Moshe and Ba'al Pe'or

Rabbi Chama b’Rabbi Chanina says (Daf Yomi: Sotah 14a): Why was Moshe buried by the house of Pe’or (an idol)? In order to atone on what happened by Pe’or (the Jewish men were enticed by the Moabite women into depravity and idolatry).

Why was Moshe chosen to be buried there to atone for this sin? What level in greatness did Moshe possess that was being used as the counterbalance to Pe’or?

Reb Chaim Shmuelewitz states that the idolatry of Pe’or is the attribute of wantonness. It indicates that a person has no restraint and the feelings or rights of others do not concern him. [The procedure of serving this Avodah Zarah involved defecating before the idol.] He is solely interested in himself. This is why Moshe Rabbeinu was buried opposite Pe’or. Moshe is the epithet of what it means to be interested in his task and mission of leading Klal Yisroel, and his own personal concern is the farthest thing from his mind. Moshe is the faithful servant that Hashem has complete trust in him.

This is why he can receive the “klil tiferes,” - the crown of glory on his head. A king, when he temporarily removes his crown from his head (due to its weight or on account of the heat), will not place it on the head of his vice-minister for several reasons. If someone would walk in and observe that the king’s crown is on his head, they would assume that he is indeed the king. Furthermore, the vice-minister himself would entertain those feelings. The king, therefore, would place it on a “hook on the wall.” No one will consider that the hook became king. The Holy One, Blessed be He, can place His “crown of glory” on Moshe’s head, for he is the ultimate faithful servant. Moshe will not suppose that he became the king, and nobody who sees the crown on his head will think that way.

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Miriam's Steadfastness

It is written: Miriam the prophetess, sister of Aaron, took (her drum in her hand). The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 13a) asks: Was she the sister of Aaron, but not the sister of Moshe? Rav Amram said in the name of Rav, and others say that it was Rav Nachman in the name of Rav: This teaches us that Miriam was saying prophecy while she was only the sister of Aaron (before Moshe was born), and she said, “In the future, my mother will be giving birth to a son, who will save Klal Yisroel.” And once Moshe was born, the entire house became filled with light. Her father stood up and kissed her on her head. He said, “My daughter, your prophecy has been fulfilled.” But when Moshe was thrown into the water, he said to her, “My daughter, where has your prophecy gone?” And that is what’s written: His sister stood at a distance to find out what would happen with him. She wanted to know what would happen with her prophecy.

It was through this that Miriam merited that the entire Jewish people waited for her for seven days.

The commentators ask: What was so significant about waiting around to see how the matter would resolve itself? Wouldn’t any curious person wait around to see what might transpire?

Another question is asked: Why didn’t Yocheved, Moshe’s mother wait there as well to see what would happen with the prophecy?

Reb Meir Bergman writes that even with greatness of Yocheved, her faith in Hashem and her fear of God, at the time that Moshe was cast into the river; she thought that Moshe would certainly die there. This is why the Medrash says that Yocheved, after Moshe was thrown into the river, also asked Miriam, “where is your prophecy now?” According to the natural law, Moshe would not be saved and the river was destined to be his end. As a matter of fact, it took an unusual miracle for Moshe to be saved.

Miriam, on the other hand, was strong in her beliefs and she refused to budge. She received a prophecy that Moshe would be the savior of the Jewish people, and although the odds were not favorable, she knew that somehow, he would survive.

This is why she was rewarded so greatly. She was steadfast in her belief in Hashem that nothing could sway her.

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The Consumption of Non-Kosher Food Causing “Timtum”

The Gemora states (Daf Yomi: Sotah 12b): And his sister said to Pharaoh’s daughter, “Shall I go and call for you a wet-nurse from the Hebrew women?” The Gemora asks: Why was it necessary to summon a Hebrew woman? The Gemora answers: This teaches us that they handed Moshe to all the Egyptian women, but he would not nurse from them. He said: “Shall a mouth that is destined to speak with the Shechinah nurse from something which is not kosher?”

The question is asked: Why does the Gemora state this reason with respect to Moshe, when the halacha clearly rules that all Jews must refrain from having an idolater nurse their child, if a Jewish nurse is available (Rama Y”D 81:7)?
Maharatz Chayos suggests that this halacha only applied after the Giving of the Torah, for then many of the foods consumed by non-Jewish women are forbidden to Jews. Since this reason was not applicable to Moshe in Egypt, it was necessary to provide a different explanation for his refusal to be nursed by an Egyptian woman.

