The Mishna had stated: If he married this one by ma'amar, and that one by ma'amar, they require two bills of divorce and chalitzah.
The Gemora states that this seemingly would be inconsistent with Ben Azzai’s opinion. Ben Azzai maintains that there is validity for a ma’amar after another ma’amar in a case where there were two yevamim and they both performed ma’amar with one yevamah. However, if one yavam performed ma’amar with one yevamah, and then he performed ma’amar with a second yevamah, the second one has no validity (and therefore there would be no necessity for a get to the second one). (53a)
The Mishna had stated: If he married this one by ma'amar, and he submitted to chalitzah from the other one, the first requires a bill of divorce.
The Gemora states that we can infer from the Mishna that when he perform a ma’amar with one, it is proper to submit to chalitzah from the other one; for a chalitzah from the ma’amar recipient will not release the co-wife (since it does not sever the ma’amar attachment). This implication would support Shmuel, for Shmuel had stated: If a yavam performs a ma’amar with one of the widows and then he decides to release her, she needs a get and a chalitzah. If the yavam performs a chalitzah with the woman who received the ma’amar, the co-wife is not released. If he performs a chalitzah with the co-wife, the woman who received the ma’amar is released.
This would be a refutation to Rav Yosef, who maintains that one should always perform a chalitzah with the woman who is anyway disqualified for the Kehunah. (Rebbe taught that a person should not spill out the extra waters from his pit when others may have a need for it. If he is performing chalitzah anyway, which will render her forbidden to a Kohen, he should perform the chalitzah with the widow who is anyway disqualified to marry a Kohen.) (In our Mishna, he should submit to chalitzah from the ma’amar recipient, who will anyway require a get.)
The Gemora answers: The Mishna does not instruct him what to do; rather, the Mishna is discussing that case. Perhaps, he should have submitted to chalitzah from the ma’amar recipient, since she will be receiving a get to sever the ma’amar attachment. (53a)
The Gemora states that this seemingly would be inconsistent with Ben Azzai’s opinion. Ben Azzai maintains that there is validity for a ma’amar after another ma’amar in a case where there were two yevamim and they both performed ma’amar with one yevamah. However, if one yavam performed ma’amar with one yevamah, and then he performed ma’amar with a second yevamah, the second one has no validity (and therefore there would be no necessity for a get to the second one). (53a)
The Mishna had stated: If he married this one by ma'amar, and he submitted to chalitzah from the other one, the first requires a bill of divorce.
The Gemora states that we can infer from the Mishna that when he perform a ma’amar with one, it is proper to submit to chalitzah from the other one; for a chalitzah from the ma’amar recipient will not release the co-wife (since it does not sever the ma’amar attachment). This implication would support Shmuel, for Shmuel had stated: If a yavam performs a ma’amar with one of the widows and then he decides to release her, she needs a get and a chalitzah. If the yavam performs a chalitzah with the woman who received the ma’amar, the co-wife is not released. If he performs a chalitzah with the co-wife, the woman who received the ma’amar is released.
This would be a refutation to Rav Yosef, who maintains that one should always perform a chalitzah with the woman who is anyway disqualified for the Kehunah. (Rebbe taught that a person should not spill out the extra waters from his pit when others may have a need for it. If he is performing chalitzah anyway, which will render her forbidden to a Kohen, he should perform the chalitzah with the widow who is anyway disqualified to marry a Kohen.) (In our Mishna, he should submit to chalitzah from the ma’amar recipient, who will anyway require a get.)
The Gemora answers: The Mishna does not instruct him what to do; rather, the Mishna is discussing that case. Perhaps, he should have submitted to chalitzah from the ma’amar recipient, since she will be receiving a get to sever the ma’amar attachment. (53a)
The Mishna had stated: If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and a bill of divorce to the other one, they require from him chalitzah. The Mishna continued: These halachos apply whether one yavam to two yevamos, or two yevamim to one yevamah.
The Gemora states that this would support Rabbah bar Rav Huna’s opinion. He states: Whenever there is a deficient chalitzah, each brother must submit to chalitzah from that yevamah. (Three sisters who are sisters-in-law (they were married to three brothers) who fall for yibum before two brothers, one brother performs chalitzah to one of them, the other brother performs chalitzah to a different one of them, and the middle one (the other sister) requires chalitzah from both of them.)
The Gemora deflects the proof: Our Mishna does not mean that they both perform chalitzah; rather it (the plural form) means that that Yevamos in general would require a chalitzah in this case (but only from one brother). (53a)
The Mishna had stated: If he submitted to chalitzah and he married her by ma’amar, there is no validity to anything which follows chalitzah, and the ma’amar is not effective. The Mishna continued: These halachos apply whether one yavam to two yevamos, or two yevamim to one yevamah. The implication would be that if one yavam submitted to chalitzah and performed ma’amar with her co-wife, or if the yavam submitted to chalitzah and his brother performed ma’amar with her, there is no validity to anything which follows chalitzah, and the ma’amar is not effective.
