Incidental Benefit

Abaye explains the Gemora (Nedarim 16b) as follows: In the case of a vow, one says, “The pleasure of the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” (Since the vow is upon the object, not the person, it is effective.) However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not derive any pleasure from the sukkah.” (Since the oath is upon the person and the mitzvah is upon the person, they are contradicting each other and the oath cannot take effect.)

Rava asks on Abaye’s language: Were mitzvos given to derive benefit from them? (He should still be able to sit in the sukkah?)

Rather, Rava explains: In the case of a vow, one says, “The sitting in the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not sit in the sukkah.”

The Reshash asks on Rava’s question: Although the mitzvos were not given for the purpose of deriving benefit from them, it still should be forbidden to sit in the sukkah in this situation? This is because he is enjoying the incidental pleasure of the shade!

He answers that if it is shade that the person desires, he could stay inside the house. The reason he chose to sit in a sukkah is solely because of the mitzvah. It is therefore not regarded as if he is befitting from the shade of the sukkah.

The Machaneh Efraim is not satisfied with this answer. He asks that the bottom line is that he is not dwelling in his house; he is inside the sukkah and enjoying its shade! Why should this be permitted?

The Oneg Yom Tov answers: We are only concerned with the physical pleasure when the benefit is purely incidental and not related to the mitzvah. However, the mitzvah of sukkah is different. The Torah commands us to dwell in the sukkah in the same manner that one would live in his house. The enjoyment of sitting in a sukkah is not regarded as an incidental benefit; this is the fulfillment of the mitzvah. And since mitzvos were not given for the purpose of deriving pleasure from them, the (direct) benefit that one receives as he is fulfilling the mitzvah is not regarded as a benefit, and is therefore permitted.

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Ran Elucidated - Daf 16

Distinction between a vow and an oath - The Gemora cites the Scriptural source for this: How do we know that one cannot swear to transgress a mitzvah? It is because it is written [Bamidbar 30:3]: If a man makes a vow to Hashem or makes an oath to prohibit himself, he shall not desecrate his word; according to whatever came out of his mouth, he shall do. We see from here that only “his word” (a discretionary matter) he should not desecrate. However, he may desecrate it when it involves the wishes of Heaven (where his oath contradicts a mitzvah).

The Gemora asks: Why is a vow any different? If it is because it says makes a vow to Hashem, which implies that he should not desecrate his word even when his vow involves the wishes of Heaven, why, by an oath, it is also written makes an oath to Hashem (since the words “to Hashem” is written between a vow and an oath)?

Abaye answers: In the case of a vow, one says, “The pleasure of the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” (Since the vow is upon the object, not the person, it is effective.) However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not derive any pleasure from the sukkah.” (Since the oath is upon the person and the mitzvah is upon the person, they are contradicting each other and the oath cannot take effect.)

The Ran explains: It is reasonable that the word “to Hashem” should be referring to a vow, but not an oath. It is logical to assume that a neder in this manner will take effect. This is because he is not vowing directly against the Torah’s commandment. The neder takes effect and he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the sukkah because we cannot force a person to eat something that is forbidden to him. However, by an oath, he is saying that he will not sit in the sukkah. This is a direct contradiction to the Torah’s commandment and he doesn’t have the power to free himself from the Torah’s commandment to sit in a sukkah.

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Zohar and the Gemora

The Gemora cites a braisa: There is greater stringency in oaths than in vows, and greater stringency in vows than in oaths. There is greater stringency in vows, for vows apply to objects necessary for the performance of a mitzvah just as to optional matters, which is not so regarding oaths (which do not take effect if one would take an oath against performing a certain mitzvah). And there is greater stringency in oaths, for oaths are valid with respect to matters that have substance and matters that are intangible, which is not so regarding vows (which do not take effect on intangible things).

It is noteworthy that the Zohar writes exactly the opposite. An oath, he says, can only take effect on a davar she’yeish bo mamash, something that has substance, whereas a vow can take effect even on a matter that lacks substance.

The Shoel U’meishiv in his haskamah to the sefer Beis Yisroel cites from the Neizer Yisroel that it is a printer’s mistake and the correct version of the Zohar is the way the Gemora states.

Reb Reuven Margoliyos disagrees and cites a Ramban in Shavuos who hints to the version that we have in the Zohar. The Ramban writes that according to Sod, vows do not take effect on matters of substance, whereas an oath will be effective on matters of substance.

In the sefer Mei Hashiloach, he explains the Zohar in a manner that is identical to our Gemora. We find in the Zohar that a davar she’yeish bo mamash frequently means something that has the ability to reproduce. The reason that an oath can take effect even on intangible matters is because an oath is an issur gavra, one is prohibiting himself from the object. The oath, therefore, is taking effect upon the person. The meaning of the Zohar is that an oath takes effect on the person, for he is a davar she’yeish bo mamash, i.e. man has the ability to reproduce; objects do not! An oath takes effect upon the person and not on the object. A vow, on the other hand, takes effect even on a davar she’ein bo mamash, something that does not have the ability to reproduce, i.e. objects. For by a vow, one is prohibiting the object upon himself (issur cheftza), and therefore, the vow takes effect upon the object, not upon the person.

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A Question of Linkage

The Ra”n Elucidated

LINKAGE - Rami bar Chama inquired (Nedarim 11b - 12a): A piece of korban shelamim was sitting next to a loaf of bread, and he said, “This (bread) should be like this (shelamim).” Is he referring to the prohibition that the meat originally had before its blood was sprinkled on the Altar, or is he referring to the fact that the meat is now permitted? If he is referring to the fact that the meat is now permitted, the neder is not effective.

The Ran asks: Even if he is referring to the present status of the meat, the neder should be valid, for there are prohibitions that still exist in the shelamim? A tamei is prohibited against eating from the korban! The “chest and the thigh” are forbidden to any non-Kohen!

He answers: We are only concerned with prohibitions that emerge because of his vow. Any prohibition coming from his vow will be forbidden to everyone because he sanctified this animal. A prohibition that is limited to a select group of people cannot be on account of his vow and therefore, such prohibitions may not serve as an association to his present vow.

Hatfasah to a Shelamim

Rami bar Chama inquired: If someone states, “This is upon me like meat of a korban shelamim after it its blood is sprinkled (on the Altar),” what is the law? The Gemora asks: If he uses this terminology, he is essentially saying that it is permitted to him (as everyone is allowed to eat the meat of a shelamim after its blood has been sprinkled on the altar)! Rather, it must that his question was in a case where a piece of korban shelamim was sitting next to a loaf of bread, and he said, “This (bread) should be like this (shelamim).” Is he referring to the prohibition that the meat originally had before its blood was sprinkled on the Altar, or is he referring to the fact that the meat is now permitted?

Reb Chaim Brisker explains: The inquiry of the Gemora is not regarding the vower’s intention (does he mean to link the object of his vow to the original status of the shelamim or to its present status?); rather, Rami bar Chama’s uncertainty is in respect to the laws of this association. Does one associate the object of his neder with prohibitions that are now present or is the association with the essential state of the shelamim, i.e. its previous state, which is the sanctity that brought about its prohibition?

According to Reb Chaim’s explanation, we can answer a challenge to this Gemora posed by Reb Shmuel Rozovsky and Reb Naftoli Trop. They ask: Why don’t we apply the principle of “undefined nedarim are treated stringently” (we are strict in regard to its meaning until the vower explains differently)? They answer that this principle is applicable only when the vower has declared a valid neder, consisting of a legitimate language fit for a neder; however, there was uncertainty regarding his true intent. In such cases, we apply this principle and we assume that a person does not express himself for nothing. He probably meant to invoke a neder. However, in Rami bar Chama’s inquiry, the question is regarding the explanation of his words; did the vower mean to associate the object of his neder with the original prohibition of the shelamim or to its present status? If he meant to link the object of his neder to the present (permitted) status of the shelamim, he is not invoking a neder at all! When one fails to express his neder with his mouth, we cannot rule stringently.

According to Reb Chaim Brisker’s explanation, however, their question does not even begin. For Rami bar Chama’s inquiry has nothing to do with the vower’s intent. Rami bar Chama is inquiring into the mechanics of invoking a neder through an association. Is the association to the object’s present status or to its previous condition? The principle of “undefined nedarim are treated stringently” does not apply here.

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“From the implication of a negative, we cannot hear the positive"

The Gemora (Nedarim 11a) asks: Who is the author of our Mishna? It cannot be Rabbi Meir, as he does not hold of the concept that if someone makes a negative statement, the positive is automatically implied. [It is not chullin means that it is like a korban.] This is apparent from Rabbi Meir’s statement (in a Mishna). Rabbi Meir states: Any condition that is not similar to the condition made (by Moshe Rabbeinu) with the sons of (the tribe of) Reuven and Gad (the condition was doubled; if the condition is fulfilled, the agreement is valid, but if it is not fulfilled, the agreement is not valid) is not a valid condition. (Obviously, we not infer the positive from the negative.)

The Rishonim ask: The Gemora in Shavuos (36a) states that Rabbi Meir only holds that “the positive cannot be implied from the negative statement” only in regards to monetary matters; however, in regards to prohibitory matters, Rabbi Meir agrees that we may infer the positive from the negative. If so, the Mishna here can very well be following Rabbi Meir’s opinion, for we are discussing the laws pertaining to vows and this is not a monetary matter, but rather, a prohibitory matter?