Shulchan Aruch rules that a Jewish baby is permitted to have a non-Jewish wet nurse; however it is not preferable because the non-kosher food will harm the baby spiritually. The Rama adds that a Jewish woman who must eat non-kosher food for health reasons should not nurse her baby because the non-kosher food will be detrimental for the child.

The Gra cites our Gemora that Moshe refused to nurse from an Egyptian woman because he was destined for prophecy, so it would be improper for him to consume non-kosher food. It would seem that the non-kosher food would have affected his soul, and disqualify him to be the Prophet that he became.

Reb Micha Berger gleans from here that non-kosher food is intrinsically harmful for a person’s soul even if it is permissible to eat.

He cites a Ran in his Drashos (11) that states this explicitly. In his discussion as to why halacha is decided by the Chachamim and not by the Prophets, he asks the following question: If a sage errs and permits a forbidden food, it is like a doctor who makes a mistake and gives a patient poison instead of medicine. In both cases, the person is harmed. Accordingly, wouldn’t it be preferable for the Prophets to decide halachic matters, and then, there would be no mistakes?

He answers that prophecy is not always available. He then adds that even though eating non-kosher food is harmful, the mitzvah of listening to our sages may offset the harmful effects. It is however evident from the Ran that the consumption of non-kosher food is objectively poison, and detrimental to one’s soul even if it is done permissibly.

The Abarbanel (Devarim 17:4) disagrees with the Ran. He maintains that it is impossible for harm to befall a person if he is following the Chachamim. If the food is permitted, it cannot be harmful. Reb Micha explains that it would seem from the Abarbanel that he maintains that the consumption of non-kosher food is not intrinsically harmful; rather, it is harmful only because it is prohibited. If for some reason, there is no prohibition, then it is not harmful.

Reb Moshe (O”C 2:88) quotes the Chasam Sofer where he was discussing a handicapped girl in the following situation: If she would remain at home, she would not develop properly and remain ignorant her entire life. However, if the parents would send her to a special school, they claimed that she would then reach the potential of a teenager. However, the school was in a non-Jewish area, and there was no possibility of providing kosher food. The Chasam Sofer ruled that it is permitted to send her there, but he recommended against sending her, for the following reason: If they send her to that school, she will become intelligent enough to be obligated in mitzvos. The non-kosher food that she will consume will affect her heart, and she will probably violate Torah and mitzvos. It is therefore preferable for her to remain in her present situation. (He concludes: Her present situation is more preferable than being “b’timtum” before the Holy One, Blessed is He for one moment.)

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Abortions

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 11b) cites a braisa: “Shifrah” is Yocheved; and why was her name called Shifrah? It was because she straightened the limbs of the baby. Another explanation of Shifrah is that the Jewish people were fruitful and multiplied in her days. “Pu’ah” is Miriam; and why was her name called Pu’ah? It was because she would coo to the child. Another explanation of Pu’ah is that she used to cry out through the Divine Spirit and say, “My mother will bear a son who will be the savior of Israel.”

The Maharal (Gur Aryeh) asks: Why does the Torah refer to Yocheved and Miriam as Shifra and Pu’ah, rather than referring to them by their actual names? He explains that prior to the birth of Moshe, the Torah did not want to give any recognition to his family members, especially his parents, because that would indicate that Moshe’s parents were responsible for who he was. Although normally the merits and contributions of the parents form the child, and without these specific parents, the child will not exist; by Moshe, this was not the case. Moshe’s existence was not dependent on Amram and Yocheved as his parents. Moshe was already set and destined from the six days of creation to lead the Jews out of Egypt. That is why the Torah doesn’t even mention Amram and Yocheved when describing Moshe’s birth.

The Chasam Sofer (Torah Moshe), with Reb Avi Lebowitz’s (Heoros – Insights on the Daf) elucidation explains that Pharaoh specifically requested of the Jewish women to murder the children, rather than asking the non-Jewish midwives, because he realized that the Jewish woman do not receive capital punishment for performing an abortion, whereas the non-Jewish woman do. Pharaoh wanted them to use the sign of “stones” to determine when the labor will begin, so that they can be present, and then use the dependable sign of which way the child is facing to determine if it is a boy or a girl, and to abort all the boys before the head comes out while it still has a status of a fetus. Pharaoh’s applied the following logic: Normally one is not allowed to commit murder to save their own life because “who says that your blood is redder than the other one?”, but this would only apply to a murder of a “life.” For an idolater, even the fetus has the status of “life,” since they receive capital punishment for performing an abortion, and the logic of “who says etc.” would apply equally to murder and abortion. But for the Jewish women, the fetus was not considered a full “life,” since they are not liable for abortion, and therefore they should be able to determine that their lives are more precious than that of the child. They would therefore abort the fetus to fulfill the command of the king and save their own lives. However, when confronted by Pharaoh for not following through with this partial birth abortion, their claim was that by the time they arrived, the fetus was fully born, and they were not allowed to kill a born child, even if it would cost them their own lives.

