Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 101 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: A minor girl who has refused her husband (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively.); a woman who is a secondary ervah (Rabbinically forbidden to marry this man); and the aylonis (a woman incapable of procreating) have neither a kesuvah, nor the produce (this refers to the fact that the husband will ransom her if she is taken captive, which is in exchange for his rights to her produce), nor the support, nor the worn-out articles.

If at the outset, he married her knowing that she was an aylonis, she has a kesuvah.

If a widow is married to a Kohen Gadol, a divorced woman or a chalutzah to an ordinary Kohen, a mamzeres or a nesinah to a Yisroel, the daughter of a Yisroel to a nesin or to a mamzer, they receive their kesuvah. (100b)

Does the Argument Between Rav and Shmuel Have an Earlier Source?

Rav learned the Mishna as follows: A minor girl who is divorced does not receive a kesuvah and certainly a minor girl who refused her husband. Shmuel learned: A girl who refused her husband does not receive her kesuvah, but a minor girl who is divorced does receive her kesuvah (he obviously maintains that the marriage of a minor girl is valid).

Let us say that this argument (between Rav and Shmuel) is an argument among the Tanaim. Rabbi Elazar says: The actions of a minor (girl regarding marriage) are insignificant. Her husband is not entitled to the lost objects that she finds; he does not receive her earnings; he cannot annul her vows; he does not inherit her and he cannot become impure to her (if she dies and he is a kohen). The rule is that she is not considered his wife regarding anything, aside for the fact that to get out of the marriage, she must perform mi’un (refuse the marriage).

Rabbi Yehoshua says: The actions of a minor (girl regarding marriage) are significant. Her husband does acquire lost objects that she finds; he is entitled to her earnings; he can annul her vows; he inherits her and he can become impure to her (if she dies and he is a kohen). The rule is that she is considered his wife regarding everything, aside from the fact that she is able to get out of the marriage by performing mi’un (refusing the marriage).

The Gemora asks: Let us say that Rav holds like Rabbi Elazar and Shmuel holds like Rabbi Yehoshua.

The Gemora answers: This that you said that Rav holds like Rabbi Elazar while Shmuel does not is clearly true. The argument between Rav and Shmuel can even take place according to Rabbi Yehoshua. It is obvious that Shmuel can hold like Rabbi Yehoshua. How can Rav hold like Rabbi Yehoshua? Rav will say: Rabbi Yehoshua only said that she is considered his wife in regards to what she gives him (or what he has rights to in her, i.e. denying her vows). However, regarding his obligations to her, even Rabbi Yehoshua would agree that he is not obligated like he would be to a regular wife. (100b – 101a)

Shmuel’s Statement

Rav Huna bar Chiya said to Rav Kahana: You told us in the name of Shmuel that (the Mishna’s statement that he does not have to return used clothes) this only applies to nichsei melog (possessions brought into a marriage that a husband may freely use). However, this does not apply to nichsei tzon barzel (possessions brought into a marriage that a husband must return at the value that they were evaluated at the beginning of the marriage).

Rav Papa wondered: Which case in the Mishna is Shmuel’s statement referring to? If it is talking about a girl who performs mi’un, then if the clothes still exist, it makes sense she should take both types of clothes with her out of the marriage! If they are not extant, she should not be able to take both types! [Rashi explains that he can claim that he will only give back their value when he divorces her, as he still has the potential to inherit her.]

Rav Papa therefore entertains that this is referring to an aylonis (a woman with no signs of femininity, see Yevamos 80b). The Gemora asks: If the clothes still exist, it makes sense she should take both types of clothes with her out of the marriage! If they do not exist, then the opposite should be true. The clothes that are nichsei melog which he has no right to use up (his right to benefit is not a right to destroy) should go to her. The clothes that were nichsei tzon barzel that were not in her possession (and which he had a right to use) she should not receive!

The Gemora therefore concludes that this statement of Shmuel is referring to a shniyah (a woman who is forbidden to marry based on a rabbinic prohibition). The Rabbis gave each of them a fine. She loses what she would normally collect from him, and he loses what she would normally let him keep.

Rav Simi bar Ashi says: We see from here that a coat (that is nichsei melog) is considered principle, and a husband cannot wear it (saying that he is merely benefiting) until it gets worn out. The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rav Nachman say such usage is appropriate benefit? The Gemora answers: Rav Nachman argues. (101a)

Additional Amounts

Shmuel says: When the Mishna says these women do not have a kesuvah, it means they do not have the standard amounts of one (widow) or two hundred (never married). However, they do receive the additional amounts pledged to them.