The Gemora above (10b) presented a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish. (A man performed a chalitzah with his yevamah and then married her; Rish Lakish said that he is not liable for kares for marrying the chalutzah (the one with whom the chalitzah was performed), but the brothers will be liable to kares for taking her. He (the one who performed the chalitzah) and his brothers will be liable to kares for taking the co-wife. Rabbi Yochanan says: Both he and the brothers will not be liable to kares for taking the chalutzah or her co-wife.)
The Gemora asks: It is understandable why the Mishna mentioned these halachos according to Rabbi Yochanan; although he holds that (after chalitzah) the entire house is only subject to a negative prohibition, nevertheless, kiddushin does not take effect with her (and the Mishna would be following Rabbi Akiva’s opinion that kiddushin does not take effect with a woman subject to a negative prohibition). However, what is the novelty of these rulings according to Rish Lakish? He maintains that (after chalitzah) the entire house is subject to a penalty of kares; does the Mishna need to teach us that kiddushin does not take effect with women subject to a penalty of kares?
The Gemora defends Rish Lakish’s position, and asks: Is it any better according to your reasoning? The Mishna had stated: If he cohabited with her and he married by ma’amar, there is no validity for the ma’amar. The Mishna continued: These halachos apply whether one yavam to two yevamos, or two yevamim to one yevamah. The implication would be that if one yavam cohabited with her and a second yavam performed ma’amar with her, the ma’amar will not be valid. What is the necessity of this ruling? Does the Mishna need to teach us that kiddushin does not take effect with a married woman?
The Gemora concludes: It is obvious that this is the explanation of the Mishna. The Mishna taught all the halachos pertaining to releasing one yavam and one yevamah, and then it taught us the halachos pertaining to two yevamos and one yavam. Since we mentioned the halachos regarding two yevamos and one yavam, the Mishna also mentioned the halachos regarding two yevamin and one yavam. (53a)
The Mishna had stated: There is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah. This would apply whether he submitted to chalitzah at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end. However, regarding cohabitation, when it is at the beginning, there is no validity for anything which follows it, whereas if it was in the middle, or at the end -- there is validity to something which follows it. Rabbi Nechemia said: It is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, there is no validity for anything which follows it.
The Gemora cites a dissenting opinion from a braisa: Abba Yosi son of Yochanan, a man from Yerushalayim said in the name of Rabbi Meir: It is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah; if it is done in the beginning, there is no validity for anything which follows it. However, if it is done in the middle (a get preceded it, and ma’amar followed it) or in the end (following a get and ma’amar), there is validity for that which follows it.
The Gemora states all the opinion: There are three viewpoints. The Tanna Kamma of our Mishna maintains that there is a distinction between cohabitation and chalitzah. If one cohabits (in the middle or at the end), there is reason to decree that something which follows should have validity, for we are concerned that people might say: Just as cohabitation following a ma’amar effects acquisition, so too, cohabitation after cohabitation should acquire her. And just as cohabitation after a get effects acquisition, so too, cohabitation after chalitzah should acquire her. It was for this reason that the Rabbis decreed that cohabitation does not acquire her. However, regarding chalitzah which is performed between get and ma’amar or afterwards, there is no reason to be concerned, therefore there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah.
Rabbi Nechemia said: It is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, there is no validity for anything which follows it.
Rabbi Nechemia disagrees with the Tanna Kamma’s logic: There is no reason to be concerned. The Gemora explains: That which the Tanna Kamma said, that just as cohabitation after a get effects acquisition, so too, cohabitation after chalitzah should acquire her; this is not a concern. Everyone knows that chalitzah releases the yevamah Biblically, and they will not think that cohabitation after chalitzah will acquire her. That which the Tanna Kamma said, that just as cohabitation following a ma’amar effects acquisition, so too, cohabitation after cohabitation should acquire her; this is also not a concern. Everyone knows that cohabitation acquires the yevamah Biblically, and they will not think that cohabitation after cohabitation will acquire her.
Abba Yosi son of Chanan (who holds that it is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah; if it is done in the beginning, there is no validity for anything which follows it; however, if it is done in the middle (a get preceded it, and ma’amar followed it) or in the end (following a get and ma’amar), there is validity for that which follows it) holds like the Rabbis that there is sufficient reason to decree by cohabitation (that it is not completely effective), and he decrees by chalitzah because of the concern regarding cohabitation. (53b)
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