Daf Yomi - Yevamos 66 - Highlights

This chapter continues to discuss the prohibition of eating terumah when an unlawful marriage has taken place. To understand this mishnah, we must first mention (as already mentioned above [4:3]) that the property of a married woman is divided into two categories: (1) nikhsei melog (usufruct property) -- the property which the woman brings in with her from her father's house, and which is not recorded in the ketubah, as well as property which comes to her by inheritance or as a gift after the marriage. This property is hers, and her husband is not responsible for it, since he may only usufruct (the right to use and enjoy the profits and advantages of something belonging to another as long as the property is not damaged or altered in any way) it. The term nikhsei melog is derived from the Aramaic word meligah, plucking, i.e., the husband plucks the property just as a chicken is plucked. (2) nikhsei tzon barzel (ironclad property) -- the property which the wife brings in to her husband in the dowry, and which the husband records in the ketubah. The husband makes use of this property as he wishes, its profits or losses are his, and he is responsible for it. Hence the name, "ironclad property": the principal remains as does iron, for if it is lost, the husband is required to pay (see Bartenura). (from Rabbi Pinchas Kahati – Torah Community Connections)

The Mishna states: Concerning a widow who is married to a Kohen Gadol, or a divorcee or a chalutzah who is married to an ordinary Kohen; if she brought into the marriage melog slaves and tzon barzel slaves, the melog slaves are not permitted to eat terumah (they are regarded as belonging to the woman, and she is disqualified from eating terumah), whereas the tzon barzel slaves are permitted to eat terumah (they are regarded as belonging to the husband).

And these are melog slaves: If they die, it is her loss. If they increase in value, the increase belongs to her. Although the husband is required to sustain them, they are not permitted to eat terumah.

And these are tzon barzel slaves: If they die, it is his loss. If they increase in value, the increase belongs to him. Since he is responsible for these slaves, they may eat terumah.

If a daughter of a Yisroel is married to a Kohen, and she brings slaves into the marriage, whether they are melog slaves or tzon barzel slaves, they are permitted to eat terumah.

If a daughter of a Kohen is married to a Yisroel, and she brings slaves into the marriage, whether they are melog slaves or tzon barzel slaves, they are not permitted to eat terumah. (66a)

The Gemora asks: Why can’t the melog slaves of the widow be permitted to eat terumah? They should be regarded as the acquisition of the Kohen that bought other property (and that property is permitted to eat terumah). It was taught in a braisa: How do we know that a Kohen who married a woman or bought slaves that they are permitted to eat terumah? It is written [Vayikra 22:11]: If a Kohen shall buy any soul, the purchase of his money, he may eat of it. How do we know that a Kohen’s wife who bought slaves or a Kohen’s slave that bought other slaves that they are permitted to eat terumah? It is written If a Kohen shall buy any soul, the purchase of his money, he may eat of it. We derive from this verse that the acquisition of the Kohen that bought other property, the purchased property may eat terumah.

The Gemora answers using the following principle: Anyone who eats terumah himself can entitle others to eat terumah, whereas anyone who may not eat terumah himself cannot entitle others to eat terumah. (Since the widow married to the Kohen Gadol may not eat terumah, she cannot entitle others to eat terumah.)

The Gemora challenges this principle: But an uncircumcised Kohen or a Kohen who is tamei may not eat terumah, but they entitle others to eat terumah?

The Gemora answers: These people are only temporarily prohibited from eating terumah (the uncircumcised Kohen can become circumcised, and the Kohen who is tamei can become tahor; therefore they can entitle others to eat terumah, whereas the widow is disqualified permanently).

The Gemora asks: But a mamzer who cannot eat terumah, yet entitles others to eat terumah? (A Kohen marries a non-Kohen (Sarah) and they have a daughter. This daughter marries a mamzer and they have a son, who is also recognized as a mamzer. If the Kohen and his daughter dies, the grandmother, Sarah may continue to eat terumah on account of the mamzer grandson even though he himself cannot eat terumah.)

Ravina qualifies the principle: Any Kohanic acquisition who eats terumah himself can entitle others to eat terumah, whereas any Kohanic acquisition who may not eat terumah himself cannot entitle others to eat terumah. (This explains why the widow’s melog slaves cannot eat terumah.)

