalitzah from the brothers.

The Gemora explains their opinions: Rabbi Yochanan maintains that she is not required to have a chalitzah from the brothers because the chalitzah has been retroactively determined to be valid, and performing a yibum with a pregnant yevamah who subsequently miscarries is retroactively determined to be valid. Rish Lakish disagrees: He maintains that she would require chalitzah from the brothers because a chalitzah performed with a pregnant yevamah is not valid and a yibum performed with a pregnant yevamah is not considered a valid yibum, even if she later miscarries.

The Gemora elaborates further regarding this dispute: It can be explained that they argue based on the understanding of a verse or it can be explained based on logic.

The dispute based on logic can be explained as follows: Rabbi Yochanan holds that if Eliyahu would have informed us that she is going to miscarry, wouldn’t she be regarded as fit for a chalitzah or a yibum, now too, it is retroactively determined to be valid. Rish Lakish disagrees with this logic.

Alternatively, the dispute can be based on the understanding of the verse [Devarim 25:5]: And he has no child (then there is an obligation for yibum). Rabbi Yochanan says: He died without having a child. Rish Lakish says: Expound the verse to mean “Examine him.” (If he died with any type of child, including a fetus, the yibum or chalitzah is not valid.) (35b)

The Mishna had stated: One who performed chalitzah with his yevamah and she was found to be pregnant and later gave birth; if the child is not viable, he will be prohibited in her relatives, she will be prohibited in his relatives and she is disqualified from marrying a Kohen.

Rish Lakish explains the prohibition for her to marry a Kohen as a Rabbinic decree because in truth, the chalitzah was not valid. (35b)

[END]

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Desecrating his Words - Yevamos 34 - Daf Yomi

The Mishna in Makkos states that a person can commit one action of plowing and be liable for eight transgressions.

The Gemora asks: Couldn’t the Mishna list a ninth; if he took an oath not to plow on Yom Tov?

The Gemora answers: He has already been sworn from Har Sinai not to violate Yom Tov and therefore the oath does not take affect.

The Ran explains the principle: An oath must be regarding something voluntary; anything that a person is obligated to do regardless of his oath is not binding. However, this is only relevant to the bringing of a korban chatas if he would violate the oath, but in respect of transgressing the oath intentionally, he would incur the thirty-nine lashes.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks on the Ran from the Gemora in Makkos: The Gemora was discussing the amount of lashes one could possibly receive for committing one action that entails many different transgressions. The Gemora states that an oath cannot be included for a person is sworn from Har Sinai prior to uttering the oath against plowing on Yom Tov. According to the Ran, it should still be included because it is another prohibition that incurs the penalty of lashes?

Reb Akiva Eiger understands the Gemora that the oath does not have any validity whatsoever because of the principle that one prohibition cannot take effect on an existing prohibition.

Reb Shmuel Rozovksy asks: Why don’t both prohibitions take effect simultaneoulsy; the oath does not take effect until the beginning of Yom Tov and that is precisely the same moment that the prohibition against engaging in labor on Yom Tov commences?

Reb Elchonon Wasserman states: The principle that one prohibition cannot take effect on an existing prohibition is not applicable to an oath. He cites a Tosfos as proof to this: Tosfos states that the principle of one prohibition not taking effect on an existing prohibition would not apply to a case where one eats on Yom Kippur and simultaneously carries the food in his mouth from one domain to another. Although, the swallowing of the food causes both transgressions it is regarded as two different actions; swallowing and carrying.

Reb Elchonon explains regarding one who violates an oath by eating something he swore not to eat or by plowing a field when he swore that he wouldn’t; the transgression is not the eating or plowing, but rather the desecration of his words the oath. It is therefore not considered the same action which causes the other prohibition, and the principle of one prohibition not taking effect on an existing one would not be applicable.

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WHERE DOES THE SECOND PROHIBITION GO? - Yevamos 33 - Daf Yomi

The Shach (Y”D 238) rules that one who takes an oath that he will not eat neveilah (an animal that was not slaughtered properly), and subsequently got sick in a manner that he was permitted to eat neveilah; he is allowed to eat it, and he is not required to have his vow annulled.

The Peri Megadim in his introduction to Hilchos Pesach asks on this ruling. He states: That which we say that one prohibition cannot take effect on an existing prohibition merely means that the he will not be liable for violating both prohibitions; however, he is violating two prohibitions and he will be buried together with the completely wicked.

Accordingly, he asks on the ruling of the Shach: While it’s true that the prohibition stemming from his personal oath not to eat neveilah will not take effect because he is already prohibited from eating neveilah from the Torah, nevertheless, the oath is valid and is existent; he will not be liable for transgressing the oath. However, when he is dangerously ill and he is permitted to eat neveilah, the oath would subsequently take effect and he must have it annulled.

The Avnei Miluim (teshuva 12) does not agree with the way the Peri Megadim understands the Shach. He states: The ruling of the Shach is not based on the principle of one prohibition not taking effect on an existing prohibition, but rather, it is because of the principle mentioned specifically regarding an oath. One oath cannot take effect on another one and every person took an oath at Mount Sinai that he will not eat neveilah; this is why his personal oath is not valid and does not require annulment.

He explains the distinction between the two principles: One cannot be liable for a second prohibition when a previously existing prohibition is in effect, but there are obviously both prohibitions present. Regarding an oath, one does not have the capabilities to take an oath prohibiting himself on something that he already is sworn to uphold anyway; the second oath has no legitimacy whatsoever.

Rav Shach in Hilchos Shavuos (5:16) asks on the premise of these Acharonim. If the second prohibition is present, why isn’t one liable for violating it? If a second prohibition cannot take effect on an existing one only means that we do not administer punishment for the second prohibition, why should there be an exception for an extensive or an inclusive prohibition? He therefore learns that the second prohibition does not take effect at all. The Gemora, which states that one who violates such a prohibition will be buried with the completely wicked does not mean to say that he has indeed violated two transgressions; rather, it means that he is regarded as completely wicked since he is committing an action which involves two prohibitions even though in fact, he has only violated one.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 33 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a dispute regarding a non-Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos. Rabbi Chiya maintains that he has violated two transgressions; one for a non-Kohen performing the Temple service and the other for desecrating the Shabbos. Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one; for a non-Kohen performing the Temple service.

Rabbi Chiya jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression.

Rabbi Chiya explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing labor on Shabbos. Permission was granted to perform labor in the Beis HaMikdosh only for Kohanim. It is therefore logical to assume that a non-Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing labor on Shabbos. Permission was completely granted to perform labor in the Beis HaMikdosh (and it was not specific to the Kohanim). A non-Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos has violated only one transgression; for a non-Kohen performing the Temple service, but not for violating the Shabbos. (32b)

The Gemora cites a similar dispute between Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara: A blemished Kohen performed the Temple service (we are referring to a communal offering whose time is fixed, which is permitted to be brought by Kohanim in a state of tumah) while he was in a state of tumah. Rabbi Chiya maintains that he has violated two transgressions; one for performing the Temple service with a blemish and the other for performing the Temple service while he is tamei. Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one; for performing the Temple service with a blemish.

Rabbi Chiya jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression.

Rabbi Chiya explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah. Permission was granted to perform the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah (for a communal offering) only for unblemished Kohanim. It is therefore logical to assume that a blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah. Permission was completely granted to perform the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah (and it was not specific to unblemished Kohanim). A blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh while he was tamei has violated only one transgression; for performing the Temple service with a blemish, but not for performing the service while he was tamei. (32b)

The Gemora cites a third dispute between Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara: A non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah (a Kohen pierces the back of the bird’s neck with his fingernail – this is valid only by a sacrificial offering, otherwise, it would be deemed a neveilah and could not be eaten). Rabbi Chiya maintains that he has violated two transgressions; one for a non-Kohen eating sacrificial food and the other for eating neveilah. Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one; for a non-Kohen eating sacrificial food.

Rabbi Chiya jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression.

Rabbi Chiya explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from eating neveilah. Permission was granted in the Beis Hamikdosh (for a bird offering) only for Kohanim. It is therefore logical to assume that a non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from eating neveilah. Permission was completely granted in the Beis Hamikdosh (and it was not specific to Kohanim). A non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah has violated only one transgression; for a non-Kohen eating sacrificial food, but not for eating neveilah. (32b)

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara are arguing in regards to an inclusive prohibition (more objects become forbidden to the same people) taking effect on an existing prohibition, and according to Rabbi Yosi (who maintains that one prohibition can take effect on an existing one). Rabbi Chiya holds that Rabbi Yosi maintains that the inclusive prohibition does take effect and therefore he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara holds that it does not take effect and he has violated only one prohibition. (33a)

The Gemora asks: What are the inclusive prohibitions in each of three cases cited above?