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Preventing Intermarriage

It is written: And they were disgusted because of the Children of Israel. This teaches us that the Jewish people were like thorns in the eyes of the Egyptians (when they saw that the Jewish people were increasing).

It is noteworthy that when we read this portion from the Torah on Mondays and Thursdays, we conclude one of the aliyos with this verse.

The question is asked that the halacha is that we do not end an aliyah on a bad note. Why therefore would we conclude with this verse, which demonstrates the hatred that the Egyptians had for the Jewish people?

The Mattersdorfer Rav, at an Agudah Convention, once answered that on the contrary! The fact that the Egyptians despised the Jews was a blessing. It was through this that the Jews were able to maintain their Jewish identity, and ultimately, this is what brought about the redemption. The Jewish people were able to keep their distance from the Egyptians. This prevented assimilation. When the idolaters befriend the Jews and begin mingling with them, this can have catastrophic results.

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One Sixty-fourth

Rav Chiya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav (Daf Yomi: Sotah 5a): A Torah scholar should have one eighth of an eighth of haughtiness (so that lighthearted people should not play with him and that they will accept his rulings).

The Sheiris Hapeleitah explains this precise measurement as follows: The Gemora in Bava Basra (73b) states that Mount Tabor was four parasangs (parsa’os) high. A parsah is four mil. A mil consists of two thousand amos. Accordingly, a parsah is eight thousand amos. It emerges that Mount Tabor is thirty-two thousand amos high. Chazal tell us that Mount Sinai was five hunred amos tall, which is precisely one sixty-fourth of Mount Tabor.

The following question may be asked: If the Holy One, Blessed be He did not wish to give the Torah on Mount Tabor, for it was haughty, why did He give the Torah on a mountain at all? The Torah could have been given on a flatland, where there would be no concern for haughtiness whatsoever! It was given on Mount Sinai, a mountain which its height was one sixty-fourth of Mount Tabor to teach us that a Torah scholar should possess this small measure of haughtiness.

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His Right from his Left

In the city of Dvinsk, there was a very prestigious and scholarly man named Reb Leib. He was referred to as Reb Leib Charif, the sharp one, due to his intelligent insights in torah. He was extremely close to Reb Meir Simcha, the Ohr Sameach, and they would spend many hours in each others company discussing Torah matters together.

There was once an incident where they were both sitting in the Beis Medrash when a different scholar was delivering a lecture to thirty laymen. Reb Leib heard how the scholar was explaining a certain topic to them and immediately asked a penetrating question that the scholar was incapable of answering.

Reb Meir Simcha arose from his designated seat near the eastern wall, walked to the back of the Beis Medrash and admonished Reb Leib: “Someone that doesn’t know between his right and his left, should be asking questions in the middle of a lecture?” Reb Leib was quiet, left the Beis Medrash in embarrassment and the scholar continued on with his lecture.

All those that witnessed the incident were bewildered. Is it possible that Reb Leib Charif could ask a question that was not fit to be asked? What did he do so terrible that caused Reb Meir Simcha to react in such a manner?

Reb Leib was puzzled as well and he went to Reb Meir Simcha’s house to inquire of him why he took such offense with his question, which was seemingly a legitimate one.

Reb Meir Simcha told him: “Did I say that your question was not a valid one? No, I did not. I was repeating a Gemora in Moed Katan (and in Sotah as well).”

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One who appraises his conduct (he considers the loss he might incur by performing a mitzva against the eternal reward that the mitzva will bring, and the benefit he may obtain by committing a sin against the tremendous loss that will result) will merit in seeing the salvation of Klal Yisroel through Hashem. He cites a verse in Tehillim [50:23]: Vesam derech arenu beyasha Elokim, And to him that sets his way, I will show the salvation of Hashem. Do not read it as Vesam (and to him that sets), rather, read it as Vesham, and one who appraises his way.

Rabbi Yannai had a student who would consistently ask questions during the lecture. On the Shabbos of the festival (within thirty days of the festival, the scholars would teach and discuss the laws of the festival), the student wouldn’t challenge Rabbi Yannai (since there were many people attending and if Rabbi Yannai wouldn’t know how to respond, he would be embarrassed). Rabbi Yannai said in reference to him: And to him that appraises his way, I will show the salvation of Hashem (due to the student’s careful calculation).

