Introducing: Daf Hayomi

The Braisa states that Rabban Gamliel related the following incident: I was once traveling in a boat and I saw a boat break, and I was pained regarding the Torah scholar who was in that boat. Who was that? Rabbi Akiva. And when I went ashore, he (Rabbi Akiva) came, sat, and judged before me a Halachic matter. I said to him, “My son, who took you out (of the water)?” He answered “A board from the ship chanced by me, and at every wave that came over me I bent my head.” From here the Chachamim said that if a person encounters evildoers he should bend his head to them. Rabban Gamliel stated that he said at this time, “How great are the words of the Chachamim that they said that (if one falls into) water that has an end, his wife is permitted, into water that does not have an end, his wife is forbidden!”

Reb Meir Shapiro introduced the concept of Daf HaYomi with this Gemora.

The time period, in which those Tannaim lived was regarded as one of the harshest for the Jewish people throughout their history. There were constantly decrees against the studying of Torah and the observance of mitzvos. Many people were not able to withstand these decrees. Rabbi Akiva stood out as an exception to this rule. He was able to return the crown of Torah to its glory and eventually, he established a Beis Medrash and had twenty-four thousand students.

Rabban Gamliel, upon observing this miraculous sight, wished to know the secret of Rabbi Akiva’s success. How was he capable of accomplishing such an astonishing feat?

Rabbi Akiva answered: It was the “Daf shel sefinah,” the board from the ship that chanced by me. It is the establishment of the Daf HaYomi that brought about this change. The inspiration of all the Jews in the entire world to study the same page of Gemora one day, and to continue with the following page the next day, that lifted the Jewish people from their rut, and instilled enthusiasm into the studying of Torah world wide.

The Gerrer Rebbe, the Pnei Menachem, said by the Siyum Hashas in Tel Aviv in the year 5735: One cannot begin to fathom the amount of Torah that was learned because of the establishment of Daf Hayomi.

The Gemora in Avodah Zarah (5b) states: A person does not fully realize and appreciate his teacher until after forty years. It is now forty years since the churban of Europe, and now we can fully comprehend the true value of learning Daf Hayomi.

The Gemora in Eruvin (13b) states: Rebbe said: The reason why I am sharper than my colleagues is because I saw Rabbi Meir from his backside. This means that he saw him at a distance of time since he departed this world. Chazal say: On e could not fully comprehend Rabbi Meir, but Rebbe said many years later that now he was closer to ascertaining Rabbi Meir’s words. It is only now, years after the passing of Reb Meir Shapiro, that we are able to grasp the brilliance of the establishment of Daf Hayomi.

May Hakodosh Boruch Hu give us all strength to continue on the path that Reb Meir Shapiro set for us; we should be zoche to commence and conclude Meseches Kesuvos (beginning Monday iy”H) and may we all merit to witness the coming of Mashiach bimeheira, Amen!

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 121 - Highlights

Identifying Victims of Drowning

The Gemora inquires: Was Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava (quoted in the Mishna 120a) being lenient or being stringent? The Gemora says that we can understand his position from the following incident. A man drowned in (a place called) Karmi, and they found him in Bei Hedya after three days. Rav Dimi from Naharda enabled his wife to remarry. Moreover, a person drowned in Diglas and they found his body by the bridge of Shavistana. Rava enabled his wife to remarry based on the identification provided by his Shushbani (friends who would participate in many aspects of a colleagues weddings) five days (after he drowned, though he was identified soon after he was taken out of the water, see below). If you will say that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava in our Mishna is being lenient, than we can assume that these Rabbanim acted in accordance with his opinion. If he was being stringent, who did these Rabbanim rely on to permit these women?

The Gemora answers that water is different (and therefore not subject to the time limits in our Mishna) as it preserves (the face) from changing (and it can therefore be identified). The Gemora asks, didn’t we say earlier (120b) that water strengthens and exaggerates wounds? The Gemora answers that this is only when there is a wound, but when there is no wound (as in a drowning) it preserves (the face) from changing. The Gemora further qualifies that water only preserves the person so that he can be identified at the time that he is taken out of the water. However, if the body is left out for awhile it swells up (and is difficult to identify). (121a)

Mishna

If a person fell into water (and his body was not recovered), whether it was water that had an end or not (will be explained in the Gemora), his wife is forbidden to remarry. Rabbi Meir says that there was an incident where someone fell into a large pit and he ascended after three days. Rabbi Yosi says that there was an incident with a blind man who went to bathe in a cave and his helper descended with him. People stayed around the (bathing area) cave until they definitely would have already been dead, and they (the Rabbanim) permitted their wives to remarry. There was also an incident where someone was lowered into the sea (by rope), and when they raised him up they only found his leg. The Chachamim said that if they found his leg above the knee his wife can remarry, but if it was below the knee she cannot remarry. (121a)
What is Water with an End?

The Braisa states that if a person fell into water (and his body was not recovered), whether it was water that had an end or not his wife is forbidden to remarry. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Chachamim say that if the water had an end his wife is permitted, if not his wife is forbidden. What is a case of water that has an end? Abaye says that anyone who can see (the end of the water) from where he is standing in all four directions.

There was someone who drowned in the pond in Samki and Rav Shilo enabled his wife to remarry. Rav said to Shmuel, “Let us excommunicate him.” Shmuel answered, “Let us first send to him (regarding his ruling).” They sent a message asking him whether someone who falls into water that has no end is permitted. Rav Shilo replied that his wife is forbidden. They further sent a message asking if the pond of Samki was water that has an end or not. Rav Shilo replied that it did not have an end. They further asked, why did you do this (permit this women to remarry)? He answered that he had made a mistake. He thought that because the waters stayed in one place, they are considered like water that does have an end. However, Rav Shilo stated that he later realized this is not true, because there are waves in the water that can bring a person further downstream. Shmuel recited about Rav the Pasuk “A Tzadik will not have any bad occur to him (that he did not excommunicate Rav Shilo who merely made a mistake).” Rav recited about Shmuel the Pasuk “and salvation through much advice (as Shmuel advised him originally to talk to Rav Shilo).”

The Braisa states: there was an incident with two people who were laying out their nets in the Jordan river. One of them went into an area of the river where there was a lot of fish, and the sun set and he could not see the entrance of the area (his head was sticking out of the water, but he could not see where to go). His friend waited until he surmised that he must have drowned, and went and let this be known to his household. The next day the sun shone and the fisherman saw the entrance to the area, and returned and found a great eulogy going on in his house. Rebbi stated, “How great are the words of the Chachamim that they said that (if one falls into) water that has an end his wife is permitted, into water that does not have an end his wife is forbidden. The Gemora asks, if this (story above) is the case, even water that has an end should be forbidden! The Gemora answers that it is uncommon that such a situation could occur in water that has an end.

Rav Ashi said that the Rabbanan say that water that has no end does not enable one’s wife to remarry is only regarding a regular person. However, if he is a Rabbinical scholar this is inapplicable, as if he would have exited (the water) there would definitely be a rumor to that effect. The Gemara says that this is incorrect. It does not make a difference if the person is a regular person or a Rabbinical scholar. Only if they got married already do we say that this enough (for them not to have to get divorced), not to enable them to marry. (121a)
“How Great are the Words of the Chachamim!”

The Braisa states that Rabban Gamliel related the following incident: I was once traveling in a boat and I saw a boat break, and I was pained regarding the Torah scholar who was in that boat. Who was that? Rabbi Akiva. And when I went ashore, he (Rabbi Akiva) came, sat, and judged before me a Halachic matter. I said to him, “My son, who took you out (of the water)?” He answered “A board from the ship chanced by me, and at every wave that came over me I bent my head.” From here the Chachamim said that if a person encounters evildoers he should bend his head to them. Rabban Gamliel stated that he said at this time, “How great are the words of the Chachamim that they said that (if one falls into) water that has an end, his wife is permitted, into water that does not have an end, his wife is forbidden!”

The Braisa states that Rabbi Akiva related the following incident: I was once traveling by boat and I observed a boat sinking in the sea and I was pained regarding the Torah scholar who was in that boat. Who was that? Rabbi Meir. When I arrived at the country of Kaputkiya , he (Rabbi Meir) came, sat, and judged before me a Halachic matter. I said to him, “My son, who took you out (of the water)?” He answered “A wave washed over me and passed me to the next wave etc. until it spit me onto the land.” Rabbi Akiva stated that he said at this time, “How great are the words of the Chachamim that they said that (if one falls into) water that has an end his wife is permitted, into water that does not have an end his wife is forbidden!” (121a)
Other Calamities

The Braisa states that if someone fell into a lion’s den, we do not testify that he died. If he fell into a pit full of snakes and scorpions we do testify that he died. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beseirah said that even if he fell into a pit full of snakes and scorpions we do not testify that he died, as we suspect he is a Chaver (someone who know how to whisper things that would keep snakes from attacking him). And the Tana Kama (why doesn’t he suspect this as well)? The Gemora answers that because he is pressed against them they will attack him anyway.

The Braisa states that if he fell into a furnace we testify that he is dead. If he fell into a boiling pot of wine or oil, we testify that he is dead. In the name of Rabbi Acha it is said that if he fell into a pot of oil we testify he is dead, as oil burns (when something falls into it, the oil that splashes out and hits the fire just makes the fire increase). We do not testify he is dead in the case of a boiling pot of wine, as wine makes the fire go out (when it hits the fire). They answered him that in the beginning it acts to put out the fire, but eventually it actually causes the fire to burn further. (121a – 121b)
Rabbi Meir’s Statement in the Mishna

The Braisa states that they retorted to Rabbi Meir that we do not mention miraculous stories (as examples to set Halachah). What was miraculous in Rabbi Meir’s story (where someone fell into a large pit and he ascended after three days)? If it is the fact that he did not eat or drink for three days, doesn’t it say that Queen Esther or ordered that the Jews should fast for her, and not eat or drink for three days? It must be that the miracle is that he did not fall asleep (and therefore drown). This is supported by Rabbi Yochanan’s statement that if someone takes a vow that he will not sleep for three days we give him lashes and he can immediately sleep (as it is clear that he cannot possibly keep his vow). Why did Rabbi Meir use this as proof? There was little ledges on top of other little ledges (where he was able to lean and rest). Why don’t the Rabbanan agree? They understood that these were smooth ledges (and would only enable one to rest his head, not his body, and people cannot sleep standing up). Why did Rabbi Meir use this as proof? It is impossible, Rabbi Meir says, that he would not gain strength and be able to sleep a little on these ledges. (121b)
Nechunya’s Daughter

The Braisa states that there was an incident with the daughter of Nechunya the well-digger who fell into a big pit. When they came and told this to Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa, he said during the first hour that she was well. The second hour he also said she was well. During the third hour, he said that she had already ascended safely. He then asked her, “my daughter, who saved you?” She answered that a male sheep chanced before me and an old person was guiding it. They asked (Rabbi Chanina), are you a prophet (as he apparently knew she would be saved)? He answered, “I am not a prophet nor the son of a prophet, but it is impossible that something that a Tzadik is involved in will be something that his children will stumble on.” Rabbi Aba said, even so Nechunya’s son died of thirst, as it says “and around Him is very stormy.” This teaches us that Hashem is exacting with those around Him like a small thread (meaning that he will punish them for even a small sin, in order to elevate their status in the next world). Rabbi Chanina says that this concept is apparent from the Pasuk “Hashem is very glorified in the secret of the holy ones, and His awe is on all those who surround Him.” (121b)

Mishna

Even if he heard women saying “a certain person died,” it is enough. Rabbi Yehuda says that even if he heard children saying that “we are going to eulogize and bury a certain person,” whether or not he intended to testify at the time (he may later testify that the person is deceased). Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava states that if the witness is Jewish, even if he intended to testify about this person when he was told that he died the testimony is valid. If the witness is an idolater, if he intended to testify his testimony is invalid. (121b)
When Are Children Reliable?