The Gemora answers: The first case is where a non-Kohen performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos. The non-Kohen is permitted to perform labor, but is prohibited from perform the Temple service. When Shabbos arrives, we can say that since he is now prohibited from engaging in any labor, he also is prohibited from performing the Temple service on account of Shabbos. (This is an inclusive prohibition since more objects become forbidden.)

The second case is where a blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh while he was tamei. The blemished Kohen is permitted to eat portions of the sacrificial offerings, but he is prohibited from performing the Temple service. When he becomes tamei, we can say that since he is now prohibited from eating portions of the sacrificial offerings, he is also prohibited from performing the Temple service on account of tumah. (This is an inclusive prohibition since more objects become forbidden.)

The Gemora asks that the third case cannot be explained to be referring to an inclusive prohibition taking effect on an existing prohibition since both prohibitions take effect simultaneously. As soon as the melikah is performed, the meat of the bird offering becomes forbidden to a non-Kohen and it becomes a neveilah at the same time. (33a)

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara are arguing in regards to simultaneous prohibitions, and according to Rabbi Yosi (who maintains that he would be liable for two prohibitions). Rabbi Chiya holds that Rabbi Yosi maintains that the inclusive prohibition does take effect and therefore he has violated two transgressions. (Rabbi Yosi must be referring to the following case: Two brothers designated one agent to go and betroth two sisters. The sisters also appointed an agent to accept the betrothals for them. The agent of the brothers gave the two betrothals to the agent of the sisters simultaneously. The prohibition of his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife occurred simultaneously.) Bar Kappara holds that it does not take effect and he has violated only one prohibition. (33a)

The Gemora asks: What are the simultaneous prohibitions in each of three cases cited above?

The Gemora answers: The first case is where a non-Kohen performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos. This is referring to a case when he grew the two pubic hairs that render him an adult on Shabbos. The prohibition against a non-Kohen performing the Temple service and the prohibition against engaging in labor on Shabbos occur simultaneously.

The second case is where a blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh while he was tamei. This is referring to a case when he grew the two pubic hairs that render him an adult after he had a blemish and became tamei. These two prohibitions occur simultaneously. Alternatively, we can say that his finger got cut off with a knife that was tamei. (The third case, we explained previously.) (33a)

The Gemora asks on this explanation: According to Rabbi Chiya, we can understand Rebbe’s two statements; the statement that he has violated two transgressions is following Rabbi Yosi’s opinion and the statement that he has violated only one transgression is following the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. However, according to Bar Kappara, was Rabbi Chiya lying when he stated in the name of Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions? (33a)

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara are arguing in regards to simultaneous prohibitions, and according to Rabbi Shimon (Rabbi Chiya maintains that by simultaneous prohibitions, he would be liable for two prohibitions, and not by an inclusive prohibition, and Bar Kappara holds that he will never be liable for two transgressions).

The Gemora asks on this explanation: According to Bar Kappara, we can understand Rebbe’s two statements; the statement that he has violated only one transgression is following the opinion of Rabbi Shimon and the statement that he has violated two transgressions is following Rabbi Yosi’s opinion. However, according to Rabbi Chiya, was Bar Kappara lying when he stated in the name of Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Chiya could say that Bar Kappara was mistaken when he quoted Rebbe as ruling that one is liable for only one transgression in all three cases. Although it is true that Rabbi Shimon would hold that in cases of an inclusive prohibition, he is liable for only one; but in cases involving simultaneous prohibitions, Rabbi Shimon would concede that they both take effect. Rebbe did not issue a ruling to bar Kappara regarding the third case where a non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah. This case can only be referring to simultaneous prohibitions and not an inclusive prohibition. Bar Kappara erroneously (according to Rabbi Chiya) grouped this case together with the other two and stated that Rebbe maintains according to Rabbi Shimon that one is liable for only one transgression even when the prohibitions occur simultaneously. Rabbi Chiya disagrees and holds that Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yosi by simultaneous prohibitions that one would be liable for two transgressions. (33b)

The Gemora cites a braisa which refutes the opinion of Bar Kappara. It is evident from the braisa that Rabbi Shimon only disagrees with Rabbi Yosi by an inclusive prohibition, but agrees that one will be liable for two transgressions when the prohibitions occur simultaneously. (33b)

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THE PROHIBITION OF A WIFE’S SISTER EVEN AFTER THE WIFE’S DEATH - Yevamos 32 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora cites a braisa: (Three were two brothers, Reuven and Shimon that were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless, leaving his wife Rochel to fall for yibum to Shimon. Shimon cannot perform a yibum at this time for Rochel is his wife’s sister.) If Shimon went ahead and cohabitated with Rochel (while his wife was still alive), he has violated two prohibitions; his brother’s wife and his wife’s sister. These are the words of Rabbi Yosi. Rabbi Shimon said: He is only liable for the prohibition against taking one’s brother’s wife.

Rashi specifically mentions that this dispute is referring to a case where he cohabitated with her while his wife was still alive. The Rashba and other Rishonim explain that Rashi is coming to exclude the opinion of Rabbeinu Chananel, who understands this sugya as referring to a case where his wife had already died (like the case of the Mishna).

All the Rishonim ask on Rabbeinu Chananel: How can he possible learn that these Tannaim are discussing a case where his wife had already died and nevertheless, there should still be a prohibition against taking one’s wife’s sister? There is no argument to the halacha that a wife’s sister is permitted after one’s wife has already died.

Reb Avrohom Erlanger in Birchas Avrohom attempts to answer this question. He prefaces his remarks by saying that what he is about to say is a novel idea, but we must at least attempt to explain the viewpoint of Rabbeinu Chananel.

Let us examine the permissibility of the wife’s sister after the wife dies. Is the name of the initial prohibition “a wife’s sister, while the wife is alive”? (It would not be called a prohibition that is dependent on time, i.e. the lifespan of his wife because the prohibition is only until then.) Or perhaps the prohibition of a wife’s sister is forever, similar to any other ervah; the Torah reveals to us that the death of the wife permits her sister to be taken by the husband?

A possible difference in halacha between these two possibilities would be in a case when we are uncertain if the wife died. Would there be a chazakah that the wife’s sister is still forbidden to him? Reb Elchonon Wasserman states that the principle of chazakah can only be applicable if the original prohibition was forever and the uncertainty is regarding a change in the status.

Although the simple explanation would be that the wife’s sister prohibition is initially only relevant during the lifespan of his wife; if we learn differently, we can explain the opinion of Rabbeinu Chananel.

He maintains that the prohibition of a wife’s sister is forever, but there is a halacha that the death of the wife is a matir, permits her to be taken by the husband.

Reb Shimon Shkop states that in order for one prohibition to take effect on an existing prohibition, it must have halachic ramifications. Perhaps we can say similarly regarding the permission emerging form the death of the wife. If her death will result in a permission for the sister to be taken by the husband, the death will permit her; however, if the wife’s death will not bring about such a consequence because she will anyways be forbidden to the husband on account of being his brother’s wife, the death of the wife will not remove the wife’s sister prohibition, and she will still be forbidden to the husband on account of being a wife’s sister as well.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 32 - Highlights

The Mishna states: Three were two brothers, Reuven and Shimon that were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless, leaving his wife Rochel to fall for yibum to Shimon. (Shimon cannot perform a yibum at this time for Rochel is his wife’s sister.) Afterwards Shimon’s wife dies and now Rochel would be permitted to Shimon (since one’s wife’s sister is permitted to him after his wife dies). Shimon is still forbidden from performing a yibum with Rochel, his wife’s sister because once a yevamah is prohibited to the yavam, she is forbidden forever. (32a)

The Gemora asks a question on our Mishna based on a Mishna we had learned previously (30a). (The Mishna had stated: There were three brothers, Reuven, Shimon and Levi. Reuven and Shimon were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless, leaving his wife Rochel to fall for yibum to Shimon and Levi. Shimon cannot perform a yibum at this time for Rochel is his wife’s sister. Levi performed the yibum, and subsequently, Leah, Shimon’s wife died. Levi died childless, leaving his wife Rochel to fall for yibum again to Shimon. This time, however, she is not forbidden to Shimon because Shimon’s wife had died. The Mishna taught us that nevertheless, Shimon cannot perform a yibum with Rochel because once she was forbidden to Shimon, she remains forbidden to him forever.) The Gemora asks: If in the previous Mishna, when the yevamah was not completely rejected from this house (since she was permitted to Levi), nevertheless, we rule that she remains forbidden to the other brother (Shimon) forever; in our Mishna, where she is completely rejected from this house (for Shimon was the only brother), she should certainly remain forbidden to Shimon (even after his wife dies). Why was it necessary to teach this case?