Reb Meir Simcha concluded: “You, Reb Leib, should have been cognizant of the difference between the right and the left of the letter sin; it was written vesam, with the letter sin, which has the dot on the left and the Gemora expounds it to mean vesham, with the letter shin, which has the dot on the right. Vesham means that one should appraise his ways and calculate his every move and word. When this scholar was lecturing in front of thirty laymen, you should not have asked a question that quite possibly could embarrass him.

(Margoliyos HaShas – Moed Katan)

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Ben Azzai

Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan (Daf Yomi: Sotah 4b): All of these Tannaim figured out the length of a seclusion based upon their own experience (how long it took each of them to perform the initial act of cohabitation with their own wife).

The Gemora asks: But Ben Azzai never got married (based upon the Gemora in Yevamos 63b, where Ben Azzai explained why he did not marry: “What should I do? My soul desires the Torah. The world can survive through other people.”)?

The Gemora answers: You could say that he got married and later divorced.

Alternatively, you can say that he heard this opinion from his teacher.

And if you prefer, you can say that “The secrets of Hashem are revealed to those that fear him.”

Rabbeinu Avraham min Ha’har explains that due to Ben Azzai’s tremendous desire to study Torah, he did not experience any unclean thoughts, and was therefore not obligated to get married.

Reb Elchanan Wasserman states that Ben Azzai was exempt from the mitzvah of marrying, for he was unable to cease studying Torah even for one moment.

Reb Yosef Engel writes that Ben Azzai discharged his obligation of procreation through his new insights in Torah. This is based upon the Gemora in Brochos (47b), which states that two torah scholars studying together can be regarded as three with respect to the laws of Birchas Hamazon (they could make a mezumen, even though the halacha is that three people are needed). The Rosh explains that the Torah that they are studying is regarded as the third person.

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Spirit of Foolishness

Rish Lakish says (Daf Yomi:Sotah 3a): A person does not sin unless a spirit of foolishness enters him.

Reb Chaim Shmuelitz asks: If so, why should a man be guilty for committing a transgression? If a spirit of foolishness entered him, it should be regarded as if it was unavoidable and he should be exempt from any punishment! It should be compared to a person who is standing on the edge of a pit and a strong wind blows and he falls into the pit. Is that his fault?

Reb Chaim explains that yes it is! It was his fault that he was even in the vicinity of the edge of the pit. Immediately, when he realized that he was near the boundary of the pit, he should have distanced himself from there. If he would have been far away from the pit, no wind, no matter how strong, would have been able to propel him into the pit. So too, it is with the spirit of foolishness that enters a person and causes him to sin. He obviously was too close to the sin in the first place that when a spirit of foolishness entered him, it was able to overpower him and cause him to sin.

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Heavenly Voice Regarding Marriage

The Gemora states: Every day, a Heavenly voice pronounces: “The daughter of this individual is designated for that man.”

Why when it is referring to the woman does it say, “The daughter of this man,” and when it is referring to the man, it says “that man”?

Tal Chaim answers: The Torah gives the right to the father to marry off his daughter and to receive the money; this right does not apply for his son.

Others answer based on Tosfos, which states that this Heavenly voice is issued forty days before the formation of the boy. At this point in time, the girl is not in existence yet and therefore it only mentions her father.

Kometz Mincha offers an alternative answer: The Gemora Bava Basra (109b) states that a man should investigate the woman’s father and her family. Regarding a woman, on the other hand, the Gemora in Kiddushin (7a) states: A woman would rather grow old together with a husband than alone; no matter whom the man might be, and therefore his family is not mentioned.

Sotah during Sefirah

It is written in the sefer, Minchas Ha’omer that it is fitting to learn Tractate Sotah, which contains forty-nine blat during the days of Sefirah, when we are counting forty-nine days.

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An Idolater is Stricter than a Jew

The Rishonim ask: It is evident from our Gemora that according to the one that holds that an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, can only Rabbinically pronounce a vow, but Biblically, it will not be effective; nevertheless, with respect to an idolater, an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, may pronounce a vow and it will be Biblically binding. Why would this be? How can an idolater be more stringent that a Jew?

The Mefaresh explains that there are other examples where we find that the law is stricter with an idolater than it is with respect of a Jew. The Mishna in Bava Kamma teaches us that if the ox of idolater gores an animal belonging to a Jew, the idolater is liable to pay full damages, even if the ox gored for the first time. A Jew, however, whose ox gores for the first time, will only be liable to pay half-damages.