Tosfos answers: It is evident from the Gemora there that a prohibition that involves money has the status of a monetary matter and Rabbi Meir will still maintain that “from the implication of a negative, we cannot hear the positive.” Since a vow involves money, for one is prohibiting the possession’s of his fellow on himself, Rabbi Meir would not concede in this case.

The Ran answers similarly that since by a vow, one is prohibiting the object upon himself, it is considered a prohibition that involves money.

(A difference between Tosfos and the Ran may be by an oath, where, according to Tosfos, it still would involve money because he is prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from his fellow’s possessions; however, according to the Ran, it would not be regarded as a monetary matter since the object itself is not forbidden.)

Tosfos in Shavuos answers that Rabbi Meir concedes only by a strict prohibition, i.e. one that a person will be liable to death; however, by a vow, which is not regarded as a strict prohibition, Rabbi Meir will still maintain that “from the implication of a negative, we cannot hear the positive.” (The Rashba does not agree that the Gemora states such a distinction.)

The Rosh answers: Since by a vow, we go according to the language of people, it is regarded as a monetary matter. Rabbeinu Avraham min Hahar explains: People generally explain themselves completely. Therefore, by a vow and all money matters (for the same reason), Rabbi Meir maintains that “from the implication of a negative, we cannot hear the positive.”

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Shalom Aleichem - Aleichem Shalom

We learned in the following braisa (Nedarim 10b): Rabbi Shimon says: How do we know that a person should not say (when consecrating an offering) “to Hashem an olah,” “to Hashem a mincha,” “to Hashem a todah,” or “to Hashem a shelamim” (but rather, the Name of Hashem should always be mentioned first)? It is derived from the verse [Vayikra 1:2]: An offering to Hashem.

The Yeshuos Yaakov (Y”D 148) uses our Gemora to explain our custom of greeting your fellow with “Shalom Aleichem,” and they respond with “Aleichem Shalom.” In truth, it should be forbidden to say “Shalom aleichem,” for “Shalom” is one of the Names of Hashem and we should be concerned that a person will die immediately after saying “Shalom” without having the opportunity to conclude and say “aleichem.” If this would happen, it would emerge that he had said Hashem’s Name in vain. However, since Chazal have told us that one who greets his fellow with “shalom” will merit living a long life, there is no need to be concerned that he will die immediately following saying “shalom.” This logic is only applicable to the first one greeting his fellow, for he is the one that has this guarantee. The fellow responding, however, does not have this guarantee, and that is why he replies and says, “Aleichem shalom.”

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Pious and Righteous

The Gemora (Nedarim 10a) states: Rabbi Yehudah said in a braisa: The early pious ones were eager to bring a chatas offering, because the Holy One, blessed be He, never caused them to stumble. What did they do? They arose and made a nedavah vow of nezirus to the Omnipresent, so they should be liable to bring a chatas offering to the Omnipresent (when the nezirus was completed; this was considered virtuous).

Shoel U’meishiv asks: Tosfos writes in several places in Shas that Hashem does not cause the righteous to stumble only in respect to prohibitions dealing with eating; however, they may stumble by other prohibitions. If so, it is still possible for them to bring a chatas offering, when they stumble in other prohibitions, so why were they compelled to take a vow of nezirus?

He answers that Tosfos only said that in regards to the righteous people. They may stumble in other prohibitions. However, the pious people are on a much higher level and Hashem would not allow them to stumble in any prohibition.

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Locks of Hair Arranged in Curls

The Gemora (Nedarim 9b)states: A nedavah for nezirus is regarded as virtuous in cases such that of Shimon the Righteous (a great Kohen Gadol who served in the beginning of the second Beis Hamikdosh). For we learned in a braisa: Shimon the Righteous said, “I never ate from the meat of an asham sacrifice offered by a nazir who had become tamei except for one case. There was once a handsome young man from the south with beautiful eyes and locks of hair arranged in curls (who had become tamei and came to the Beis Hamikdosh to have his hair removed and to offer the required sacrifice). I asked him why he had taken upon himself a vow to become a nazir, which would eventually lead to having such beautiful hair removed
(even if he would have completed his term of nezirus without becoming tamei, a nazir shaves his head upon completion). He responded to me, ‘I was a shepherd for my father and one day I went to a spring to fill my pail of water and saw my reflection in the water. My evil inclination suddenly tempted me to take advantage of my looks and wished to drive me out from this world. I said to my evil inclination: Wicked one! Why are you being so haughty in a world that is not yours, with one that in the future will be worms and maggots? I swore at that time to become a nazir.’ I was so impressed (by his piety) that I kissed him on his head and said to him, May there be more vowers of nezirus like you in Israel.”

The question that is asked is why the young man with the locks of hair arranged in curls did not simply go to a barber for a haircut to remove this temptation.

Rabbi Mendel Weinbach answers that on the way to the barber he was likely to change his mind and give in to temptation. The only solution was to immediately take upon himself a vow of nezirus which would eventually force him to eliminate his hair and the problems that accompanied it.

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Food for Thought

*** What was the necessity to state that the nazir came from the south? What difference did it make where he came from?

*** How was he permitted to look at his reflection in the water; isn’t it forbidden for a man to look at a mirror?

*** Why connection is there between the “haughtiness” of the evil inclination and the temptation to sin?

Humility

By Rabbi Yosef Levinson
The Torah details the laws which apply to one who makes a vow to be a nazir. He must refrain from drinking wine and eating fresh grapes and raisins, grapeseeds and skins. He may not shave his hair; rather he must let it grow long. A nazir may also not defile himself by coming in contact with a corpse. And when the term of his vow has ended, and the nazir wishes to revert to his former life, he must first shave off all his hair and then bring korbanos, offerings, to Hashem. In total, there are ten mitzvos pertaining to the nazir (Sefer Hachinuch Mitzvos 368:377).
The mitzvos which are enumerated in the parsha of nazir were given by Hashem in order to provide a means of self-sanctification for one who wishes to do so. The Chinuch (mitzva 374) writes that by abstaining from wine, one breaks his desires and humbles himself. (While one's main focus should be on spiritual pursuits, nevertheless one should not ignore his physical needs. Abstaining from wine allows the nazir to break his desires in a manner that is not detrimental to his health, Sefer HaChinuch, ibid.)

The Chinuch adds that this is also why the nazir must let his hair grow long. By not concerning himself with his appearance, he humbles himself. Similarly, the nazir shaves his hair completely at the end of his nazirus because there is no doubt that either, extremely long hair or totally bald distorts the appearance of man.

The Chinuch proves that the purpose for growing the hair is to subdue the yetzar hara, evil inclination from the following anecdote recorded in the Gemara (Nedarim 9b). "Shimon Hatzaddik (who was the Kohen Gadol) related that once a certain nazir appeared before him. The man had beautiful eyes, was very good looking and his locks were arranged in curls. Shimon Hatzaddik asked him: 'Why do you make a vow of nazirus, which necessitates that you destroy your beautiful hair?' (For he will be required to shave his head at the end of his nazirus.) The man replied: 'I was a shepherd for my father. Once I went to draw water from the well and gazed at my reflection in the water. My yetzer hara seized me and wished to drive me from the world. I said - Rasha (wicked one), why are you conceited in a world that is not yours, with one who is destined to be consumed by maggots and worms? I swear that I will shave you for the sake of Heaven.' "

The Steipler Gaon, HaRav Y. Y. Kanievsky zt"l observes that although the shepherd did not mention the sin that the yetzer hara was enticing him to transgress, nevertheless from his response to himself, we see that he was concerned lest he become conceited. Indeed there is nothing that can drive one from both this world and the next, other than ga'ava, haughtiness. As it is written: "It is an abomination to Hashem, all who are haughty in their heart (Mishlei 16:5)." Chazal also say that regarding one who is conceited, Hashem says: "I and him cannot live in the world together" (Sota 5a). The Shechina departs from a ba'al ga'ava and he is left to his own defenses to combat his yetzer hara and survive in this world.

The Steipler continues that when one is praised for his accomplishments, he is overjoyed. At times, he might let this joy "go to his head" and he begins thinking that he is deserving of honor. One must be wary lest he fall into the trap of haughtiness. We see how this shepherd trembled when he saw his handsome features and realized that it might lead him to ga'ava. He therefore took an oath of nazirus.

HaRav Yerucham Levovitz zt"l points out that growing one's hair can have the opposite effect and can lead to ga'ava as is evident from Shimon Hatzaddik's story. It all depends on one's intent. One may become obsessed with his appearance and become conceited. Hashem despises such a person. On the other hand, if one lets his hair grow so that he appears disheveled, he will be humbled. Such an individual is Kadosh L'Hashem, holy to Hashem. Moreover, the hair itself becomes kadosh. This is meant literally - the law states that it is forbidden to derive pleasure from the hair of a nazir. Thus, the status of the nazir's hair is similar to the status of Kodashim (articles sanctified for the Beis Hamikdash).