The Gemora answers: Originally, the Tanna of the Mishna was of the opinion that only in our case would the yevamah remain forbidden because she was completely rejected from this house, however, in the case when she was not completely rejected from the house, the Tanna maintained that she would be permitted (he therefore omitted this case). Afterwards, the Tanna reversed his opinion and ruled that she would remain forbidden in both cases, even when she was not completely rejected from the house. Since this case was dear to him, he inserted it prior to the other ruling; and since the other ruling was taught already, it was not moved from its original place. (32a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: (Three were two brothers, Reuven and Shimon that were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless, leaving his wife Rochel to fall for yibum to Shimon. Shimon cannot perform a yibum at this time for Rochel is his wife’s sister.) If Shimon went ahead and cohabitated with Rochel (while his wife was still alive), he has violated two prohibitions; his brother’s wife and his wife’s sister. These are the words of Rabbi Yosi. Rabbi Shimon said: He is only liable for the prohibition against taking one’s brother’s wife.

The Gemora asks a contradiction from a braisa: Rabbi Shimon said: He is only liable for the prohibition against taking one’s wife’s sister.

The Gemora answers: The first braisa is referring to a case where the prohibition of the brother’s wife preceded the prohibition of the wife’s sister; the second braisa is discussing a case where the prohibition of the wife’s sister preceded the prohibition of the brother’s wife. (Rabbi Shimon holds that a prohibition cannot take effect on an existing prohibition.) (32a)

The Gemora asks on Rabbi Shimon: In the first braisa, where the wife’s sister prohibition does not take effect, why can’t Shimon perform a yibum in this case; the only prohibition is the brother’s wife and the mitzvah of yibum overrides that?

Rav Ashi answers: The wife’s sister prohibition is pending; if at any point in time, the brother’s wife prohibition is lifted, the prohibition of taking one’s wife’s sister will take effect. It is for this reason that the brother’s wife prohibition remains in effect. (32a)?

The Gemora discusses Rabbi Yosi’s opinion: Rabbi Yosi maintains that he is liable for two prohibitions; his brother’s wife and his wife’s sister. It emerges that Rabbi Yosi would hold that a prohibition can take effect on an existing prohibition.

The Gemora asks from a braisa: If one committed a transgression that entails two different death penalties, he receives the one that is stricter. Rabbi Yosi says: He incurs the first punishment. Rabbi Yosi explains in a different braisa: If the woman was first his mother-in-law and later became the wife of another man, he is subject to the mother-in-law prohibition. If the woman was first the wife of another man and later became his mother-in-law, he is subject to the wife of another man prohibition. Thus we see that Rabbi Yosi maintains that one prohibition does not take effect on an existing prohibition.

Rabbi Avahu answers: Rabbi Yosi maintains that one prohibition does not take effect on an existing prohibition; however, he agrees in a case that the second prohibition can take effect if it is a more extensive prohibition. (This explains why Rabbi Yosi maintains that if Shimon went ahead and cohabitated with Rochel, he has violated two prohibitions; his brother’s wife and his wife’s sister. When Shimon married, Rochel was forbidden to him on account of being his wife’s sister. When Reuven married Rochel, she became prohibited to the other brothers besides for Shimon. This prohibition includes more people, so it takes effect on Shimon as well. In a case where the second prohibition is not more extensive, Rabbi Yosi concedes that the second prohibition does not take effect. This would explain Rabbi Yosi’s opinion in the second braisa. A married woman is forbidden to the entire world; becoming his mother-in-law does not create any new prohibitions to any others. This is why the mother-in-law prohibition does not take effect. If she was his mother-in-law first and then she got married, the wife of another man prohibition will take effect. If he committed the transgression unintentionally, he will be required to bring two chatas offerings. If he sinned intentionally, he will be subject to two death penalties, but since he can only be executed once, he will receive the stricter type of execution.)

The Gemora asks: This would only be understandable in a case where the prohibition of the wife’s sister preceded the prohibition of the brother’s wife; since the brother’s wife prohibition includes more people (the brothers), it is deemed a more extensive prohibition and it will take effect. However, where the prohibition of the brother’s wife preceded the wife’s sister prohibition, why would Rabbi Yosi hold that the second prohibition takes effect?

Perhaps you will answer that the second prohibition does add more people; when Shimon marries his wife, he becomes prohibited to all her sisters besides the one who was already his brother’s wife. Let us say that Rochel will be subject to the wife’s sister prohibition besides the brother’s wife prohibition based on that? The Gemora states that this would not be considered an extensive prohibition (the forbidden object becomes prohibited to more people). This is an inclusive prohibition (more objects become forbidden to the same people) and Rabbi Yosi does not hold that the second prohibition takes effect when it is an inclusive one.

Rava answers: Although Rabbi Yosi maintains that he is liable for one prohibition (since the second one does not take effect), he is considered a completely wicked person (for violating two prohibitions) and will be buried in a cemetery reserved for those that were executed by burning or stoning. (32a – 32b)

[END]

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FROM THEIR MOUTHS AND NOT FROM THEIR WRITING - Yevamos 31 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that testimony is valid only from the mouths of the witnesses, not on the basis of any documents. It is evident that writing is not the same as talking.

The Gemora Chagigah (10b) cites Shmuel who states that one who resolves to make a vow must express the vow with his lips; otherwise, it is meaningless.

The Noda b’Yehudah (Y”D I: 66) inquires if an oath that was written down but not expressed would be valid as an oath. His underlying question is: Do we regard his written word as an expression of his lips?

This should be dependent on a dispute between the Rambam and Rabbeinu Tam regarding the validity of testimony from a written document. The Rambam maintains that testimony must be from the mouth of the witnesses and a document will not be Biblically acceptable for testimony. Rabbeinu Tam disagrees and holds that one who is physically capable of testifying may testify through the means of a document.

He concludes, however, that even the Rambam would agree that writing is considered testimony and yet, a written document cannot be accepted by Beis Din. The logic for this is as follows: An act of writing can constitute speech, but only during the time that it is being written. Beis Din will only accept an oral testimony when they hear it directly; hearsay is disqualified. Witnesses who signed a document are testifying, but Beis Din is not present at that time. If they would sign in front of Beis Din, that would be considered valid testimony.

With this principle, you can answer what would seemingly be a contradiction in the Rambam. He rules in Hilchos Eidus (3:7) that testimony must be from the mouth of the witnesses and a document will not be Biblically acceptable for testimony; yet later in Perek 9:11, he writes that one is required to testify with his mouth or at least that he is fitting to testify with his mouth. This would imply that if he is fitting to testify with his mouth, he would be permitted to testify through the means of a document. According to the Noda b’Yehudah’s explanation, it can be said that the Rambam allows witnesses to testify through the means of a document, but only if they sign the document when Beis Din is present. Accordingly, we can say that an oath taken through writing will be binding.

Reb Akiva Eiger discusses some other practical applications for this principle.

(http://weeklyshtikle.blogspot.com/2007/05/weekly-shtikle-emor.html) The Weekly Shtikle writes the following: The topic is the discussion as to whether or not writing may qualify as a valid means of fulfilling the mitzvah of Sefiras HaOmer. That is, if one was to write, "Hayom Yom X La'Omer," would that be sufficient to fulfill one's obligation and would this action disallow one from repeating the count with a brachah?

The discussion of this halachic quandary follows an interesting family tree. This issue is first dealt with in Shaalos uTeshuvos of R' Akiva Eiger, siman 29. The teshuvah is actually written by R' Akiva Eiger's uncle, R' Wolf Eiger. Unable to attend his nephew's wedding, he made a simultaneous banquet of his own to celebrate the occasion. He wrote to his nephew about this halachic issue which was discussed at the banquet. He cites a number of related issues which he builds together to try to reach a conclusion. The gemara (Yevamos 31b, Gittin 71a) teaches that witnesses may only testify by means of their mouths and not by writing. The gemara (Shabbos 153b) states that mutes should not separate Terumah because they cannot say the brachah. It is assumed that writing the brachah would not have been sufficient. Also, there is a discussion amongst the commentaries with regards to the validity of a vow that is written and not recited. R' Wolf Eiger concludes that writing is not a sufficient means of fulfilling the mitzvah of Sefiras HaOmer. However, this sparks a debate between him and his nephew which stretches out to siman 32.