Tosfos suggests the following: A Jewish adult is subject to the prohibition against desecrating his word. Accordingly, we expound that any Jew who is not included in this prohibition cannot pronounce a vow. A minor, who is not subject to this commandment, cannot therefore utter a vow, which would be Biblically valid. An idolater, however, who is not included in this prohibition, cannot be excluded from pronouncing a vow based on this, and therefore, even a minor’s vow would be Biblically binding.

It is evident from Tosfos that the prohibition against desecrating his word is not applicable to an idolater. The Mishna L’melech cites proofs that an idolater is obligated to keep his word based upon the prohibition against desecrating his word.

The Ohr Sameach answers this question by citing the Chasam Sofer, who says that any idolater, even a minor is obligated to observe their commandments. This explains why with respect to idolaters, an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, can pronounce a vow and it will be Biblically valid, whereas a Jewish minor cannot. By an idolater, there is no distinction whatsoever between a minor and an adult. Proof to this is from the Rosh, who states that the guidelines for a minor to reach adulthood are learned from an oral tradition that was transmitted to Moshe at Sinai with respect to all measurements. These laws were given to the Jewish people; not for the idolaters.

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Accepting Charity from an Idolater

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 62a) cites a Scriptural source to teach us that an idolater can vow vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings just like Jews.

The Haga’os Ashri (in Bava Basra) brings the following question in the name of the Maharich: Why are we not allowed to accept charity from an idolater, but we are permitted to accept his korbanos?

He answers in the name of his Rebbe: A voluntary korban is not brought to serve as atonement, and therefore, we are not concerned if they offer a sacrifice, for those do not bring about forgiveness and they will not serve as a protection for them. However, one who gives charity receives atonement for his sins, and merits protection for his good deed. It is not in our best interests to assist them in this matter.

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Depilatory

Rami bar Chama’s Inquiry

Rami bar Chama inquired (Daf Yomi: Nazir 61a): Is the reason that these four shavings are done because of the mitzvah of shaving, or is the purpose merely to remove the hair? The difference between these two reasons is whether or not they can be done with a depilatory. If they have the same laws as shaving when it is a mitzvah, it must be done with a razor. If it is just a matter of removing the hair, it can be done with a cream. What is the law?

Rami bar Chama’s question cannot be with respect to all the shavings, for a metzora and a nazir tahor are definitely required to shave with a razor. His inquiry can only be relevant to a nazir tamei.

Furthermore, Tosfos explains, he cannot be discussing the precise case of the braisa, for there, all four shavings must be done with a razor, since we are uncertain which of the four shavings is for the nazir tamei. He must be referring to a case where it was definitely known that the nazir was tamei. In truth, Rami bar Chama could have inquired simply: Does the shaving of a nazir tamei require a razor or not!

The Gemora brings a proof from the braisa which explicitly states that four shavings are required. Tosfos explains: Since in the braisa’s case, he would not be permitted to drink wine until after the fourth shaving; if a razor would not be necessary for the shaving of a nazir tamei, we would not have required a razor for the third shaving out of the concern that he might be concluding his nezirus with this shaving.

Depilatory

The Rambam rules that a nazir who shaves will receive lashes, whether he used a razor, and even if a different type of implement was used. However, if he used a depilatory, he will not incur lashes; rather, he will have negated the nazir’s positive commandment of growing his hair.

The Brisker Rav notes that it is evident from the Rambam that using a depilatory does not constitute a shaving at all! Accordingly, Rami bar Chama’s inquiry regarding a nazir tamei is not merely if a razor is required for his shaving; rather, his inquiry is if a nazir tamei has an obligation to shave! Perhaps, it is not necessary for him to shave at all; as long as his hair is removed, that is sufficient.

Based on this understanding, we can understand Rava’s proof from the braisa which states that a nazir, who might be tamei, is obligated to “shave” four times. The Gemora had stated earlier that he must shave four times, and not less, because one shaving cannot count for the other. This would only be understandable if a nazir tamei has an obligation to shave. However, if the halacha merely is that the hair of a nazir tamei must be removed, and this can even be done by means of a depilatory, which does not constitute a shaving at all, it would not be necessary to require a special shaving for the nazir tamei. When he shaves his hair for the tzaraas, it should automatically be valid for his “removal of hair,” needed for a nazir tamei. By the fact that the braisa rules that four shavings are required and not one of them can count for the other, this proves that a nazir tamei also has a mitzvah of shaving, and therefore, a depilatory may not be used.

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Two for One

Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai said (Daf Yomi: Nazir 60b): The shaving of a nazir, whether he is tahor or tamei cannot count for the shaving of a metzora. This, he explains, is because each of the shavings are different than the other (either because one is to remove hair and one is to grow hair, or because one is before the korbanos and one is afterwards, or because one is after immersion in a mikvah and the other is before immersion).

