Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 46 - Highlights

Punishment for Slandering

The Gemora cites a braisa discussing the punishment administered to one who slanders. The braisa cites the Scriptural sources proving that he receives lashes and he is required to pay a fine. (46a)

Warning against Slandering

The Gemora asks: From where do we derive that the Torah issues a warning against slandering (in order to receive punishment for a sin, the Torah must explicitly state a warning prohibiting that particular action)?

Rabbi Elozar said: It is from the following verse: You shall not go about as a talebearer. Rabbi Nosson said: It is from the following verse: Beware of any evil word.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Elozar does not use the other text?

The Gemora answers: That text is required for the deduction made by Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair: Beware of any evil word. Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair deduced that a man should not indulge in immoral thoughts by day that might lead him to uncleanness (seminal emission) by night.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Nosson does not use the other text?

The Gemora answers: That text is required to warn the court that it must not be lenient with one of the litigants and harsh to the other. (46a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: If a (slandering) husband did not say to the witnesses, “Come and give evidence for me,” but rather, they volunteered to give it, he does not receive lashes, nor is he required to pay the hundred sela. If the accusation is true, she or her false witnesses that became zomemim (witnesses who other witnesses proclaim could not possibly have seen the event, as they were together in a different location, see Makos 2a) are hurried to the place of stoning.

The Gemora asks: How can we think that she would receive stoning together with false witnesses? It must mean that either she, or her false witnesses that became zomemim receive stoning.

The Gemora comments: The reason that he does not receive lashes is because he did not tell them to give their evidence. Had he, however, told them to testify, he would have been subject to the prescribed penalties even though he did not hire them. This ruling comes to exclude the viewpoint of Rabbi Yehudah, for it was taught in the following braisa: Rabbi Yehudah ruled: A husband does not receive any penalties unless he has hired the witnesses.

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source as the reason for Rabbi Yehudah’s ruling.

Rabbi Yirmiyah inquires: What is the law if the husband hired the witnesses with land (the Scriptural source would seem to indicate that he will only be liable if he hires them with money, food or any movable object)? What is the law if he hires them with less than a perutah? What is the law if he hired them both with a single perutah?

Rav Ashi inquired: What is the law if he slandered her on account of his first marriage (he married her, divorced her and married her again)? What is the law if he slandered her on account of his brother’s marriage (his brother died childless and he performed yibum; he now claims that she was not a virgin when she married his brother)?

The Gemora resolves one of the inquiries, for Rabbi Yonah taught a braisa: It is written: I gave my daughter to this man. We may infer from here that the law of slandering is applicable only when the father gave his daughter to this man, and not to the yavam. (46a)
The Laws of the Defamer

The Gemora elaborates on the dispute mentioned above (45b) between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov as to whether the laws of the slanderer applies even if the couple did not cohabit. It was taught in the following braisa: What is the case of the slanderer? The husband comes to Beis Din and says to his wife’s father, “I did not find your daughter to be a virgin.” If there are witnesses that she committed adultery, she is subject to stoning. If she cohabited before the erusin, she receives a kesuvah of a manah. If his accusation is found to be a false one, he incurs lashes and he is required to pay one hundred selaim. These laws are applicable whether he cohabited with her or whether he did not cohabit with her. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: These words were only said if he did cohabit with her.

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, one can well understand why the Torah stated: And he comes to her … and I came near to her, but according to the Rabbis, what is the meaning of that expression?

The Gemora answers: And he comes to her means with wanton charges, and I came near to her means with words.

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, one can well understand why the Torah stated: I did not find signs of virginity on your daughter, but according to the Rabbis, what is the meaning of that expression?

The Gemora answers: It means that the husband could not find witnesses to confirm her virginity.

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, one can well understand why the Torah stated: And these are the signs of my daughter's virginity (her parents produce the bloodstained sheet and bring them to Beis Din, proving that she was indeed a virgin), but according to the Rabbis, what is the meaning of that expression?

The Gemora answers: It means that her father produces witnesses who confirm her virginity (presenting witnesses who testify that the husband’s witnesses are zomemim).

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, one can well understand why the Torah stated: And they shall spread out the sheet, but according to the Rabbis, what is the meaning of that expression?

Rabbi Avahu answered: They explain the charge which he submitted against her, as it was taught in the following braisa: And they shall spread out the sheet teaches us that the witnesses of this one and those of the other one come, and the matter is clarified like a new sheet. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: The words are to be taken in their literal sense; they produce the actual sheet.

Rabbi Yitzchak the son of Rav Yaakov bar Giyorei sent in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Even though we do not find elsewhere in the Torah that there is a distinction between cohabitation in an ordinary manner and cohabitation in an unnatural manner in respect to lashes and fines, in regards to a husband who slanders, there is the following distinction: He is subject to the punishments of slandering even if he cohabits with his wife in an unnatural manner, provided that he accuses his wife of committing adultery in an ordinary manner.

