Daf Yomi - Yevamos 55 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a Mishna: They told a married man, “Your wife has died,” and he went and married her paternal sister. Later, they told him, “She (the second wife) has died,” and he went and married her (the second wife) maternal sister. Later, they told him, “She (the third wife) has died,” and he went and married her (the third wife’s) paternal sister. Later, they told him, “She (the fourth wife) has died,” and he went and married her (the fourth wife’s) maternal sister. He found out that in fact, none of them had died. The halacha is that he is permitted to remain married to the first, third and fifth wives. (Since he is legally married to the first wife, that renders his marriage to the second wife (her paternal sister) null and void. He is thus legally married to the third wife because she is not related at all to the first wife. Now that he is legally married to the third wife, that renders his marriage to the fourth wife (her paternal sister) null and void. He is thus legally married to the fifth wife because she is not related at all to the first or the third wives.) If he would subsequently die childless, a yibum or chalitzah with one of these wives will release the others from any yibum or chalitzah obligations. He is forbidden to the second and the fourth wives, and a yibum or chalitzah with one of them will not release the others from a yibum or chalitzah obligation.

The Mishna continues: If the husband cohabited with the second wife after the death of the first one (she indeed did die), he is permitted to remain married to the second and fourth wives. (Since he is legally married to the second wife, that renders his marriage to the third wife (her maternal sister) null and void. He is thus legally married to the fourth wife because she is not related at all to the second wife. Now that he is legally married to the fourth wife, that renders his marriage to the fifth wife (her maternal sister) null and void.) If he would subsequently die childless, a yibum or chalitzah with one of these wives will release the other from any yibum or chalitzah obligations. He is forbidden to the first, third and fifth wives, and a yibum or chalitzah with one of them will not release the others from a yibum or chalitzah obligation.

Implicit in this Mishna is that one is prohibited from taking his wife’s sister, whether she is a paternal or maternal sister.

The Gemora asks: How do we know that one’s maternal sister is prohibited?

The Gemora answers: It can be derived from the prohibition of a sister. Just as one is prohibited from taking his sister, whether she is a paternal or maternal sister, so too, one is prohibited from taking his wife’s sister, she is a paternal or maternal sister.

The Gemora asks: Let us derive from the prohibition regarding one’s father’s brother’s wife? Just as there, the prohibition is only applicable if the husband and the brother are paternal brothers and not maternal, so too, regarding the prohibition of one’s wife’s sister; she should only be forbidden if she is the wife’s paternal sister?

The Gemora answers: It is more logical to derive the halacha pertaining to a wife’s sister from one’s own sister because she is his own relative (a father’s brother’s wife is not regarded as his own relative).

The Gemora asks: It would be preferable to derive the halacha of a wife’s sister from the prohibition regarding one father’s brother’s wife because they are both related through marriage (in contrast to one’s sister, where no marriage is involved).

The Gemora concludes: We derive this halacha from the prohibition regarding one’s brother’s wife. (This prohibition is applicable whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers.) They are comparable because they are related through marriage and are one’s own relatives. (54b – 55a)

The Gemora asks: How do we know that one’s brother’s wife is prohibited, whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers?

The Gemora cites a braisa which discusses this precise issue. It is written [Vayikra 18:16]: The ervah of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover. This verse prohibits one from taking his brother’s wife, whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers.

The braisa asks: Perhaps the prohibition is only applicable if they are paternal brothers?

The braisa presents the source for both options. We could derive this halacha from the prohibition regarding one’s sister. Just as one is prohibited from taking his sister, whether she is a paternal or maternal sister, so too, one is prohibited from taking his brother’s wife, whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers.

Or perhaps, we can derive this halacha from the prohibition regarding one’s father’s brother’s wife. Just as there, the prohibition is only applicable if the husband and the brother are paternal brothers and not maternal, so too, regarding the prohibition of one’s brother’s wife; she should only be forbidden if the husband and the brother are paternal brothers.