This issue is eventually discussed in Shaalos uTeshuvos Kesav Sofer (Yoreh Dei'ah siman 106) by R' Avraham Shmuel Binyomin Sofer, R' Akiva Eiger's grandson who was, in fact, named after R' Wolf Eiger. He covers a host of related topics and eventually discusses the exchange recorded in his grandfather's sefer. The debate, although it encompasses various pertinent issues, never produces any concrete proof directly concerning the act of counting. However, Ksav Sofer quotes his father, Chasam Sofer, in his footnotes to Shaalos uTeshuvos R' Akiva Eiger (his father- in-law) where he provides a more concrete proof. The gemara (Yoma 22b) teaches that one who counts the number of B'nei Yisroel transgresses a prohibition as it is written (Hoshea 2:1) "And the number of B'nei Yisroel shall be like the sand of the sea that shall not be measured nor counted." The gemara cites two examples (Shmuel I 11:8, 15:4) where Shaul HaMelech went out of his way to avoid this prohibition by using pieces of clay or rams in order to perform a census. Chasam Sofer suggests that Shaul could simply have counted the men by writing down the numbers and not saying them. Since Shaul went to far greater lengths, we are compelled to say that writing the number of men would still have qualified as counting them and he would hot have sufficiently dodged the prohibition. Thus, concludes Chasam Sofer, if one has explicit intention to fulfill the mitzvah, writing is a valid means of performing the mitzvah of Sefiras HaOmer. However, Kesav Sofer suggests that perhaps the brachah should not be recited in this case.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 29 - Highlights

The Mishna states: Three were three brothers, Reuven, Shimon and Levi. If two of them (Reuven and Shimon) are married to two sisters, or to a woman and her daughter, or to a woman and her daughter's daughter, or to a woman and her son's daughter (and both Reuven and Shimon die childless), these two women require chalitzah, but they may not be taken in yibum (since each one of these women is an ervah from the other zekukah). Rabbi Shimon exempts even from chalitzah.

If one of the sisters was an ervah to one of the brothers, he would be prohibited from marrying her, but permitted to her sister.

If her prohibition is because of mitzvah or because of sanctity, they would require chalitzah but they may not be taken for yibum. (28b)

The Mishna had stated: If one of the sisters was an ervah to one of the brothers, he would be prohibited from marrying her, but permitted to her sister.

The Gemora asks: Why is this halacha in the Mishna repeated here; precisely the same halacha was taught in a previous Mishna (26a)?

The Gemora answers that it is necessary according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. He maintains that whenever two sisters fall for yibum to one yavam, they are excluded from yibum and chalitzah. One might possibly think that even if one of the sisters was an ervah to the yavam, the other sister should not be taken for yibum because we should be concerned that people will mistakenly think that you can perform a yibum with one of the sisters when there is no ervah; the Mishna teaches us that we do not institute such a decree and the brother may perform a yibum on the sister who is not an ervah. (28b)

The Mishna had stated: If her prohibition is because of mitzvah or because of sanctity, they would require chalitzah but they may not be taken for yibum.

The Gemora asks: If the latter portion of the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, why in this case would Rabbi Shimon require a chalitzah; Rabbi Shimon maintains that whenever two sisters fall for yibum to one brother, they are exempt from yibum and chalitzah, and here both women are Biblically falling for yibum to the brother (one of them is only Rabbinically forbidden); there should be no chalitzah requirement?

The Gemora answers: They were concerned that if these women would be released without a chalitzah, we would release a yevamah who is Rabbinically forbidden to the yavam even without chalitzah (in a regular case, when they aren’t sisters).

The Gemora asks: This is understandable regarding the Rabbinically forbidden woman herself, but why do we require a chalitzah to her sister?

The Gemora answers: It was decreed because of the Rabbinically forbidden woman. If we would release the sister without a chalitzah, this would result in people releasing the Rabbinically forbidden woman without chalitzah.

The Gemora asks: Why don’t we issue the same decree when one of the sisters is Biblically forbidden; there the halacha is that the sister can be taken for yibum or chalitzah, but the ervah is released outright, without even a chalitzah?

The Gemora answers: Everyone is learned regarding a Biblical ervah; they all know that she is exempt from yibum and chalitzah. This reason becomes publicized. Not everyone knows the laws regarding a Rabbinically forbidden woman and therefore chalitzah was required. (28b – 29a)

The Mishna states: There were three brothers, two of whom were married two sisters, and one is unmarried. If one of the husbands of the sisters died, and the bachelor performed a ma'amar, and afterwards his second brother died. Beis Shamai said: His wife stays with him, and the other is released because she is his wife's sister. (Beis Shamai maintains that ma’amar is Biblically valid.) Beis Hillel said: He must release his ma’amar-wife with a get (bill of divorce) and with chalitzah, and his brother's wife with chalitzah. This is what they said, “Woe unto him because of his wife and woe unto him because of his brother's wife.” (29a)

Rabbi Elozar said: Do not say that a ma’amar according to Beis Shamai accomplishes a complete acquisition of the yevamah, and if he would want to release her, it would be sufficient for him to give her a get (and not chalitzah); rather, the ma’amar accomplishes that her relatives are now Biblically forbidden to be taken for yibum.

Rabbi Avin attempts to bring support from the Mishna (26a) to Rabbi Elozar’s interpretation. The Mishna had stated: (There were four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those who were married to the sisters died; these sisters require chalitzah, but they cannot be taken for yibum. The reason to prohibit yibum in this case would be because each yevamah is the sister of his zekukah, the bond that exists between the yavam and the yevamah.) If the brothers married them, they are required to divorce them. Rabbi Eliezer states: There is actually an argument between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel regarding this matter. Beis Shamai maintains that the brother may remain married to the sisters and Beis Hillel disagrees.

It can be implied from Beis Shamai’s words that the brothers should not initially perform yibum with the sisters. Now, if a ma’amar according to Beis Shamai would accomplish a complete acquisition of the yevamah, and if he would want to release her, it would be sufficient for him to give her a get (and not chalitzah), let each brother perform a ma’amar with one sister (it is not forbidden to perform a ma’amar with a zekukah’s sister) acquiring her as a wife (which would render the sister as his wife’s sister, dissolving any zikah attachment with her; this would allow him to take his ma’amar wife for yibum), and then he will be permitted to take her for yibum. Since Beis Shamai does not allow this option, it is evident that ma’amar does not accomplish a complete acquisition of the yevamah.

The Gemora deflects this proof: Even if the ma’amar does not accomplish a complete acquisition; it at least accomplishes that the relatives of the ma’amar-wife are forbidden to him. Accordingly, the same question can be asked. Why can’t each brother perform a ma’amar with one sister, which would reject the other sister from him, and then he should be permitted to take the woman he performed ma’amar with for yibum.

It is apparent that only a permitted ma’amar (one where it would be permitted to perform a yibum) accomplishes that the relatives of the ma’amar-wife are forbidden to him, so too if you hold that a ma’amar accomplishes a complete acquisition, that is only when the ma’amar is a permitted one. (29a – 29b)

Rav Ashi taught the above discussion differently: Rabbi Elozar said: Do not say that a ma’amar according to Beis Shamai accomplishes a complete rejection of the yevamah’s relatives, and her sister would not even require a chalitzah; rather, the ma’amar accomplishes that she will not become forbidden on account of being a zekukah’s sister, and that her sister will be Biblically forbidden to be taken for yibum, but she will require a chalitzah.

Rabbi Avin attempts to bring support from the Mishna (26a) to Rabbi Elozar’s interpretation. The Mishna had stated: (There were four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those who were married to the sisters died; these sisters require chalitzah, but they cannot be taken for yibum. The reason to prohibit yibum in this case would be because each yevamah is the sister of his zekukah, the bond that exists between the yavam and the yevamah.) If the brothers married them, they are required to divorce them. Rabbi Eliezer states: There is actually an argument between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel regarding this matter. Beis Shamai maintains that the brother may remain married to the sisters and Beis Hillel disagrees.

It can be implied from Beis Shamai’s words that the brothers should not initially perform yibum with the sisters. Now, if a ma’amar according to Beis Shamai would accomplish a complete a complete rejection of the yevamah’s relatives, and her sister would not even require a chalitzah, let each brother perform a ma’amar with one sister (it is not forbidden to perform a ma’amar with a zekukah’s sister) acquiring her as a wife, which would thereby reject the second sister from himself and then he will be permitted to take his ma’amar-wife for yibum. Since Beis Shamai does not allow this option, it is evident that ma’amar does not accomplish a complete rejection of the ma’amar-wife’s sister.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Beis Shamai state in our Mishna that in the case where there were three brothers, two of whom were married two sisters, and one is unmarried. If one of the husbands of the sisters died, and the bachelor performed a ma'amar, and afterwards his second brother died. Beis Shamai said: His wife stays with him, and the other is released because she is his wife's sister. We see that the ma’amar-wife’s sister is released completely and does not require chalitzah?

This version of Rabbi Elozar is thus refuted.

The Gemora explains the reason of the other Mishna why each one of the brothers cannot perform a ma’amar with one of the sisters and then take her for yibum. Any yevamah who is not eligible for a complete yibum will not be eligible for a partial yibum, i.e. ma’amar either. (In that Mishna, the two sisters were widowed together and they each became forbidden on account of being a zekukah’s sister. Since they cannot be taken for yibum, ma’amar will not be fully effected either. In our Mishna, at the time that the yavam performed a ma’amar, there was only one widow and she could have been taken for yibum; here, the ma’amar is effective and later when the other sister falls for yibum, she is completely rejected on account of being his ma’amar-wife’s sister and is released without chalitzah or yibum.) (29b)

[END]

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CONVERSIONS BY REB JAY - Yevamos 28 (actually 24) - Daf Yomi

A conversion must be done lishma, i.e, with the desire of accepting the Torah and joining Klal Yisroel. Therefore, one cannot convert for marriage or any other external reason.