The following Beraisa supports this statement. The Beraisa states: The women who the sages said do not have a kesuvah, for example a girl who does mi’un and others listed with her, do not receive one or two hundred, but they do receive the additional monies. The women whom the sages said must get divorced without a kesuvah, like woman who sins (see 72a) and her friends, do not receive additions, and certainly not one or two hundred. A woman who is divorced because of a bad name (that she was promiscuous), takes what is in front of her (nichsei melog) and leaves. (101a)

Does She Lose Her Clothes?

This supports the statement of Rav Huna. Rav Huna said: If she was promiscuous, she does not lose the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog).

A Beraisa was taught in front of Rav Nachman: If she was promiscuous, she loses the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog). Rav Nachman said: If she was promiscuous, were her clothes promiscuous? Rav Nachman therefore said the correct text must be: If she was promiscuous, she does not lose the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog).

Rabah bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: These (the text as it was presented to Rav Nachman) are the words of Rabbi Menachem Stimtah. However, the Chachamim say the correct text is that if she was promiscuous, she does not lose the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog). (101a – 101b)

Knowing Beforehand

Rav Huna said: An aylonis is sometimes considered like a wife and sometimes not. A widow who marries a kohen gadol is like a regular wife. An aylonis is sometimes considered like a wife and sometimes not, as if he knew beforehand she was an aylonis (and agreed to marry her anyway) she receives a kesuvah, but if he didn’t know she does not. A widow who marries a kohen gadol receives a kesuvah, whether or not he knew she was a widow. Rav Yehudah argues: In both cases she only receives a kesuvah if he knew of her status beforehand.

The Gemora asks from a Beraisa. The Beraisa states: If he married her knowing that she was like this and she indeed was, she receives a kesuvah. This implies that if it was simply not discussed, she does not receive a kesuvah!

The Gemora answers: The implication could be otherwise. It could be that if he married her based on a lie (that she had never married previously) and he later realized she was a widow, she does not receive a kesuvah. However, if it was never discussed, it is possible she does receive a kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: If this is true, why doesn’t the Beraisa state this case instead (where nothing was discussed), and we would certainly know about a case where it was discussed that she would receive a kesuvah! Additionally, there is another Beraisa that explicitly states that if he knowingly married her as a widow, she receives a kesuvah. If he married her without having discussed her status, she does not receive a kesuvah. This seems to be a strong question on Rav Huna!

The Gemora explains that Rav Huna made a mistake in understanding the text of the Mishna. He thought that because the Mishna only discussed this difference regarding an aylonis and not a widow, it must be that a widow would receive a kesuvah when the topic was not discussed. This, however, was incorrect. The Mishna’s statement about a widow was based on the previous distinction made by aylonis. (101b)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU,
ALMANAH NIZONESS

Mishna

If someone marries a woman and promises to support her daughter (from a previous marriage) for five years, he must do so. If she (is divorced from him and) marries someone else (within those five years), and she makes that same condition with her new husband, he must keep this condition as well. The first husband cannot say, “when she comes to me I will feed her.” He is obligated to bring her food to where her mother resides. Both husbands cannot say that they will split the costs of her food, but rather one buys her food and the other gives her the monetary equivalent. If the daughter marries within this time, her husband gives her food and the husbands give her their monetary equivalent. If the husbands die, their daughters are fed from possessions that do not liens, and this daughter (that we are discussing) can be fed from possessions that do have liens, as she is considered like a creditor. Smart people who were asked to make such a condition (before marrying a woman) would stipulate that they would support their wife’s daughter as long as they stay married. (101b)


Talking About Owing Money in a Document

It is taught: If someone says to his friend “I am obligated to give you a manah,” Rabbi Yochanan says he is indeed obligated, while Reish Lakish says he is not. The Gemora asks: In what case are they arguing? If the case is where he took witnesses aside beforehand and said “you are my witnesses that I am obligated etc,” why would Reish Lakish say he is not obligated? If he didn’t say this, why would Rabbi Yochanan say he is obligated?

The Gemora answers: The case is where he did not say this. He said: “I owe you a manah as stated in this document.” Rabbi Yochanan says he is obligated, because saying that it is stated in the document is as strong as saying “you are my witnesses.” Reish Lakish says he is not obligated, as just the statement and the giving over of a document (that Rashi says merely states “I owe you a manah”) is not as strong as a statement along with saying “you are my witnesses.” (101b)

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