Teaching Torah to Girls

Rabbi Eliezer said (Daf Yomi: Sotah 21b): If someone teaches his daughter Torah, he is teaching her lewdness.

Tosfos cites a Yerushalmi which notes that Ben Azzai does not follow the exposition of Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah. For it is written regarding the mitzvah of Hakhel that men, women and children should assemble. The men come to learn, the women come to listen and the children come so that those who brought the children can earn reward. According to Ben Azzai, the reason why the women come is to learn, just like the men. However, according to Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah, who holds that one should not teach his daughter Torah, the women are not coming to learn; but rather, they are listening to the words of Torah in order for them to know how to fulfill the mitzvos that they are commanded to perform.

The Rambam rules that a woman who studies Torah receives reward, but not in the same capacity as a man. However, the Chachamim commanded a father not to teach Torah to his daughter, for women, in general, are not capable of understanding the intricacies and the fine details of the Torah, and it will lead them to incorrect halachic conclusions. This admonition is only applicable to the Oral Law; however with respect of the Written Law, one should not teach it to her, but if he does, it is not regarded as if he taught her lewdness.

The Maharatz Chiyos asks: According to the Rambam, Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah could also expound the verse by Hakhel to be saying that the women are coming to learn Torah, for there, the king was teaching the Written Law, and there is no prohibition whatsoever to teach that to her!?

He writes that after careful scrutiny of the Rambam’s language, it is clear that there is a prohibition to teach one’s daughter the Written Law; however, it is not with the same degree as the prohibition regarding the Oral law.

The Tur (Y”D 246:6) seemed to have a different version of the Rambam, for he writes that the Rambam holds that the concept of lewdness only applies by the Written Law, but with respect of the Oral Law, there is no lewdness; however, one should not teach it to her, but if he does, it is not regarded as if he taught her lewdness.

The Beis Yosef writes that it must be a printer’s mistake in the Tur, for the Rambam says the exact opposite.

The Rama rules that the laws pertaining to a woman, she is obligated to learn. The Bach writes that it is for this reason that a woman recites a birchas HaTorah in the morning.

The Aruch Hashulchan comments that it was never the custom for women to learn from a sefer. They were taught orally all the halachos that were relevant to them.

The Chafetz Chaim in Likutei Halachos writes that these halachos only applied in earlier times when the children lived in the same place as their parents and the tradition was strong. Then, it was forbidden to teach the women Torah, and the women followed the examples of the previous generations. However, in today’s times, when children live far away from their parents and the tradition has been weakened, and especially because the woman are studying the language and writings of the secular world, it is an important obligation to teach the girls Chumash, Prophets, the Writings, Pirkei Avos and the ethical teachings of our sages in order to strengthen their faith. For if not, they are liable to stray from the correct path of Hashem. The Steipler Gaon writes that in today’s times, it is more dangerous not to teach them Torah than to teach them. He even rules that one is allowed to teach Mishna to girls. However, Reb Moshe Feinstein (Y”D III, 87) rules that Mishna is part of the Oral Law, and the original prohibition is still intact, and therefore, girls should not be taught Mishna in school.

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First Thoughts

The Gemora asks (Daf Yomi: Sotah 21b): What is an example of a cunning evildoer? Rabbi Yochanan answers: This is someone who tells his side of the story to the judge before the other party shows up.

Rashi explains that once the judge hears the first side, it will be difficult for him to remove that from his mind, and he will not be impartial in the case.

The Mirrer Mashgiach, Reb Chaim Shmuelwitz notes that this is true regarding the way a person thinks as well. The first thought that enters one’s mind becomes entrenched in his brain, and he will not pay attention to a different perspective presented to him. He will not even bother thinking that perhaps his opinion is incorrect, and all that will happen in the future will only serve to strengthen his original thought.

Accordingly, he explains that which the Shach (C”M 37:109) brings from the Ball Ha’itur: If witnesses observed something concerning a relative of theirs, they cannot offer testimony even if at the time of the testimony, they were no longer relatives. This is because it is the nature of man to follow his initial thoughts, and their recollection of the incident will be based on their initial perception, which occurred while they were related.