This is the lesson of the nazir. We must realize the significance of humility. In addition, the nazir teaches us that we have the ability to elevate and sanctify ourselves. If by abstaining from wine and letting one's hair grow, a nazir is sanctified, all the more so, one who sincerely undertakes to improve himself and tackle his desires and bad character traits, is Kadosh and beloved to Hashem.
Daf Hashavua Kollel Beth HaTalmud Copyright (c) 2002 by Rabbi Yosef Levinson and reprinted here with permission

Maharal on the Yetzer Harah

By Rabbi Shaya Karlinsky

That man's yetzer harah exists only as a result of his arrogance is alluded to by the Rabbis in a number of places. In Nedarim (9b) Shimon HaTzaddik said: I have never partaken from a Nazir sacrifice, except for one time. Once, a person came from the south (at the conclusion of his nazir period) and I saw that he was very handsome, with his hair arranged in long curls. I said to him: My son, why did you see fit to destroy such beautiful hair? (A nazir must cut off all his hair at the end of the nazir period. By undertaking to become a nazir, he ensured that all his hair would have to be cut off.) He said to me: "I was a shepherd for my father in my home town, and I once went to draw water from the spring. As I looked at my reflection, my yetzer harah surged forth in an effort to distract me and undermine my existence. (The commentary attributed to Rashi explains that when he saw how handsome he was, his yetzer harah wanted to seduce him to improper behaviours.) I said: 'Evil one! How can you be arrogant in a world that is not yours, trying to incite one who is destined to become a worm (in the grave). I swear that I will shear you for the sake of Heaven.'" Immediately, I (Shimon HaTzadik) stood up and kissed him on his forehead and said to him "My son, there should be many more Jews like you who commit to a nazir period. It is those like you to whom the Torah refers in the verse 'A man who will make a nazir oath, for the sake of G-d(Bamidbar 6:2)'."

We see that when the man saw how handsome he was (leading to a feeling of arrogance) the yetzer harah was immediately aroused, with the intention of distracting him and leading him astray in order to undermine his existence. For this is the goal of the yetzer harah: To destroy a structure which has a stable existence. When the structure is already in a tenuous state, there is no need to undermine it further, and the yetzer harah leaves it alone. This young man recognized how vulnerable he was to the yetzer harah, and in order to remove (and undermine) the source of his arrogance (which he understood as being the breeding ground for the yetzer harah, and caused by a lack of sufficient clarity of his dependency on G-d) he vowed to cut off his hair for the sake of Heaven. (How much of our arrogance is caused by unwarranted attention given to our appearance? How much of that attention is caused by our need to cover up our own feelings of insecurity?) It was for this reason that Shimon HaTzadik praised him with the blessing that there should be more Jews who undertake neziruth for these pure motivations, and applied the phrase "an oath for the sake of Heaven" to this person.

Normally a person vows neziruth out of remorse for a sin that he committed. But as the neziruth drags on, he may come to regret the neziruth itself, as it becomes more difficult than he anticipated. This regret is even more likely when the person began the neziruth out of feelings of remorse for an earlier act, indicating that his decisions are frequently subject to vacillation. Just as he swung from a sinful act to an act of self-denial, it is possible that, as the difficulty of the neziruth weighs on him, he will once again change his mind.

But this young man wasn't motivated by any regret, making his neziruth purely for the sake of Heaven.
(When the source of activity is reactive, it embodies the potential for regret, and is also built on personal motivations - in this case, the desire to protect himself from damage and to eliminate guilt. So the element of lshaim shamayim, for the sake of Heaven, is lacking. When one's behavior is proactive, as it was in the case of the young man in our story, the motivation is to reach beyond the level at which he finds himself, out of an altruistic desire to elevate himself to become closer to G-d. We have discussed in a number of the shiurim the difference between service of G-d out of love and out of fear. Service out of fear includes a dimension of personal motivation. You are afraid of what will happen to you if you don't do the right thing. Service out of love is purely altruistic, and is therefore on a much higher level. This also has relevance to chumroth, adapting halachic stringencies. The Mahral in Chapter 1 indicates that the proper motivation for these stringencies is an intense love of G-d, with the desire to reach higher spiritual levels in order to come closer to Him. Too often, however, people are motivated to increase stringencies out of fear and self-centered motivations.)

(The Maharal will now elaborate on how each element of the young man's story reflected the purity of his motivations, and the fact that he was not acting in a way in which future regret was likely.)

The reason it mentions that he "came from the south," which is a long distance (from Jerusalem, where the nazir sacrifice was brought) is to emphasize that the person knew when he made the vow that he would have to travel that long distance to bring the sacrifices. This diminished the likelihood that the great distance he would have to travel would subsequently cause him to regret that he took the vow. Only unanticipated difficulties, those which a person rarely experiences, such as abstaining from wine for a significant time, raise the possibility of later regret.

The reason that it mentions that he was "a shepherd for his father in his home town" is because the yetzer harah besets a person when he is idle instead of being involved in productive activity. If the young man's yetzer harah was aroused due to his own idleness, then he would have been responsible for having invited the yetzer harah to entice him. Activities which would then be necessary to neutralize that self-inflicted yetzer harah could not be termed "for the sake of Heaven," but would have been a protective measure taken for his own welfare, in response to his own negligence. Therefore, it was significant that he had been a shepherd (a productive activity), not wasting his time in an idle way and not making himself vulnerable to the yetzer harah. Furthermore, the work of being a shepherd was being done for his father, so he was involved in a mitzvah (honoring his father) further insulating him from the yetzer harah. In addition, the task was being done in his home town, where he felt subject to the influence and authority of his father (which enhances humility, further insulating him from the yetzer harah) . Had he been far away from his home, he may have felt the desire and the ability to resist the authority his father, creating a sense of independence and arrogance, inviting the control of the yetzer harah. A neziruth made to in response to a feeling of independence and arrogance would not be judged purely "for the sake of Heaven." (When a person travels away from home, there is a common tendency to lower our inhibitions compared to the way we would behave at home. This is true for young men and women going away to university or camp, and for adults away on vacation or a business trip. This is an important and very relevant insight that we have from the Maharal's explanation.

But the young man did nothing to induce the yetzer harah. Rather it came upon in an unexpected way, as he unexpectedly saw his reflection in the pond and realized how handsome he was, inducing an urge to show off this beauty. This attack by the yetzer harah was no fault of his, and the response to become a nazir, resulting in his cutting off his hair, was purely "for the sake of Heaven."

(In order to fully to understand the connections being made by the Maharal, we again need to focus on the difference between serving G-d out of love and out of fear, which we discussed in the first chapter, especially in Mishna 3. Most dependable people will intervene to rectify a situation for which they feel responsible, with an element of ego being one of the motivating forces. So in the case where the individual was responsible for creating his vulnerability to the yetzer harah, the response to neutralize that yetzer harah can be viewed as having a self-centered component. But when someone observes a situation for which he has no responsibility, he will only take action to rectify a problem if he feels a connection to the outcome on a transcendent level. You look to help a loved one without examining how the situation developed, because of your love and commitment to that person. It is an altruistic and giving perspective. When someone finds himself in a situation where he has a legitimate excuse for inaction, the motivation for taking action is on a higher plane than action taken when one will be blamed for a negative outcome. So, when our young man found himself beset by the yetzer harah through no fault of his own, it would have been very easy to succumb to that yetzer harah. His proactive response, not looking for excuses but looking to do what needed to be done to fulfill the will of G-d, is the result of "service out of love," and is why Shimon HaTzakik referred to this as a nezirut that was purely "for the sake of Heaven," motivated by something that transcends the individual.)

From every element of this story, we see that the source of the yetzer harah is arrogance, with the goal of distracting man from the purpose of his existence in the world, leading to his ultimate destruction.

The class is taught by Rabbi Shaya Karlinsky, Dean of Darche Noam Institutions, Yeshivat Darche Noam/Shapell's and Midreshet Rachel for Women.

http://www.torah.org/learning/maharal/p3m1part2.html

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Oath to Study a Certain Tractate

The Gemora (Nedarim 8a) states that when one makes a vow to learn a specific tractate, it is binding even in regard to a korban, and it is not regarded as a vow to fulfill a mitzvah. The reason is that since the Torah does not explicitly indicate an obligation to learn any more than just kerias shema in the morning and evening, the vow is completely binding on anything beyond what is explicitly stated in the Torah.

The Reshash asks that since one is not obligated to learn that specific tractate, the vow should be binding to learn that specific tractate? Actually, the Ritva uses this approach to understand what the Gemora is saying. Since one can fulfill their obligation with some other type of learning i.e. kerias shema, or any other tractate, therefore, when he makes a vow on a specific tractate, it is fully binding.

Tosfos writes that even if one makes a vow not to learn something specific, the vow is binding. Reb Avi Lebowitz cites Reb Moshe (Dibros Moshe heora #43), who explains that Tosfos cannot be understood to be saying that one is not obligated to learn all sections of Torah, because both the obligation of knowing Torah and the obligation of constantly learning Torah actually requires a person to learn all sections of Torah every day. While it may be impossible to do so, there is still technically an obligation on every single aspect of Torah. Therefore, Tosfos can only be explained like the Ran that the obligation to learn every section of Torah is not stated explicitly. Based on this, the Rosh and Ramban would hold that a vow not to learn even a specific or obscure section of Torah on any particular day would not be binding at all.