The braisa states the reasons as to which prohibition is more comparable to the prohibition regarding one’s brother’s wife. A brother’s wife is his own relative, and his sister is his own relative; one’s father’s brother’s wife is not his own relative. However, there is a counterargument: A brother’s wife is a prohibition which involves a marriage, and a father’s brother’s wife also involves a marriage; one’s sister is a prohibition that occurs automatically, not because of any marriage.

The braisa concludes by citing the end of the aforementioned verse: She is the ervah of your brother. These words (because they are superfluous) teach us that one is prohibited from taking his brother’s wife, whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps one verse is necessary to teach us the prohibition regarding a case where the brother has children, and it is during his lifetime, and the other verse teaches us that the prohibition exists in a case where he has children, and it is after her husband died?

The Gemora answers: It is unnecessary to teach us that the brother’s wife is forbidden in a case where he has children, and the husband died. Since the Torah explicitly permits a brother’s wife when the brother died childless, we can infer that she would be forbidden if he did have children.

The Gemora counters: Perhaps we can say that if he died childless, she is forbidden to marry anyone else, but is permitted to the yavam; however, if he died with children, she would be permitted to everyone? Alternatively, we can say: If he died childless, there is a mitzvah to marry her; if he died with children, it would be voluntary? Alternatively, we can say: If he died childless, he is permitted to marry her; if he died with children, there would be a positive commandment against marrying her (but she would not be subject to the penalty of kares)?

The Gemora answers: There is actually a third verse, which is certainly extra. It is written [Vayikra 20:21]: He has uncovered his brother’s ervah. These words (because they are superfluous) teach us that one is prohibited from taking his brother’s wife, whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers. (55a)

The Gemora cites a Scriptural verse which indicates that although a brother’s wife is prohibited whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers, the mitzvah of yibum is applicable only if they are paternal brothers, not maternal brothers. (55a)

The Gemora asks: Why does the Torah mention kares regarding the prohibition of cohabitating with one’s sister (all arayos are subject to the penalty of kares)?

The Gemora answers: It is to teach us the halacha of Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Yochanan states: If one committed all the arayos transgression (mistakenly thinking that she was permitted to him) during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a korban chatas for each and every transgression. (55a)

The Gemora asks: Why does the Torah mention that one will die childless if he cohabited with his father’s brother’s wife; the Torah has already stated that regarding all arayos?

The Gemora answers: It is necessary for Rabbah’s teaching. Rabbah states that one verse teaches us that if one has children, and he has committed one of these transgressions; he will be forced to bury his children. The other verse teaches us that if he does not have children, he will continue to live in that state, and he will eventually die without ever having children. The Gemora comments: This applies to children born prior to transgressing as well as to those that were born afterwards. (55a)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source which indicates that a partial cohabitation is prohibited by a negative prohibition, by a negative prohibition involving the Kehunah and by a positive commandment. The Gemora also cites the source which indicates that a yavam will acquire his yevamah and a man will acquire his wife through partial cohabitation. (55a – 55b)

Rava asks: Why does the Torah mention the words a copulation of seed (a complete cohabitation) regarding a designated slavewoman (a Canaanite slavewoman betrothed to a Hebrew slave is forbidden to cohabit with a regular Jew) regarding a married woman, and regarding a sotah (an adulteress)?

Rava answers: The words a copulation of seed regarding a designated slavewoman is necessary for the ruling we stated above (namely, that one is not liable to bring a korban asham until he cohabits completely with her).

The words a copulation of seed regarding a married woman teaches us that one is not liable for cohabitating with a corpse of a married woman. This is necessary, for we might have thought that since she is still regarded as the husband’s relative (regarding a kohen becoming tamei to his wife), it might be considered adultery; the Torah teaches us that this is not the case.

The words a copulation of seed regarding a sotah teaches us that one who warns his wife not to engage in bodily contact with another man does not render her a sotah. This is necessary, for we might have thought that becoming a sotah is dependent on the objection of the husband, and since he is is obviously objecting to this behavior, perhaps she would be rendered a sotah; the Torah teaches us that this is not the case. (55b)

The Gemora cites different opinions regarding what is considered the beginning of cohabitation. One opinion maintains that even genital contact constitutes partial cohabitation. Others hold that the insertion of the corona is considered the beginning of cohabitation. (55b – 56a)

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