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Forced to Drink

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Sotah 20a) had stated: If she had any merit, it would suspend her punishment. Certain merits suspend it for one year; others can suspend it for two years; and others suspend it for three years.

Ben Yehoyadah explains: There are certain mitzvos that can only be fulfilled during the day. If the woman performed such a mitzvah, the merit can delay her punishment for one year, i.e. twelve months, which corresponds to the twelve hours of the day. There are some mitzvos, such as the reading of the Megillah, which apply by day and by night. Performance of such a mitzvah can postpone her punishment for two years, twenty-four months, corresponding to the twenty-four hours of the day and night. There are mitzvos that are applicable for a day, night and a day, such as the mitzvah of fasting on Yom Kippur. The Gemora tells us that one who eats on the ninth day is regarded as if he fasted on the ninth and the tenth (of Tishrei). According to many poskim, the mitzvah of eating on Erev Yom Kippur can only be fulfilled during the day; not the night before. The mitzvah of Shabbos is also a mitzvah which comprises thirty-six hours, since there is a mitzvah to prepare for Shabbos on Friday. If the woman performed these mitzvos, the merits can hold back her punishment for thirty-six months, three years.

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Hidden Away

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Sotah 20a) had stated: If before the scroll has been erased she said: “I will not drink,” her scroll is hidden away and her minchah offering is scattered on the ashes.

Rashi learns that they are hidden away at the sides of the Sanctuary, for all sacred writings which cannot be used any longer are hidden away in a place that they will not be treated with disrespect.

In the sefer Torah Haohel, he asks, why did the sotah scroll have to be hidden away? Couldn’t they have given it to a child in order for him to learn the portion in the Torah dealing with the sotah?

He answers that since it was written with sanctity, and it contains the Name of Hashem, they were concerned that the children will not treat the scroll with the proper respect, and therefore it was required to be hidden away.

Furthermore, he says that it would be degrading for the woman, for everyone would say that this is the scroll that was prepared for So-and-So the sotah.

Tosfos cites a Yerushalmi (and some understand that this is what Rashi means as well) that the scroll is hidden away in the hinges of the Sanctuary door. The opening and closing of the door will cause that it will be worn away.

The Minchas Kenaos asks: How would it be permitted to erase Hashem’s Name by opening and closing the door? The Gemora Makkos (22a) rules that one who erases Hashem’s Name receives lashes! Since the opening and closing of the door will certainly result in the erasure of His Name, it should be regarded as a “direct erasing,” and should be forbidden!

The Ridvaz answers: Since the Name of Hashem was written on this scroll with the intention that it will be erased (in the bitter waters), there is no prohibition to erase this Name. It is not regarded as a permanent inscription, and therefore it would be permitted to erase it.

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Benefiting from the Sotah Waters

Rava inquired (Daf Yom: Sotah 18a): If two scrolls were written for two different sotahs, but they were erased into one cup, what is the halacha?

If you would conclude that each sotah needs her own personal cup, what would the halacha be if the scrolls were erased into two separate cups, but then they were mixed together? Is it valid because the scroll was erased into her cup? Or perhaps, it is disqualified, because she is not drinking her own personal cup!

The Steipler Gaon asks: Even if the halacha would be that a sotah is not obligated to drink from her own personal cup, how would she be permitted to drink from a cup that was mixed together with another sotah’s water? The water for a sotah comes from the kiyor, and that water has sanctity and carries with it a me’ilah transgression. One is prohibited from benefiting from something that possesses an inherent sanctity. If this woman is indeed innocent, she will give birth to male handsome children. It will emerge that she is deriving pleasure from these holy waters! How can this be allowed?

He answers based upon a Gemora below (20a) which states that we place something bitter into the water in order for the scroll to be properly erased. Accordingly, we can state that one who drinks water with a bitter taste will not be violating the me’ilah prohibition, for it would be regarded as drinking in an abnormal manner. This would be Biblically permitted.