Because of this, during certain periods in Jewish history, converts were not accepted. For example, during the reign of Dovid Hamelech, converts were not accepted due to a concern that their acceptance was based on fear (due to the strength of Dovid’s army). Similarly, during the days of Shlomo Hamelech there were no conversions due to a concern that the conversions were based on a desire for prestige (as Klal Yisroel at that time was considered to be the jewel of the world).

The Rambam notes that although technically converts were not accepted at these times, there were Beis Din Hedyotos (Common Courts) that did accept converts. How was the status of these converts resolved?

The Rambam writes that their status was pending; if they saw after a period of time that these converts were still keeping the mitzvos, it could be assumed that their conversion was legitimate, and they were considered to be Jews retroactive to their conversion (meaning, for example, if it was a woman who had a child during the waiting period, the child was considered to be Jewish).

Perhaps we can use this principle to understand a difficulty in MegilasRus. Boaz married Rus as a redeemer of the property of Noami (and Rus was an extension of this due to her being the wife of the cousin of Boaz--Machlon). However, if Rus was a converts, then we know that a converts is regarded like a newborn baby, and any prior status - which in the case of Rus would include her marriage to Machlon - should be negated?

Using the principle of the Rambam we can say that Rus initially converted prior to marrying Machlon; however, there were doubts regarding her conversion (as it appeared that it was done for marriage). Therefore, her conversion had a probation period, and once she decided to follow Noami, it was retroactively revealed that her initial conversion (at the time of her marriage) was legitimate, and she fell under the category of things that could be redeemed by a redeemer (Boaz).

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 28 - Highlights

Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina asks on Rabbi Yochanan (who maintains that any yevamah that we cannot apply the verse “her yavam shall cohabit with her” at the time that she fell for yibum is regarded as a wife of a brother who has children and will be forbidden to the yavam forever) from a Mishna. The Mishna (26a) states: There were four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those who were married to the sisters died; these sisters require chalitzah, but they cannot be taken for yibum. (The reason to prohibit yibum in this case would be because each yevamah is the sister of his zekukah, the bond that exists between the yavam and the yevamah.) Why don’t we say that one of the brothers should perform a chalitzah with the second widow in order that the one widowed first will be regarded, towards the other brother, as a yevamah who was originally permitted (when she fell to yibum alone), then forbidden (when her sister fell for yibum, resulting in a prohibition of a zekukah’s sister), and then permitted again (when the zikah of her sister dissolved due to the chalitzah performed with her sister)?

Rabbi Yochanan replied: I do not know who taught the Mishna regarding the two sisters; it is not authoritative.

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t Rabbi Yochanan respond to him that the Mishna is referring to a case where the brother performed a chalitzah with the first widow; the second widow may not be taken in yibum because she was always forbidden?

The Gemora objects to this interpretation: The Mishna had stated that they require chalitzah; it is evident that they both require chalitzah and there is no option for avoiding this.

The Gemora asks: Rabbi Yochanan could have responded that the only reason that the Mishna ruled that both sisters require chalitzah is because the Rabbis were concerned that if they would rule that chalitzah can be performed with the second widow and then the other brother can perform a yibum with the first widow, perhaps they will reverse the order and perform chalitzah on the first widow and take the second widow for yibum (which is forbidden because she was always prohibited).

The Gemora rejects this proposal: The Mishna had stated that they both cannot be taken in yibum; this would indicate that there is no possibility of yibum at all even if chalitzah is performed with the second widow first.

The Gemora asks: Rabbi Yochanan could have answered that the Mishna is referring to a case where both widows fell at precisely the same moment, and we are following the viewpoint of Rabbi Yosi Hagelili who maintains that two things can happen at the exact same time?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna would not issue an anonymous ruling according to Rabbi Yosi Hagelili (since his viewpoint is a minority opinion and rejected by most of the other Sages).

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t Rabbi Yochanan respond to him that the Mishna is referring to a case where we are uncertain which of the widows fell for yibum first, and that would explain why we cannot first perform a chalitzah with the second widow and the other brother would then perform a yibum with the widow that fell for yibum first?

The Gemora answers: This would raise a difficulty with a different portion of the Mishna. The Mishna had stated: If the brothers married them, they are required to divorce them. If we are uncertain which widow fell for yibum first, it is understandable why the first brother who performed a yibum would be required to divorce the sister, but let the second brother claim that he married the first widow and thereby he would be permitted to remain married to this sister. The Gemora concludes: This explains why Rabbi Yochanan told Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina that he does not know who taught the Mishna regarding the two sisters; it is not authoritative. (27b – 28a)

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Eliezer states: There is actually an argument between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel regarding this matter. Beis Shamai maintains that the brothers may remain married to the sisters and Beis Hillel disagrees.

The Gemora cites a braisa which lists various opinions regarding this matter: Rabbi Eliezer said: Beis Shamai maintains that the brothers may remain married to the sisters and Beis Hillel holds that they are required to divorce them. Rabbi Shimon says: The brothers may remain married to them. Abba Shaul said: Actually, Beis Hillel issued the lenient opinion in this matter for Beis Shamai maintains that the brother are required to divorce them and Beis Hillel holds that they may remain married to the sisters.

The Gemora explains Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: He maintains that Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel did not dispute this matter and both schools were of the opinion that the brothers may remain married to the sisters. (28a)

The Mishna had stated: If one of the sisters was prohibited because of mitzvah or because of sanctity, her sister would require chalitzah but she is not taken for yibum.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t we learn an identical ruling to this in a Mishna above (20a)? The Mishna there said: They stated a general rule concerning the yevamah: Whoever is prohibited to the yavam because of an ervah is exempt from chalitzah and yibum. If her prohibition is because of mitzvah or because of sanctity, she would require chalitzah but she is not taken for yibum.

The Gemora answers: The first Mishna taught us that a yevamah who is Rabbinically forbidden to the yavam may not be taken for yibum; our Mishna teaches us that a sister of a Rabbinically prohibited yevamah may not be taken for yibum since she is considered a zekukah’s sister.

We might have thought that in this case, where the yevamah is Rabbinically forbidden to the yavam, the Rabbis would make an exception and permit the sister of the zekukah; the Mishna teaches us that she is still forbidden. (28a – 28b)

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav and it was taught in the braisa of Rabbi Chiya: The following teaching can apply to the fifteen cases of the Mishna: The one who is forbidden to one brother will be permitted to the other brother, and her sister, who is also a yevamah can do chalitzah or be taken in yibum.

The case is as follows: There were four brothers; two of them, Reuven and Shimon were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. If Reuven and Shimon died, the remaining two brothers (Levi and Yehudah) cannot perform a yibum with any of them because each one of these women is attached to every potential yavam with a zikah, an attachment on the account of yibum. The Rabbis decreed that one cannot marry the sister of a zekukah (the woman who is attached to the yavam) because a zekukah is similar to a wife and one is not permitted to marry his wife’s sister.

If Rochel was an ervah to Levi (his mother-in-law) and Leah was an ervah to Yehudah; Levi can perform yibum with Leah and Yehudah can perform yibum with Rochel. In this case, the sisters are not forbidden because there is only a zikah from one man to one woman (since an ervah removes the zikah).

According to Rav Yehuda, the Tanna of our Mishna (26a) can only be referring to the last nine arayos listed in the first Mishna, but not to the first six (such as his daughter). The reason is because those six cases cannot occur unless the daughter was born through the violation of her mother (If Levi and Yehudah’s daughters are sisters, they obviously have the same mother; Levi and Yehudah could not possibly marry the same woman); and the Mishna is discussing cases of marriage, not cases of violation.

Abaye states that the Mishna can be referring to the first six cases because the Mishna has no compunctions discussing cases of violation. It is not discussing the case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world because that would involve a disagreement (Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis) and the Mishna does not involve itself with disputed cases.

Rav Safra states that the Mishna can be discussing the case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, but only in the following scenario: There were six brothers all together. Originally, there were four, and two of them, Reuven and Shimon were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless and then a fifth brother, Yissochar was born. (Rochel is forbidden to Yissochar on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world.) Levi, the third brother, performed a yibum with Rochel and subsequently, Shimon died childless. (Yissochar can perform a yibum with Leah because he was alive together with Shimon.) A sixth brother, Zevulun was now born. (Rochel is not forbidden to Zevulun on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world because when he was born she was married to Levi. Leah is forbidden to Zevulun on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world.) Yehudah performed a yibum with Leah. Levi and Yehudah then died childless. The Rabbis maintain that each one is forbidden to the surviving brothers on the account of being the wife of their brother who was not in this world (because of the initial marriage). Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that the remaining brothers can perform yibum or chalitzah (he is concerned only with the last marriage). (28b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 27 - Highlights

Shmuel said: If there were three brothers, two of them were married to two sisters and they each had another wife as well. The two brothers died childless, leaving their wives available for yibum to the third brother. If he performs chalitzah with the sisters, the co-wives are not released and are still in a zikah situation (the chalitzah to the sisters is a deficient chalitzah because they cannot be taken for yibum and a deficient chalitzah does not exempt the co-wives). If he performed chalitzah with the co-wives, the sisters are released from their attachment to the yavam. (The Gemora will explain why the chalitzos are not deemed to be deficient in this case as well.)