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Oath to Fulfill a Mitzvah

The Ran and Rosh (Nedarim 8a) argue whether an oath to fulfill a mitzvah is binding in the sense that one would be in violation of “desecrating his word” for not keeping his promise. Ran understands that an oath on a mitzvah is not binding for the purpose of being liable for a korban, but is binding, and if he transgresses the mitzvah, he has violated the prohibition against desecrating his word. The Rosh seems to understand that it is not binding at all. This is also the opinion of the Ramban brought by Reb Akiva Eiger.

Reb Avi Lebowitz points out that based on this understanding, they also argue as to what the novelty of Rav Gidal’s teaching is. The Ran understands that the oath is binding and therefore obviously not an oath taken in vain, so the novelty is that one is encouraged to make these types of oaths (even those who generally refrain from taking oaths), for it will inspire him to fulfill the mitzvah. But, according to the Rosh that the oath is not really binding, the novelty is simply that by making such an “oath,” it is not an automatic violation of an oath taken in vain, since it at least accomplishes a function of encouraging the person to fulfill the mitzvah.

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Yitzchak's Blessing

Rav Chanin said in the name of Rav (Nedarim 7b) : One who hears his fellow utter Hashem’s name in vain is obligated to excommunicate him; otherwise, he himself is fit to be excommunicated. The Gemora explains the rationale behind this: For wherever the unnecessary utterance of the Divine Name is prevalent, poverty will be prevalent, and poverty is regarded as death. (Thus we see the severity of Hashem’s Name being mentioned in vain.)

Using this Gemora, Reb Shlomo Kluger explains the following verse [Breishis 27:23]: And he did not recognize him because his hands were hairy like the hands of his brother Esav, and he blessed him.

What caused Yitzchak to bless him? What is the connection between the observation that his hands were hairy like Esav and the blessing?

He explains: Wherever the unnecessary utterance of the Divine Name is prevalent, poverty will be prevalent. Up until this moment, Esav did not regularly utter the Name of Hashem. Therefore, Yitzchak had no need to be concerned about Esav becoming poor. However, now that he heard “his hairy son” using the Name of Hashem, he decided that it was time to bless him.

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Yosef's Success

It is written [Breishis 39:3]: And his master saw that the Lord was with him, and whatever he (Yosef) did, the Lord made prosper in his hand. Rashi comments: The name of Heaven was frequently in his mouth.

The Sheiris Yaakov explains Rashi: The Gemora (Nedarim 7b) states: Rav Chanin said in the name of Rav: One who hears his fellow utter Hashem’s name in vain is obligated to excommunicate him; otherwise, he himself is fit to be excommunicated. The Gemora explains the rationale behind this: For wherever the unnecessary utterance of the Divine Name is prevalent, poverty will be prevalent, and poverty is regarded as death. (Thus we see the severity of Hashem’s Name being mentioned in vain.)

Since Yosef commonly used Hashem’s Name, he should not have been successful; nevertheless, his master saw that Hashem was with him and made Yosef successful.

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The Ra”n Elucidated - Daf 7

Rulings – The Gemora left several issues unresolved. The Ran rules that regarding kiddushin, since it is an uncertainty relevant to a Biblical law, we must rule stringently and there would be yados. The Ramban and the Rashba rule similarly regarding charity and in respect to pe’ah. This is based upon the principle that we rule stringently regarding all matters of doubt which are relevant to a Biblical prohibition. The Ran disagrees with their ruling regarding charity and pe’ah because these are monetary matters; the question of the Gemora was if the money or produce designated belongs to the poor people, and therefore, we should rule leniently. The money must remain by the original owner unless there is a proof that he relinquished his rights to it. He also rules that there are no yados by hefker because it is a money matter, and hence we rule leniently. His final ruling is that there is no yados by a designation for a bathroom. He explains that the designation would only be effective on a Rabbinical level, and on all doubts that are relevant to a Rabbinical prohibition, the principle is that we rule leniently.

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Kiddushin Declaration

Rav Papa inquired (Nedarim 6b): Is there a yad for kiddushin or not (A man may betroth a woman by saying, “You are hereby betrothed to me.” What is the halacha if he makes a partial declaration? Do we compare kiddushin to nedarim or perhaps there is a distinction between the two; a vow is strict that it takes effect with merely a declaration, but kiddushin requires an action as well?)

The Gemora explains the case: A man said to a woman, “You are hereby betrothed to me,” and then he said to another woman, “And you.” Do we say that he is saying to her “And you, too,” and based upon this partial declaration, kiddushin would take effect with her. Or, perhaps, he is saying to her, “And you have seen that I married the first woman,” and kiddushin will not take effect? The Gemora leaves the matter unresolved.

Reb Chaim Brisker analyzes Rav Papa’s inquiry: Was he uncertain regarding the words “and you,” if that constitutes a language for kiddushin or not? Or, perhaps, it certainly is a valid expression for kiddushin; Rav Papa inquired regarding someone who uses this language. Is his intention to effect kiddushin or not? Reb Chaim concludes that the Gemora’s doubt is regarding the language, for if the question would be in respect to his intent, there would be a simple solution: Ask him! Reb Shimon Shkop explains the uncertainty of the Gemora to be referring to the man’s intention, and not in respect to the language.

The Avnei Miluim maintains that kiddushin cannot take effect without the man’s declaration of betrothal. Reb Boruch Ber states that the husband’s declaration is an integral part of the kiddushin acquisition. The witnesses are required to hear his declaration. It is insufficient for the witnesses to merely recognize his intent for kiddushin and observe as the man presents the woman with an object worth at least a perutah.

The Steipler Gaon, however, disagrees and holds that the husband’s declaration of betrothal is not necessary to effect a kiddushin. His declaration is only needed for the sake of revealing to us his intent for kiddushin. Accordingly, the Steipler is greatly troubled by our Gemora. What difference would it make if there is a yad for kiddushin or not; it is only their intentions that are the necessary component to effect a kiddushin? If they say that they were intending for kiddushin, what is lacking?

He answers that although it is not necessary to hear the husband’s declaration, it is necessary to hear from him that he intends to perform a kiddushin. Kiddushin will not take effect because he intended to perform a kiddushin, if that intent remained in his heart and it was not verbalized. However, if we can gauge from his words that he undoubtedly intended for kiddushin, the kiddushin will be valid. Rav Papa inquired: Are there yados by kiddushin? If there are yados, then his partial declaration is regarded as a full one; we could then determine that he certainly intended for kiddushin. However, if there are no yados by kiddushin, his declaration remains a partial one; we then, cannot ascertain with any degree of certainty that he intended for kiddushin. The Gemora leaves this matter unresolved.

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The Ra"n Elucidated - Daf 5

Inconclusive Partial Declarations - The Gemora concluded that the following is the explanation behind Shmuel’s statement: Since the vower said, “in that which I will eat from you,” or “in that which I will eat from you,” he is forbidden. However, if he only said, “I am vowed from you,” there is no prohibition whatsoever. What is the rationale for this? If he says, “I am vowed from you,” perhaps he only meant that he does not want to talk with him. If he says, “I am separated from you,” perhaps he meant that he does not want to conduct business with him. If he says, “I am distanced from you,” perhaps he meant that he does not want to stand within four amos of him. (These expressions are all regarded as an inconclusive yad since it is far from evident what his intention was; therefore, the vow is totally ineffective.)

The Ran explains that since his declaration can be understood in two different fashions, the vow does not effect at all. A vow can only be valid when its meaning is clear. Therefore, he is not prohibited to derive pleasure from his fellow, nor is he forbidden to talk with him.

The Ran cites an alternative explanation in the Gemora. One who declares, “I am vowed from you,” is prohibited from conversing with his fellow. One who states, “I am separated from you,” is prohibited from engaging in business with his fellow. One who vows, “I am distanced from you,” is prohibited from standing within four amos of him.

The explanation is that in respect to these prohibitions, his partial declarations are considered conclusive. When the Gemora states that this is an example of a partial declaration that is inconclusive, it is referring to the vow in respect to deriving benefit from his fellow; however; in respect to these other prohibitions, it is regarded as conclusive. The declaration of “I am vowed from you” clearly means that he does not wish to converse with his fellow.

(The Rosh challenges this explanation, for how could the Gemora prove from here that an inconclusive partial declaration is not regarded as a yad? We could say that the reason there is no prohibition in respect to deriving benefit is because his expression is clearly indicative that he does not mean that; he does mean, “I will not converse with you,” and for that reason, he is prohibited from talking with him.)

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His possessions, but not himself - Nedarim Daf 5

Reb Akiva Eiger writes that it would seem from the language of the Ran that when one declares, “I am vowed to you,” he is only prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from his fellow’s possessions, but he would be permitted to derive benefit from the fellow himself. Reb Akiva Eiger wonders as to why this should be the case. Shouldn’t everything be included? (Sefer Beis Arazim says that the Ran could be understood to mean that all benefits are forbidden. As a matter of fact, the Ran in Kesuvos states explicitly that all pleasures are forbidden, even if it does not involve the fellow’s possessions.)

Shalmei Nedarim answers that the expression, “to you” connotes “from something that belongs to you.” The possessions of a person belong to him; his body does not. This is why the vower would be permitted to derive benefit from the fellow, provided that he is not benefiting from his possessions.