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Benefit of Techeiles

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 17a) asks: It is understandable that Tefilin straps were a reward (for this world as well), as the verse states, “And all of the nations of the land will see that the name of Hashem is upon you and they will fear you.” The braisa quotes Rabbi Elazar the Great as saying that this refers to the Tefilin that we wear on our heads. However, what (earthly) reward do we have from Techeiles?

The Gemora answers this question from a braisa. Rabbi Meir taught: Why was Techeiles singled out from all colors (to be used in tzitzis)? This is because Techeiles is a similar color to that of the ocean, which is similar to that of the sky, which is similar to that of the Throne of Glory. This is as the verse states, “And they saw the G-d of Israel, and under His feet was like something made out of a brick of sapphire, and like the purity of the sky.” The verse also states, “like the appearance of a sapphire stone is that of the Throne of Glory. [The Gemora’s answer seems to be that this merit benefits us in this world as well.]

Rashi explains that anyone who fulfills the mitzvah of tzitzis is regarded as if he received the Divine Presence. This is obviously beneficial to the person.

Rashi in Chulin (89a) explains differently. He says that when Hashem looks at His Throne of Glory, He is reminded of the mitzvah of Techeiles that is being performed by the Jewish people. And because of this, Hashem has compassion on Klal Yisroel.

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Halacha Trumps a Verse

Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael (Daf Yomi: Sotah 16a): There are three places that a halacha l’Moshe mi’Sinai trumps the simple meaning of a verse: The Torah states that the blood must be covered with earth, and yet, the halacha is that it may be covered with anything (providing that it is something in which plants can grow). The Torah forbids a nazir from cutting his hair with a razor, and yet, the halacha is that he may not cut it with anything. The Torah says that a get (bill of divorce) must be written on parchment, and yet, the halacha is that it can be written on anything.

The Vilna Gaon in Aderes Eliyahu quotes our Gemora and provides other examples besides those mentioned in our Gemora. It is written with respect to a Jewish slave [Shmos 21:6]: His master shall bring him to the judges, and he shall bring him to the door or to the doorpost, and his master shall bore his ear with a tool, and he shall serve him forever. Based upon the textual reading of the verse, the doorpost would be a valid place to bore his ear, but halacha overrides the verse. Rashi states: I might think that the doorpost is a valid place on which to bore the slave’s ear. Therefore, the Torah says [Devarim 15:17]: “And you shall thrust it into his ear and into the door.” This means that it should be “into the door,” but not “into the doorpost.” What then does “or to the doorpost” mean? The Torah is comparing “the door” to “the doorpost.” Just as the doorpost is upright (attached to the house), so too, the door must be upright. [If the door is detached, it may not be used for the ritual of ear boring.]

The Gaon continues by citing the Gemora in Makkos (22b): How foolish are those who rise for a Torah scroll (to honor it), but they do not rise for a Torah scholar.

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Sinner should not Gain

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 15a) cites a braisa: Rabbi Shimon said: In truth, the sinner’s minchah should require oil and levonah, for we do not want the sinner to gain. Why then does it not require them? It is because we do not want his minchah to be elegant.

The Gemora (Yoma 86b) states that repentance is so great that willful transgressions can be regarded as merits, providing that one is motivated to repent by love.

The question is asked: How can that be? Isn’t the sinner gaining?

The Maharsha answers: The Gemora does not mean that the sin itself converts into a merit; but rather, through his repentance out of love, he will merit performing other mitzvos and good deeds.

Reb Tzadok Hakohen answers: The sin does convert into a merit. This is because once a person has tasted the pleasure of a sin, it becomes more difficult for him to control himself and not sin again. If, after sinning, one can nevertheless restrain himself from transgressing again, he will merit that his sins are converted into merits.

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Moshe and Ba'al Pe'or

Rabbi Chama b’Rabbi Chanina says (Daf Yomi: Sotah 14a): Why was Moshe buried by the house of Pe’or (an idol)? In order to atone on what happened by Pe’or (the Jewish men were enticed by the Moabite women into depravity and idolatry).