The Gemora asks, maybe the children aren’t really going (to a funeral)? Rav Yehuda answers in the name of Shmuel that the case is where the children say that we have come from eulogizing and burying a certain person. The Gemora asks, perhaps a simple ant died and they merely named it after this person? The Gemora answers that the case is where they say that a certain amount of Rabbanim were there, and a certain amount of eulogizers were there (showing that there really was a funeral). (121b)
Intent Matters

Rav Yehuda states in the name of Shmuel that this (that we do not accept his testimony) is only if he wanted to permit the woman to remarry, but if he intended to testify his testimony is valid. How can we determine this? Rav Yosef states that if a person comes to Beis Din and says that a certain person died and therefore you should allow his wife to remarry, this is a case of someone who is called having intention to permit remarriage (he is therefore deemed to have an agenda and is disqualified). If he just tells Beis Din that the person died (without telling them to permit her to remarry), this is called intent to testify and his testimony is valid. We similar learned that Reish Lakish stated this is only if he wanted to permit the woman to remarry, but if he intended to testify his testimony is valid. Rabbi Yochanan said to him, wasn’t there an incident with Oshiya b’Rabbi who argued with eighty-five elders. He told them this is only if he wanted to permit the woman to remarry, but if he intended to testify his testimony is valid, but the Chachamim (elders) did not agree to him.

Proclamation of an Idolater

The Gemora asks, our Mishna that states that if the witness is an idolater, if he intended to testify his testimony is invalid. What is the case? Where he talks simply (innocently, without being aware of the ramifications). This is like the case of the idolater who was proclaiming, “Who is from the house of Chivai? Who is from the house of Chivai? Chivai has died!” Subsequently, Rav Yosef enabled his wife to remarry. There was (a similar incident with) an idolater who went around saying “Woe is to Parsha Zriza who lived in Pumbedisa and has died!” Subsequently, Rav Yosef, and some say Rava, enabled his wife to remarry.

There was (a similar incident with) an idolater who went around saying “Who is from the house of Chasa? Chasa drowned!” Rav Nachman said “Elokim! Fish must have eaten Chasa!” From Rav Nachman’s words Chasa’s widow remarried, and no one protested. Rav Ashi remarked that from here we see that this that the Rabbanan say that if a man falls into waters without an end his wife cannot remarry means she is not permitted to remarry. However, if she gets remarried anyway we do not make her get divorced. Some say that Rav Nachman enabled Chasa’s wife to remarry. He said “Chasa was a great man, and if he was alive there would be rumors to that effect.” The Gemara says that this is incorrect. It does not make a difference if the person is a regular person or a Rabbinical scholar. Only if they got married already do we say that this enough (for them not to have to get divorced), not to enable them to marry. (121b)

[END]

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Brothers Sent Specifically the “Coat of many Colors”

It is written [Breishis 37:32]: And they sent the coat of many colors, and they brought it to their father; and said: “This have we found. Know now whether it is your son's coat or not.”

The question is asked: Why did the brothers feel the necessity to destroy specifically his fine woolen coat; this was a very special garment and valuable? Why didn’t they rip one of Yosef’s other garments and send it to their father?

The simple answer would be that Yaakov would not recognize Yosef’s other garments; it was the special garment that he gave to Yosef that he would indeed recognize.

Rabbi Aharon Kroll offers another answer based on our Gemora. The Mishna had stated: One may only testify to the identity of a dead man on the basis of the face with the nose, even though there are identifying marks on his body and on his garments. The Gemora explains that we cannot rely on the identifying marks of his garments because we are concerned that the clothes may be borrowed.

Accordingly, one may ask: How could Yaakov be certain that Yosef was killed based on the blood found on Yosef’s clothing; perhaps someone had borrowed Yosef’s garments?

The Be’er Heitev (E”H, 17, 71) cites from the Ra’anach that if it is customary for only one person in the community to wear a certain garment, we do not take “borrowing” into consideration.

The Keli Yakar explains that the k’sones passim that Yaakov gave to Yosef represented the firstborn right that Yaakov took away from Reuven and granted to Yosef. The service in the Beis HaMikdosh required that the Kohen would wear special clothing, and Yosef was given this garment as a sign of honor and glory. This coat was obviously worn only by Yosef, and he would never lend it out.

This explains why the brothers sent to their father Yaakov the fine woolen coat of many colors, and not any other of Yosef’s garments. Yaakov would recognize that this was Yosef’s coat, and only he would be wearing it. This was a clear indicator that Yosef was indeed devoured.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 120 - Highlights

Rabbi Elozar’s Reasoning

The Mishna had stated: If they were married by yibum, and the yevamim died, they are prohibited from marrying (any stranger; though the evidence of each woman was valid to enable herself to be taken for yibum, it is not valid to exempt her sister-in-law- from the zikah-attachment, and the possibility that their absent yavam’s (the first husbands) were still alive must he taken into consideration). Rabbi Elozar says: Since they were permitted to the yevamim, they are permitted to any man.

Rava inquires: What is Rabbi Elozar’s reason? Is it because he is of the opinion that a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart? Or, is it because he maintains that she would not ruin herself (for the sake of ruining her counterpart)?

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between the two reasons?

The Gemora answers: The practical difference between the two reasons would be if we would allow her co-wife to marry before herself. If it is granted that a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart, her co-wife may be permitted to marry even if she herself did not remarry. If, however, it be maintained that the reason is because she would not ruin herself, the co-wife would be permitted to marry only if she herself had married again, but if she herself did not remarry, her co-wife also would not be permitted to remarry.

The Gemora asks: So, what is his reason?

The Gemora says: Come and hear from our Mishna. Rabbi Elozar said: Since they were permitted to the yevamim, they are permitted to any man. Now, if it be granted that the reason is because she would not ruin herself, one can well see the reason why only when the one married again is the other permitted to remarry. If it be maintained, however, that the reason is because a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart, the co-wife should be permitted to marry again even if the co-wife did not remarry. Consequently it must be concluded that Rabbi Elozar's reason is because she herself had married again and she would not ruin herself!

The Gemora deflects this proof: Rabbi Elozar is not offering his own opinion in the Mishna, but rather, he was arguing even in accordance with the Rabbi’s opinion. This is what he was saying: According to me, a co-wife is eligible to tender evidence for her counterpart, and even if she herself did not remarry, the other may be allowed to marry again. According to your view (that a co-wife is disqualified to testify for her counterpart, even when the counterpart’s permit emerges incidentally), however, you must at least agree with me that where she herself remarried, the other also should be allowed to marry again, since she (the woman who testified) would naturally not ruin herself!

And would the Rabbis respond to this argument? She might be acting in the spirit of let me die with the Philistines (in order to inflict injury upon her counterpart, she is willing to ruin herself).

The Gemora attempts to resolve the inquiry from the following braisa: If a woman went with her husband overseas, and she came and said, “My husband died,” she may marry and she takes her kesuvah, but her co-wife is forbidden. Rabbi Elozar says: Since she is permitted to remarry, her co-wife may also remarry. (This proves that, on the evidence of a co-wife, her counterpart is always permitted to marry again whether the co-wife who gave the evidence did or did not herself marry again.)

The Gemora rejects the proof: The braisa should be emended to say the following: Rabbi Elozar says: Since she is permitted to remarry and she married, her co-wife may also remarry.

The Gemora asks: But let us be concerned that she may have returned from overseas with a letter of divorce and that the reason why she made her statement (that her husband was dead) is because it was her intention to ruin her co-wife (but she herself would not be ruined since she is in any case divorced from her husband)?

The Gemora answers: We are referring to a case where she married a Kohen (which she may not do if she was indeed divorced). (119b – 120a)

Mishna

The Mishnayos from here until the end discuss the laws of testimony regarding death.

The Mishna states: One may only testify to the identity of a dead man on the basis of the face with the nose, even though there are identifying marks on his body and on his garments. One may not testify unless his soul has actually departed, and even if they saw him mortally wounded, or hanging from the gallows, or being devoured by a beast. One may testify only if he observed the corpse within three days of the man’s death. Rabbi Yehudah ben Bava says: Not every man, and not all places, and not all times are alike. (120a)

Gemora

The Rabbis taught in a braisa: Evidence of identification may be tendered if the witnesses see the corpse’s forehead without the form of his face or the form of his face without the forehead. Both together with the nose must be present.

The Gemora cites Scriptural proof for this.

The Gemora records a related incident: Abba bar Marta, who is known as Abba bar Manyumi, owed money to the people of the Exilarch's house. Taking some wax, he smeared it on a piece of rag and stuck it upon his forehead. He passed before them and they did not recognize him. (120a)

Identifying Marks

The Mishna had stated: One may only testify to the identity of a dead man on the basis of the face with the nose, even though there are identifying marks on his body and on his garments.

The Gemora asks: Does this imply that identification marks are not Biblically valid? A contradiction, certainly, may be pointed out from the following braisa: If he (an agent who was carrying a letter of divorce from a husband to his wife) found it tied to his bag, purse or a signet ring, or if it was found among his utensils, even after a long time, it is valid! (This is provided that he is able to identify the bag, or any of the other objects mentioned, as the original object to which the letter of divorce had been tied. Though the assumed validity of the document affects a Biblical law (permitting a married woman to marry a stranger) it is nevertheless permitted to rely upon the identification marks, contrary to the implication of our Mishna.)

