The Mishna had stated: If a man cohabited with his yevamah, whether in error or wantonly (not for the sake of the mitzvah), whether under compulsion or willingly; even if he acted in error and she wantonly, he wantonly and she in error, he under compulsion and she not under compulsion, she under compulsion and he not compulsion; whether he has partial cohabitation or he completes cohabitation, he has acquired her.
The Gemora presents a dispute regarding these acts of cohabitation that were not performed with the intent of acquisition. Rav maintains that the yavam acquires her for all matters (if the yavam is a Kohen, she may eat terumah). Shmuel holds that he acquires her only for those matters specifically mentioned in the Torah; he inherits the property of his brother, and she is released from any yibum obligations. (However, she may not eat terumah yet.)
The Gemora qualifies the argument. If she fell for yibum from a state of nisuin, everyone would agree that she may eat terumah now because she was eating terumah when she was married to the first husband. (This inferior yibum renders her a complete nesuah.) They argue only when she fell for yibum from a state of erusin; Rav maintains that she may eat terumah since the Torah equates an unintentional cohabitation with an intentional one. (She is considered his complete wife regarding all matters.) Shmuel holds that an unintentional cohabitation is included to give her the same status as the deceased husband, but the yavam’s relationship with her will not become superior than that of the deceased (unless he performs a proper yibum). (56a)
The Gemora asks on Shmuel from the following braisa: If a mentally competent woman becomes betrothed to a mentally competent Kohen, but he becomes a deaf-mute before he was able to marry her (nisuin), she may not eat terumah. (Rabbinically, an arusah is prohibited from eating terumah, and a deaf-mute cannot effect nisuin.) If he died and she fell for yibum to a deaf-mute yavam, she is permitted to eat terumah. This is a case where the strength of the yavam is superior to that of the husband.
The Gemora asks: According to Shmuel, who states that an inferior yibum does not allow a yevamah to eat terumah, how can the yibum of the deaf-mute (where he is obviously not intending to acquire her as a yevamah) allow her to eat terumah?
The Gemora answers: Shmuel could interpret the braisa to mean as follows: If he married her with nisuin, and afterwards became a deaf-mute, she is still permitted to eat terumah. If he subsequently dies childless, and she fell for yibum before a deaf-mute yavam, and he performs a yibum, she is permitted to eat terumah. This is a case where the strength of the yavam is superior to that of the husband since a deaf-mute’s nisuin will not permit her to eat terumah, but a deaf-mute’s yibum will permit her to eat terumah. (56a)
The Gemora presents a dispute regarding these acts of cohabitation that were not performed with the intent of acquisition. Rav maintains that the yavam acquires her for all matters (if the yavam is a Kohen, she may eat terumah). Shmuel holds that he acquires her only for those matters specifically mentioned in the Torah; he inherits the property of his brother, and she is released from any yibum obligations. (However, she may not eat terumah yet.)
The Gemora qualifies the argument. If she fell for yibum from a state of nisuin, everyone would agree that she may eat terumah now because she was eating terumah when she was married to the first husband. (This inferior yibum renders her a complete nesuah.) They argue only when she fell for yibum from a state of erusin; Rav maintains that she may eat terumah since the Torah equates an unintentional cohabitation with an intentional one. (She is considered his complete wife regarding all matters.) Shmuel holds that an unintentional cohabitation is included to give her the same status as the deceased husband, but the yavam’s relationship with her will not become superior than that of the deceased (unless he performs a proper yibum). (56a)
The Gemora asks on Shmuel from the following braisa: If a mentally competent woman becomes betrothed to a mentally competent Kohen, but he becomes a deaf-mute before he was able to marry her (nisuin), she may not eat terumah. (Rabbinically, an arusah is prohibited from eating terumah, and a deaf-mute cannot effect nisuin.) If he died and she fell for yibum to a deaf-mute yavam, she is permitted to eat terumah. This is a case where the strength of the yavam is superior to that of the husband.
The Gemora asks: According to Shmuel, who states that an inferior yibum does not allow a yevamah to eat terumah, how can the yibum of the deaf-mute (where he is obviously not intending to acquire her as a yevamah) allow her to eat terumah?
The Gemora answers: Shmuel could interpret the braisa to mean as follows: If he married her with nisuin, and afterwards became a deaf-mute, she is still permitted to eat terumah. If he subsequently dies childless, and she fell for yibum before a deaf-mute yavam, and he performs a yibum, she is permitted to eat terumah. This is a case where the strength of the yavam is superior to that of the husband since a deaf-mute’s nisuin will not permit her to eat terumah, but a deaf-mute’s yibum will permit her to eat terumah. (56a)
The Gemora presents a different explanation in the dispute between Rav and Shmuel (regarding an unintentional yibum). Others say: There is no argument in a case where she fell for yibum from a state of erusin; everyone would agree that she may not eat terumah since she was not able to eat terumah when she was married to the first husband. The dispute is only in a case where she fell for yibum from a state of nisuin. Rav maintains that she may eat terumah since she was eating terumah when she was married to the first husband. Shmuel holds that she may not eat terumah because the Torah includes an unintentional cohabitation as if it was intentional only regarding those matters specifically mentioned in the Torah; he inherits the property of his brother, and she is released from any yibum obligations. Regarding all other matters, it is not considered an act of yibum. (she may not eat terumah yet).
The Gemora asks: Rav Nachman said in the name of Shmuel that wherever a husband permits his wife to eat terumah, the yavam also permits her to eat (even in a case of an inferior yibum)?
The Gemora answers: Shmuel meant in this ruling that a type of cohabitation where a husband would entitle his wife to eat terumah with (with intention for nisuin), a yavam will also entitle the yevamah through it; however, a type of cohabitation where a husband would not entitle his wife to eat terumah with (when there was no intention for nisuin), a yavam will also not entitle the yevamah through it.