The Gemora asks: According to which Tanna was this ruling issued? It cannot be according to the Rabbis, for they hold that the husband is subject to the punishments of slandering even if he does not cohabit with her. It can also not be following Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov’s opinion, for he holds that the husband is subject to the punishments of slandering only if he cohabits with his wife in a natural manner.

The Gemora retracts and cites another version: Rav Kahana sent in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The husband is subject to the punishments of slandering only if he cohabits with his wife in a natural manner and only if he accuses his wife of committing adultery in an ordinary manner. (46a – 46b)

Mishna

The Mishna states: A father has jurisdiction over his daughter regarding her betrothal; he receives the money, he accepts the document, or he can give his daughter to him for cohabitation. The father is entitled to that which she finds, and to her earnings and to annul her vows. He receives her get, but he does not eat the fruit of her property during her lifetime (if she had inherited property from her mother’s family).

Once she is married (nisuin), the husband exceeds the father in that he does eat the fruit of her property during her lifetime. He is obligated to provide for her maintenance, for her ransom and for her burial. Rabbi Yehudah says; Even the poorest man in Israel may not hire less than two flutes and a wailing woman to lead the mourning at his wife’s burial. (46b)

Scriptural Sources

The Gemora asks: How do we know that a father is entitled to his daughter’s betrothal money?

Rav Yehudah says: It is written concerning a Jewish maidservant who becomes a na’arah: She shall leave free of charge, without payment. Since the words without payment are seemingly superfluous, we derive from here the following exposition: There is no payment paid to this master, but there is a payment made to a different master (when a na’arah leaves his jurisdiction). Who is that? It is her father (when the na’arah gets married, the father is entitled to the betrothal money).

The Gemora asks: Perhaps there is a payment, but the payment belongs to her and not to her father?

The Gemora answers: Since the father is empowered to give his daughter in marriage, it stands to reason that he receives the payment as well.

The Gemora persists in its questioning: Perhaps the father is entitled to her betrothal money only when his daughter is a minor, at a time that she does not have a hand (capable of making legal transactions); however, a na’arah, who has a hand (capable of making legal transactions), let her betroth herself and receive the money?

The Gemora answers: It is written [Bamidbar 30:17]: In her naarus, in her father’s house. We derive from here that all profits generated by a na’arah belong to the father. It is therefore evident that the betrothal money goes to him, and not to her.

The Gemora objects to this drasha: Let us examine that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: How is it known that a daughter’s earnings belong to her father? It is because it is written [Shmos 21:7]: When a father shall sell his daughter as a maidservant. The Torah juxtaposes the words “daughter” and “maidservant” to teach the following: Just as the earnings of a maidservant belong to her master, so too, the earnings of a daughter belong to her father. The Gemora asks: Why is it necessary to expound the verse in this manner? Let us derive this halacha from the verse mentioned above, namely, In her naarus, in her father’s house?

Rather, it is evident that this verse cannot be the source for this halacha. This is because the aforementioned verse is discussing the annulment of vows (and we cannot derive from there that the payments for embarrassment and depreciation belong to the father).

The Gemora asks: Why can’t we compare the two halachos, and say that just like the father has control over his daughter’s vows, he should receive the betrothal money?

The Gemora answers: We cannot derive a monetary halacha from a prohibitory one.

The Gemora asks: Let us derive the halacha from the fact that the fine belongs to the father?

The Gemora answers: We cannot derive a monetary halacha from a fine.

And should you suggest that that this should be inferred from the law of compensation for embarrassment and depreciation, it could be retorted that embarrassment and depreciation are different, since the father has a right to betroth his daughter to a repulsive man or one who is afflicted with boils (thereby embarrassing her and depreciating her value) and receive the betrothal money in exchange. It is therefore evident that the payments for her embarrassment and depreciation belong to her father.

This, however, is the explanation: It is logical to conclude that when the Torah excluded another case of “going out,” the exclusion was meant to be understood in a manner similar to the original (just as in the verse concerning the maidservant who became a na’arah, it is the master, and not the maidservant, who, in the absence of the specific text to the contrary, would have received the money for the latter's redemption, so too in the implication it must be the father (who corresponds to the master), and not his daughter, who is to receive the money when she leaves his jurisdiction at betrothal).

The Gemora asks: But one “going out” is not like that of the other, for in the case of the master, the maidservant departs his jurisdiction completely, whereas in the “going out” from the jurisdiction of her father, she still lacks being given over for chupah?

The Gemora answers: In respect of the annulment of vows, she does depart from her father’s jurisdiction, for he cannot annul her vows by himself any longer. As we have learned in the following Mishna: Concerning a betrothed na’arah, her father and her husband are both necessary to annul her vows. (46b)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source indicating that the father accepts the betrothal document and that he can give his daughter to a man for betrothal by cohabitation. (46b)

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