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Daily Daf Dose
Rabbah and Rav Yosef were sitting before Rav Nachman at the conclusion of his lecture, and they said: A braisa was taught which supports Rav Yehudah’s opinion, and a braisa was taught which support Rav Ami’s opinion. The Gemora cites those two braisos.
Rava said in the name of Rav Nachman: The halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah.
Rava asked Rav Nachman: But there is a braisa supporting the viewpoint of Rav Ami (why are you ruling in accordance with Rav Yehudah)?
Rav Nachman replied: Although there is a braisa that supports Rav Ami, Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, since he had stated: (the wife has a valid claim to take the tzon barzel properties back) because these properties represent the assets of her father’s house, and she has a valid claim to take them back.
The flow of the Gemora is a bit problematic. Rava was not talking to Rav Nachman when he said that the halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah. He said that over in his name. It seems a bit odd that he would then ask Rav Nachman.
Furthermore, why was he asking from a braisa that supports Rav Ami when the Gemora just quoted a braisa that supported Rav Yehudah as well?
Reb Yissochar Dov from Buska explains this Gemora. He states: There is a principle that whenever the Gemora cites two explanations, and introduces the second one with the terminology “v’ibais eima,” “alternatively, you can say,” the halacha follows the second opinion. This is also an established principle in Shulchan Aruch. When the Shulchan Aruch cites two opinions, the halacha follows the second one. This applies also when the Gemora cites two braisos, one supporting one viewpoint, and a second supporting the other opinion; the halacha is in accordance with the second one.
When Rabbah and Rav Yosef were sitting before Rav Nachman, Rava was there as well. The Gemora had stated that they were sitting before Rav Nachman at the conclusion of his lecture. The Likutei Maharil (78) states that whenever the Gemora uses the terminology “b’shilhei pirkei,” “at the conclusion of his lecture,” it means that the Amora was extremely tired and weak from his lecture. The Targum of the word “oyef,” meaning tired, is “shilhei.” Rav Nachman was not involved in the discussion between Rabbah and Rav Yosef when they were citing the braisos. Rava, being a disciple of Rav Nachman, remembered that Rav Nachman had ruled according to Rav Yehudah. Upon hearing the discussion between Rabbah and Rav Yosef, and realizing that the second opinion cited was according to Rav Ami, Rava questioned Rav Nachman: “How can you rule according to Rav Yehudah when the second opinion cited was according to Rav Ami, and the halacha would follow the latter opinion?” Rav Nachman, who was extremely weak, did not respond at all, and Rava himself (or the Gemora) answered that the principle does not apply when the logic follows the other opinion. Since Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, we rule according to him, even though the braisa supporting Rav Ami was cited second.
Rava said in the name of Rav Nachman: The halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah.
Rava asked Rav Nachman: But there is a braisa supporting the viewpoint of Rav Ami (why are you ruling in accordance with Rav Yehudah)?
Rav Nachman replied: Although there is a braisa that supports Rav Ami, Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, since he had stated: (the wife has a valid claim to take the tzon barzel properties back) because these properties represent the assets of her father’s house, and she has a valid claim to take them back.
The flow of the Gemora is a bit problematic. Rava was not talking to Rav Nachman when he said that the halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah. He said that over in his name. It seems a bit odd that he would then ask Rav Nachman.
Furthermore, why was he asking from a braisa that supports Rav Ami when the Gemora just quoted a braisa that supported Rav Yehudah as well?
Reb Yissochar Dov from Buska explains this Gemora. He states: There is a principle that whenever the Gemora cites two explanations, and introduces the second one with the terminology “v’ibais eima,” “alternatively, you can say,” the halacha follows the second opinion. This is also an established principle in Shulchan Aruch. When the Shulchan Aruch cites two opinions, the halacha follows the second one. This applies also when the Gemora cites two braisos, one supporting one viewpoint, and a second supporting the other opinion; the halacha is in accordance with the second one.
When Rabbah and Rav Yosef were sitting before Rav Nachman, Rava was there as well. The Gemora had stated that they were sitting before Rav Nachman at the conclusion of his lecture. The Likutei Maharil (78) states that whenever the Gemora uses the terminology “b’shilhei pirkei,” “at the conclusion of his lecture,” it means that the Amora was extremely tired and weak from his lecture. The Targum of the word “oyef,” meaning tired, is “shilhei.” Rav Nachman was not involved in the discussion between Rabbah and Rav Yosef when they were citing the braisos. Rava, being a disciple of Rav Nachman, remembered that Rav Nachman had ruled according to Rav Yehudah. Upon hearing the discussion between Rabbah and Rav Yosef, and realizing that the second opinion cited was according to Rav Ami, Rava questioned Rav Nachman: “How can you rule according to Rav Yehudah when the second opinion cited was according to Rav Ami, and the halacha would follow the latter opinion?” Rav Nachman, who was extremely weak, did not respond at all, and Rava himself (or the Gemora) answered that the principle does not apply when the logic follows the other opinion. Since Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, we rule according to him, even though the braisa supporting Rav Ami was cited second.
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