Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 47 - Highlights

Rights to her Finds

The Mishna had stated: The father is entitled to that which his daughter finds. The Gemora explains that this was a Rabbinic decree established because we did not want there to be animosity between father and daughter (which might happen if she would be allowed to keep that which she finds and he would no longer support her). (46b – 47a)

Earnings to the Father

The Mishna had stated: The father is entitled to the earnings of his daughter.

The Gemora asks: What is the source for this?

The Gemora answers: It is learned from that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: How is it known that a daughter’s earnings belong to her father? It is because it is written [Shmos 21:7]: When a father shall sell his daughter as a maidservant. The Torah juxtaposes the words “daughter” and “maidservant” to teach the following: Just as the earnings of a maidservant belong to her master, so too, the earnings of a daughter belong to her father.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps, the Torah is only referring to a minor, whom a father may sell as a maidservant; however, in respect to a na’arah, whom the father may not sell, her earnings belong to her?

The Gemora answers: It can be derived through the following logical argument: If it would be imagined that her earnings does not belong to him, how would the father have the right to deliver his daughter to the chupah (bridal chamber)? How could he consign her when he thereby prevents her from doing her work (during her preparations for chupah and its ceremony)?

Rav Achai objects to this line of reasoning and asks: Perhaps the father pays her compensation for her loss of work during the time of the chupah? Alternatively, he may deliver her to the chupah at night (when she is not working anyway)! Alternatively, he may deliver her to the chupah on Shabbos and Yom Tov (in which time, it is forbidden to perform any labor)!

The Gemora concludes: It would not be necessary for the Torah to teach us that a father is entitled to his minor daughter’s earnings, for since he has a right to sell her as a maidservant, it is evident that her earnings belong to him. It emerges that the verse mentioned above is teaching us that the father is entitled to the earnings of his daughter, who is a na’arah. (47a)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural sources indicating that a father annuls his daughter’s vows and that he receives her get. (47a)

Fruits for Ransom

The Mishna had stated: The father does not eat the fruit of her property during her lifetime (if she had inherited property from her mother’s family).

The Gemora cites the following braisa: The father does not eat the fruit of her property during her lifetime. Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah says: The father does eat the fruit of her property during her lifetime.

The Gemora explains the argument: The Tanna Kamma holds that it is understandable why the Rabbi established that a husband may eat the fruit from his wife’s property, for otherwise, he would redeem her if she was being held for ransom (the Rabbis obligated the husband to redeem her and as a tradeoff, instituted that he eats the fruit from her property). However, in respect to her father, it was not necessary to make such a decree, for the father will redeem her anyways; therefore, he does not eat the fruit of her property. Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah, however, maintains that if not for the fact that father may eat the fruit of her property; he also would refuse to redeem her, for he would think, “Let her use her purse full of money (that is being held for her in trust from the fruit of her property) to redeem herself.” (47a)

A Dowry and an Addition

The Gemora cites a braisa: If a father wrote for his daughter in writing fruit, clothing or other movable objects that she may take with her from her father's house to that of her husband (this is known as tzon barzel – ironclad property; the property which the wife brings in to her husband in the dowry, and which the husband records in the kesuvah; the husband makes use of this property as he wishes, its profits or losses are his, and he is responsible for it; hence the name, “ironclad property”: The principal remains as does iron, for if it is lost, the husband is required to pay), and she died (during her betrothal before the marriage was consummated), her husband does not acquire these objects. It was said in the name of Rabbi Nosson: The husband does acquire them.

The Gemora attempts to link this argument with another: Can we assume that they differ on the same principles as those on which Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah and the Rabbis differed? For we learned in a Mishna: A woman who was widowed or divorced, either after marriage or after betrothal, is entitled to collect everything (the basic obligations of the kesuvah, plus any additions that the husband included). Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah ruled: Only a woman widowed or divorced after nisuin collects everything, but if it is only after her betrothal, a virgin collects only two hundred zuz and a widow only one maneh, for the husband wrote the addition for her with the sole objective of marrying her (and since he did not marry her, she may not claim it).

The Gemora explains the connection: May we assume that the one who ruled that ‘her husband does not acquire (the movable objects written into the dowry)’ upholds the same principle as Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah (as he makes the woman’s right to the additional money written into the kesuvah dependent on marriage, so also does the Tanna Kamma make the husband's right to the dowry that his wife brings from her father's house dependent on marriage), whereas the one (Rabbi Nosson) who ruled that ‘the husband does acquire (the movable objects written into the dowry)’ upholds the same principle as the Rabbis (as they both maintain that betrothal provides the same rights as the marriage)?

The Gemora objects to the linkage: No! The Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Nosson both may hold like Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah. For the one who ruled that ‘her husband does not acquire (the movable objects written into the dowry)’ obviously upholds the same principle as Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah. And as to the one (Rabbi Nosson) who ruled that ‘the husband does acquire (the movable objects written into the dowry),’ it may be explained that only in respect of commitments from him towards her did Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah maintain his view, for the husband wrote the addition for her with the sole objective of marrying her (and since he did not marry her, she may not claim it). However, in respect of commitments from her towards him, even Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah may admit that betrothal has the same force as marriage since commitments of such a nature are due to a desire from the bride’s father for matrimonial association with the groom, and such association, even with a betrothal alone, has surely taken place. (47a – 47b)
Providing Maintenance

The Mishna had stated: After nisuin, the husband is obligated to provide for her maintenance.

The Gemora cites a braisa: The Rabbis established that the husband should provide for her maintenance in return for his entitlement to her earnings, and the husband provides for her burial in return for his inheriting the dowry items written into her kesuvah. Therefore, the husband eats the fruit from his wife’s property.

The Gemora asks: Who mentioned fruits?

The Gemora answers: There are missing words in the braisa, and this is what it should say: The Rabbis established that the husband should provide for her maintenance in return for his entitlement to her earnings, and the husband is obligated to redeem her if she was held captive, and as a tradeoff, instituted that he eats the fruit from her property, and the husband provides for her burial in return for his inheriting the dowry items written into her kesuvah. Therefore, the husband eats the fruit from his wife’s property.

The Gemora asks: What is the meaning of the word “therefore”?

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that a husband should not eat the fruits, but should rather leave them (letting them accumulate as a fund for his wife’s ransom if it should be necessary) since, otherwise (if he would eat the fruits), he might refrain from ransoming her. The braisa informs us that it is preferable for the husband to eat the fruit, for sometimes, the accumulation of the fruit might not suffice and he would refuse to ransom her from his own expenses.

The Gemora asks: How do we know that the husband should provide for her maintenance in return for his entitlement to her earnings, and the husband is obligated to redeem her if she was held captive, and as a tradeoff, instituted that he eats the fruit from her property; perhaps, the husband should provide for her maintenance in return for the right to eat the fruit from her property, and the husband is obligated to redeem her if she was held captive in return for his entitlement to her earnings?

Abaye answered: They established the obligation for a common need (maintenance) in return for a common occurrence (her earnings), and an obligation for an uncommon need (her being held captive) in return for an uncommon occurrence (her owning her own property).

Rava cites a braisa indicating that the husband’s obligation to provide maintenance for his wife is Biblical. (47b – 48a)

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