Abaye responded: This is no difficulty. The braisa is reflecting the viewpoint of Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai while the Mishna is reflecting the opinion of the Rabbis. For it was taught in the following braisa: No evidence of identification by a mole (on the same limb where the husband had one) may he legally tendered. Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai says: Such evidence may be legally tendered. Do they not disagree regarding the following point; Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai is of the opinion that identification marks are Biblically valid, while the Rabbis hold that identification marks are only Rabbinically valid?

Rava objects to this explanation: All agree that identification marks are Biblically valid, but here they disagree regarding whether it is common for the same kind of mole to he found on persons of simultaneous birth (persons born at the same hour of the day are assumed to be physically and morally subject to the same planetary influences for good and for evil). The Rabbis hold that it is common for the same kind of mole to be found on persons of simultaneous birth, and Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai is of the opinion that it is not common for the same kind of mole to be found on persons of simultaneous birth (and therefore a mole could be used as an identifying mark).

Others explain Rava as follows: They argue whether a mole usually undergoes a change after one's death. The Rabbis are of the opinion that it usually undergoes a change after one's death and Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai is of the opinion that it does not usually undergo a change after one's death.

Others maintain that Rava said: All agree that identification marks are only Rabbinically valid, but here they argue whether a mole constitutes a distinct identification mark. Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai is of the opinion that it constitutes a distinct identification mark, and the Rabbis maintain that it does not constitute a distinct identification mark. (120a – 120b)

The Consideration for Borrowing

The Gemora asks: According to the version which Rava stated that everyone agrees that identification marks are Biblically valid, wasn’t the following taught in our Mishna: One may only testify to the identity of a dead man on the basis of the face with the nose, even though there are identifying marks on his body and on his garments?

The Gemora answers: As to the body, the marks indicated by the witnesses were only that the corpse was long or short (which cannot be regarded as reliable marks of identification) and as to one's garments, no reliability can be placed upon their identification since we are concerned that one man borrowed someone else’s clothing.

The Gemora asks: If, however, borrowing is to be taken into consideration, how could we allow the return of a lost donkey on one providing the identification marks of a saddle?

The Gemora answers: People do not borrow a saddle because it makes the back of the donkey sore (due to the incorrect size).

The Gemora asks: Where one found it tied to his bag, purse or a signet ring, or if it was found among his utensils, how do we allow its return?

The Gemora answers: As to a signet ring, one is afraid of forgery (and he will not lend it out). And as to one's bag and purse, people are superstitious and do not lend such objects.

Alternatively, you can answer the original question by saying that the identification marks of the garments mentioned in the Mishna is referring to their color, if they were white or red (many people wear garments of red and white, and the colors therefore, cannot be regarded as a reliable mark of identification). (120b)

Mortally Wounded

The Mishna had stated: One may not testify unless his soul has actually departed, and even if they saw him mortally wounded, or hanging from the gallows, or being devoured by a beast.

The Gemora states: This implies that a man whose arteries have been cut may live; but this is apparently inconsistent with the following Mishna: A person does not transmit corpse-tumah before his soul has departed, even though his arteries had been cut and even though he is in a dying condition. The Mishna seems to indicate that it is only tumah that he does not cause, but he certainly will not live in such a situation?

Abaye answered: This is no difficulty. Our Mishna represents the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar; the other Mishna follows the opinion of the Rabbis. For it was taught in the following braisa: Evidence may be legally tendered regarding the death of a person whose arteries were cut, but no such evidence may be tendered concerning one who was hung. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar said: No such evidence may be legally tendered even concerning one whose arteries were cut, because the wounds might be cauterized and the man may survive.

The Gemora asks: Can our Mishna be following the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar? But the latter part of our Mishna states: It once happened at Asya that a man was lowered into the sea and only his leg was brought up, and the Rabbis ruled: If the recovered leg contained the part above the knee, the man's wife may marry again, but if it contained only the part below the knee, she may not remarry (because a man may survive even in such circumstances; the drowning also cannot be regarded as a certainty since the waters may have thrown the body up on another shore where the man's life may have been saved)? (Now, if our Mishna represents the view of Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar, remarriage should be forbidden even in the case where the part above the knee was also torn away?)

The Gemora answers: Waters are different since they irritate the wound.

The Gemora asks: But, surely, Rabbah bar bar Chanah related: I myself have seen an Arab merchant who took hold of a sword and cut open the leg of his camel above his knee, but this did not cause it to cease its cry until it died?

Abaye replied: That camel was a weak animal.

Rava replied: Our Mishna is discussing a case where the person was wounded with a glowing hot knife, and this is in agreement with everyone (that he will not survive). (120b)

[END]

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Calculation for Determining a “Minority of a Minority”

The Beis Yosef (E”H 128) states that a “ten percent chance” is considered a “minority of a minority,” and even Rabbi Meir would not take that amount into consideration.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha asks: Why should this be? According to his calculation, even a “fifteen percent chance” should be regarded as a “minority of a minority”? For sixty percent is considered a legitimate majority; this would result in “forty percent” being the minority. If we would divide the “forty percent-minority” into a majority and a minority, it would result in twenty-five percent joining the majority and fifteen percent becoming the “minority of a minority.” Why does the Beis Yosef state that ten percent only is a “minority of a minority,” when according to our calculation, even fifteen percent should be regarded as a “minority of a minority”?

Perhaps, it can be explained by saying that a recognizable majority is needed. Rabbeinu Yonah in Brochos states that a recognizable majority is when there is a two to one ratio. Accordingly, the original minority would be thirty-three percent. A minority of that would be a little more than ten percent. This could be the explanation for the Beis Yosef.

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Story from the Daf - Yevamos 119 - Daf Yomi

The Zidichover Rebbe was deathly ill in Levov, and the people standing by his bedside observed that he was almost in a vegetable state. The Rebbe instructed them to give charity to the tzedakah of Rabbi Meir ba’al haneis. He explained: The majority of people, who are in a vegetable state will die; most people who are ordinarily sick will survive. Rabbi Meir is the Tanna, who is always concerned for the minority; this is why giving charity to a tzedakah in Rabbi Meir’s merit can produce a recovery from the locks of death.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 119 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: If a woman’s husband and her co-wife went overseas and they informed her that her husband has died (based on the report, she would be free to remarry, however, it is uncertain if she falls for yibum), she should not marry or be taken in yibum until she determines if her co-wife is pregnant or not.

If the woman had a mother-in-law who went overseas, we do not need to be concerned that the mother-in-law gave birth to a son, and now the woman will be subject to yibum to her husband’s new brother. If the mother-in-law went overseas when she was pregnant, we are concerned that she gave birth to a son, and the woman will be subject to yibum. Rabbi Yehoshua said: We are still not concerned, and she is permitted to marry anyone. (119a)
Consideration for the Minority

The Gemora asks: It is understandable why she cannot be taken in yibum, for perhaps her co-wife is pregnant, and if she will cohabit with her husband’s brother, they would be infringing on the prohibition of cohabiting with a brother’s wife. But why can’t she marry a stranger? Let us follow the majority of women who conceive and bear children (we should assume that the co-wife did in fact conceive and gave birth to a child, thus exempting the co-wife from yibum or chalitzah)? Shall we say that the Mishna is following Rabbi Meir’s opinion, who is concerned on account of the minority?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna can be following the opinion of the Rabbis as well; for they follow a majority only when the majority is “before us,” like in the case of the “nine stores” (which were selling permitted meat, while one shop in their vicinity was selling forbidden meat; if between these shops a piece of meat was found and it is not known from which shop it came, it is assumed to be permitted meat, since the majority of the shops were selling meat of such a character) or “Sanhedrin” (a majority of whom (twelve against eleven) are in favor of a certain decision). However, in this case, where the majority (of women in general who are assumed to conceive and bear) is “not before us,” even the Rabbis do not follow the majority.

The Gemora asks: But in the case of a minor boy or minor girl, where the majority is “not before us,” and nevertheless, we follow the majority? For it was taught in a braisa: The Gemora challenges Rabbah’s explanation: How can you say that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Rabbi Meir? Didn’t we learn the following braisa: Rabbi Meir said: A minor boy or girl does not perform chalitzah or yibum. The Rabbis replied to Rabbi Meir: That which you said that a minor should not perform chalitzah is understandable because the Torah uses the term “ish,” man in the portion regarding chalitzah, and we compare the laws of a man to a woman. However, what is your rationale for saying that a minor should not perform a yibum? Rabbi Meir responded: A minor boy should not perform a yibum because we are concerned that he might be found to be a saris (he cannot father a child due to defects in his body); a minor girl should not perform a yibum because we are concerned that she might be found to be an aylonis. If they would perform yibum, it would be tantamount to cohabiting with an ervah. The Rabbis, however, maintain that we follow the majority of minor boys, who are not sarisim, and we follow the majority of minor girls, who are not aylonisos. (The majority spoken of here is, surely, one which is not actually present, and the Rabbis are nevertheless guided by it.)

Rather, it is clear that the Mishna is following Rabbi Meir’s opinion. (119a)

Confirmed Status and Majority

The Gemora analyzes the Mishna’s latter clause. The Mishna stated: If the woman had a mother-in-law who went overseas, we do not need to be concerned that the mother-in-law gave birth to a son, and now the woman will be subject to yibum to her husband’s new brother.

The Gemora asks: If our Mishna follows Rabbi Meir’s viewpoint that we are concerned for the minority, we should be concerned that the mother-in-law gave birth to a son? One should be guided by the majority of women, and the majority of women conceive and bear while a minority miscarry, and, since all those who give birth, half bear males and half bear females, the minority of those who miscarry should be added to the half of those who bear females, and so the males would constitute a minority which should be taken into consideration! (And, contrary to the ruling in our Mishna, the woman should be forbidden to marry a stranger?)

The Gemora answers: It is possible that since the woman was confirmed (when her mother-in-law went overseas) in her status of permissibility to strangers (since there was no yavam at that time), the possibility of the birth of a yavam does not need to be taken into consideration (we rely on the chazakah that she was not subject to yibum).

The Gemora asks: But in the former case of the Mishna, where she was confirmed in the status of eligibility for yibum (since her husband had no children when he departed), let her be taken for yibum based on the original presumption?

Rav Nachman answers in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: In the Mishna’s first case, where a prohibition which is subject to the penalty of kares is involved (cohabiting with a brother’s wife), the possibility of the birth of a son had to be provided against; in the Mishna’s latter case, however, where a mere prohibition is involved (a yevamah marrying a stranger), they were not concerned with the possibility that the mother-in-law gave birth to a son.

Rava asked: Both prohibitions are Biblical; aren’t we obligated to avoid all Biblical transgressions, even mere prohibitions?

