Daf Yomi - Yevamos 68 - Highlights

The Mishna states: The fetus, and the yavam, and the betrothal, and the deaf-mute, and a boy nine years and one day old, disqualifies others from eating terumah (if a Kohen’s daughter marries a Yisroel and he dies; if she is pregnant, the fetus disqualifies her from eating terumah from her father’s house; so too, falling for yibum would disqualify her; if she becomes betrothed to a Yisroel, he will disqualify her; if she marries a non-Kohen deaf-mute, he will disqualify her), but they do not entitle her to eat terumah (if a Yisroel’s daughter marries a Kohen and he dies, if she is pregnant, the fetus does not entitle her to eat terumah; so too, falling for yibum would not entitle her to eat terumah; if she becomes betrothed to a Kohen, she cannot eat terumah; if she marries a Kohen deaf-mute, he will not entitle her to eat terumah).

The same halacha would apply if there exists a doubt whether he is nine years and one day old, or not; if there exists a doubt whether he has produced two hairs, or not.

If a house fell on him and on his brother's daughter, and it is not known which one died first, her co-wife submits to chalitzah and is not married by yibum. (If the wife died first, the co-wife falls to yibum, since at the time of her husband’s death, he was not married to the ervah; therefore, chalitzah is necessary. If he died first, she would be released because she is the co-wife of an ervah.) (67b)

The Gemora explains each case of the Mishna, and cites the reason for the halacha. The first case of the Mishna was regarding a fetus: If a Kohen’s daughter marries a Yisroel and he dies; if she is pregnant, the fetus disqualifies her from eating terumah from her father’s house. If a Yisroel’s daughter marries a Kohen and he dies, if she is pregnant, the fetus does not entitle her to eat terumah. The Gemora cites Scriptural sources for both halachos. (67b)

The next case of the Mishna was regarding a yavam: If a Kohen’s daughter marries a Yisroel and he dies childless, falling for yibum would disqualify her from eating terumah. If a Yisroel’s daughter marries a Kohen and he dies childless, falling for yibum would not entitle her to eat terumah. The Gemora cites Scriptural sources for both halachos. (67b)

The next case of the Mishna was regarding a betrothal. If a Kohen’s daughter is betrothed to a Yisroel, he will disqualify her from eating terumah because he has acquired her. If a Yisroel’s daughter is betrothed to a Kohen, he would not entitle her to eat terumah because of Ula’s teaching. (Ula maintains that she is Rabbinically forbidden from eating terumah because we are concerned that she will bring the terumah to her father’s house, and feed it to her brothers and sisters.) (67b – 68a)

The next case of the Mishna was regarding a deaf-mute. If a Kohen’s daughter is married to a deaf-mute, he will disqualify her from eating terumah because he has Rabbinically acquired her. If a Yisroel’s daughter is married to a Kohen deaf-mute, he would not entitle her to eat terumah because she is not an acquisition of his money. (68a)

The next case of the Mishna was regarding a boy nine years and one day old. Abaye explains the case to be referring to a Kohen minor, who is over nine years and one day old, who performs a yibum and cohabits with her. Since he Biblically has acquired her, we might have thought that she would be entitled to eat terumah. The Mishna teaches us that she cannot because the Rabbis treated the minor’s cohabitation as if it was a ma’amar performed by an adult, and therefore it is only a Rabbinical acquisition; therefore, she may not eat terumah.

Rava asked: If that is the explanation of the first portion of the Mishna, what is the explanation for the latter part? The Mishna had stated: The same halacha would apply if there exists a doubt whether he is nine years and one day old, or not. Now, if he does not entitle her to eat terumah when he is definitely nine years of age, then he certainly would not entitle her to eat terumah when there is a doubt regarding his age. What is the necessity to teach this latter halacha?

Rava interprets the Mishna differently: The Mishna is referring to a case where a nine year old boy with a blemished lineage (a mamzer) cohabited with a woman; she is disqualified from eating terumah (and the latter part of the Mishna teaches us that she is disqualified even if there is uncertainty regarding his age), as is stated in the following braisa: A boy who is nine years and one day old, who is an Amonite, Moabite, Egyptian, or Edomite convert (who are not permitted to marry into the congregation), or is a Cuthean, Nasin, chalal, or mamzer, who cohabited with a Koheness, Leviah, or an Israelite woman has disqualified her from the Kehunah.

The Gemora asks: By the fact that the latter portion of our Mishna discusses cases where a man who is unfit to enter into the congregation cohabits with a woman, she is disqualified from the Kehunah; this would indicate that the earlier part of the Mishna is not referring to men who have a blemished lineage.

The Gemora answers: The first portion of the Mishna is referring to men who are unfit to enter the entire congregation; the latter portion of the Mishna is discussing men who are unfit for Kehunah. (68a)

The Gemora cites the braisa mentioned above: A boy who is nine years and one day old, who is an Amonite, Moabite, Egyptian, or Edomite convert (who are not permitted to marry into the congregation), or is a Cuthean, Nasin, chalal, or mamzer, who cohabited with a Koheness, Leviah, or an Israelite woman has disqualified her from the Kehunah.