Why was Moshe chosen to be buried there to atone for this sin? What level in greatness did Moshe possess that was being used as the counterbalance to Pe’or?

Reb Chaim Shmuelewitz states that the idolatry of Pe’or is the attribute of wantonness. It indicates that a person has no restraint and the feelings or rights of others do not concern him. [The procedure of serving this Avodah Zarah involved defecating before the idol.] He is solely interested in himself. This is why Moshe Rabbeinu was buried opposite Pe’or. Moshe is the epithet of what it means to be interested in his task and mission of leading Klal Yisroel, and his own personal concern is the farthest thing from his mind. Moshe is the faithful servant that Hashem has complete trust in him.

This is why he can receive the “klil tiferes,” - the crown of glory on his head. A king, when he temporarily removes his crown from his head (due to its weight or on account of the heat), will not place it on the head of his vice-minister for several reasons. If someone would walk in and observe that the king’s crown is on his head, they would assume that he is indeed the king. Furthermore, the vice-minister himself would entertain those feelings. The king, therefore, would place it on a “hook on the wall.” No one will consider that the hook became king. The Holy One, Blessed be He, can place His “crown of glory” on Moshe’s head, for he is the ultimate faithful servant. Moshe will not suppose that he became the king, and nobody who sees the crown on his head will think that way.

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Miriam's Steadfastness

It is written: Miriam the prophetess, sister of Aaron, took (her drum in her hand). The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 13a) asks: Was she the sister of Aaron, but not the sister of Moshe? Rav Amram said in the name of Rav, and others say that it was Rav Nachman in the name of Rav: This teaches us that Miriam was saying prophecy while she was only the sister of Aaron (before Moshe was born), and she said, “In the future, my mother will be giving birth to a son, who will save Klal Yisroel.” And once Moshe was born, the entire house became filled with light. Her father stood up and kissed her on her head. He said, “My daughter, your prophecy has been fulfilled.” But when Moshe was thrown into the water, he said to her, “My daughter, where has your prophecy gone?” And that is what’s written: His sister stood at a distance to find out what would happen with him. She wanted to know what would happen with her prophecy.

It was through this that Miriam merited that the entire Jewish people waited for her for seven days.

The commentators ask: What was so significant about waiting around to see how the matter would resolve itself? Wouldn’t any curious person wait around to see what might transpire?

Another question is asked: Why didn’t Yocheved, Moshe’s mother wait there as well to see what would happen with the prophecy?

Reb Meir Bergman writes that even with greatness of Yocheved, her faith in Hashem and her fear of God, at the time that Moshe was cast into the river; she thought that Moshe would certainly die there. This is why the Medrash says that Yocheved, after Moshe was thrown into the river, also asked Miriam, “where is your prophecy now?” According to the natural law, Moshe would not be saved and the river was destined to be his end. As a matter of fact, it took an unusual miracle for Moshe to be saved.

Miriam, on the other hand, was strong in her beliefs and she refused to budge. She received a prophecy that Moshe would be the savior of the Jewish people, and although the odds were not favorable, she knew that somehow, he would survive.

This is why she was rewarded so greatly. She was steadfast in her belief in Hashem that nothing could sway her.

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The Consumption of Non-Kosher Food Causing “Timtum”

The Gemora states (Daf Yomi: Sotah 12b): And his sister said to Pharaoh’s daughter, “Shall I go and call for you a wet-nurse from the Hebrew women?” The Gemora asks: Why was it necessary to summon a Hebrew woman? The Gemora answers: This teaches us that they handed Moshe to all the Egyptian women, but he would not nurse from them. He said: “Shall a mouth that is destined to speak with the Shechinah nurse from something which is not kosher?”