The Gemora asks on Shmuel from the following braisa: If a mentally competent woman becomes betrothed to a mentally competent Kohen, but he becomes a deaf-mute before he was able to marry her (nisuin), she may not eat terumah. (Rabbinically, an arusah is prohibited from eating terumah, and a deaf-mute cannot effect nisuin.) If he died and she fell for yibum to a deaf-mute yavam, she is permitted to eat terumah. This is a case where the strength of the yavam is superior to that of the husband.
The Gemora explains: Rav would be able to interpret the braisa in the same manner as we interpreted above according to Shmuel (If he married her with nisuin, and afterwards became a deaf-mute, she is still permitted to eat terumah. If he subsequently dies childless, and she fell for yibum before a deaf-mute yavam, and he performs a yibum, she is permitted to eat terumah. This is a case where the strength of the yavam is superior to that of the husband since a deaf-mute’s nisuin will not permit her to eat terumah, but a deaf-mute’s yibum will permit her to eat terumah.). However, this braisa is in direct conflict with Shmuel’s opinion (for Shmuel holds that a yibum without proper intent will never permit her to eat terumah).
The Gemora remains with this difficulty. (56a)
The Gemora cites a braisa: If a mentally competent woman becomes betrothed to a mentally competent Kohen, but he becomes a deaf-mute before he was able to marry her (nisuin), she may not eat terumah. If she gave birth to a child (from this deaf-mute Kohen), she is entitled to eat terumah (on account of her son, who is a Kohen). If the son died, Rabbi Nosson says that she can continue to eat terumah and the Chachamim disagree.
The Gemora asks: What is Rabbi Nosson’s logic?
Rabbah answers: Since she was able to eat beforehand, the permission continues.
Abaye asks: If so, a daughter of a Yisroel that marries a Kohen who died without children, she should still be permitted to eat terumah since she was able to eat beforehand (when she was married to the Kohen)? The answer is: Since her husband died, she loses the sanctity of his Kehunah; so too, when the son died, she should lose the sanctity of his Kehunah?
Rav Yosef answers: The nisuin of a deaf-mute Kohen does entitle her to eat terumah. (Biblically, an arusah is allowed to eat terumah; the Rabbis issued a decree against it because she is still in her father’s house and she might share the terumah with her non-Kohen siblings; this concern is not applicable by a deaf-mute’s nisuin for although she is still legally an arusah, but she is living in the Kohen’s house, and not by her father.) The Rabbis did not issue a decree regarding the nisuin of a deaf-mute out of concern that we will become confused with the case of an erusin of a deaf-mute.
Abaye asks: If this is correct, why does the braisa state that she had a child from the Kohen, and that entitles her to eat terumah; she should be able to eat terumah on account of the nisuin?
Rav Yosef answered: This was only said because of the Chachamim’s opinion (who disagree with Rabbi Nosson regarding the nisuin; they agree if she would have a son from the Kohen). (56a)
The Mishna had stated: So, too, if a man cohabits with any of the arayos listed in the Torah etc.
Rav Amram said: Rav Sheishes told us the following matter, and he enlightened our eyes from our Mishna. He said: If the wife of a Yisroel was violated, even though she is permitted to her husband, she becomes disqualified from the Kehunah. And this can be supported from the Tanna of our Mishna. He said: So, too, if a man cohabits with any of the arayos listed in the Torah, or with those that are disqualified from the Kehunah. What is the Mishna referring to when it says, “So too”? Isn’t the Mishna referring to where one cohabited with one of the arayos, whether in error or wantonly, whether under compulsion or willingly? And the Mishna continued: In any of the above cases, he disqualifies her from the Kehunah. (Since a married woman is one of the arayos mentioned in the Torah, and the Mishna teaches us that one who cohabits with her, she is disqualified from the Kehunah even though it was against her consent.
The Gemora rejects this proof: Perhaps the Mishna is only referring to the halacha of partial cohabitation; this applies to all of the arayos. Thus, there would be no proof that a married woman, who has been violated, becomes disqualified to the Kehunah.
The Gemora asks: According to this interpretation of the Mishna, we are deriving the halacha of partial cohabitation by all arayos from the mitzvah of yibum. As a matter of fact, it is precisely the opposite; partial cohabitation is valid by yibum because we compare yibum to the arayos. It is by the arayos that we originally learned that a partial cohabitation is regarded as a complete one.
The Gemora concludes: The Mishna, when it says, “So too,” can be referring to cohabitation in an unnatural manner regarding those women that are forbidden only by a negative prohibition. (56a – 56b)
Rabbah rules: If the wife of a Kohen has been violated, and her husband cohabits with her, he incurs lashes because she is a zonah (a woman who went astray and committed adultery).
The Gemora asks: Will he only incur lashes on account of cohabiting with a zonah? Shouldn’t he be liable to lashes on account of tumah as well (she has been defiled, and therefore forbidden to her husband)?
The Gemora answers: Let us say that Rabbah meant that he will also incur lashes on account of cohabiting with a zonah (besides the halacha of tumah).
The Gemora cites an alternative version of Rabbah’s ruling: If the wife of a Kohen has been violated, and her husband cohabits with her, he incurs lashes because of tumah.
The Gemora infers that he will not receive lashes because she is a zonah. (56b)
[END]
1 comments:
I deeply appreciated the story of R' Katz and his wisdom in not saying no when he realized how it would be received. There is always a question of one's responsibility to make a point, to voice objections, and to stand ground on matters of principle, yet R' Katz found being wise was a higher obligation than being right. I will have greater kavana saying Atto Chonen L'Odom Da'as thanks to this story. It's essential to be discerning and to know when silence brings better results.
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