Shmuel rules regarding another case: There were two brothers, one of them had two wives and died childless. The yavam gave a get (bill of divorce) to one of the women. He is now prohibited from performing yibum with any of these women, but he is required to perform a chalitzah. (Although giving a get to a yevamah does not accomplish anything (for the Torah prescribes only a yibum or a chalitzah with a yevamah), the Rabbis decreed that it should be treated similar to a chalitzah.) If the yavam performs a chalitzah with the woman who received the get, the co-wife is not released; however if he performed chalitzah with the co-wife, the woman who received the get is released.

Shmuel issued a third ruling: If a yavam performs a ma’amar with one of the widows and then he decides to release her, she needs a get and a chalitzah. If the yavam performs a chalitzah with the woman who received the ma’amar, the co-wife is not released. If he performs a chalitzah with the co-wife, the woman who received the ma’amar is released. (27a)

The Gemora asks on Shmuel’s first ruling: (If there were three brothers, two of them were married to two sisters and they each had another wife as well. The two brothers died childless, leaving their wives available for yibum to the third brother. If he performs chalitzah with the sisters, the co-wives are not released and are still in a zikah situation. If he performed chalitzah with the co-wives, the sisters are released from their attachment to the yavam.) Why are the co-wives not released when he performed chalitzah with the sisters? It is because each sister is regarded as a wife’s sister because of the zikah-attachment. Since they cannot be taken for yibum, their chalitzah is considered deficient and does not exempt their co-wives. Accordingly, the same logic should apply in the case when he performed a chalitzah with the co-wives. It is also forbidden to perform a yibum with the co-wives of a wife’s sister through zikah. Why does Shmuel rule that chalitzah performed with the co-wives releases the sisters; their chalitzah is deficient as well?

The Gemora answers: Shmuel is following the opinion of the one that says that there is no zikah-attachment. (The sisters would not be similar to a wife’s sister and the chalitzah with the co-wives is not deficient.)

The Gemora asks: If so, why does a chalitzah to the sisters not release the co-wives, the chalitzah should be legitimate if there is no zikah-attachment? The Gemora clarifies its question: (the example given is where he initially performs a chalitzah with Leah and then with the other sister Rochel) It is understandable that the co-wife of Rochel, who received chalitzah second, should not be released because Rochel’s chalitzah was deficient; she is a sister of a chalutzah, namely Leah, and she could not have been taken for yibum. However, the Gemora does not understand why the co-wife of Leah should not be released. If Shmuel is following the opinion who holds that there is no zikah-attachment, Leah could have been taken for yibum; her chalitzah is completely legitimate and should release her co-wife?

The Gemora concedes that Shmuel only meant to rule regarding the co-wife of the second sister, Rochel; she has not been released from the yavam. The co-wife of the first sister, Leah, to have chalitzah is released, and she is permitted to marry another man.

The Gemora asks: If when Shmuel mentioned the “co-wives,” he is referring specifically to Rochel’s co-wife, let us examine Shmuel’s next statement. Shmuel said: If he performed chalitzah with the co-wives, the sisters are released from their attachment to the yavam. Why would Rochel, the second sister, be released on account of the chalitzah performed with her co-wife; the chalitzah performed with the co-wife is deficient because she is the co-wife of his chalutzah’s forbidden relative (Leah’s sister’s co-wife)?

The Gemora explains Shmuel’s statements differently: Shmuel’s first statement is as follows: If the yavam began with one of the sisters (he performed chalitzah with Leah), he may not complete the sequence by performing chalitzah with one of the co-wives since she is forbidden to be taken for yibum on account of being the co-wife of his chalutzah’s forbidden relative. Shmuel’s second statement is as follows: If the yavam began with one of the co-wives (he performed chalitzah with Leah’s co-wife), he may complete the sequence by performing chalitzah with the other sister, Rochel. Performing a chalitzah with Rochel will release Rochel’s co-wife as well. This is because we learned in a Mishna that one is permitted to perform a yibum with the relative of his chalutzah’s co-wife. (27a)

Rav Ashi presents a different explanation of Shmuel’s statements: (Shmuel’s statements are to be understood literally and his ruling is based on his opinion that there is a zikah-attachment. Shmuel’s first statement is that if he performs chalitzah with the sisters, the co-wives are not released and are still in a zikah situation. This is because the chalitzah to the sisters are deficient because they cannot be taken for yibum and a deficient chalitzah does not exempt the co-wives. Shmuel’s second statement is that if he performed chalitzah with the co-wives, the sisters are released from their attachment to the yavam.) The Gemora above questioned this; it is forbidden to perform a yibum with the co-wives of a wife’s sister through zikah. Why does Shmuel rule that chalitzah performed with the co-wives releases the sisters; their chalitzah is deficient as well? Rav Ashi answers that although their chalitzah is deficient, it is a superior chalitzah than that of one performed with the zekukah’s sister. The prohibition pertaining to the zekukah’s sister is more severe than the prohibition regarding the co-wife of the zekukah’s sister. Hence, Shmuel rules that the inferior chalitzah (one performed with the zekukah’s sister does not release the co-wives, whereas a superior chalitzah (although it is also deficient) performed with the co-wife of the zekukah’s sister will in fact release the sister from a chalitzah.

The Gemora attempts to offer support for Rav Ashi from a braisa, but it is ultimately rejected. (27a)

The Gemora inquires: There were two brothers and one died childless, leaving two widows for yibum. The yavam performed ma’amar with one of them and gave a get to the other one. (He now cannot perform a yibum with either.) Which woman should he perform chalitzah with (and will thus release her co-wife)? Should he perform chalitzah with the woman who received the get because he already initiated a chalitzah (rejection through the get) to her or should he perform the chalitzah with the one who received the ma’amar because she is closer to cohabitating with the yavam than the co-wife?

Rav Ashi said: Let us learn from the following braisa: Rabban Gamliel admits that a get (to one widow) has validity after a ma’amar (to the co-wife), and the yavam will be prohibited from performing a yibum with them or marrying the get-recipient’s relatives. He also admits that a ma’amar (to one widow) has validity after a get (to the co-wife), and the yavam will be prohibited from marrying the ma’amar-recipient’s relatives. (Rabban Gamliel and the Chachamim disagree regarding a ma’amar after a ma’amar and a get after a get.) The Gemora states: If a get is superior, the ma’amar should not have any validity after the get; if ma’amar is superior, the ma’amar should not have any validity after the get? It is evident that they are regarded as equal and neither would take precedence over the other. (27a – 27b)

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: There were two brothers who were married to two sisters. Reuven died first and then Shimon died. Both of their widows fall for yibum to a third brother, Levi. If Levi performs a chalitzah with Reuven’s widow, she is released. If he then performs a chalitzah with Shimon’s widow, she is released. (The same halacha would be true if he reversed the order.) If the first widow dies (dissolving the zikah from her), the yavam may perform a yibum with the second widow. (Even though, the second widow was initially forbidden to Levi on account that she was his zekukah’s sister, Rav maintains that she can subsequently become permitted, provided that the zikah has dissolved.) It is not necessary to state that if the second widow would die that he may perform a yibum with the first widow because she is a yevamah who was originally permitted (when she fell to yibum alone), then forbidden (when her sister fell for yibum, resulting in a prohibition of a zekukah’s sister), and then permitted again (when the zikah of her sister dissolved due to her death).

Rabbi Yochanan disagrees: If the second widow would die, he may perform a yibum with the first widow; however if the first widow dies, the yavam may not perform a yibum with the second widow. Why not? Any yevamah that we cannot apply the verse “her yavam shall cohabit with her” at the time that she fell for yibum is regarded as a wife of a brother who has children and will be forbidden to the yavam forever.

The Gemora states that Rav actually holds of this principle as well, but only regarding a Biblical ervah such as a wife’s sister. If the yevamah is the yavam’s wife sister and subsequently, his wife dies (resulting in the fact that the yevamah does not have the prohibition of a wife’s sister any longer), he may not perform a yibum with her because she was forbidden to him at the time that she fell for yibum and remains forbidden forever. However, in our case, where the prohibition is merely Rabbinic in nature (the zekukah’s sister), Rav maintains that she can become permitted to him at a later time. (27b)

[END]

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Second Wife - Yevamos 26 - Daf Yomi

The Mishna states: And all of them (an agent who brings a bill of divorce from overseas, one who testifies about a wife that her husband had died and the sage who did not release the wife from her vow causing the husband to divorce her); if they had wives at that time and subsequently they died, they are permitted to marry those women (since they were married at the time, people will not suspect that they acted in order to marry them).