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Drinking Wine by Kiddush

The Gemora (Nedarim 4a)explains that the novelty of a chatas nazir is that it cannot be pledged to be brought as a vow. When we asked earlier that this is a trademark of all chatas offerings, it is possible to answer that all other chatas offerings are obviously not brought because they are pledged, as they are obligated to be brought to atone for a sin. However, why is a korban chatas of a nazir brought? [One might therefore have thought the prohibition of delaying vows does not apply to it, which is why the hekeish is needed.]

The Gemora asks: The korban chatas of a woman who gives birth is also not brought for a sin that she committed, but nonetheless we know the prohibition for delaying vows does apply to her korban chatas. [Why should a korban chatas of a nazir be different?]

The Gemora answers: Her korban chatas is still different than that of a nazir, as it enables her to eat kodoshim (korbanos, which she was unable to eat beforehand and is a mitzvah).

The Meiri asks: Doesn’t the chatas offering of a nazir help him that he is now permitted to drink wine?

Tosfos and the Ran answer that drinking wine is a voluntary act, and it is not a mitzvah like the eating of kodoshim.

However, we can ask: What about the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush and havdalah? The Gemora Pesachim (106a) derives from the verse Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it that there is an obligation to recite kiddush over a cup of wine. Accordingly, we should say that a nazir’s bringing of the korbanos is similar to that of a woman who gave birth; he is bringing the korban in order to be permitted to partake in the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush?

The Meiri answers: The mitzvah of drinking the wine for kiddush is only a Rabbinical one, and the korban is not coming for that.

Tosfos explains that although there is a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush with wine, the obligation that the one who recites the blessing should drink the wine is only Rabbinical.

Reb Koby Shapiro in the Hebrew Midrashiya states that there may be a practical difference in halacha whether the mitzvah of drinking the wine is a Biblical one or merely Rabbinical.

It is ruled upon in Shulchan Aruch that a woman is Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush on Shabbos. Accordingly, she would be allowed to discharge a man of his obligation by reciting the kiddush for him.

The Acharonim raise the following question: When a man comes home from Shul Friday night, he has already fulfilled his Biblical obligation of kiddush in the Shemoneh Esrei of ma’ariv. He still has a Rabbinical obligation to recite the kiddush over a cup of wine. His wife, on the other hand, who did not daven ma’ariv, still has a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush. How can the man, who only has a Rabbinical obligation discharge his wife of her Biblical obligation?

Some answer that she should recite vayechulu prior to kiddush.

Reb Akiva Eiger answers that there is no concern here because of the principle that one who has fulfilled the mitzvah can nevertheless discharge an obligation for someone who did not yet fulfill the mitzvah. This works because every Jew is a guarantor for another. Some Acharonim are not satisfied with this answer because they say that a woman is not included in this guarantee for each other.

The Chasam Sofer answers: It is as if the husband had intention not to fulfill the Biblical obligation of kiddush when he is davening ma’ariv. This way, they are both Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush.

This entire discussion is based upon the Meiri’s opinion that the mitzvah of drinking the wine is merely a Rabbinical mitzvah. However, if we would hold that there is a Biblical mitzvah to drink the wine of kiddush, then, there would be no discussion, for the husband still has not discharged his own obligation by davening ma’ariv; he still has a Biblical obligation to drink the wine.

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A Vow to Eat & Concern for Death

A Vow to Eat

The Gemora (Nedarim 3b) states: It is understandable how one can violate the prohibition of Not to desecrate his word; if one would invoke a vow that this bread he will eat, and he does not eat it, he has desecrated his word.

How can this be a valid vow; did we not learn previously (2b) that a vow is when one prohibits the object upon himself; a vow to perform an action should have no validity?

Reb Akiva Eiger adds: The Ran cited the opinion of the Ramban who maintains that if one pronounces a vow using the language of an oath (I make a vow not to eat this bread) or he takes an oath using the language of a vow (This bread is forbidden to me by an oath), even though it is not regarded as a basic type of vow, it does take effect on account of being “a handle of a vow.” It is a partial declaration and he will be prohibited from eating the bread. However, that is only if his intention is to prohibit the object upon himself, but it cannot be regarded as a partial declaration of a vow if he is saying that he vows to eat this bread?

He concludes: May Hashem enlighten my eyes.

The Chasam Sofer explains the case as follows: He said, “This bread should be forbidden to me if I do not eat this other bread.” He went ahead and ate the first loaf of bread. The halacha would be that he is obligated to eat the second bread, for if he does not eat it by the conclusion of the day, he would have retroactively desecrated his word by eating from the first one.

Concern for Death

In Shulchan Aruch (O”C 568:3) it is ruled that if one vows to fast a certain amount of fasts, he is permitted to wait until the winter when the days will be shorter.

The Magen Avraham asks: Shouldn’t the halacha be that he is required to fast immediately, for perhaps he might die? He proves that we are concerned for death in respect to a vow from our Gemora.

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The Ra”n Elucidated - Daf 3

Delaying his Nezirus - The Gemora asks (Nedarim 3b): How does one violate the prohibition of Not to delay by nezirus? If one says, “I am a nazir,” he is automatically a nazir! If he eats grapes or drinks wine, he has violated the prohibition of a nazir, but he has not delayed!?

Rava answers: It is applicable in the following case: If one says, “I will not leave this world without becoming a nazir first,” he has an obligation from that moment on to become a nazir. (Since he might die at any moment, he is required to become a nazir immediately; otherwise, he is delaying.)

Rava cites proof to this concept from the following halacha: If a Kohen says to his wife: “Here is your get on the condition that it should take effect one moment before my death,” she is forbidden from eating terumah immediately because we are concerned that he will die the next moment. This same logic applies in this case of nezirus as well. We are concerned that he will die at any moment; therefore, he is obligated to become a nazir immediately.

The Ran explains that there is a distinction between the two cases. If she would eat terumah and her husband wouldn’t die, she has not violated any prohibition. However, he is obligated to become a nazir immediately, and if he does not, he has violated the prohibition against delaying (even though he didn’t die yet). This is because it is as if he said, “It is upon me to become a nazir in a manner that there is no concern that I will not be able to fulfill this vow of nezirus before I die.”

He asks: When an individual makes a vow to bring an offering, he is not regarded as delaying the fulfillment of his vow, unless three festivals have passed. Shouldn’t we allow the person to become a nazir within three festivals; why is he immediately regarded as procrastinating?

He answers: If one vows that he will bring an offering immediately, he is required to bring it immediately. If he procrastinates at all, he is regarded as delaying and he has violated the prohibition against delaying. He is only allowed to wait three festivals if he vowed to bring an offering without imposing any deadline. Here, we interpret his nezirus vow to mean that he wants to become a nazir immediately; any delay will be regarded as violating the terms of his vow.

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Master of All

The Ran (Nedarim 2a) maintains if one states that he will not do something and includes the Name of Hashem, that itself is regarded as an oath. He proves this from a Gemora below (22b) which says that if one says, “By the Master of all, I will not eat it,” he is prohibited from eating it, although he did not say that he was invoking an oath.

It is evident from this Ran that the words “Master of all” is regarded as saying the Name of Hashem. If so, Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach asks: How would one be permitted to mention this expression (Adon Olam) in his daily speech; it should be regarded as pronouncing the Name of Hashem in vain?

The Chasam Sofer writes that this is indeed the halacha. Just as saying “The Compassionate One” in Hebrew is considered an oath, so too, if he says “Rachmana” in Aramaic, it is regarded as an oath. And just as these expressions are included in the prohibition of swearing with the Name of Hashem in vain, so too, if one uses this expression in vain, he has violated this prohibition, for both of these transgression (swearing falsely and saying Hashem’s Name in vain) are derived from the same verse. Reb Shlomo Zalman is deeply troubled by this ruling, for if so, it would be forbidden to say “Ribbono shel Olam,” or “Adon Olam,” and this is not found in the poskim.

The Netziv cites a different ruling of the Chasam Sofer: If one finds himself in a situation where he is uncertain if he should recite a certain blessing or not, he may say the following: Brich Rachmana Mara D’alma (Blessed is the Compassionate One, Master of all). This would seemingly be a contradiction to the other ruling of the Chasam Sofer. If “Master of all” is considered the Name of Hashem in regards to an oath and in respect to uttering the Name of Hashem in vain, what remedy is there by reciting this other version of the blessing; he is anyway saying the Name of Hashem? Reb Akiva Eiger rules that one is prohibited from using this other version because of this concern.

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The Ra”n Elucidated - Nedarim 2

LINKAGE - One who states, “This bread should be prohibited to me” is now forbidden to derive benefit from the bread. This is a complete declaration. He also may say, “This bread should be like a sacrifice to me.” Just as one is prohibited to derive benefit from a sacrifice, so too, he is forbidden to benefit from the bread.

In order for the vow to take effect, he is not required to link the subject of the vow to a forbidden item; however, if he chooses to link the subject of the vow to an object previously forbidden, that object must be one that was prohibited through a vow and not to something intrinsically forbidden. (Other Rishonim maintain that a neder without hatfasah is not regarded as an ikkur neder; it is only effective as a yad to a neder.)

NAME OF HASHEM - The Mishna stated: All substitute words for oaths are effective just as a genuine oath (if he says, “shevusah” instead of “shevuah”). It may be proven from here that an oath taken without mentioning the Name of Hashem is completely valid, for otherwise (if he did indeed mention Hashem’s name), why would this language be regarded as a substitute term for an oath; we have learned that if one states that he will not do something and includes the Name of Hashem, that itself is regarded as an oath.