Rather, Rava explains the Mishna as follows: In the Mishna’s first case, the woman's confirmed status (it was an established fact that her husband had no children and that a yavam was in existence) would subject her to yibum while the majority principle (most women bear viable children and her co-wife’s child would exempt her from yibum) would enable her to marry any stranger; and though the confirmed status is not as compelling as a majority, the minority of women who miscarry must be added to the confirmed status so that the factors on either side are equally balanced (it is a half and a half; her confirmed status plus the minority of miscarriages pointing to her being subject to yibum, while the majority principle points to permissibility to marry any stranger). Hence, she should not marry or be taken in yibum until she determines if her co-wife is pregnant or not. In the Mishna’s latter case, however, the woman's confirmed status (as one who has no yavam) as well as the majority principle (miscarriages and the births of females constitute a majority against the minority of births of viable males) points to the permissibility of marriage with any stranger; viable males constitute a minority of a minority (besides the fact that viable males are in a minority, the possibility of the birth of a viable male is still less to be taken note of in view of the confirmed status of the woman) and a minority of a minority is not taken into consideration even by Rabbi Meir. (119a – 119b)
Waiting Forever

The Mishna stated: If a woman’s husband and her co-wife went overseas and they informed her that her husband has died (based on the report, she would be free to remarry, however, it is uncertain if she falls for yibum), she should not marry or be taken in yibum until she determines if her co-wife is pregnant or not.

The Gemora asks: Is she prohibited from marrying a stranger forever? Let her perform chalitzah with the yavam, and then she should be permitted to marry anyone?

Ze'iri replied: She must wait on account of herself three months (just like any other woman whose husband died), and on account of her co-wife, she must wait nine months (since her chalitzah will not be valid if the co-wife produced a viable child), and then she may perform chalitzah and marry.

Rabbi Chanina said: She must wait on account of herself three months, but on account of her co-wife, she remains prohibited forever (until it is definitely ascertained whether her co-wife had given birth to a viable child).

The Gemora repeats its original question: Is she prohibited from marrying a stranger forever? Let her perform chalitzah with the yavam, and then she should be permitted to marry anyone?

Abaye bar Avin and Rabbi Chanina bar Avin answer: This is a preventive measure against the possibility that the child might be viable as a result of which, we will require an announcement that she is permitted to marry a Kohen (since the chalitzah was unnecessary).

The Gemora asks: So, why don’t we make the announcement?

The Gemora answers: Perhaps someone will be present by the chalitzah and will not hear of the announcement; he will be under the false impression that a chalutzah is permitted to a Kohen. (119b)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If the wives of two brothers returned from overseas, and one says, “My husband died,” and that one says, “My husband died,” that one is prohibited because of the husband of this one, and this one is prohibited because of the husband of that one. (A woman is eligible to tender evidence on the death of her husband in so far only as to enable herself to marry again. She is ineligible, however, to give evidence enabling her sister-in-law to marry again.) If one had witnesses that her husband died, and the other one does not, the one who has witnesses is prohibited (to marry a stranger, since there are no witnesses to testify to the death of the yavam; the evidence of his wife alone is not sufficient for this purpose), and the one who does not have witnesses is permitted (to marry any stranger, since she herself is believed in respect of the death of her husband while in respect of the death of the yavam, the evidence of the witnesses is available). If this one has sons and that one does not have sons, the one who has sons is permitted, and the one who does not have sons is prohibited. If they were married by yibum, and the yevamim died, they are prohibited from marrying (any stranger; though the evidence of each woman was valid to enable herself to be taken for yibum, it is not valid to exempt her sister-in-law- from the zikah-attachment, and the possibility that their absent yavam’s (the first husbands) were still alive must he taken into consideration). Rabbi Elozar says: Since they were permitted to the yevamim, they are permitted to any man. (119b)

[END]

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HASHEM’S HATRED FOR US

It is written: “Like a face’s reflection in the water, so is the reflection of one’s heart to another’s heart.” [Accordingly, the Rabanan felt that once one person in a relationship is deemed to hate the other, it is obvious that the other person should be considered to hate the first person, as it is only natural that people hate those who hate them. This is why they did not list these people separately in the Mishna (unlike Rabbi Yehudah in the braisa).]

Why, then, does Rabbi Yehudah list them separately? Rabbi Yehudah understood that this verse is referring to words of Torah (that the more effort you put into Torah, the more you get out, see Rashi), not people’s feelings towards each other.

The Torah writes [Devarim 1,27]: You murmured in your tents and said, “Because the Lord hates us, He took us out of the land of Egypt, to deliver us into the hand[s] of the Amorites to exterminate us.”

The Sifri states on this verse: Is it possible that the Lord hates Klal Yisroel; doesn’t it say: I love you, so said Hashem? Rather, you hate Him. A common parable says: What is in your own heart about your friend, is in his heart about you.

The simple explanation in this Sifri would be according to our Gemora (the Rabbanan, not Rabbi Yehudah). In truth, Hashem loves Klal Yisroel, but since there are those that hate Him, this effects Hashem’s relationship with them and He does indeed hate them.

Alternatively, Reb Yosef Engel explains that the Sifri could be referring to what seems apparent to Klal Yisroel. It would seem that Hashem hates those who hate Him because of the common parable that what is in your own heart about your friend, is in his heart about you. However, this is not the case, and Hashem loves all of Klal Yisroel, even those who hate Him.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 117 - Highlights

Mishna

(This Mishna is a continuation of the preceding one, and deals with a woman who was permitted to be married on the basis of her statement that her husband had died, and discusses whether she receives the financial settlement of her kesuvah.) Beis Shamai say: She may marry and she takes her kesuvah. Beis Hillel say: She may marry but she does not take her kesuvah. Beis Shamai said to them: You permitted a stringent prohibition of ervah, will you not permit the less important matter of property? Beis Hillel said to them: We find that the brothers do not enter into an inheritance on her testimony. Beis Shamai said to them: And do we not learn from her kesuvah scroll that he writes to her: “If you will be married to another, take that which is written to you.” Beis Hillel retracted to teach according to the opinion of Beis Shamai. (116b – 117a)

The Dead Brother’s Assets

Rav Chisda says that if the woman (who stated that her husband died) has yibum done to her, her new husband receives his dead brother’s assets based on her statement (that her husband had indeed died). After all, if they extrapolated the teaching regarding kesuvah (that the woman receives in this case, as stated in the Mishna), we should not extrapolate a teaching that is explicitly stated in the Torah? The Torah states: “He should be established in the name of his brother,” (meaning that he should receive his possessions) and he has taken the place of his brother (by performing yibum)! (117a)

The Woman’s Request

Rav Nachman says that if a woman comes to Beis Din and says that her husband has died and she wants permission to remarry, we give her permission and a kesuvah. If she only says that she wants her kesuvah, we do not even give her permission to remarry. Why? This latter statement is merely a demand to receive the money from her kesuvah (and therefore two witnesses are required, as it is a monetary matter).

The Gemora inquires: What is the halacha if she says that she wants permission to marry and to be given her kesuvah? Do we say that since she requested her kesuvah, she is coming for the money of her kesuvah, or do we say that people merely tell Beis Din about all of their issues (that are connected to the claim)? Assuming that people merely tell Beis Din about all of their issues, what would be the halachah if she said give me my kesuvah and permit me to marry? Do we say that in this instance she is clearly coming to claim the kesuvah (as she mentioned it first)? Or do we say that since it is possible that she doesn’t know what exactly makes her permitted to remarry, she therefore requested her kesuvah first (as she thinks thet is what allows her to remarry)? The Gemora leaves the question unresolved. (117a)
Mishna

Everyone is believed to give testimony that a woman’s husband died, besides her mother-in-law, daughter of her mother-in-law, co-wife, her potential co-wife (if she would fall to yibum), and the daughter of her husband. What is the difference between a get and death (that we do not believe these women regarding the death of her husband, but we do believe them to bring her get from abroad and testify that it was written and signed in her presence, giving the get validity)? The get has writing on it (which is already a greater sign of validity and her statement is only the “finishing touch” that it is valid). (117a)
Reasoning of the Mishna, and Does it Apply to Others?

The Gemora inquires: What about the daughter of her father-in-law? The reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law is not believed is since her mother (the mother-in-law) hates her, she also hates her. This would mean that the daughter of a father-in-law would not present a problem, as her real mother does not hate this woman! On the other hand, perhaps the reason that a daughter of a mother-in-law is forbidden is because she is upset that the woman is eating away at the possessions her mother brought into the marriage. Here, too, it is possible that the daughter of a father-in-law would hate this woman, as she is depleting the resources of the marital house (of her father and the possessions the mother-in-law brought into the marriage).

The Gemora tries to answer this from a braisa: All are believed to testify for this woman (that her husband died) besides for five women. If a daughter of a father-in-law would also be forbidden, it should have said six women! The Gemora answers that being that the reason for hatred is that she is depleting the resources of the marital house, it should not make a difference whether she is the daughter of the mother-in-law or the daughter of the father-in-law (and therefore both are included as one person in this listing).

The Gemora asks, didn’t we learn in a braisa that there are actually seven such women? The Gemora answers that this is the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who included in a braisa a stepmother and daughter-in-law. They (Chachamim) retorted to Rabbi Yehudah, a stepmother is included in the Mishna’s listing of the daughter of her husband and a daughter-in-law is included in the Mishna’s listing of a mother-in-law! What is Rabbi Yehudah’s reasoning? It makes sense that the mother-in-law hates the daughter in law as she depletes the resources of the marital house, but why would the daughter-in-law hate the mother-in-law? Similarly, it makes sense that a stepdaughter would hate her stepmother as she is depleting her father’s resources, but why would the stepmother hate her stepdaughter? Indeed, why does Rabbi Yehudah add these two people?

The Gemora answers that a daughter-in-law hates her mother-in-law because she tells her son about everything that his wife does. A stepmother similarly hates her stepdaughter who tells her father everything that his wife does. Why don’t the Rabanan also include these women? The Pasuk states “like a face’s reflection in the water, so is the reflection of one’s heart to another’s heart.” [Accordingly, the Rabanan felt that once one person in a relationship is deemed to hate the other, it is obvious that the other person should be considered to hate the first person, as it is only natural that people hate those who hate them. This is why they did not list these people separately in the Mishna (unlike Rabbi Yehudah in the braisa).]

Why, then, does Rabbi Yehudah list them separately? Rabbi Yehudah understood that this Pasuk is referring to words of Torah (that the more effort you put into Torah, the more you get out, see Rashi), not people’s feelings towards each other. (117a)
The Believability of a Future
Mother-in-Law
Rav Acha bar Avya asked in Israel: is a future mother-in-law (mother of someone to whom she would fall to yibum if her husband indeed died) believed? Do we say that she thinks ahead that if the woman’s husband died she will fall to yibum, and therefore she hates her, or not?