Shulchan Aruch rules that on Purim, one must cease from learning Torah in order to go and hear the Megillah.

The Beis Efraim asked the son of the Noda B’Yehuda as to why this would be considered bitul Torah. Isn’t the reading of the Megillah also considered learning?

The Chachmas Shlomo answers according to our Gemora, which states that one action cannot count for two different things. If he will be intending to fulfill the mitzvah of studying Torah, it cannot count for the mitzvah of reading the Megillah. And if he intends to discharge his obligation for reading the Megillah, it cannot count for learning Torah. This is why it is regarded as bitul Torah. (This, he says, is according to those that rule that one needs intent in order to discharge his obligation; it is impossible to have in mind for two mitzvos when he is only performing one action.)

This answer is perplexing in light of the halacha that one who recites kerias shema is also fulfilling his mitzvah of studying Torah! We see that one action can accomplish two things.

The Beis Efraim maintains that one who reads the Megillah or listens to it will not be fulfilling a mitzva of studying Torah. The Avnei Neizer (O”C 517) disagrees with him vehemently to such an extent that he writes: “I do not believe that those words came out of the mouth from such a righteous person as the Beis Efraim.”

Reb Chaim Voloziner talks at great length that there is a concept of neglecting to study Torah in depth and not only time. According to this, the Gemora can be explained to mean that even though reading the Megillah is considered learning, nonetheless it would be regarded as bitul Torah since he is not delving into the depths of Torah; if not for the special halacha that one is obligated to close the Gemora and hear the Megillah.

The Beis Efraim himself speculates that perhaps one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of learning Torah through the reading of the Megillah because it is part of Tefillah. This is based on the viewpoint of the Beis Yosef, who rules regarding one who had forgotten to recite birchas hatorah in the morning. The blessing of Ahava Rabbah can be utilized as a birchas hatorah, providing that he learns immediately after Shemoneh Esrei. The recital of kerias shema will not be sufficient because that is part of Tefillah. Perhaps, the same logic can be used for the reading of the Megillah.

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Wearing the Clothing of a Woman

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said (Daf Yomi: Nazir 59a): How do we know that a woman shall not go out wearing weapons of war? It is because it’s written: A man’s attire shall not be on a woman. And the verse, nor may a man wear a woman’s garment teaches us that a man is prohibited from beautifying himself with the adornments of a woman (included in this prohibition would be the removal of his hair).

The Beis Yosef rules that even according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, the Torah only forbade something that is in the open and recognizable to all; however, something that is hidden from the eye, it will only be Rabbinically forbidden. Therefore, he explains, that although the Rambam rules according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, it is not Biblically forbidden to shave the hair by the underarms and the pubic area, for that is something that is not seen.

The Bach wonders where the Beis Yosef saw such a distinction in the Gemora.

The Bach himself explains the Rambam as follows: Only things which are done for the sake of beauty is forbidden. This is why it would be Biblically forbidden for a man to wear make-up, eye shadow or wear colorful garments of a woman; however, shaving his body hairs is only removing things that are repulsive to him. That is why the Rambam rules that it is only Rabbinically forbidden.

The Bach rules that it is permitted for a man to wear the clothing of a woman if his purpose is not to appear like a woman. It is therefore permitted for a man to wear a woman’s clothing in order to protect himself from the rain or to shield him from the sun.

The Shach qualifies this ruling to be referring only to the embellishments of a woman; however, if he wears a woman’s garment in a manner that it would not be recognizable that he is a man, even the Bach would prohibit this.

The Darkei Moshe rules that this prohibition is not applicable on Purim. A man may wear the garment of a woman and a woman may wear the garment of a man. He explains: Whenever there is a custom for a man and a woman to wear the same clothing, there is no prohibition. (This is why the Rashba rules that in a place where it was the custom for the men to remove the hair by their underarms, there is no prohibition.) Since on Purim, it became the custom to switch clothing, there is no prohibition. Additionally, since it is being done for the joy of Purim, it is permitted.

The Yereim writes that a man may not wear a woman’s clothing, even if it just temporary and even if it is being done just for fun. The Mishna Berura rules like this.

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Reasons for a Mitzvah

The Tur (Y”D 181) cites the Rambam who writes that the Torah prohibits rounding the corners of one’s head and destroying one’s beard because it was the practice of idolaters.

The Tur writes that we do not need to seek out the reasons for mitzvos, for they are the King’s commandments, even if we do not understand the reason.