He asks from the halacha of an oath by witnesses where one is required to include the Name of Hashem. He answers that this (if any oath requires the Name of Hashem) is a matter of dispute between the Tannaim.

He cites Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion that there is a distinction between an oath administered by someone else (the Name of Hashem must be included) and one taken by himself (it is not required). The Ran strongly disagrees with this distinction.

SWITCHING THE LANGUAGE - The Gemora had stated: Since the Mishna taught the halacha of a vow, where one is prohibiting the object upon himself (issur cheftza), the Tanna mentions the halacha of charamim, where the person is also prohibiting the object upon himself. An oath, on the other hand, is where one is prohibiting himself from the object (issur gavra); this, the Tanna mentions afterwards.

He cites the opinion of Rabbeinu Chananel, who derives from our Gemora that if one pronounces a vow using the language of an oath (I make a vow not to eat this bread) or he takes an oath using the language of a vow (This bread is forbidden to me by an oath), the vow or the oath have no validity and he is permitted to eat the bread.

He cites the opinion of the Ramban who disagrees and holds that even though it is not regarded as a basic type of vow, it does take effect on account of being “a handle of a vow.” It is a partial declaration and he will be prohibited from eating the bread.

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Mazel tov!!! - Hadran - Food for Thought - Kesuvos 112

Rabbi Chelbo, Rabbi Avira, and Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina went to a certain place and they brought before them a peach that was the size of a pan from Kfar Hino. How big is that? It can contain five Sa’ah. They ate one third; they relinquished ownership on one third and gave one third to their animals.

After one year Rabbi Eliezer went one there, and they brought this before him and he took it in his hands and said “A land of fruit went back to becoming salted, from the evil of those who dwell in it.”

*** How were they able to eat before their animals? Doesn’t the Gemora Brochos (40a) rule that it is forbidden for one to eat prior to feeding his animals?

*** How were they permitted to give food to the animals that was fit for human consumption? Doesn’t the Gemora Taanis (20b) rule that it is regarded as degrading food if one gives animals food fit for humans?

*** Why did Rabbi Eliezer state that it was on account of the evil of its inhabitants that the land turned into waste? Didn’t the spies witness that the land of Eretz Yisroel was flowing with milk and honey even before the Jewish people entered there? At that time, only idolaters lives there, and nevertheless, the land produced delicious produce!

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Light of Torah

Rabbi Elozar said (Kesuvos 111b): One who uses the light of Torah, the light of Torah will revive him; those that do not use the light of Torah, the light of Torah will not revive them.

The Chafetz Chaim explains: Every Jewish person merits a portion in the World to Come. The distinction is as follows: The soul of a person will bask in the pleasure of Gan Eden because it is the soul of a Jewish person; however, regarding the body, which has already become dust, nothing will revive it except for the light of Torah that he learned himself, or if he supported others in their study of Torah and certainly if he provided for his children the ability to learn Torah. Those people that did none of these things will merit a share in Gan Eden, but are in grave danger of not being resurrected.

The Beis Halevi explains: There is a distinction between an article that was used for holiness and one which was used for a mitzvah. An article used for a mitzvah may be discarded immediately after usage because the holiness has ceased upon the completion of the mitzvah. However, regarding an article used for holiness, the holiness remains forever; it must be treated as a holy object and may not be discarded.

The body of someone who learns Torah is considered an article of holiness; even after he dies, the holiness remains and that is what revives him at the time of Resurrection. However, concerning one who does not study Torah, his body is regarded as an article that was used for a mitzvah; when he dies, his body does not retain the holiness and he cannot revive at the time of Resurrection.

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The Parameters of Living in Eretz Yisroel Atoning for our Sins

Rabbi Elozar says: One who lives in Eretz Yisroel lives without sin (their sins are forgiven).

The Chasam Sofer writes: He must be a permanent resident of Eretz Yisroel in order to merit this. One who is a guest in Eretz Yisroel does not merit having his sins forgiven.

The Ben Yehoyadah disagrees and says that while he is living in Eretz Yisroel, even if his intention is to return to the Diaspora, his sins will be atoned for.

The Pnei Yehoshua is bothered by this Gemora: If every sin committed in Eretz Yisroel is forgiven automatically, why were our forefathers punished and driven into Exile and the Beis Hamikdosh was destroyed because of their sins? He states that Eretz Yisroel has the capacity to forgive sins if one is living there because there is a mitzvah to settle Eretz Yisroel because of its holiness. He wants that the merit of Eretz Yisroel should protect him against sinning. A person who happens to live there because he was born there, or one that resides in Eretz Yisroel because of its delicious produce and certainly the brazenly wicked people will not be protected from sinning and will not be granted atonement for their sins.

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Divine Presence in the Diaspora

The Gemora (Kesuvos 111a) cites a braisa: A person should always live in Eretz Yisroel, even if it is in a city which has a majority of idolaters living there. A person should not live outside of Eretz Yisroel, even if it is a city which has a majority of Jews living there. For one who lives in Eretz Yisroel is regarded as one who has a God, and one who lives outside of Eretz Yisroel is regarded as one who does not have a God.

Rabbi Avraham Chalavah explains the following Zohar with our Gemora: The Divine Presence never left the Jewish people on Shabbos and the festivals and even on Shabbos during the weekday.

What is the explanation behind these ambiguous words?

He explains based upon our Gemora: There is no place for the Divine Presence to rest outside of Eretz Yisroel, for anyone who resides there is regarded as if he is Godless. On Shabbos and Yom Tov, however, the divine Presence descends even outside of Eretz Yisroel.

The Zohar does not mean “Shabbos during the weekdays.” Rather, the meaning is that the Divine Presence rests upon the Jewish people in the Diaspora on Shabbos and Yom Tov.

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Resurrected in their Clothes

by Reb Ben

Rav Chiya bar Yosef states: The righteous will be resurrected in their clothes.

The Gemara (Shabbos 113a) states that the clothing that one wears on Shabbos should be different than the clothing that he wears during the week. The Maharal explains that Shabbos is holy and anything that is holy is distinct from materialism. For this reason, writes the Maharal, one is forbidden to perform labor on Shabbos, as labor by definition is bringing something to fruition, which is considered materialism. An object that is removed from materialism is deemed to contain honor, and for this reason ones Shabbos clothing should be distinct from the clothing that he wears during the week.

Perhaps we can suggest an alternative explanation to this statement of the Gemara. Elsewhere (Sanhedrin 90b) the Gemara states that the righteous will be resurrected in the future with the very clothes that they were buried in. [There is a discussion (See Kesubos 111b and Tosfos and Gilyon HaShas Ibid) whether the righteous will be resurrected in the same clothing that they were buried in or if they will be resurrected in different clothing.]

One must wonder regarding the significance of the righteous being resurrected in their clothing. It would seem that clothing is a covering for the body in this world, but in the future man will be akin to Adam HaRishon before the sin, where there was no need for clothing. Why then will the righteous be wearing clothing at the time of the resurrection? Perhaps the idea of this Gemara is that clothing, besides for the need of covering the body, also symbolizes a state of preparedness. After the sin of Adam HaRishon, HaShem clothed Adam and Chava in garments of skin. The purpose of these garments was so that Adam and Chava would be prepared for the first Shabbos of creation. It is noteworthy that the Gemara in Shabbos (113a) states that one should change his clothing, manner of walking and his manner of speech on Shabbos. The only one of these distinctions that is performed prior to the onset of Shabbos is the changing of ones clothing. Thus, it is evident that changing ones clothing prior to the onset of Shabbos is a symbol of preparedness. This then is the explanation of the Gemara in Sanhedrin regarding the resurrection of the righteous. The righteous will be resurrected in their clothing as a reward for having always been in a state of preparedness in this world. The idea is that the Gemara (Avodah Zara 3a) states that one who toils prior to Shabbos will eat on Shabbos. The period when the righteous will be resurrected is referred to as a day that is completely Shabbos. Thus, when the true Shabbos arrives, the righteous will be prepared in their "Shabbos" clothing. It is for this reason that we change our clothing in honor of Shabbos, so that we reflect a state of preparedness for this Holy Day.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 111 - Highlights

Living in Eretz Yisroel

The Gemora cites a braisa: A person should always live in Eretz Yisroel, even if it is in a city which has a majority of idolaters living there. A person should not live outside of Eretz Yisroel, even if it is a city which has a majority of Jews living there. For one who lives in Eretz Yisroel is regarded as one who has a God, and one who lives outside of Eretz Yisroel is regarded as one who does not have a God.

The Gemora asks: How can it be that one who lives outside of Eretz Yisroel is regarded as one who does not have a God?

Rather, the Gemora says: One who lives outside of Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he worships idols. (110b)

Oath not to Ascend to Eretz Yisroel
Rabbi Zeira desired to leave Bavel and ascend to Eretz Yisroel. He avoided Rav Yehudah (for he was concerned that Rav Yehudah would decree that he may not leave Bavel for Eretz Yisroel), as Rav Yehudah interpreted the verse, they shall be brought to Babylonia and they shall remain there, to mean that one is forbidden to leave Bavel to ascend to Eretz Yisroel. One who does so has transgressed a positive commandment. Rabbi Zeira, however, interpreted the verse to be referring to the vessels of the Beis Hamikdosh, which the prophet foretold would remain in exile for a while.