Rabbi Yosi states: Any man, whose children are disqualified, will disqualify a woman with whom he cohabits from the Kehunah. Any man, whose children are not disqualified, will not disqualify a woman with whom he cohabits from the Kehunah.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Any man, whose daughter a Kohen is permitted to marry, he would be permitted to marry his widow. Any man, whose daughter a Kohen is not permitted to marry, he would not be permitted to marry his widow. (68a)

The Gemora asks: From where do we derive these halachos?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: It is written [Vayikra 22:12]: And if a Kohen's daughter should be married to a strange man, she may not eat of the separated holies. This teaches us that as soon as she has cohabited with an unfit person, the latter disqualifies her.

The Gemora asks: But the verse cited is surely required for another purpose? Didn’t we learn form this verse that the daughter of a Kohen who was married to a non-Kohen may not eat terumah?

The Gemora answers: That may be deduced from the next verse: And if a Kohen’s daughter should become a widow or divorcee…she shall return unto her father's house, as in her youth; she may eat of her father's bread. Since the Torah ordained, she shall return unto her father's house … she may eat, it follows that prior to that, she was not permitted to eat.

The Gemora asks: But if this halacha would be derived only from this verse, one might have assumed that as a negative precept which is derived from a positive commandment, it has only the force of a positive commandment. The Torah required the other verse to indicate that it is a negative precept.

The Gemora answers: That it is a negative precept may be deduced from an earlier verse, which states: And any strange man may not eat of the holy foods.

The Gemora asks: But that verse is required for its own purpose (to teach that a non-Kohen shall not eat terumah)?

The Gemora answers: The expression, And any strange man, is written twice. (One verse teaches us that a non-Kohen cannot eat terumah, and the other verse teaches us that a Kohen’s daughter cannot eat terumah if she marries a non-Kohen.)

The Gemora asks: But still, isn’t the second verse required for the exposition of Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina? For Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina stated: And any strange man implies that the Torah has imposed a prohibition concerning a non-Kohen from eating terumah, but not concerning an onein (one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet).

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina 's exposition may be deduced from the Scriptural use of the longer expression “And any strange man” instead of “any strange man”.

The Gemora persists: But still, isn’t the verse (And if a Kohen's daughter should be married to a strange man, she may not eat of the separated holies) required for the halacha which was taught in the following braisa: When she returns, she returns only to the privilege of eating terumah, but does not return to the privilege of eating the breast and thigh (of the shelamim korbanos). And Rav Chisda stated in the name of Ravina bar Rav Shila: What Scriptural text proves this halacha? It is written: And if a Kohen's daughter should be married to a strange man, she may not eat of the separated holies. This teaches us that she may not eat the breast and thigh which is separated from the holies.

The Gemora answers: The Torah could have written “she may not eat of the holies;” why did the Torah write then the longer expression of “she may not eat of the separated holies”? Two deductions may consequently be made. (One is, that a Kohen’s daughter who cohabits with an unfit person, the latter disqualifies her; and the other is, a daughter of a Kohen who marries a non-Kohen may never eat the breast and thigh which is separated from the shelamim.)

We have now deduced the law pertaining to a Kohen’s daughter; how do we derive this halacha in respect of the daughter of a Levite or an Israelite?

The Gemora answers: As Rabbi Abba stated in the name of Rav: The Torah could have written “a Kohen's daughter;” why did the Torah write then the longer expression of “And if a Kohen's daughter”? It is to teach us that a daughter of a Levite or an Israelite can also become disqualified.

The Gemora asks: Is this only in accordance with the view of Rabbi Akiva who bases expositions on superfluous vavin (and)?

The Gemora answers: This exposition will even be according to the Sages because the entire word is superfluous.

The Gemora asks: It has proven that they are disqualified in respect to terumah; how do we derive that the disqualification extends also to the prohibition of marrying a Kohen?

The Gemora answers: Has not the daughter of a Levite or of an Israelite been included in respect of marrying a Kohen? For, regarding terumah, neither of them is ever eligible to eat it (since we are not discussing marriage).

The Gemora asks: Perhaps the exclusion would be relevant to cases where they would eat on account of their child who is a Kohen (if she has a child from a Kohen, she would be permitted to eat terumah even if she was not married to him)?

The Gemora answers: A verse would not be necessary to teach this halacha, for it can be derived by means of a kal vachomer. If a Koheness, who may eat terumah on account of her own sanctity, nevertheless becomes disqualified when she cohabits with an unfit man; the daughter of a Levite or an Israelite, who may only eat terumah on account of their children, certainly would be disqualified by cohabiting with an unfit man.

The Gemora asks: On the contrary; a Koheness who has her own sanctity can become disqualified, but the others, who are not sanctified will not become disqualified.

The Gemora retracts and derives the halacha (the disqualification extends also to the prohibition of marrying a Kohen) from a kal vachomer. If a divorcee, who is permitted to eat terumah (if she is a Kohen’s daughter), is forbidden to marry a Kohen; then this woman, who may not eat terumah, will certainly be disqualified from marrying a Kohen.

The Gemora asks: Can we derive a negative precept from a kal vachomer?

The Gemora answers: The kal vachomer reveals to us that one who is disqualified from eating terumah is disqualified from marring a Kohen. (68a – 68b)

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