Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 43 - Highlights

The Daughter’s Earnings

Rabbi Avina inquired of Rav Sheishes: If the daughter is being supported by her brothers (as stated in the kesuvah; all daughters will be supported from the father’s estate until they marry or become a bogeres), who has the rights to her earnings? Do the brothers take the place of their father, and just as her earnings would have belonged to the father, so too now, they belong to the sons? Or, perhaps, we should not compare the brothers to the father. The father is entitled to her earnings because he supports her, but the brothers are not supporting her from their money; they are supporting her from their father’s estate, and therefore, they should not be entitled to her earnings.

Rav Sheishes responds: We have learned in the following Mishna: A widow is supported from the property inherited by the orphans and they are entitled to her earnings (proving that the brothers should be entitled to the daughter’s earnings).

The Gemora objects to this proof: How can the two cases be compared? The reason that the orphans are entitled to the widow’s earnings is because the husband (when writing the kesuvah) does not desire that his widow should profit at the expense of the sons. However, in respect to the daughter, the father does desire that she should profit (and keep her earnings) even at the expense of the brothers (because this way, she will have a larger dowry and will be more desirable to marry).

The Gemora asks: Do you mean to say that the man has preference for his daughter over his widow? But Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yosi: The relationship between a widow and her daughter, in the case of a small estate (which does not suffice for the maintenance of the dependents of the deceased man for a period of twelve months), has been put on the same level as that of the relationship between a daughter and her brothers. Just as in the case of the relationship between a daughter and her brothers, the daughter is supported while the brothers can go begging at people's doors, so also in the case of the relationship between a widow and her daughter, the widow is supported and the daughter can go begging at people's doors (this proves that there is a preference to the widow over the daughter).

The Gemora answers: As regards against degradation (begging for money), a man gives preference to his widow; as regards to profiting, he gives preference to his daughter.

Rav Yosef asks on the ruling of Rav Sheishes (that the earnings of the daughter belong to the brothers) from our Mishna which states: Her earnings and what she finds, even though she did not collect them, and the father died, they then belong to the brothers. It would seem that the reason the brothers are entitled to her earnings is because they originated while the father was alive; however, if they originated after his death, they would belong to her. Isn’t our Mishna discussing a case where the brothers were supporting her (and still the earnings belong to her)?

The Gemora answers: No! The Mishna is referring to a case where the brothers are not supporting her (there was no inheritance from the father).

The Gemora asks: If the Mishna is discussing a case where the brothers are not supporting her, what was the Mishna’s necessity to state this case? For even according to the one who ruled that a master is entitled to say to his slave, “Work for me, but I will not maintain you,” this ruling applies only to a Canaanite slave concerning whom “for it is good for him with you” was not written in the Torah, but not to a Hebrew slave concerning whom “for it is good for him with you” was written in the Torah. How much more so that he cannot say this to his daughter?

Rabbah bar Ula answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where the brothers are not supporting her, but the Mishna is teaching us that even the extra income that she is earning (if it exceeded the cost of her maintenance) belongs to her and not to the brothers.

Rava asked: Could it be that such a great man as Rav Yosef did not know that the Mishna may be referring to a case of an extra income when he raised his objection?

Rather, Rava explains: Rav Yosef raised his objection from our very Mishna, for it was stated: Her earnings and what she finds, even though she did not collect the. From whom is she to collect anything she finds? Consequently it must be conceded that it is this that was meant: Her earnings is similar to anything that she finds; just as anything she finds belongs to her father, if she finds it while he is alive, and she may keep her findings if she finds it after his death. So too, in the case of her earnings; if it was done while her father was alive, it belongs to her father, but if it was done after his death, it belongs to herself. Thus, it may be proven that she may keep her earnings even if she is being supported by the brothers.

It was also stated: Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: Even if a daughter is being supported by the brothers, she is entitled to keep her earnings.

Rav Kahana cites a Scriptural source for this, proving that a father does not bequeath to his sons the rights to his daughter’s earnings.

The Gemora concludes that the halacha is indeed according to Rav Sheishes and Rav. (43a – 43b)
Mishna

The Mishna states: If a man gives his daughter (who is a minor or a na’arah) in betrothal, and he divorced her, and then, the father gave her in betrothal again, and she was widowed, her kesuvah (from both marriages) is his. If he gave her in nisuin, and he divorced her, and then, the father gave her in nisuin, and she was widowed, her kesuvah (from both marriages) belongs to her. Rabbi Yehudah says: The first kesuvah belongs to the father. They said to him: After he gave her in nisuin, her father has no authority over her. (43b)

Two Occurrences

The Gemora comments: By the fact that the Mishna stated a case where she was married and divorced, and married again and widowed, this would imply that had the case been that both her husbands had died, she would be labeled a katlanis (a woman that kills her husbands), and she would not be permitted to marry again. It emerges that there is an anonymous Mishna that is following Rebbe’s opinion, for Rebbe maintains that we can establish a chazakah (a presumption that something will happen) based on two occurrences (and it is not necessary to have three occurrences). (43b)

Rabbi Yehudah’s Reason

The Gemora explains Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion: Rabbah and Rav Yosef both say that the father is entitles to her kesuvah even after nisuin because the kesuvah was written while she was still under her father’s jurisdiction (since most kesuvah’s are written immediately prior to the nisuin; at that time, if she is a minor or a na’arah, the father has jurisdiction). (43b)

From When May She Collect?

The Gemora inquires (according to Rabbi Yehudah): As to the collection of the kesuvah, from which date may she collect (the properties sold by her husband between the date of the betrothal and that on which the kesuvah was written; do we say she may collect the property from the purchasers because the husband becomes Rabbinically liable for the kesuvah at the time of erusin or do we say that she may only collect properties sold by the husband after the kesuvah was actually written)?

Rav Huna replied: The hundred or the two hundred zuz (the regular obligation of the kesuvah), she may collect the properties sold from the date of the betrothal (since the lien took effect from then) and the additional amount of the kesuvah (which varies according to their specific arrangement) she may collect from the properties sold after the nisuin. Rav Assi, however, replied: Both amounts may be collected only from the date of the nisuin (having accepted the written hesuvah that bore the later date on which her nisuin took place, the woman is assumed to have waived her rights to the original lien, which she had acquired earlier on betrothal, in favor of her new advantages as well as any disadvantages that were conferred by the written document).

The Gemora asks: How could Rav Huna have issued such a ruling? Has it not been stated: If a wife produced against her husband two Kesuvos, one for two hundred, and one for three hundred zuz, she may, said Rav Huna, collect the properties sold from the earlier date if she wishes to collect the two hundred zuz, but if she desires to collect the three hundred zuz, she may only collect properties sold after the later date. Now, if the ruling were as stated, she should be entitled to collect property two hundred zuz from the earlier date and property worth one hundred from the later date?

The Gemora replies: But even according to your understanding, it might equally be challenged that she should be able to collect for all the five hundred zuz, two hundred from the earlier date and three hundred from the later date? What then is the reason why she cannot do so? It is obviously because the man did not write in the kesuvah, “I willingly added to you three hundred zuz to the two hundred.” He must have therefore meant: “If you desire to collect from the earlier date, you may collect no more than two hundred, and if you desire to collect from the later date, you may collect three hundred.”

Here also, the reason why she cannot collect two hundred from the first date and one hundred from the second date is because he did not write in the kesuvah, “I have willingly added a hundred zuz to the two hundred,” she, having accepted the kesuvah obviously is waiving her right to the first lien. (43b – 44a)

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