Rava answers differently: Biblically, her slaves are permitted to eat terumah; the Rabbis decreed that they should not eat in order for her to say, “I cannot eat terumah, and my slaves cannot eat either. It must be that I am nothing but a harlot to the Kohen.” (This will lead to strife between the two of them, and he will divorce her, which was the Rabbis intention.)

Rav Ashi offers a third answer: Biblically, her slaves are permitted to eat terumah; the Rabbis decreed that they should not eat out of the concern that they will eat terumah even after her husband’s death.

The Gemora asks: If so, let us apply the same decree when a daughter of a Yisroel marries a Kohen (legally)?

Rav Ashi clarifies his answer: The Rabbis issued a decree regarding a widowed Koheness who marries a Kohen Gadol. She might mistakenly feed her melog slaves terumah after her husband’s death by saying the following: “Initially (after I became a widow the first time), my slaves were permitted to eat terumah from my father’s house. I went and married the Kohen Gadol, and they still were permitted to eat terumah. Now that he died, I should return to my original status, and they should still be permitted to eat terumah.” She does not understand that initially, she was not a chalalah; now, that she married the Kohen Gadol, she has become a chalalah, and her slaves cannot eat terumah.

The Gemora asks: This decree is understandable concerning a widowed Koheness, but regarding a widow, who is a daughter of a Yisroel, what are we concerned about (she cannot possibly justify feeding her slaves terumah after the Kohen Gadol’s death)?

The Gemora answers: The Rabbis did not distinguish between the two types of widows. (66a)

The Gemora states: A woman who brings tzon barzel property into her marriage, and subsequently gets divorced. She wants to take her property, and the husband wants to give her its value. What is the halacha?

Rav Yehudah said: The law accords with her. Rav Ami said: The law accords with him.

The Gemora explains: Rav Yehudah said: The law accords with her because these properties represent the assets of her father’s house, and she has a valid claim to take them back. Rav Ami said: The law accords with him because our Mishna stated (regarding tzon barzel slaves): If they die, it is his loss. If they increase in value, the increase belongs to him. Since he is responsible for these slaves, they may eat terumah. (It is evident that the tzon barzel property is considered his, and he has a right to keep the property, providing that he returns their value to her.)

Rav Safra rejects Rav Ami’s proof from the Mishna. It doesn’t say: “Since these slaves are his, they may eat terumah.” The Mishna states: “Since he is responsible for these slaves, they may eat terumah.” In truth, they are not regarded as his slaves.

The Gemora asks: Is it true that the Kohen may feed his slaves terumah merely because he is responsible for them? But we learned in a Mishna (Terumos 11:9): If a Yisroel rents a cow from a Kohen, he may feed the cow with legumes of terumah (a type of beans that is only consumed by animals). However, a Kohen, who rents a cow from a Yisroel, although the Kohen is responsible to sustain it, he is not permitted to feed it legumes of terumah. (We see from this Mishna that responsibility alone is not sufficient grounds to enable the Kohen to feed terumah to the slaves or animals.)

The Gemora answers: A renter does not have full responsibility on the animals, and that is why it is not regarded as being the property of the Kohen. While he is responsible if it gets lost or stolen, he will not be responsible in cases of unavoidable loss or if the animal weakened or lost some of its value.

The Gemora cites the latter portion of that Mishna to prove this. If a Yisroel rents a cow from a Kohen, and has it evaluated, he may not feed the cow with legumes of terumah. If a Kohen rents a cow from a Yisroel, and has it evaluated, he is permitted to feed the cow with legumes of terumah.

Rabbah and Rav Yosef were sitting before Rav Nachman at the conclusion of his lecture, and they said: A braisa was taught which supports Rav Ami’s opinion, and a braisa was taught which support Rav Yehudah’s opinion. The Gemora cites those two braisos. (66a - 66b)

Rava said in the name of Rav Nachman: The halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah.

Rava asked Rav Nachman: But there is a braisa supporting the viewpoint of Rav Ami (why are you ruling in accordance with Rav Yehudah)?

Rav Nachman replied: Although there is a braisa that supports Rav Ami, Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, since he had stated: (the wife has a valid claim to take the tzon barzel properties back) because these properties represent the assets of her father’s house, and she has a valid claim to take them back. (66b)

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