Why should them having a wife prevent people from suspecting that they acted in that way in order to marry those women; wasn't taking a second wife permitted in the times of the Mishna? (As a member of my Daf Yomi shiur said: The Mishnayos in Yevamos would be much easier if they were only permitted one wife.)

The Maharshal in Yam shel Shlomo answers: Since he is presently married, we apply the chazaka that a man does not place his eyes on another man's wife because he has "bread in his basket."

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MITZVAH OF YIBUM - WHO HAS THE OBLIGATION? - Yevamos 26 - Daf Yomi

The Rambam in his Sefer HaMitzvos (216) writes that there is a commandment for the yavam to perform a yibum with his brother’s wife when his brother died childless.

The Minchas Chinuch (1:15) states that it is implicit from the Rambam that he maintains that the mitzvah of yibum is an obligation for the man (the yavam) and not for the woman (the yevamah).

The Chinuch (Mitzvah 598 and 599) states explicitly that the mitzvah of yibum is only applicable to men and not to women.

The Minchas Chinuch cites a Pnei Yehoshua in Kesuvos (40a) that the mitzvah of yibum also applies to the yevamah.

Why should there be an obligation for the yevamah; the Torah explicitly states that the brother should marry his brother’s wife. It is not written anywhere that she shall be taken for yibum?

Reb Ezriel Cziment, in his sefer Mitzvos Hamelech answers: Besides the mitzvah of performing a yibum, there is also an obligation to establish a name for the deceased. It is this mitzvah that the yevamah plays an integral role in and she is thus included in the mitzvah obligation.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 26 - Highlights

The Mishna states: And all of them (an agent who brings a bill of divorce from overseas, one who testifies about a wife that her husband had died and the sage who did not release the wife from her vow causing the husband to divorce her); if they had wives at that time and subsequently they died, they are permitted to marry those women (since they were married at the time, people will not suspect that they acted in order to marry them).

And all of them (these women); if they married others and were divorced or became widows, they are permitted to be married to those men.

And all of them are permitted to their sons, or to their brothers. (26a)

The Mishna had stated: If they had wives at that time and subsequently they died, they are permitted to marry those women (since they were married at the time, people will not suspect that they acted in order to marry them).

The Gemora asks: The Mishna implies that they are permitted to marry those women if their wives died, but not if they were divorced. But we learnt in a braisa: Even if they divorced they are permitted to marry them?

The Gemora answers: It is no contradiction. Our Mishna is discussing a case where there was previous friction (in his marriage, and the divorce was not on account of the rumored incident), and the braisa is referring to a case where there was no previous friction (and the divorce could be because of the alleged incident; he is then prohibited from marrying her).

Alternatively, we can answer that in both cases, there was no previous friction, but the braisa is discussing a case where he started the fight, thus we suspect that he is looking for an excuse to divorce, and therefore he may not marry the woman, whereas the Mishna is discussing a case where she started the fight, and there is therefore no reason to assume that he planned the divorce in order to marry the woman. (26a)

The Mishna had stated: And all of them are permitted to their sons, or to their brothers.

The Gemora asks: How is this case different from that which was learnt in a braisa: One who is suspected of adultery with a woman is forbidden to marry her mother, daughter, and sister? (The reason for this prohibition is because this marriage might bring him closer to that woman.)

The Gemora answers: Women are accustomed to visit other women (and we are therefore concerned that he will continue his relationship with the woman when she comes to visit his wife), but men are not accustomed to visit other men (and therefore we are not concerned that she will come into contact with that man again).

Alternatively, women, who live with other women’s husbands do not cause the husband to become prohibited to his wife, and therefore the wives are not so concerned about the continued relationship, whereas men, who live with other men’s wives do cause the wives to become prohibited to their husbands, the husbands are concerned about other men being involved with their wives and therefore we permit the woman to marry his relative since the relative will not allow his wife to continue the relationship. (26a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, KEITZAD

The Mishna states: There were four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those who were married to the sisters died; these sisters require chalitzah, but they cannot be taken for yibum. (The only reason to prohibit yibum in this case would be because each yevamah is the sister of his zekukah, the bond that exists between the yavam and the yevamah.) If the brothers married them, they are required to divorce them. Rabbi Eliezer states: There is actually an argument between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel regarding this matter. Beis Shamai maintains that the brother may remain married to the sisters and Beis Hillel disagrees.

If one of the sisters was an ervah to one of the brothers, he would be prohibited from marrying her, but permitted to her sister; the other brother would be prohibited to marry both of them. (The case is as follows: Two brothers (Reuven and Shimon) married two sisters Rochel and Leah), and the two husbands died childless. The sisters fall for yibum to Levi and Yehudah, and one of the sisters is prohibited to Levi because she is an ervah (a former daughter-in-law). The ervah’s sister requires chalitzah or is married by yibum. Normally, if two sisters fall before the yavam for yibum, both are prohibited from marrying him as his yevamah, since each is the sister of a zekukah, and she has the status of his wife's sister. In this case, however, in which one of the women is prohibited to the yavam by a prohibition of ervah, and therefore there is no zikah between her and the yavam, he is permitted to marry her sister by yibum, because she is not the sister of a zekukah. Both of them are forbidden to Yehudah.)

If one of the sisters was prohibited because of mitzvah or because of sanctity, her sister would require chalitzah but she is not taken for yibum.

If one of the sisters (Rochel) was an ervah to one of the brothers (Levi) and the other sister (Leah) was an ervah to the other brother (Yehudah), the law is as follows: The one (Rochel) who is forbidden to this one (Levi) is permitted to the other brother (Yehudah), and the one (Leah) who is forbidden to this one (Yehudah) is permitted to the other brother (Levi). This case is where they say: Her sister who is her fellow yevamah would require chalitzah or yibum. (26a)

The Gemora states: Our Mishna obviously indicates that zikah (an attachment on the account of yibum, which would create halachos similar to marriage) exists between the yevamah and the yavam, for if you will say that no zikah exists, each yevamah is coming from two different houses, and one brother could marry the one while the other could marry the other?

The Gemora answers: Actually the Mishna could maintain that no zikah exists, but nevertheless, it would be forbidden to perform yibum with each of the widows. This is because a yibum with one can annul the precept of yibum with the other; if one of the brothers performs yibum with one sister and the other brother dies, there would be no possibility of yibum or chalitzah with her (since she is the yavam’s wife’s sister) and this would have negated the mitzvah of yibum with her.

The Gemora asks: If so, the Mishna should have stated a case where there were only three brothers (The case is as follows: Two brothers (Reuven and Shimon) married two sisters Rochel and Leah), and the two husbands died childless. The sisters fall for yibum to a third brother Levi. If Levi performs a yibum with one of them, he would negate the mitzvah of yibum with the other because she would be his wife’s sister.)?

The Gemora answers: There is a novelty in the case of four brothers that we would not have learned if the Mishna had only stated the case of three brothers. In the case of three brothers, a yibum to one of the sisters automatically negates a mitzvah of yibum with the other, whereas in the case of four brothers, it is merely a possibility that a yibum with one can negate the mitzvah of yibum with the other sister, namely if the other brother dies. The Mishna is teaching us that even when it is not a certainty, we still are concerned.

The Gemora asks: If so, let the Mishna teach a case regarding five brothers?

The Gemora answers: We are not concerned that two of the brothers will die. (26a – 26b)

Rabbah bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: Three sisters who are sisters-in-law (they were married to three brothers) who fall for yibum before two brothers, one brother performs chalitzah to one of them, the other brother performs chalitzah to a different one of them, and the middle one (the other sister) requires chalitzah from both of them.

Rabbah said to Rabbah bar Rav Huna: By the fact that you ruled that the middle one (the other sister) requires chalitzah from both of them, it is evident that you hold that there is a zikah-attachment between the widows and the brothers, and you must hold that the chalitzah performed with the middle sister is a deficient chalitzah (because she cannot be taken for yibum since she is the sister of his chalutzah), and a deficient chalitzah requires that she goes for chalitzah to all of the brothers.

If so, the first two sisters also should be required to have chalitzah with each of the brothers (since they could not be taken for yibum on account of being a sister of his zekukah)?

The Gemora answers: If they fell for yibum simultaneously, you would be correct. The case is speaking about that one brother died first. One of the brothers performed a chalitzah with her. Then, another brother died, and the other brother performed a chalitzah with her. (Each of those chalitzos was a proper full chalitzah because they could have taken her in yibum and therefore only one chalitzah from one of the brothers is required.) When the third brother died, his wife could not be taken in yibum; she will need a chalitzah from both brothers. (26b)

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Ri from Orleans - Daf Yomi - Yevamos 25

Rabbi Gil Student has an interesting discussion regarding one of the baalei haTosfos, the Ri from Orleans.