Rav Yehudah cites other Scriptural verses which teach us that we are bound by an oath not to ascend to Eretz Yisroel as a group by force, or even as individuals.

Rabbi Zeira says that those verses are needed for the teachings of Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina. For Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: What was the purpose of these three oaths? One is that the Jewish people shall not go up to Eretz Yisroel all together in a wall of force; the second is that the Holy One, Blessed be He, adjured the Jewish people that they shall not rebel against the nations of the world; and the third is that the Holy One, Blessed be He, adjured the idolaters that they shall not oppress the Jewish people too much.

Rav Yehudah says that it is derived from the redundancy in the verse that there is also an oath against individuals from immigrating to Eretz Yisroel.

Rabbi Zeira says that the redundancies appearing in the verses are needed for the teachings of Rabbi Levi. For Rabbi Levi said: What was the purpose of these six oaths? Three oaths have already been mentioned above. One is that the prophets should not reveal when the Final Redemption will occur; the second is that the Jewish people should not cause a delay in the coming of the Final Redemption (through their sins); and the third is that they should not reveal the secret (intercalation; the fixing of the calendar or the reason behind the commandments of the Torah) to idolaters.

Rabbi Elozar expounds the verse: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the Jewish people, “If you will keep the adjuration (and not force the Redemption), it will be well and good for you, but if not, I will permit your flesh to be a prey like that of the gazelles and the hinds of the field.” (110b – 111a)

Greatness of Eretz Yisroel
Rabbi Elozar says: One who lives in Eretz Yisroel lives without sin (their sins are forgiven).

Rav Anan says: Whoever is buried in Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he were buried under the Altar (it serves as an atonement for his sins).

It was common practice for Ula to ascend to Eretz Yisroel. He died outside of Eretz Yisroel. When Rabbi Elozar heard this, he exclaimed, “You, Ula, shall you die upon a contaminated land?” He was told that Ula will be buried in Eretz Yisroel. Rabbi Elozar said, “There is no comparison between Eretz Yisroel absorbing someone while he is alive than absorbing someone after he dies.”

A certain man whose brother died childless and the sister-in-law resided in Bei Chozaah (in Bavel). He came to Rabbi Chanina and asked him whether it was proper for him to descend there to perform the mitzvah of yibum. Rabbi Chanina replied, “His brother married a Cuthean woman (since they lived outside of Eretz Yisroel) and died; blessed be the Omnipresent Who killed him! Should this one go and follow him?” (111a)

Greatness of Bavel
Rav Yehudah says in the name of Shmuel: Just as one is prohibited to go from Eretz Yisroel to Bavel (since he will no longer be obligated to observe certain mitzvos), so too it is prohibited to go from Bavel to any other country (because of the Torah study that took place in Bavel).

Rabbah and Rav Yosef both said: The worthy persons of Bavel are absorbed by Eretz Yisroel, and the worthy ones of other countries are absorbed by Bavel.

The Gemora asks: In what respect is this referring to? If you will suggest that it is in respect of purity of descent (that such persons may marry into any pure families of Eretz Yisroel and Bavel), surely that cannot be the case. For didn’t the master say: All countries are like dough (a mix of many ingredients; a metaphor for a mixture of unblemished people and other with tainted lineage) in comparison to Eretz Yisroel and Eretz Yisroel is like dough in comparison to Bavel (it emerges that Bavel is completely pure, even more than Eretz Yisroel)?

The Gemora answers: They are referring to burial (the worthy people that die in Bavel are buried in Eretz Yisroel and the worthy people from faraway lands are buried in Bavel).

Rav Yehudah said: One who lives in Bavel is regarded as if he were living in Eretz Yisroel.

Abaye said: One who lives in Bavel will not experience the sufferings before the arrival of Mashiach. (111a)

Resurrection
Rabbi Elozar said: Those that are buried outside of Eretz Yisroel will not be resurrected.

Rabbi Avahu said: Even a Canaanite maidservant who resides in Eretz Yisroel is guaranteed to have a share in the World to come.

Rabbi Yirmiyah bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Anyone who walks four amos in Eretz Yisroel is guaranteed to have a share in the World to come.

The Gemora asks on Rabbi Elozar: Is it possible to say that the righteous people who are buried outside of Eretz Yisroel will not be resurrected?

Rabbi Ila answers: Their bones will roll to Eretz Yisroel, and only then will they be resurrected.

Rabbi Abba Sala the Great asked: Why do the righteous have to suffer in this manner?

Abaye answers: They will stand on their feet and travel through tunnels in the ground until Eretz Yisroel; there, they will emerge from the ground. (111a)

Burial in Eretz Yisroel
Karna said: Yaakov, although he knew that he was completely righteous, and if he would be buried outside of Eretz Yisroel, he would still be resurrected, he was, nevertheless concerned that he would be unworthy (see Maharsha) of walking through the tunnels.

Rabbi Chanina said similarly: Yosef, although he knew that he was completely righteous, and if he would be buried outside of Eretz Yisroel, he would still be resurrected, he was, nevertheless concerned that he would be unworthy (see Maharsha) of walking through the tunnels and that is why he troubled his brother to carry his body four hundred parsaos.

The brothers of Rabbah (wanting him to come to Ererz Yisroel) sent him the following message: Yaakov, although he knew that he was completely righteous, and if he would be buried outside of Eretz Yisroel etc. Ilfa added to this the following incident. A man was once troubled on account of his inability to marry a certain woman who lived outside of Eretz Yisroel. He wanted to go down to her, but as soon as he heard this (regarding Yaakov), he decided to stay in Eretz Yisroel and remain unmarried until the day of his death. Although you (Rabbah) are a great scholar, you know that a man who studies on his own cannot be compared with a man who studies from his teacher. Perhaps you might think that there is no teacher good enough for you here, we may inform you that you will have one, and he is Rabbi Yochanan. If you decide not to come up, we advise you of the following three things: Do not sit too long, for long sitting can result in hemorrhoids; do not stand for a long time, because that is harmful to the heart; and do not walk too much, because excessive walking may be harmful to the eyes. Rather, you should spend one third of your time sitting, one third standing and one third walking. Standing with support is better than sitting without support. (111a – 111b)

Ignorant of Torah
Rabbi Elozar said: People who are ignorant of Torah knowledge will not be resurrected.

The Gemora cites a braisa which corroborates Rabbi Elozar’s statement.

Rabbi Yochanan disagreed: The braisa is referring to people who are lax in their observance of Torah which leads them to stray after idols.

Rabbi Elozar replied by citing another verse and expounding: One who uses the light of Torah, the light of Torah will revive him; those that do not use the light of Torah, the light of Torah will not revive them.

Rabbi Elozar saw that Rabbi Yochanan was disturbed by his ruling. He therefore said: There is a remedy for them. If they marry off their daughter to a Torah scholar, or engages in business on behalf of a Torah scholar, or he gives pleasure to Torah scholars from his property, the Torah considers it as if he is clinging to the Divine Presence. (111b)

There will be a Time…
Rav Chiya bar Yosef said: The righteous will arise in Yerushalayim.

He stated further: The righteous will be resurrected in their clothes.

He also said: There will be a time when the land of Eretz Yisroel will produce (ready-made) baked cakes and fine woolen garments.

The Gemora cites a braisa: There will be a time that a stalk of wheat will grow straight up similar to a palm tree until it is of the same height as the tree. It will not be any trouble to harvest this wheat, for Hashem will cause the wind to blow and fine flour will fall from it. People will go to their fields and gather a palmful of flour and that will be sufficient to support his entire household.

There will be a time that wheat will be as large as two kidneys of a huge ox. This should not come as a surprise, for a fox lived inside a large turnip; they weighed the turnip and it contained sixty litrin.

There will be a time that every grapevine in Eretz Yisroel will require the entire city to pick its grapes.

There will be a time that every nonfruit tree in Eretz Yisroel will produce fruit to load up two donkeys. These grapes will produce tasty red wine that will be intoxicating and it will provide pleasure for both young and old men. (111b)

[END]

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Settling in Eretz Yisroel Nowadays

The Mishna (Kesuvos 110b) had stated: A man may force all of his family members to go up to Eretz Yisroel, but he may not force them to leave Eretz Yisroel. A man may force all of his family members to go up to Yerushalayim, but he may not force them to leave Yerushalayim. This applies to both men and women (a wife can force the husband).

The Gemora explains that these halachos are based upon the mitzvah of furthering the settlement of Eretz Yisroel.

The Ramban says that this mitzvah is a Biblical commandment. The Rambam omits this mitzvah is his Sefer Hamitzvos. There are those that explain that the Rambam holds that it’s only a Rabbinical mitzvah. Other say that the Rambam holds it is not a mitzvah at all; the only reason why a man can force his family members to move to Eretz Yisroel is because this way, they will be able to fulfill the mitzvos which are dependent upon the Land of Israel.