The Beis Yosef defends the Rambam, and he writes that there is no one who is concerned for the honor of the Torah and its mitzvos more than the Rambam. Although the laws of the Torah can be decrees from the King, nevertheless, wherever a reason for the mitzvah is found, it may be said. Whenever a reason cannot be found, it should be attributed to our shallow understanding. We are, nonetheless, obligated to fulfill those mitzvos that we do not understand its reasons in the same manner as we are obligated to fulfill those mitzvos that we do understand.

He concludes that the Rambam did not think up the reason for these mitzvos himself; rather, he saw from the juxtaposition of the verses that this is the reason for these prohibitions.

The Rama explains the Tur: Heaven forbid to think that the Tur suspected the Rambam to mean that if one does not understand the rationale for a mitzvah, he is not obligated to fulfill it. No sage will believe such a thing! However, those heretics who deny the truth of the Torah only believe in a mitzvah that they understand its reason. Rather, the following is the way that the Tur understood the Rambam: It is only if one shaves his head or destroys his beard in the same manner that the idolaters do; that is when one has transgressed this prohibition. The Tur writes that it is forbidden in any fashion whatsoever. Since the reason is not explicit in the Torah, the prohibition always applies. There is no room for leniency in a place where the reason is not applicable!

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Merely Growing his Hair

Rav Sheravya asks from our Mishna, which stated that he does not have to redo the days of nezirus that he had already observed and he can start counting right away. Now, if the Mishna is referring to a case of a thirty-day nezirus, how can it rule that he does not forfeit the days that he had already observed? He needs to count another thirty days in order for him to have a thirty-day growth of hair! It must be referring to a case where he declared a long nezirus, but the Mishna states that he can start counting right away. [This implies that the days of tzaraas are not counted towards his term of nezirus. This is direct contrast to Rav Chisda’s ruling!]

Rav Sheravya himself answers the question: The Mishna is referring to a case where he declared to be a nazir for fifty days, and he became a metzora after twenty days. He must undergo the purification process for a metzora and then he counts another thirty days, for then he will have a thirty-day growth of hair.

Tosfos notes that the Gemora could have stated a case where he declared to be a nazir for forty days, and he became a metzora after ten days. He must undergo the purification process for a metzora and then he counts another thirty days, for then he will have a thirty-day growth of hair.

The Brisker Rav asks: Couldn’t the Mishna be referring to a case where he declared to be a nazir for one hundred days, and he became a metzora after seventy days. He would not forfeit the original days, and the days that he was a metzora will not count towards his nezirus, for he needs to have a thirty-day growth of hair. When the purification process is completed, he will be compelled to count another thirty days!

He answers that if there are not thirty days remaining from the time that the purification process is completed, the days that he was a metzora will not count at all, and the days that he observes afterwards will be days of an actual nezirus; not only days where he is growing his hair. This is true only if he did not have a fulfillment of thirty days before he became a metzora; however, if he became a metzora after thirty days, then even if when the purification process is completed, he does not have thirty days remaining, the days that he was a metzora counts towards the nezirus, and the days of waiting afterwards are merely days where he is growing his hair. They are not regarded as days of nezirus!

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Leaving Eretz Yisroel

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir Daf 55a) cited a braisa: If one enters the land of the nations inside of a carriage, chest or closet, Rebbe rules that he is tamei and Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that he is tahor.

The Gemora suggested that the basis for their argument is as follows: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that since traveling inside a chest is uncommon, the Rabbis did not intend for the decree to apply in such a situation. Rebbe holds that although it is unusual, the Rabbis decreed tumah in this case as well.

The question is asked: How can this be their argument? Do we not find all throughout Gemora that the Rabbis did not intend that their decree should be applicable in cases that are uncommon? We do not find any Tanna that disagrees with this principle! Why in this specific case would they dispute this well-established principle?

The Mishna L’melech answers: In this case, the Rabbis decreed a tumah on anyone entering the land of the nations, even if they enter in an unusual manner. This is because they wished to prevent people from leaving Eretz Yisroel. Their original decree was on all situations!

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Mummies and Kohanim Entering the Land of the Nations

By: Reb Avi Lebovitz (Heoros al Hadaf)

The Mishna L'melech (Avel 3:1) has a teshuva where he discusses Kohanim going into the mummy business. He begins by saying that although they may consist of very dry bones, theywill still transmit tumah. However, his reason to be lenient is based on the opinion of the Yerai'im that we follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai that aside from idolaters not transmitting tumah through roof association, they also do not transmit tumah via “touching.” (Tosafos 54a clearly rejects this and says that even according to Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, they will transmit tumah via “touching.”) Based on the combination of the Yerai'im, and the Ra'avad who says that any Kohen who is already tamei (even after he separates from the corpse) has no prohibition of becoming tamei again, the Mishna L’melech creates a s'fek sfeika (double doubt) to be lenient, but eventually rejects it, since it is clear from the many places, including our Tosfos, in the name of Rabbeinu Chaim Cohen that a Kohen cannot make himself tamei even if he is already a tamei meis.