The question is asked: Why does the Gemora state this reason with respect to Moshe, when the halacha clearly rules that all Jews must refrain from having an idolater nurse their child, if a Jewish nurse is available (Rama Y”D 81:7)?
Maharatz Chayos suggests that this halacha only applied after the Giving of the Torah, for then many of the foods consumed by non-Jewish women are forbidden to Jews. Since this reason was not applicable to Moshe in Egypt, it was necessary to provide a different explanation for his refusal to be nursed by an Egyptian woman.

Shulchan Aruch rules that a Jewish baby is permitted to have a non-Jewish wet nurse; however it is not preferable because the non-kosher food will harm the baby spiritually. The Rama adds that a Jewish woman who must eat non-kosher food for health reasons should not nurse her baby because the non-kosher food will be detrimental for the child.

The Gra cites our Gemora that Moshe refused to nurse from an Egyptian woman because he was destined for prophecy, so it would be improper for him to consume non-kosher food. It would seem that the non-kosher food would have affected his soul, and disqualify him to be the Prophet that he became.

Reb Micha Berger gleans from here that non-kosher food is intrinsically harmful for a person’s soul even if it is permissible to eat.

He cites a Ran in his Drashos (11) that states this explicitly. In his discussion as to why halacha is decided by the Chachamim and not by the Prophets, he asks the following question: If a sage errs and permits a forbidden food, it is like a doctor who makes a mistake and gives a patient poison instead of medicine. In both cases, the person is harmed. Accordingly, wouldn’t it be preferable for the Prophets to decide halachic matters, and then, there would be no mistakes?

He answers that prophecy is not always available. He then adds that even though eating non-kosher food is harmful, the mitzvah of listening to our sages may offset the harmful effects. It is however evident from the Ran that the consumption of non-kosher food is objectively poison, and detrimental to one’s soul even if it is done permissibly.

The Abarbanel (Devarim 17:4) disagrees with the Ran. He maintains that it is impossible for harm to befall a person if he is following the Chachamim. If the food is permitted, it cannot be harmful. Reb Micha explains that it would seem from the Abarbanel that he maintains that the consumption of non-kosher food is not intrinsically harmful; rather, it is harmful only because it is prohibited. If for some reason, there is no prohibition, then it is not harmful.

Reb Moshe (O”C 2:88) quotes the Chasam Sofer where he was discussing a handicapped girl in the following situation: If she would remain at home, she would not develop properly and remain ignorant her entire life. However, if the parents would send her to a special school, they claimed that she would then reach the potential of a teenager. However, the school was in a non-Jewish area, and there was no possibility of providing kosher food. The Chasam Sofer ruled that it is permitted to send her there, but he recommended against sending her, for the following reason: If they send her to that school, she will become intelligent enough to be obligated in mitzvos. The non-kosher food that she will consume will affect her heart, and she will probably violate Torah and mitzvos. It is therefore preferable for her to remain in her present situation. (He concludes: Her present situation is more preferable than being “b’timtum” before the Holy One, Blessed is He for one moment.)

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Abortions

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 11b) cites a braisa: “Shifrah” is Yocheved; and why was her name called Shifrah? It was because she straightened the limbs of the baby. Another explanation of Shifrah is that the Jewish people were fruitful and multiplied in her days. “Pu’ah” is Miriam; and why was her name called Pu’ah? It was because she would coo to the child. Another explanation of Pu’ah is that she used to cry out through the Divine Spirit and say, “My mother will bear a son who will be the savior of Israel.”

The Maharal (Gur Aryeh) asks: Why does the Torah refer to Yocheved and Miriam as Shifra and Pu’ah, rather than referring to them by their actual names? He explains that prior to the birth of Moshe, the Torah did not want to give any recognition to his family members, especially his parents, because that would indicate that Moshe’s parents were responsible for who he was. Although normally the merits and contributions of the parents form the child, and without these specific parents, the child will not exist; by Moshe, this was not the case. Moshe’s existence was not dependent on Amram and Yocheved as his parents. Moshe was already set and destined from the six days of creation to lead the Jews out of Egypt. That is why the Torah doesn’t even mention Amram and Yocheved when describing Moshe’s birth.