The Gemora tries to answer from a braisa: If she says that her husband died and afterward her father-in-law died, she can get remarried, receive her kesuvah, and she causes her mother-in-law to be forbidden (to remarry). Why is her mother-in-law forbidden? It must be that we suspect that her husband and father-in-law did not die, and she is merely saying this to ruin her mother-in-law. She thinks that after awhile her mother-in-law will no longer have the ability to bother her. [When her husband and her father-in-law come back from abroad, her mother-in-law will be known as a married woman who married another man while her husband was away. She will be unable tell her son negative things about her, as her son will no longer listen to his mother, as her status will be severely lowered. This is why Chazal rule that the mother-in-law cannot remarry.] This seems to prove that we do suspect ill feelings even when they are no longer applicable, just as we suspect this woman of setting up her ex-mother-in-law (as she first testified that her own husband died, and only later testified that her mother-in-law’s husband died). We should similarly suspect a future mother-in-law!

The Gemora answers that this case is not proof, as it is talking about someone who was already in a situation where she felt pain from her mother-in-law. This does not mean that we should suspect someone who will become a woman’s mother-in-law. (117a – 117b)
Mishna

A witness testified that a husband died, causing the widow to remarry. A different witness proceeded to testify that he did not die. The woman does not have to leave her new husband. If one witness says that the husband died and two say that he did not die, even if she remarried (due to the first witnesses testimony) she must leave her new husband. If two witnesses say that her husband died, and one says that he did not die, she is allowed to remarry. (117b)

One Witness Vs. Another Witness

The reason that the Mishna stated in the first case that she can stay married appears to be because she is already married. This implies that if did not yet marry in this case, she should not get remarried. The Gemora asks, didn’t Ula say that whenever the Torah believed a single witness it is as if his testimony is as strong as when there are two witnesses? If this is the case, the second witness should be considered as a single witness contradicting two witnesses (and she should be permitted to marry)! The Gemora answers that the Mishna means that if one witness testified that he died, and based on that the woman was permitted to remarry, she does not have to abandon the permission that she received to remarry even if another witness testifies that her first husband is still alive. Accordingly, even if she did not yet remarry she indeed may still remarry. (117b)
One Lenient Witness Vs. Two Stringent Witnesses

It is simple that two witnesses override one witness (and that the woman in the second case of the Mishna must therefore leave her husband)! The Gemora answers that the case is necessary to tell us that this is the law even when the two witnesses are generally unfit to testify (but are accepted by testimony regarding dead husbands). This is like the opinion of Rabbi Nechemiah. The braisa states that Rabbi Nechemiah said that wherever the Torah believed one person, go after the majority of opinions on the matter. This means that the Torah equated in such a case the testimony of two women who contradict one man to the testimony of two men who contradict one man (in both cases two beats one).

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that it is possible that whenever one generally kosher witness testifies first, even one hundred women who would contradict him are viewed as one witness. The Mishna is speaking about a case where the first witness was a woman (and two women later contradicted her permissive testimony). According to this explanation, you should explain Rabbi Nechemiah’s law (stated above) in the following manner. Wherever the Torah believed one person, go after the majority of opinions on the matter. This means that the Torah equated in such a case the testimony of two women who contradict one woman to the testimony of two men who contradict one man. However, Rabbi Nechemiah would agree that two women who contradict one man is akin to half (of the total witnesses) versus half. (117b)

Two Lenient Witnesses Vs. One Stringent Witness

What is the novelty of this teaching (isn’t it obvious that two versus one always wins)? It must be teaching us the law in a case where the witnesses are generally unfit, applying the teaching of Rabbi Nechemiah regarding unfit witnesses (see above). The Gemora asks, this is the same teaching as the second case of the Mishna (and therefore not novel at all)! The Gemora answers that you might have thought from the second case that we only apply Rabbi Nechemiah’s law regarding taking into consideration the majority opinion when it is a stringency, not to be lenient. The last case in the Mishna teaches us that this is incorrect (and we even apply it in a lenient fashion). (117b)
Mishna

One wife says that her husband died, while her co-wife says that her husband did not die. The one that says that her husband died can remarry and receive her kesuvah, and the one that said that he did not die may not remarry or take a kesuvah. If one says that he died naturally and one says that he was killed, Rabbi Meir says that since they are contradicting each other, they both may not remarry. Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon say that as they both admit that he is dead they can remarry. (117b – 118a)

[END]

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JUSTIFYING A CUSTOM REGARDING GEBROCHTS

Shoel U’meishiv (I: 1:130) issues a novel ruling based on our Gemora.

The Gemora cites the opinion of Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya, who maintains that when a decree was impelled because of a certain incident, it is limited to the same situation as the original incident.

The Shoel U’meishiv says: The obligation of eating matzah on Pesach, which is lechem oni, poor man’s bread (water and flour) is only on the first night of Pesach and not any other nights or days, including the second night. Eating lechem oni is because the Jewish people baked the dough before it had a chance to rise on the way out of Egypt. Since the mitzvah is based upon that incident and that occurred on the night of the fifteenth of Nissan, that is the only night that we have this obligation.

We know when the night of the fifteenth is, and we are not uncertain regarding the days of the new month. The Chachamim instituted that we must observe two days of Yom Tov since that it what they did in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh. Accordingly, we must fulfill all mitzvos on the second night, as well.

However, that is only regarding mitzvos that if we wouldn’t fulfill, it would be degrading for the Yom Tov. We are required to eat matzah and marror since otherwise, it would be apparent that we are not recognizing this night as a Yom Tov; however, matzah which is not lechem oni would not degrade the Yom Tov at all and therefore it would not be necessary. He cites a Beis Yosef as proof to this.

I heard that this could be the justification for the custom of not eating gebrochts only on the first night of Pesach. If the reason for not eating gebrochts on Pesach is because there is a concern that it might result in chametz, there is no distinction between the first night and all the other nights; but if the reason is based on lechem oni, there can be logic to say that it is only applicable on the first night.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 116 - Highlights

Concern for the Same Name

The Gemora relates an incident: Yitzchak Reish Gilusa (surname), the nephew of Rav Bibi was traveling from Cortava to Aspamya, and he died. The following message was sent from there: Yitzchak Reish Gilusa, the nephew of Rav Bibi was traveling from Cortava to Aspamya, and he died.

The Gemora inquires: Should we be concerned that that there are two Yitzchak’s or not?

Abaye said: We should be concerned. Rava said: There is no need to be concerned.

Abaye said: How do I know that we should be concerned? A letter of divorce was once found in Nehardea. It was written in it: Near the town of Colonia, I, Androlinai of Nehardea, released and divorced my wife So-and-so. When Shmuel's father sent it to Rabbi Yehudah Nesiah, the latter responded: All of Nehardea should be searched (to ascertain whether there is no other person of the same name in that town; this obviously proves the soundness of Abaye's ruling).Rava, however, said: If that were so, he should have instructed that the whole world should be searched. The truth is that it was only out of respect for Shmuel's father that he sent that message.

Rava said: How do I know that we should not be concerned? Two loan documents were once produced in court at Mechuza and the names of the lenders were written as Chavai son of Nanai and Nanai son of Chavai. Rava bar Avuha ordered the collection of the debts based on these documents. But, surely, there are many men in Mechuza bearing the names of Chavai son of Nanai and Nanai son of Chavai? (And yet it was not doubted that the persons who held the notes were the men named, which proves that even the definite existence of other men of the same name in the same place need not be taken into consideration. This being the rule in monetary matters, it may be inferred that in religious matters, the uncertain existence at least of men of the same name need not be taken into consideration.)

And what would Abaye reply? There is no reason to be concerned in that case. There is no concern that a lender would lose the document and this person with the same name found it because lenders are generally careful in regards to loan documents. There is no concern that the lender deposited these documents by this person, for a lender would never deposit a document for safekeeping with a man whose name is the same as his name. There is no concern that the lender gave the document to this person in order that the latter should acquire the loan, but he did not employ a valid act of transfer, because loan documents are acquired by merely giving the document from the previous owner to the new one. (115b – 116a)

From Sura to Nehardea

A letter of divorce was once found in Sura, and the following was written in it: In the town of Sura, I, Anan son of Chiya of Nehardea, released and divorced my wife So-and-so. The Rabbis searched from Sura to Nehardea and they found that there was no other Anan son of Chiya except for Anan son of Chiya of Chagra who was presently residing in Nehardea. Witnesses came and declared that on the day on which the letter of divorce was written Anan son of Chiya of Chagra was with them in Nehardea, and not in Sura, where the divorce was written. Abaye said: Even according to me who holds that the possibility of the existence of other men of the same name is to be taken into consideration. no such possibility need be considered here, for even in respect of the only other man known to have that name, witnesses declared that he was in Nehardea; how then could he on the same day, have been in Sura! Rava said: Even according to me who holds that the possibility of the existence of other men of the same name is not to be taken into consideration, such a possibility must be considered here, since the man in question may have gone to Sura on a flying camel, or perhaps, he arrived there by a miraculous leap (using the Divine name), or he may have given verbal instructions for the letter of divorce to be written on his behalf, as, in fact Rav said to his scribes, and Rav Huna, similarly, said to his scribes: When you are writing and signing documents in Shili, write “in Shili,” although the instructions were given to you in Hini, and when you are in Hini, write, “in Hini,” although the instructions were given to you in Shili. (116a)

Sesame Seeds Ruling

The Gemora asks: What is the halacha regarding the sesame seeds? Rav Yeimar said that we are not concerned that the seeds had been replaced. Ravina said: We are concerned. The halacha is that we are concerned. (116a)

Fighting between Husband and Wife

The Mishna had stated: If there was fighting between him and her, she would not be believed that her husband died.

The Gemora asks: What is considered “fighting”?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: If there is such extensive fighting that she says to her husband, “Divorce me!”

The Gemora asks: Even happily married women say that when they are angry?

Rather, it is when the woman tells her husband, “You have divorced me.”

The Gemora asks: If she says that she has been divorced she should be believed according to Rav Hamnuna, for Rav Hamnuna says that there is a presumption that a woman will not have the gall to say that to her husband if it would not indeed be the truth.

Rather, it is when the woman tells her husband, “You have divorced me in front of So-and-so and So-and-so,” and we ask them if this is indeed the case, and they answer, “Such a thing never occurred.”

The Gemora asks: Why don’t we believe the woman that her husband died in the case where there is fighting between them?

Rav Chanina said: It is because we suspect her of lying. Rav Simi bar Ashi said: It is because she might say that he died based on her assumption, although she did not actually observe that he died.