The issue that is related to our Gemora is that the Gemora in Avoda Zara (13a) says that a Kohen cannot enter into the Land of the Nations except for a mitzvah because of the decree of tumah on the Land of the Nations. The Rambam in Hilchos Ohalos (2:3) seems to understand that the concern of the Land of the Nations is because of the fetuses of idolaters that are buried there. This would clearly indicate that there is at least a prohibition of touching and carrying for Kohanim even related to the corpses of idolaters. However, the Mishna L'melech rejects this proof based on Tosfos, who says that the decree of tumah on the Land of the Nations is due to “the many Jews that were killed outside of Eretz Yisroel,” not because of the idolaters.

Practically speaking, what happened to the prohibition for a Kohen to go from Eretz Yisroel to the Land of the Nations (other than for mitzvah purposes)? The Shulchan Aruch (369) rules that a Kohen cannot go into the Land of the Nations, but the Shach (3) writes that it only applies when Eretz Yisroel is presumed to be in a state of taharah, but nowadays, this does not apply. This opinion is also quoted in the b'er hagola from the maharshal. The Shevus Yakov (brought in pischei teshuva) argues and claims that it applies even nowadays. Reb Akiva Eiger justifies the custom to be lenient about this, either because “sustaining one’s family” is a significant enough of a mitzvah (but this would not justify those who travel to chutz la'aretz for vacation) or because we are all tamei meisim. The second rationale seems to be either based on the opinion of the Ra’avad that the prohibition of tumas meis in general only applies when the Kohen is tahor, and although we are not lenient for a Biblical tumah, we rely on the Ra'avad for the Land of the Nations, which is only Rabbinical. But more likely he means to say that the entire decree of the Land of the Nations is in order to maintain the taharah of the Kohen, and it would not apply when the Kohen is a tamei meis.

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Kohen’s Sanctity based upon his Service

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 49) answers: Both words are necessary. For if the Torah would have only written for his father (that the nazir may not become tamei to), we would have thought that it is only the father that he cannot become tamei to for there is merely a presumption of paternity (for perhaps his mother committed adultery), but regarding his mother, whom we know gave birth to him, he could become tamei to her (the Torah therefore has to write “his mother” to teach us that he cannot become tamei to her). And if the Torah would have only written for his mother (that the nazir may not become tamei to), we would have thought that it is only the mother that he cannot become tamei to for her children’s lineage is not reckoned through her, but regarding his father, where the halacha is that family is determined by the father, he could become tamei to him (the Torah therefore has to write “his father” to teach us that he cannot become tamei to him).

The following question is asked: Why is the fact that we cannot prove for certain that the Kohen Gadol’s father is truly his father grounds to suggest that the Kohen Gadol may not become tamei to his father? If his father is not his actual father, for that very reason he should be permitted to become tamei to him! If the deceased man (a Kohen) is not his father, the Kohen Gadol is in all probability a Yisroel! Why would we think that he cannot become tamei to him, for he might not be his father? That is precisely the reason why he should be able to become tamei to him!

The Rashba ask a similar question on the Toras Kohanim (Parshas Emor). The verse states that an ordinary Kohen is permitted to become tamei to his father and mother. The Toras Kohanim notes that had the verse said only that he may become tamei to his mother, we might have thought that he would be forbidden to become tamei to his father, because his father is only his father based upon a presumption. He asks that the possibility that the man is not his father should not be a reason to forbid him from becoming tamei to him. On the contrary, it is precisely the reason to permit him to become tamei to him, because if this man is not his father, he is not a Kohen altogether!

The Chasam Sofer (based on Rishonim) explains it as follows: We are dealing with a case where this man was presumed to be a Kohen. He performed the service in the Beis Hamikdosh for many years. When his father dies, if not for the fact that the Torah explicitly permits him to become tamei to him, it would be forbidden. Even though on the chance that the deceased is not his father, he would be a Yisroel, he still would be forbidden to become tamei to him. This is because the verse states: You shall sanctify him, for he offers up the food offering of your God. Since he was allowed to perform the service in the Beis Hamikdosh (based on the presumption that he is indeed a Kohen), he is forbidden to contaminate himself with corpse tumah, even if he is a Yisroel. His sanctity comes about because of his service. This would be the explanation in our Gemora as well.

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