The Chasam Sofer (Torah Moshe), with Reb Avi Lebowitz’s (Heoros – Insights on the Daf) elucidation explains that Pharaoh specifically requested of the Jewish women to murder the children, rather than asking the non-Jewish midwives, because he realized that the Jewish woman do not receive capital punishment for performing an abortion, whereas the non-Jewish woman do. Pharaoh wanted them to use the sign of “stones” to determine when the labor will begin, so that they can be present, and then use the dependable sign of which way the child is facing to determine if it is a boy or a girl, and to abort all the boys before the head comes out while it still has a status of a fetus. Pharaoh’s applied the following logic: Normally one is not allowed to commit murder to save their own life because “who says that your blood is redder than the other one?”, but this would only apply to a murder of a “life.” For an idolater, even the fetus has the status of “life,” since they receive capital punishment for performing an abortion, and the logic of “who says etc.” would apply equally to murder and abortion. But for the Jewish women, the fetus was not considered a full “life,” since they are not liable for abortion, and therefore they should be able to determine that their lives are more precious than that of the child. They would therefore abort the fetus to fulfill the command of the king and save their own lives. However, when confronted by Pharaoh for not following through with this partial birth abortion, their claim was that by the time they arrived, the fetus was fully born, and they were not allowed to kill a born child, even if it would cost them their own lives.

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Preventing Intermarriage

It is written: And they were disgusted because of the Children of Israel. This teaches us that the Jewish people were like thorns in the eyes of the Egyptians (when they saw that the Jewish people were increasing).

It is noteworthy that when we read this portion from the Torah on Mondays and Thursdays, we conclude one of the aliyos with this verse.

The question is asked that the halacha is that we do not end an aliyah on a bad note. Why therefore would we conclude with this verse, which demonstrates the hatred that the Egyptians had for the Jewish people?

The Mattersdorfer Rav, at an Agudah Convention, once answered that on the contrary! The fact that the Egyptians despised the Jews was a blessing. It was through this that the Jews were able to maintain their Jewish identity, and ultimately, this is what brought about the redemption. The Jewish people were able to keep their distance from the Egyptians. This prevented assimilation. When the idolaters befriend the Jews and begin mingling with them, this can have catastrophic results.

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One Sixty-fourth

Rav Chiya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav (Daf Yomi: Sotah 5a): A Torah scholar should have one eighth of an eighth of haughtiness (so that lighthearted people should not play with him and that they will accept his rulings).

The Sheiris Hapeleitah explains this precise measurement as follows: The Gemora in Bava Basra (73b) states that Mount Tabor was four parasangs (parsa’os) high. A parsah is four mil. A mil consists of two thousand amos. Accordingly, a parsah is eight thousand amos. It emerges that Mount Tabor is thirty-two thousand amos high. Chazal tell us that Mount Sinai was five hunred amos tall, which is precisely one sixty-fourth of Mount Tabor.

The following question may be asked: If the Holy One, Blessed be He did not wish to give the Torah on Mount Tabor, for it was haughty, why did He give the Torah on a mountain at all? The Torah could have been given on a flatland, where there would be no concern for haughtiness whatsoever! It was given on Mount Sinai, a mountain which its height was one sixty-fourth of Mount Tabor to teach us that a Torah scholar should possess this small measure of haughtiness.

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His Right from his Left

In the city of Dvinsk, there was a very prestigious and scholarly man named Reb Leib. He was referred to as Reb Leib Charif, the sharp one, due to his intelligent insights in torah. He was extremely close to Reb Meir Simcha, the Ohr Sameach, and they would spend many hours in each others company discussing Torah matters together.

There was once an incident where they were both sitting in the Beis Medrash when a different scholar was delivering a lecture to thirty laymen. Reb Leib heard how the scholar was explaining a certain topic to them and immediately asked a penetrating question that the scholar was incapable of answering.