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between them?

The Gemora answers: The difference between them would be in a case where he initiated the fight (as she does not hate him she would not invent a lie in order to get rid of him but would nevertheless readily believe that he was dead should he ever have found himself in a position of danger; she would not take the trouble to ascertain whether her conjecture was not groundless). (116a – 116b)

Single Witness

The Gemora inquires: Do we believe a single witness when there is fighting between the husband and the wife? Do we say that the reason a single witness is normally believed to allow a woman to remarry is because we assume the witness is telling the truth about a person, who, if alive, would clearly turn the witness into a liar (and the witness therefore would not lie), here too, he will not lie? Or do we say that one witness is usually believed because we know that the woman herself is careful to ascertain that her husband is really dead before she would remarry, however, here, when they are fighting, she will not investigate carefully prior to remarrying?

The Gemora leaves the inquiry unresolved. (116b)

Mishna

The Mishna states: Beis Hillel said: We did not hear, except when she comes from the harvest, and in the same country, and like a case that happened (only then is she believed that her husband died). Beis Shamai said to them: It is all one whether she comes from the harvest, or she comes from the olives, or she comes from the grape harvest, or she comes from one country to another. The Chachamim spoke of the harvest only as something that happened. Beis Hillel retracted to teach as Beis Shamai. (116b)

She is Believed only by the Harvest

It was taught in the following braisa: Beis Shamai said to Beis Hillel: According to your view, one would only know the law concerning the wheat harvest; from where would the law be known concerning the barley harvest? And, furthermore, one would only know the law in the case where one harvested; from where would the law be known concerning one who picked grapes, picked olives, harvested dates, or picked figs? But you must admit it is only the original incident that occurred at harvest time and that the same law is applicable to all the other seasons. So here also we maintain that the incident occurred with a husband who died in the same country, but the same law would be applicable to all other countries.

What would Beis Hillel reply? In the case of the same country, where people freely move about, she is afraid to lie, however, from one country to another, where people do not freely move about, she is not afraid.

And how would Beis Shamai respond? Here also, caravans frequently move about from one country to another.

The Gemora asks: What was the original incident that the Mishna alluded to?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: It was the end of the wheat harvest when ten men went to harvest their wheat and a snake bit one of them and he died from the wound. His wife, thereupon, came and reported the incident to Beis Din, who, having sent to investigate, found her statement to be correct. At that time it was ordained: If a woman stated: “My husband is dead,” she may remarry; if she said “My husband is dead,” she may be taken in yibum. (116b)

Decree is Limited to the same Situation as the Original Incident

The Gemora states: Let us say that Rabbi Chanania bar Akavya and the Rabbis argue regarding the same issue as Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel. For we learned in the following braisa: No man shall carry the waters of purification and ashes of purification across the Jordan River on board a ship, nor may one stand on one side and throw them across to the other side, nor may one float them upon water, nor may one carry them while riding on an animal or on the back of another man unless his own feet were touching the ground. He may, however, convey them across a bridge. These laws are applicable to the Jordan River and to other rivers as well. Rabbi Chanania bar Akavya said: They spoke only of the Jordan River and of transport on board a ship, as was the case in the original incident. Must it, then, be assumed that the Rabbis hold the same view as Beis Shamai, whereas Rabbi Chanania bar Akavya holds the same view as Beis Hillel?

The Gemora rejects the comparison: The Rabbis can answer you: Our ruling agrees with the view of Beis Hillel also; for Beis Hillel maintained their opinion only there, since the woman is believed only because she is afraid to lie, and it is only in a nearby place that she fears, while in a distant one she does not fear. Here, however, what is the difference whether it is on the Jordan or on other rivers! Rabbi Chanania bar Akavya can also answer you: I may uphold my view even according to Beis Shamai; for Beis Shamai maintained their opinion only there because a woman investigates thoroughly and only then, will she remarry. Hence, what difference does it make whether the locality was near or far? Here, however, the prohibition is due to an actual incident; hence it is only against transport on the Jordan and on board a ship, where the incident occurred, that the Rabbis enacted their preventive measure, but against other rivers where the incident did not occur, the Rabbis did not enact a preventive measure.

What was the incident? It was that which Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: A man was once transporting the waters of purification and ashes of purification across the Jordan River on board a ship, and a piece of a corpse, of the size of an olive, was found stuck in the bottom of the ship. At that time, it was ordained: No man shall carry the waters of purification and ashes of purification across the Jordan on board a ship. (116b)

[END]

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Carrying a Siddur on Shabbos - Yevamos 114 - Daf Yomi

The following is a discussion from Meorot HaDaf HaYomi: In places without a kosher eiruv, it is forbidden to carry outside on Shabbos. Today, most shuls are well stocked with siddurim. However, in generations gone by, people had to bring their own siddurim from home. It was then a common question how to daven in shul on Shabbos, if one could not carry his siddur from home. R’ Akiva Eiger was once asked if a child could be given a siddur to carry to shul for his parents. For their own benefit: As we learn in our sugya, children may not be fed forbidden foods. Similarly, they may not be encouraged to transgress other prohibitions. However, the Rashba rules that this applies only to Torah prohibitions. Children may be encouraged to transgress a Rabbinic prohibition. As a proof, the Rashba cites the Gemara (Shabbos 139a), that forbids encouraging a child to sow kilayim (mixed seeds) even outside of Israel, where the prohibition is only Rabbinic. The Gemara explains that he might get accustomed to this habit, and continue even after he grows up. From here it seems that only because of this fear, do we forbid encouraging a young child to sow Rabbinically forbidden kilayim. The general prohibition against encouraging children to sin, seems not to apply. The Rashba adds that the fear of him getting accustomed to sin applies only when we ask him to sin for our sake. When we ask him to do something for his own benefit, this does not apply. (For this reason, we encourage children to eat on Yom Kippur). Our streets are not reshus harabim: Accordingly, R’ Akiva Eiger rules that although many Poskim hold that our streets are generally not reshus harabim by Torah standards (since they are not regularly traveled by 600,000 people), it is still forbidden to ask a child to carry a siddur for an adult to use. We may only ask him to carry a siddur for himself, and then look along inside with him (Teshuvos R’ Akiva Eiger 15, cited in Biur Halacha 343). It will not lead to a Torah prohibition: In his public lectures, the Maharam Shick warned against asking children to carry outside where there is no eiruv. However, in his writings he finds some room to be lenient. He explains, based on the Rashba, that the general prohibition against encouraging children to sin does not apply to Rabbinic prohibitions. Furthermore, the concern that he might get accustomed to sin applies only to Rabbinic sins whose Torah counterparts are common. For example, kilayim is forbidden by Rabbinic law in the Diaspora, and forbidden by Torah law in Eretz Yisroel.

However, the Torah prohibition of carrying was almost inapplicable in the Maharam Shick’s time, since there were no roads commonly traveled by 600,000 people. Therefore, perhaps small children may be asked to carry for their parents (Teshuvos Maharam Shik, 173).

The Shulchan Aruch’s ruling: This question is relevant only according to the Rashba, who rules that there is no general prohibition against encouraging young children to transgress Rabbinic prohibitions. However, the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 343) follows the opinion that even this is forbidden. Therefore, there is certainly no room to permit asking a child to carry for an adult, even in a Rabbinically forbidden area.

Chinuch: Furthermore, this discussion concerns only children who are too young to be educated in mitzva observance. Nevertheless, our sugya forbids feeding them Torah prohibited foods. Here, the Rashba rules that Rabbinically prohibited foods may be fed to them. However, the Rashba certainly agrees that once a child has reached the age to be educated in mitzva observance, his father must teach him to observe all the mitzvos – both Torah and Rabbinic. Therefore, he may not carry a siddur even for himself (see Mishna Berura 343 s.k. 3). R’ Akiva Eiger seems to apply that the obligation of chinuch in mitzva observance begins at age nine. The Maharam Shick suggests that perhaps asking a child to carry a siddur to shul is also considered good chinuch, even if there is no eiruv, since one is educating him to daven.

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DEFINING A SHOTAH - Yevamos 113 - Daf Yomi

Generally the understanding of a "shoteh" in the entire Torah as one who is exempt from mitzvos is classified by the Gemora in Chagiga 3b as someone who may have a high IQ but does crazy things.

Reb Moshe (Even Haezer 1:120) has an elaborate and controversial teshuva explaining that if he does one of the crazy acts mentioned, we assume he is a shoteh until proven otherwise, but if we can prove otherwise, then he is no longer considered a shoteh (but he points out that the Rambam implies that we consider him a shoteh even if he is crazy in only one thing and nothing else, he is still exempt from mitzvos- but R' Moshe then issues a novel ruling that regarding giving a get, so long as he understands the issues, it is valid).

A man who has shoteh status cannot divorce his wife since he needs to be mentally competent, but a woman can be divorced against her will and therefore the Gemora says she can receive a get Biblically. However, the Torah requires that in order to receive a 'get', she must: 1. Be able to watch her get, which means to distinguish between the get and something else (Gittin 64b). 2. She must have enough understanding about the concept of divorce that she does not return to her husband’s house. The Gemora concludes that even one who is a shoteh for everything else, can have enough da'as to distinguish between a get and something else, and realize that she must not return. But, since people will take advantage of her and act immorally with her, Chazal do not allow him to divorce her.

Tosafos and Rashi argue about a girl who is unable to distinguish between her get and something else, and will also continue to return after the divorce, whether the father can receive the get for her. Tosafos seems to understand that the father preventing her from returning qualifies, implying that it is a practical consideration that she must be someone who will not return, rather than being an issue of da'as. Rashi seems to understand that the father preventing her from returning isn't sufficient since it is a da'as requirement and she is still missing the da'as. It is interesting to note that according to Tosafos, a woman who is sometimes a shoteh and sometimes healthy, can receive a get at a time where she has enough intellect not to return, even though she is likely to once again become a shoteh and return to her husbands house (v'dok).

Reb Moshe (Y.D. 4:29 and Even Haezer 1:164) makes a very important distinction between a shoteh and someone with a very low IQ, implying that many mentally retarded people do not halachically qualify as a shoteh. I think his approach is very meduyak in the Gemora and Rashi on the bottom of 113a that a low level intellect which thinks clearly and straight (rather than 'krum' qualifies as sufficient da'as). (Reb Avi Lebovitz; Hearos al HaDaf

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WIFE SNATCHER

There was an incident in Narsh where a girl was married off when she was a minor. When she became an adult, they sat her by a Chupah (wedding canopy, in order to validate the first marriage), and someone else snatched her away before the “wedding” (and made her his wife)! Rav Bruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, were present when this happened, and they did not even require her to have a get from the second “husband” (as his kiddushin is invalid).