An occasional name we find in the Tosafos commentary on the Talmud is R. Yosef (Ri) from Orleans. He was a twelfth century student of R. Ya'akov (Rabbenu Tam) and is mentioned in Tosafos to the tractates Shabbos, Yevamos, Bava Basra, Zevahim and Hullin. However, on two occasions we find something quite unusual happening. In Tosafos to Yevamos 25b (top), an explanation is given in the name of the Ri from Orleans. In Tosafos to Makkos 6a (sv. nirva), the same answer is attributed to R. Yosef Bekhor Shor. Similarly, the same explanation is given in Tosafos to Hullin 112b (sv. ve-dagim) by Ri from Orleans and in Semak (no. 205) by R. Yosef Bekhor Shor.

Because of this, Victor Aptowitzer (Mavo Le-Ra'avyah, ch. 8 sv. R. Yosi br' Yitzhak pp. 351-352 n. 2) cites scholars who debate whether R. Yosef Bekhor Shor was the same person as R. Yosef (Ri) from Orleans. Aptowitzer himself argued that they were different people, but remained uncertain on this point. In support of distinguishing between the two, the Pane'ah Raza is cited who quoted contradictory comments from both Ri of Orleans and R. Yosef Bekhor Shor, strongly implying that they are two different people.

Ephraim Urbach, who has generally become the final authority on these matters, concludes that they were the same person (Ba'alei Ha-Tosafos, vol. 1 p. 134). Among his proofs was an incident that occurred regarding a man who semi-married (mekadesh) a nursing woman, attributed to Ri from Orleans in Tosafos to Yevamos 36b (sv. ve-lo) and R. Yosef Bekhor Shor in Tosafos Shantz to Sotah 24a (and elsewhere).

Yehoshafat Nevo, in his introduction to the Mossad Ha-Rav Kook edition of the Bekhor Shor's commentary on the Torah, states that the Pane'ah Raza is frequently imprecise in his attribution of sources. Therefore, he suggests, the Pane'ah Raza's differentiating between Ri from Orleans and R. Yosef Bekhor is unreliable.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 25 - Highlights

The Mishna had stated: If one was accused of cohabitating with a married woman, and Beis Din forced her husband to divorce her; if he (accused adulterer) subsequently marries her, he is required to divorce her (because she is Biblically forbidden to him).

Rav said: The Mishna is referring to a case where there were two witnesses that the adulterer committed the alleged act (and that is when he would be compelled to divorce her).

Rav Sheishes said: It would seem that Rav said this when he was drifting off to sleep (for otherwise, he would never have said it). Because it was taught in a braisa: If one was accused of cohabitating with a married woman, and Beis Din forced her husband to divorce her; she subsequently married another man and was later divorced from him; if the accused adulterer marries her, we do not force him to divorce her. The Gemora analyzes the case; if there were witnesses who observed the adultery, why should it make a difference that there was a marriage in between and the rumors had ceased, she is still forbidden to the adulterer? If there were no witnesses, and the reason that she is permitted to remain married to him is because of the marriage in between; we can infer from here that if she didn’t get married beforehand, we would require the adulterer to divorce her even though there were no witnesses. This is inconsistent with Rav’s opinion.

The Gemora answers: The halacha would be the same even without the marriage in between; if there are no witnesses, we do not force him to divorce her. The braisa is teaching us that even after the marriage to another, the adulterer is still forbidden l’chatchila to marry her.

The Gemora asks on Rav from another braisa: The accused adulterer must divorce the woman if she didn’t have children from the first marriage, but if she did have children, we do not force him to divorce her (because the divorce will give credibility to the original rumor and this will cause her children to be considered mamzeirim); however, if there were witnesses that observed the adultery, he must divorce her even if there are children from the first marriage. We can infer from this braisa that if there are no witnesses and there are no children, the adulterer is required to divorce her. This is inconsistent with Rav’s opinion.

The Gemora answers: Rav understands our Mishna to be referring to a case where there are children and there are witnesses, the adulterer would be required to divorce her. However, Rav would agree that if there are no children, he will be required to divorce her even in the absence of witnesses.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that the braisos mentioned above are following the opinion of Rebbe; Rav disagrees. It was taught in a braisa: Rebbe said: If a perfume peddler is leaving a house and the wife is found tying on her undergarments, her husband is required to divorce her since the incident indicates that adultery was committed. If a perfume peddler is leaving a house and saliva is found on top of the bed, her husband is required to divorce her since the incident indicates that adultery was committed. If a perfume peddler is leaving a house and overturned shoes are found under the bed, her husband is required to divorce her since the incident indicates that adultery was committed. (It emerges from the braisa that Rebbe holds that the husband is required to divorce his wife on the basis of a rumor, and the braisa which rules that the adulterer must divorce her even when there are no witnesses is in accordance with Rebbe.)

The Gemora rules that the halacha follows the opinion of Rav and the halacha follows the opinion of Rebbe.

The Gemora asks: How can we rule like Rav and Rebbe; these rulings contradict each other?

The Gemora answers: We rule in accordance with Rebbe in a case where there is a continuous rumor even though there are no witnesses; he is required to divorce her. We rule in accordance with Rav in a case where the rumor ceased (because of a counter-rumor); he is required to divorce her if there are witnesses.

The Gemora asks: How long must a rumor persist in order for it to be taken seriously?

Abaye answers: My mother (nursemaid) told me: A day and a half.

The Gemora qualifies this statement: This is only if the rumor persists throughout the first day and a half; if there was a counter-rumor which quieted the first rumor during that time, the first rumor is not regarded as viable.

A counter-rumor negates the original rumor only if the counter-rumor did not come about on account of fear (due to the adulterer), but if it came about because of fear, it does not negate the original rumor.

If the woman or the accused adulterer has enemies, we can disregard the rumor. (24b – 25a)

The Mishna states: If an agent brings a bill of divorce from overseas, and he said: “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed,” he may not marry his wife. (Since the validity of the divorce depends upon his testimony, it will appear suspicious if he marries her.)

If one would testify that the man died or that he killed him or that we killed him, he may not marry his wife. Rabbi Yehudah said: If he said “I killed him,” the woman may not remarry at all (a testimony that establishes himself as a sinner is not valid). If he said that we killed him, she may remarry. (25a)

The Gemora infers from the Mishna that if the agent would come from Eretz Yisroel, he would be permitted to marry her even if he said: “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed.” (His testimony is not required when the get is from Eretz Yisroel.)

The Gemora asks: But in the case where he testified that the husband died, he may not marry her even though it is not his testimony that is allowing the wife to remarry; for we have learned that it is the woman’s careful investigation that we rely upon, and nevertheless, we rule that the witness cannot marry her?

The Gemora answers: There is a clear distinction between the two cases. When he testifies that the husband died, there is no document attesting to that fact. His testimony supports the woman’s investigation and therefore he cannot marry her. However, when the agent brings the get from Eretz Yisroel, there is a written document. His testimony is completely superfluous and therefore he may marry the woman. (25a)

The Mishna had stated: If one would testify that the man died or that he killed him or that we killed him, he may not marry his wife. We can infer from there that his testimony is valid and others may marry her.

The Gemora asks: How can his testimony be valid when he said that he killed him; isn’t it written [Shmos 23:1]: Do not place your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness; this verse teaches us that a sinner is forbidden from being a witness? We cannot accept his testimony that he killed the husband since that would result in his becoming a sinner and that would disqualify him from being a valid witness.

The Gemora proposes an answer: Perhaps we can say that the Rabbis were lenient in regards to testimony permitting a woman to remarry.

The Gemora rejects this possibility for Rav Menashe says: The Rabbis are lenient for this testimony only to allow a thief by Rabbinic law to testify, but a thief by Biblical law is disqualified from testifying even in testimony that would enable a woman to remarry. One who testifies that he killed the husband is transgressing a Biblical law and would thus be ineligible from testifying.

The Gemora proposes that Rav Menashe is ruling according to Rabbi Yehudah (who disqualified this testimony, but the Rabbis would allow a thief by Biblical law to testify in regards to the woman remarrying).

The Gemora objects to this and states that Rav Menashe would maintain his ruling even according to the Rabbis; the reason the Rabbis permit the woman to remarry is based on Rava’s dictum. Rava states that a person is related to himself and therefore he cannot make himself into a sinner. (It emerges that we accept his testimony that the husband is dead, but we do not accept the fact that he himself killed him.)

Rav Yosef maintains that testimony which would establish the witness as a sinner is not accepted altogether; however, by testimony permitting a woman to remarry the Rabbis were lenient and ruled that this type of testimony will be accepted. (25a – 25b)

The Mishna states: If a sage prohibited a wife to her husband on account of a vow (she vowed not to derive any pleasure from her husband and the sage did not annul the vow for her, which resulted in the husband divorcing her), he may not marry her.

If she refused (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively.) or if she performed chalitzah in front of the sage, he may marry her, because he is part of the Beis Din.

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