Reb Meir Simcha arose from his designated seat near the eastern wall, walked to the back of the Beis Medrash and admonished Reb Leib: “Someone that doesn’t know between his right and his left, should be asking questions in the middle of a lecture?” Reb Leib was quiet, left the Beis Medrash in embarrassment and the scholar continued on with his lecture.

All those that witnessed the incident were bewildered. Is it possible that Reb Leib Charif could ask a question that was not fit to be asked? What did he do so terrible that caused Reb Meir Simcha to react in such a manner?

Reb Leib was puzzled as well and he went to Reb Meir Simcha’s house to inquire of him why he took such offense with his question, which was seemingly a legitimate one.

Reb Meir Simcha told him: “Did I say that your question was not a valid one? No, I did not. I was repeating a Gemora in Moed Katan (and in Sotah as well).”

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One who appraises his conduct (he considers the loss he might incur by performing a mitzva against the eternal reward that the mitzva will bring, and the benefit he may obtain by committing a sin against the tremendous loss that will result) will merit in seeing the salvation of Klal Yisroel through Hashem. He cites a verse in Tehillim [50:23]: Vesam derech arenu beyasha Elokim, And to him that sets his way, I will show the salvation of Hashem. Do not read it as Vesam (and to him that sets), rather, read it as Vesham, and one who appraises his way.

Rabbi Yannai had a student who would consistently ask questions during the lecture. On the Shabbos of the festival (within thirty days of the festival, the scholars would teach and discuss the laws of the festival), the student wouldn’t challenge Rabbi Yannai (since there were many people attending and if Rabbi Yannai wouldn’t know how to respond, he would be embarrassed). Rabbi Yannai said in reference to him: And to him that appraises his way, I will show the salvation of Hashem (due to the student’s careful calculation).

Reb Meir Simcha concluded: “You, Reb Leib, should have been cognizant of the difference between the right and the left of the letter sin; it was written vesam, with the letter sin, which has the dot on the left and the Gemora expounds it to mean vesham, with the letter shin, which has the dot on the right. Vesham means that one should appraise his ways and calculate his every move and word. When this scholar was lecturing in front of thirty laymen, you should not have asked a question that quite possibly could embarrass him.

(Margoliyos HaShas – Moed Katan)

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Ben Azzai

Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan (Daf Yomi: Sotah 4b): All of these Tannaim figured out the length of a seclusion based upon their own experience (how long it took each of them to perform the initial act of cohabitation with their own wife).

The Gemora asks: But Ben Azzai never got married (based upon the Gemora in Yevamos 63b, where Ben Azzai explained why he did not marry: “What should I do? My soul desires the Torah. The world can survive through other people.”)?

The Gemora answers: You could say that he got married and later divorced.

Alternatively, you can say that he heard this opinion from his teacher.

And if you prefer, you can say that “The secrets of Hashem are revealed to those that fear him.”

Rabbeinu Avraham min Ha’har explains that due to Ben Azzai’s tremendous desire to study Torah, he did not experience any unclean thoughts, and was therefore not obligated to get married.

Reb Elchanan Wasserman states that Ben Azzai was exempt from the mitzvah of marrying, for he was unable to cease studying Torah even for one moment.

Reb Yosef Engel writes that Ben Azzai discharged his obligation of procreation through his new insights in Torah. This is based upon the Gemora in Brochos (47b), which states that two torah scholars studying together can be regarded as three with respect to the laws of Birchas Hamazon (they could make a mezumen, even though the halacha is that three people are needed). The Rosh explains that the Torah that they are studying is regarded as the third person.

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Spirit of Foolishness

Rish Lakish says (Daf Yomi:Sotah 3a): A person does not sin unless a spirit of foolishness enters him.

Reb Chaim Shmuelitz asks: If so, why should a man be guilty for committing a transgression? If a spirit of foolishness entered him, it should be regarded as if it was unavoidable and he should be exempt from any punishment! It should be compared to a person who is standing on the edge of a pit and a strong wind blows and he falls into the pit. Is that his fault?