Rav Ashi explains that being that the wife snatcher acted improperly, the Rabbanan therefore acted improperly with him and removed the validity of his kiddushin. (This is following the opinion of Rav, who maintains that for the marriage of a minor to become valid, she must have marital relations with her husband when she becomes an adult, and if not the marriage is invalid.)

This incident must be referring to a case where she was “snatched” willingly, for otherwise, the kiddushin would anyways not be valid since it is taught in Gemora Kiddushin that a betrothal cannot be valid if the woman does not consent. We must say that the man snatched her, but she nodded with her head in agreement.

The Nimukei Yosef understands the case to be referring to one where originally, she did not consent, but afterwards, he convinced her until she finally agreed.

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei Hashas cites a Teshuvos haRashba who writes that we do not apply the principle of “Since he acted improperly, the Rabbanan acted improperly with him” only in places that are specifically mentioned in Chazal. The Sages did not annul the marriage in every case where one acts with trickery. This can be proven from a Gemora in Kiddushin (58b). The Gemora states: One who tells his friend to marry a woman for him (as an agent), and he goes ahead and marries her for himself, she is married to the second one. We do not say that since he acted improperly, the Chachamim invalidated his marriage.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 110 - Highlights

The Validity of a Minor’s Marriage

Rav stated (109b) that a minor who was married off by her brothers/mother, and subsequently married someone else after she became an adult without ever having done mi’un to the first husband does not require a get (halachic divorce document) from her second husband. It must be that Rav is discussing a case where the girl did not have relations with her first husband after she became an adult, and even so she does not need a get from her second husband, as the kidushin of the first husband is valid. The Gemora answers that no, Rav only stated his Halachah when the minor did have relations with the first husband after she became an adult.

The Gemora asks, if this is the case, what is the reasoning of Shmuel (who argues on Rav and state that her second husband is required to give her a get)? [It is clear that the first marriage is valid, and the second is totally invalid!] The Gemora answers that Shmuel holds that whenever someone has marital relations, they do so on the basis of their original kiddushin (not in order to make a new kiddushin).

The Gemora asks, didn’t Rav and Shmuel already argue about these principles? A case was stated where a person made a conditional kiddushin (that the woman would not have any outstanding vows or blemishes), but the nisuin was done without mention of conditions. Rav said that if the condition was later found to have been violated a get is still required. Shmuel said that a get is not required. Rav stated that a get is required because once he married her he essentially relented on his condition. Shmuel said that a get is required because his marital relations are based on the validity of his original kiddushin. [This argument seems to be the same as the previous argument between Rav and Shmuel. Why are both necessary?]

The Gemora answers that both arguments are necessary (using the text of Rashi, see Bach). In the first case of our Gemora, Rav might have only stated that the kiddushin was valid when the first husband had relations with her, because there was no condition against the kiddushin. However, in the second case where there is a condition, Rav might admit to Shmuel that the kiddushin is invalid. If we would only state the second case, maybe the second case (where an explicit condition was violated) is where Shmuel applied his rule. In the first case, perhaps he would agree to Rav. Both cases are therefore necessary.

The Gemora returns to its original question: Does Rav indeed hold that for the marriage of a minor to become valid she must have marital relations with her husband when she becomes an adult (and if not the marriage is invalid)? There was an incident in Narsh where a girl was married off when she was a minor. When she became an adult, they sat her by a Chupah (wedding canopy, in order to validate the first marriage), and someone else snatched her away before the “wedding” (and made her his wife)! Rav Bruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, were present when this happened, and they did not even require her to have a get from the second “husband” (as his kiddushin is invalid). This implies that Rav viewed the first marriage as valid when she became an adult, even before she had relations!

Rav Papa answers that this was because the custom in Narsh was to have the real marriage before the public Chupah (in such a case, meaning that they already had relations since she became an adult). Rav Ashi answers that being that the wife snatcher acted improperly, the Rabbanan therefore acted improperly with him and removed the validity of his kiddushin. Ravina asked that this makes sense if he only did kiddushin with money (as the Rabbanan can invalidate his kiddushin transaction). If he did kiddushin through having marital relations, how can the Rabbanan “take away” his having had marital relations? Rav Ashi answered that the Rabbanan can state that his relations are considered to have been promiscuous and are not valid for kiddushin.

Rav Yehuda states in the name of Shmuel that the law is like Rabbi Eliezer (see Mishna 109a). Rabbi Elazar also stated that the law is like Rebbi Eliezer. (110a)

Mishna

If someone was married to two minors who were orphans and he died, if his brothers do yibum or chalitzah to one of them, the other is then exempt from yibum or chalitzah. This would also be the case if the two girls are (adults and) deaf. If the two wives in such a case are one minor and one deaf girl, doing yibum to one of them does not exempt the other. If one is a regular woman and one is deaf, doing yibum to the regular woman exempts the deaf woman, and yibum to the deaf woman does not exempt the regular woman. If one wife was an adult and the other a minor, the yibum of the adult exempts the minor, but the yibum of the minor does not exempt the adult. (110a)

A Deaf Woman and Chalitzah

The Gemora asks, can a deaf woman have chalitzah? Doesn’t the mishna state that a deaf man who does chalitzah, a deaf woman who receives chalitzah, and a woman who received chalitzah from a minor, their chalitzah are ruled invalid. Rav Gidal says in the name of Rav that the Mishna is actually referring only to yibum as a choice for the deaf woman. Rabah (see side of Gemora) says that the Mishna could even be referring to chalitzah. Our Mishna is talking about a woman who was deaf from birth, and the Mishna earlier is talking about a woman who was originally a Pikei’ach (meaning that he has all of his senses as opposed to being deaf) and then became deaf. It makes sense that a woman who was deaf from birth can receive chalitzah, as just as she got married this way (through hints), so too she should be able to have chalitzah in this way. If she was a Pikachas adult (when she married) and only then became deaf she cannot do chalitzah, as she cannot hear the words of chalitzah.

Abaye asked, is it true that a woman who was originally deaf can have chalitzah? Doesn’t the Mishna (112b) state that if two brothers, one a Pikei’ach and one deaf, married two women of similar types, if the deaf husband of the deaf wife dies, what options are there for the Pikei’ach husband? He should do yibum, and if he wants he can subsequently divorce her. If the Pikei’ach is the one who dies, what should the deaf husband do? He can only do yibum, and he cannot give her a get (as his get cannot take away his brother’s kiddushin, which is more powerful than the kiddushin of a deaf person). Abaye asks, this Mishna seems to be talking about a case where the deaf woman married a deaf man when she was already deaf, and even so the Mishna does not give the option of chalitzah! The Gemora answers the case must be that she became deaf afterwards.

The Gemora further tries to clarify whether or not a woman who was deaf before her marriage can have chalitzah. The Mishna (112b) gives a case where two Pikei’ach brothers marry two women: one who is also a Pikachas and one who is deaf. If the husband of the deaf woman dies, what option is there for the Pikei’ach husband? He can do yibum, and if he wants he can give her a get. If the husband of the Pikachas dies, what options are there for the Pikei’ach who is married to the deaf woman? He may do either yibum or chalitzah. It must be, the Gemora states, that being that the case clearly involves men who were Pikchin originally, even before they married, the woman who is deaf must be someone who was deaf before she was married, and yet only yibum is an option and not chalitzah! The Gemora answers that each person in the case has a different status (and the deaf woman must have only become deaf afterwards).

Abaye asked (a similar question) from a Mishna (112b) regarding two brothers, one a Pikei’ach and one who is deaf, who married two similar sisters. If the deaf husband of the deaf woman dies, what option is there for the Pike’ach husband? The deaf woman is exempt from yibum as she is the sister of her potential yavam. If the Pikei’ach husband of the Pikachas wife dies, what option is there for the deaf husband of the deaf wife? He must divorce his own wife, and not marry his ex-wife’s sister as well. The Gemora asks, if you will say this deaf man is someone who was originally a Pikei’ach before marriage and only later became deaf, can someone like that divorce his wife? The Mishna states that if a wife becomes deaf, she can still be divorced, but if she becomes insane she cannot be divorced. If a man either becomes deaf or insane, he cannot divorce at all. It must therefore be that the braisa is talking about a man who was originally deaf, and his wife was also originally deaf. Being that we have now established a case in this Mishna where sisters (one who was a deaf woman) were originally deaf, it must be that the cases in this same Mishna involving deaf women who are not sisters also refers to women who were originally deaf before marriage! As stated above, these cases clearly conclude that the only option for such women is yibum, not chalitzah! [This proves that women who were deaf before marriage are not eligible for chalitzah, unlike the opinion of Rabah stated above.] This question caused Rabah to remain quiet (seemingly without an answer).

When Abaye went before Rav Yosef, Rav Yosef asked him why he had asked Rabah from these cases. Rabah could still answer that although the case of the deaf sisters discuss sisters who were originally deaf, the cases in the Mishna that deal with two wives who were not sisters deal with women who only became deaf after marriage! Rav Yosef said that you should have asked him from the following case (in the Mishna). Two deaf brother who married either two Pikachas sisters, two deaf sisters, or two sisters one of who was a Pikachas and one who was deaf, and two deaf sisters who married either two Pikei’ach brothers, two deaf brothers, or two deaf brothers one who was a Pikei’ach and one who was deaf, they are all exempt from yibum and chalitzah (in the event that one of the husband’s die). If the wives were not sisters, they can do yibum, and if they want to subsequently divorce them, they can. What is the case? If it talking about husbands who were originally Pikchim and then became deaf, doesn’t the Mishna state that if a wife becomes deaf, she can still be divorced, but if she becomes insane she cannot be divorced. If a man either becomes deaf or insane, he cannot divorce at all. The Mishna must therefore be discussing cases where everyone in the case was originally deaf, and yet the Mishna states that if the wives were not sisters, yibum can be performed. This implies that only yibum, not chalitzah! This question is a Tiyuvta (question that is seemingly impossible to answer) on Rabah. (110a – 110b)

A Minor and a Deaf Woman

Rav Nachman said that he found Rav Ada bar Ahavah and his son-in-law Rav Chana sitting and gathering students (for a study lesson) in the marketplace of Pumbedisa. They stated that this that it states in the Mishna, that the yibum of one of two widows, one who is a minor and one who is deaf, does not exempt the co-wife from yibum, is only true when their husband was a Pikei’ach. We are uncertain if he would have rather had the minor as a wife, or the deaf woman as a wife. He might have preferred to have the minor as a wife as she would eventually be knowledgeable (as opposed to being deaf), or he might have preferred the deaf woman who was physically an adult and a more appropriate mate for marital relations. However, if the husband was deaf, he certainly preferred having a wife who was deaf, as she was better for marital relations and similar to him. Rav Nachman states that he told them that even if these wives were widowed from a deaf husband we are still doubtful.

How indeed do we rectify the status of the minor and deaf widows (who the Mishna states do not exempt each other)? Rav Chisda says in the name of Rav that he should do yibum to the deaf woman, give her a get, and the minor should wait until she is older at which point the yavam can do an effective chalitzah. (110b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 109 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: If a man divorced his wife, and remarried her, she is permitted to the yavam (even though at the time his brother had divorced her, she was prohibited to the yavam, as his brother's divorced wife, nevertheless since at the time of his death she is his brother's wife who requires yibum, she is permitted to the yavam, for we do not say: the yevamah comes before the yavam for yibum on the basis of the first marriage, and from the time that this brother divorced her she is prohibited to the yavam as his brother's divorced wife; but we say: the death of the husband makes the yevamah require yibum; Kehati); but Rabbi Eliezer prohibits. So, too, if a man divorces an orphan (a minor given in marriage by her mother or brothers), and remarried her, she is permitted to the yavam; but Rabbi Eliezer prohibits. A minor who was given in marriage by her father and she was divorced is as an orphan during the father's lifetime. If the husband remarried her, all agree that she is prohibited to the yavam (since her divorce was fully effective by Torah law, since her father had given her in marriage, whereas her subsequent marriage was only valid by Rabbinic law, since she is a minor and she had already left her father's authority, and this marriage does not have the power to cancel the divorce. She therefore is prohibited to the yavam as his brother's divorced wife; Kehati). (108b – 109a)

Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning

Eifah said: What is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason? It is because she was once prohibited to yavam (at the time his brother had divorced her); this prohibition lasts forever.

The Gemora asks: If so, she should not require chalitzah either? It has been taught in a braisa that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that she must perform chalitzah.

Rather, Eifah said: I do not know what Rabbi Eliezer’s reason is.

Abaye said: Rabbi Eliezer is uncertain if it is the husband’s death which causes the yevamah to fall for yibum, in which case, she would be permitted to the yavam since we are only concerned with the moment that he died. Or perhaps he holds that the original marriage causes the yevamah to fall for yibum, in which case, she would be prohibited to the yavam since she was once prohibited to him (at the time his brother had divorced her); this prohibition lasts forever. (This explains why the yavam may not marry her, but chalitzah is nevertheless required.)

Rava explains: Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it is the husband’s death that causes the yevamah to fall to yibum. However, since people are familiar with her divorce and not with the remarriage, it would appear as if the yavam is performing a yibum with his brother’s divorcee. (This explains why the yavam may not marry her, but chalitzah is nevertheless required.)

The Gemora asks: Why should that be the case? Since she is presently living with him, everyone should know that he remarried her.

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Eliezer can be referring to a case where he remarried her at night and he died the next morning; people would not realize that he remarried her.

Rav Ashi explains: The reason Rabbi Eliezer prohibits the yibum is because of a Rabbinic decree that people might confuse this case with an orphan during the father's lifetime (a minor who was given in marriage by her father and she was divorced and later the husband remarried her, all agree that she is prohibited to the yavam). Since everyone agrees in that case that she may not be taken in yibum (since her divorce was fully effective by Torah law, since her father had given her in marriage, whereas her subsequent marriage was only valid by Rabbinic law, since she is a minor and she had already left her father's authority, and this marriage does not have the power to cancel the divorce; she therefore is prohibited to the yavam as his brother's divorced wife), Rabbi Eliezer prohibited yibum in the other cases as well, as a precautionary measure.

The Gemora shows support for Rav Ashi’s explanation from the Mishna. The last part of the Mishna stated: A minor who was given in marriage by her father and she was divorced is as an orphan during the father's lifetime. If the husband remarried her, all agree that she is prohibited to the yavam. The Gemora explains that this halacha is clear and evident and is taught here only in order to teach Rabbi Eliezer's reason in the cases of a man who divorced his wife and took her back, or who divorced an orphan and took her back, i.e., that she is prohibited to the yavam by the Rabbinic enactment of “an orphan during her father's lifetime.”

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rav Ashi’s explanation. The braisa states: The Chachamim agree with Rabbi Eliezer in the case of a minor who was given in marriage by her father and was divorced, she is like an orphan in her father's lifetime; if he remarried her, she is prohibited to the yavam, because her divorce was fully effective, and her remarriage is not. Which case are we referring to? To the case in which he divorced her when she was a minor and he remarried her when she was a minor; but if he divorced her when she was a minor and he took her back when she was an adult, or even if he remarried her when she was a minor and she became an adult when she was with him, and he died, she either performs chalitzah or is married by yibum. They said, in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, She performs chalitzah and she does not undergo yibum.

Rava inquired of Rav Nachman: What is the halacha in regards to her co-wife (according to Rabbi Eliezer, may the co-wife of a divorced minor whom the husband remarried when she became an adult be taken in yibum or not)?

Rav Nachman replied: The prohibition against marrying the divorcee is only Rabbinic in nature; shall we then go so far as to enact a preventive measure against a preventive measure? Obviously not! (109a)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If two brothers were married to two sisters that were minors and orphans, and the husband of one of them died, the yevamah is exempt on account of being the wife's sister. The halacha is the same if they were two female deaf-mutes. If two brothers were married to two sisters, one an adult woman and one a minor, and the husband of the minor sister died childless, the minor is exempt on account of being the wife's sister. If the husband of the adult sister died (he may not perform yibum because he is Rabbinically married to her sister; there is a Biblical zikah-attachment), Rabbi Eliezer says: They teach the minor to refuse him. Rabban Gamliel says: If she refused, she refused (this is referred to as mi’un, which would nullify her marriage retroactively); and if not, she waits until she becomes an adult, and then the other is exempt on account of being the wife's sister. Rabbi Yehoshua says: Woe unto him because of his wife and woe unto him because of his brother's wife. He sends away his wife with a bill of divorce, and his brother's wife with chalitzah. (109a)

Teach her to perform mi’un

The Gemora asks: is it in fact permitted to teach a minor to perform a mi’un? But Bar Kappara taught the following braisa: A man should always cling to three things and keep away from three things. A man should cling to the following three things: Chalitzah, the making of peace and the annulment of vows; and keep away from three things: From mi'un, from receiving deposits and from acting as a guarantor on a loan.

The Gemora answers: Mi'un, when it involves the fulfillment of a commandment (to enable the yibum) is different (and therefore encouraged).

Cling to three things
and keep away from three things

The Gemora had stated above: A man should always cling to three things and keep away from three things. A man should cling to the following three things: Chalitzah, the making of peace and the annulment of vows; and keep away from three things: From mi'un, from receiving deposits and from acting as a guarantor on a loan.

The Gemora explains: “He should cling to chalitzah” is following the opinion of Abba Shaul, who says: One who marries his yevamah on account of her beauty, or for the purpose of being married, or for any other reason besides the fulfillment of the mitzvah is regarded as though he has cohabited with an ervah (his brother’s wife) and the offspring from such a union is close to being a mamzer (he holds that the mitzvah of chalitzah takes precedence over the mitzvah of yibum since he might not have pure intentions).

“He should cling to the making of peace” is derived from the verse [Tehillim 34:15]: Seek peace and pursue it. Rabbi Avahu expounds a gezeirah shavah indicating the reward that is in store for such a person in the World to Come.

“He should cling to the annulment of vows” is following the opinion of Rabbi Nosson, who says in the following braisa: One who vows is regarded as if he built a private altar (in the times that they were forbidden), and one who fulfills the vow is regarded as if he offered a sacrifice on the private altar (fulfilling the vow instead of having it annulled will encourage him to vow in the future).

“He should keep away from mi’un” because she might regret her refusal when she becomes an adult.

“He should keep away from receiving deposits” applies to deposits made by his fellow townsman who considers his house as his own house (since he is a constant visitor at his house, he may remove the deposited object and claim it again from the custodian).

“He should keep away from acting as a guarantor on a loan” is referring to the guarantors of Sheltzion (where the debts were collected directly from the guarantors and not from the creditors). For Rabbi Yitzchak said: Misfortune upon misfortune will come upon those who accept converts, and to the guarantors of Sheltzion and to one who rivets himself to the words of halacha.

The Gemora explains: “Misfortune upon misfortune will come upon those who accept converts” is following the opinion of Rabbi Chelbo who said: Converts are as harmful to the Jewish people as sapachas (a type of tzara’as).

“Misfortune upon misfortune will come upon the guarantors of Sheltzion” for they collect the debts directly from the guarantor without initially seeking payment from the borrower (where now the guarantor is burdened with the task of seeking reimbursement from the borrower).

“Misfortune upon misfortune will come upon one who rivets himself to the words of halacha” is following the opinion of Rabbi Yosi. For it was taught in a braisa: Rabbi Yosi said: One who says that he did not study Torah has no reward for studying Torah.

The Gemora asks: This is obvious; what is Rabbi Yosi teaching us?

Rather, Rabbi Yosi said: One who says that he has only studied torah (but he does not fulfill the commandments) is only rewarded for the studying of Torah.

The Gemora asks: This is also obvious; what is Rabbi Yosi teaching us?

Rather, Rabbi Yosi said: He is not even rewarded for studying Torah.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this?

Rav Papa answers: It is written [Devarim 5:1]: That you may learn them and observe to do them. Whoever is engaged in observance is also regarded as engaged in Torah study (and is thus rewarded), but whoever is not engaged in observance is not regarded as engaged in torah study.

Alternatively, you can say like we said before: Rabbi Yosi said: One who says that he has only studied torah (but he does not fulfill the commandments) is only rewarded for the studying of Torah. This statement is necessary (and not obvious) for the following case: One who teaches others and they perform the mitzvos. One might think that the teacher should be rewarded for the performance of the mitzvos since it is on account of his teaching that the others are performing the mitzvos, Rabbi Yosi teaches us that this is not the case. He will only receive reward for the mitzvos if he himself performs them.

Alternatively, you can say that “Misfortune upon misfortune will come upon one who rivets himself to the words of halacha” is referring to a judge who compares one case to a similar one using his powers of logic, but he does not go to his teacher to confirm if his comparison is indeed correct. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini said in the name of Rabbi Yonasan: A judge should always imagine himself as if he had a sword lying between his thighs, and Gehinom was open beneath him; as it is written [Shir Hashirim 3: 7-8]: Behold, it is the couch of Shlomo; sixty mighty men are about it, of the mighty men of Israel etc. Because of the dread in the night is referring to the dread of' Gehinom which is like the night. (109a – 109b)


[END]

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