Reb Chaim explains that yes it is! It was his fault that he was even in the vicinity of the edge of the pit. Immediately, when he realized that he was near the boundary of the pit, he should have distanced himself from there. If he would have been far away from the pit, no wind, no matter how strong, would have been able to propel him into the pit. So too, it is with the spirit of foolishness that enters a person and causes him to sin. He obviously was too close to the sin in the first place that when a spirit of foolishness entered him, it was able to overpower him and cause him to sin.

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Heavenly Voice Regarding Marriage

The Gemora states: Every day, a Heavenly voice pronounces: “The daughter of this individual is designated for that man.”

Why when it is referring to the woman does it say, “The daughter of this man,” and when it is referring to the man, it says “that man”?

Tal Chaim answers: The Torah gives the right to the father to marry off his daughter and to receive the money; this right does not apply for his son.

Others answer based on Tosfos, which states that this Heavenly voice is issued forty days before the formation of the boy. At this point in time, the girl is not in existence yet and therefore it only mentions her father.

Kometz Mincha offers an alternative answer: The Gemora Bava Basra (109b) states that a man should investigate the woman’s father and her family. Regarding a woman, on the other hand, the Gemora in Kiddushin (7a) states: A woman would rather grow old together with a husband than alone; no matter whom the man might be, and therefore his family is not mentioned.

Sotah during Sefirah

It is written in the sefer, Minchas Ha’omer that it is fitting to learn Tractate Sotah, which contains forty-nine blat during the days of Sefirah, when we are counting forty-nine days.

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An Idolater is Stricter than a Jew

The Rishonim ask: It is evident from our Gemora that according to the one that holds that an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, can only Rabbinically pronounce a vow, but Biblically, it will not be effective; nevertheless, with respect to an idolater, an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, may pronounce a vow and it will be Biblically binding. Why would this be? How can an idolater be more stringent that a Jew?

The Mefaresh explains that there are other examples where we find that the law is stricter with an idolater than it is with respect of a Jew. The Mishna in Bava Kamma teaches us that if the ox of idolater gores an animal belonging to a Jew, the idolater is liable to pay full damages, even if the ox gored for the first time. A Jew, however, whose ox gores for the first time, will only be liable to pay half-damages.

Tosfos suggests the following: A Jewish adult is subject to the prohibition against desecrating his word. Accordingly, we expound that any Jew who is not included in this prohibition cannot pronounce a vow. A minor, who is not subject to this commandment, cannot therefore utter a vow, which would be Biblically valid. An idolater, however, who is not included in this prohibition, cannot be excluded from pronouncing a vow based on this, and therefore, even a minor’s vow would be Biblically binding.

It is evident from Tosfos that the prohibition against desecrating his word is not applicable to an idolater. The Mishna L’melech cites proofs that an idolater is obligated to keep his word based upon the prohibition against desecrating his word.

The Ohr Sameach answers this question by citing the Chasam Sofer, who says that any idolater, even a minor is obligated to observe their commandments. This explains why with respect to idolaters, an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, can pronounce a vow and it will be Biblically valid, whereas a Jewish minor cannot. By an idolater, there is no distinction whatsoever between a minor and an adult. Proof to this is from the Rosh, who states that the guidelines for a minor to reach adulthood are learned from an oral tradition that was transmitted to Moshe at Sinai with respect to all measurements. These laws were given to the Jewish people; not for the idolaters.

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Accepting Charity from an Idolater

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 62a) cites a Scriptural source to teach us that an idolater can vow vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings just like Jews.

The Haga’os Ashri (in Bava Basra) brings the following question in the name of the Maharich: Why are we not allowed to accept charity from an idolater, but we are permitted to accept his korbanos?

He answers in the name of his Rebbe: A voluntary korban is not brought to serve as atonement, and therefore, we are not concerned if they offer a sacrifice, for those do not bring about forgiveness and they will not serve as a protection for them. However, one who gives charity receives atonement for his sins, and merits protection for his good deed. It is not in our best interests to assist them in this matter.

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