The Ritva writes that the applications of the Mishna apply to nowadays also. Proof to this is from the fact that Rebbe incorporated these halachos into the Mishna even though he was living in the times after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

Tosfos cites Rabbeinu Chaim Kohen that there is no mitzvah nowadays because there are many mitzvos there which entail many punishments, and it will be impossible for one to be careful regarding all of them. This can be simply understood to mean that although there might be a mitzvah to live in Eretz Yisroel, it is simply not worth it, for one will lose out by transgressing many aveiros there. Reb Avi Lebowitz (and afterwards I found this logic in the Beis Halevi) explains a little differently: Rabbeinu Chaim is actually describing the mitzvah of living in Eretz Yisroel to be for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzvos that apply there. If one were to live in Eretz Yisroel without properly performing the mitzvos, they are not only losing out on these additional mitzvos; they are also not fulfilling the mitzvah of living in Eretz Yisroel.

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Vowing to Live in Eretz Yisroel

If a woman living outside of Eretz Yisroel pronounced a vow that she will go and live in Eretz Yisroel; at the time of her vow, it was not dangerous to live there, but later, there was a fear of war. Is the husband allowed to annul her vow?

Perhaps this question would be dependent on whether there is a mitzvah nowadays to live in Eretz Yisroel. Rabbeinu Chaim Kohen and Tosfos (110b) maintain that there is no mitzvah. The Ramban and other Rishonim disagree and hold that there is a mitzvah. The Chidah in Birkei Yosef discusses if this is regarded as a vow that involves personal affliction or not.

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Yearning to Return to Zion - Kesuvos 110

It is written [Tehillim 87:5]: And to Zion it shall be said: "this man, this man, was born in her," and He will establish her on high. (This verse is describing the future time when all the nations of the world will bring the Jews back to Zion. They will say regarding each Jew: He is a son of Zion, he was born there, let us bring him back to her.)

Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said (Kesuvos 75a): This verse is applicable to any Jew that was born in Zion and one who yearns to see her. Even Jews who were born elsewhere will be considered children of Zion, provided that they learn to return there.

I began writing the following incident when I was shown that it was already printed in Daf Digest link, so I am writing their version (with a comment or two of my own).

During World War I, Palestine was under Turkish jurisdiction and the Ottomans made life very difficult for the citizens. Press gangs would roam the streets arbitrarily drafting anyone in their wake. The conditions of these forcibly drafted soldiers were exceedingly difficult. They were subjected to hard labor, and since food was exceedingly scarce they were severely underfed.These circumstances could all be circumvented by paying bribes to officials. However, there was one decree that was exceedingly difficult to avert. The Turks declared that anyone not born in Palestine would be deported. This was more difficult to deal with than forcible conscription, since the only way someone born out of the country could get around this was to lie on the government forms.

Since everyone knew that Rav Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, zt"l,(where I saw this story brought down, it was with Rav Yosef Rogotchovi from Petach Tikva, but see below)was very careful to avoid falsehood in any form no matter what it might cost, people were afraid that he would forbid people to lie on the forms. During those difficult times, simple honesty would result in the sundering of many homes. When someone ventured to ask the Rav's opinion about this issue, he surprised everyone in the Old Yishuv. "It is certainly permitted!"

“But why is this different from any other falsehood which the Rav prohibits?” the questioner asked.
Rav Sonnenfeld explained, "This is explicit in Kesuvos 75 on the verse, 'And of Tzion it shall be said, each and every man is born therein.' The Gemora learns from the redundancy of the word "man, each and every man" that one who yearns for Tzion is as one who was born there. We see clearly that any Jew who yearns for Tzion is actually considered as one who was born in Tzion! So to write of those who came up to Tzion out of longing for her holiness that they were native citizens is no lie at all: it is a declaration of the absolute truth!"

I saw this ruling from Rav Sonnenfeld in a slightly different context. It was a question regarding people who were not born in Eretz Yisroel and they were seeking permission from the courts to emigrate to Eretz Yisroel. The courts were only granting visas to those who were born in Eretz Yisroel. Rav Sonnenfeld ruled, based on our Gemora that not only is it permitted to testify that you were born in Eretz Yisroel, but one is obligated to do so. It is not regarded as a lie at all, since one who yearns to return to Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he was born there.

The Kloizenberger Rebbe zt"l added the following: It is written that the lifespan of a person is seventy years. The Gemora in Shabbos (89b) states that the Heavenly courts do not administer punishment for the first twenty years of one's life. Consequently, it can be said that the seventy years do not begin until one is twenty years old. So too, it can be said regarding one who emigrated to Eretz Yisroel. The seventy years of his life begins only after he lives in Eretz Yisroel.

This can be proven from Rashi's commentary on the following verse [Breishis 16:3]: So Sarai, Avram's wife, took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaid, at the end of ten years of Avram's dwelling in the land of Canaan, and she gave her to Avram her husband for a wife. Rashi writes: This tells us that the time they dwelled outside of Eretz Yisroel does not count in the calculation.

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Which Surgeon should He Use?

The Gemora (Megillah 18) discusses whether one who knows the Torah by heart would be permitted to write a Scripture scroll without copying from a text. The Gemora states that Rabbi Meir was permitted to write a Megillah from memory because he knew the words fluently by heart.

Reb Elyashiv, cited by Chishukei Chemed ruled on the following inquiry and he derived his ruling from that Gemora. A person residing in Eretz Yisroel developed a heart issue and he was required to undergo a risky heart surgery. The local doctors said that they do not perform this type of surgery frequently, but they are ninety-five percent confident that the surgery will be a success. There is an expert surgeon outside of Eretz Yisroel who performs this surgery daily and he said that if he would perform the surgery, he would be successful ninety-five percent of the time.

Should this individual travel outside of Eretz Yisroel to have the surgery performed by the expert surgeon? Reb Elyashiv ruled that he should go because that doctor is more accustomed in performing this type of surgery.

The Gemora in Taanis 15a states regarding a communal fast: They would send a chazzan to lead the prayer who was an elder and fluent in the prayers. Rashi explains: One who is fluent in his prayers will not make a mistake.

The Gemora states that one who is fluent in the words of the Torah will not make a mistake when he is writing the Torah without copying from a text.

This is why it would be preferable to travel to the doctor outside of Eretz Yisroel even though the percentage of success is the same. Someone who is more accustomed to performing this type of surgery will not make a mistake.

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Divorcing a Woman Against her Will

The Gemora (Kesuvos 109a) cites a case where the father-in-law stipulated to give money to his son-in-law, and he stretched out his leg to him (an expression meaning that he doesn’t intend to fulfill his commitment), he may divorce her against her will.

The commentators discuss the halacha nowadays, where there exists the ban from Rabbeinu Gershom against divorcing a woman against her will (there is an extensive discussion among the poskim if this applies to an arusah as well). Is the husband permitted to forcefully accept the bill of divorce or not?

It is brought in the name of the Rashba that Rabbeinu Gershom did not issue his decree in cases where the husband was not negligent; the edict was only established for unethical husbands who wish to take advantage of their wives, and therefore, in this case, the husband may forcibly divorce her. Or, perhaps, even in this case, he should not divorce her against her will, for the wife did nothing wrong.

The Mishna Lamelech cites an incident that occurred with the Mishpitei Shmuel in the town of Kushtantina. The groom betrothed a woman and promised that he will perform the nisuin on a certain day. On the appointed day, the groom asked for her dowry, but his father-in-law refused, claiming that he lacked the necessary funds. The ruling was that the groom is not obligated to perform the nisuin, for he has a legitimate claim that his promise to marry her was only based upon his receiving the dowry from his father-in-law.

The Pnei Moshe derived from this ruling that in our case, the husband may forcibly divorce his arusah, for Rabbeinu Gershom’s decree would not be applicable in that case.

The Mishna Lamelech states that there is no proof from that ruling. The ruling there was only that the groom is not obligated to fulfill his promise to her and perform the nisuin, but they did not rule that he may forcibly divorce her.

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Distinction between Charity and Returning a Lost Object

The Gemora (Kesuvos 108a) states regarding one who is forbidden by a vow to derive benefit from his fellow; the fellow is permitted to return his lost property to him. This is permitted because his primary intention is to fulfill the mitzvah, and he is not intending to provide pleasure to his friend.

This, explains the Shitah Mikubetzes, is in contrast to the mitzvah of giving charity, which would be forbidden. What is the difference between the two mitzvos? He explains: When charity is given to him, he is benefiting directly from the money; therefore, it is forbidden. When his lost object is returned, he is not deriving pleasure from the item; he is getting benefit from the fact that his fellow troubled himself to return the object to him. Regarding his fellow’s exertion, it may be said that his intention is to fulfill the mitzvah, and not to provide pleasure.

Others make the following distinction: Charity may be given to any poor person; it does not have to be given to this specific poor person. That is why it is prohibited to give this particular poor person charity. However, in order to fulfill the mitzvah of returning a lost object, it must be returned to the one who lost the item, and therefore, it would be permitted.

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Paying Up a Debt of his Fellow

The Gemora (Kesuvos 108a) rules regarding one who is forbidden by a vow to derive benefit from his fellow; the fellow is prohibited to repay his debt (in a regular case).

Reb Elchonon Wasserman discusses the rationale behind this ruling. Is it prohibited because the one who pronounced the vow is directly benefiting from the money that is being used to repay his debt? Or, perhaps it is because the fellow is causing the lender to forgive the borrower for his debt (once he has the money from elsewhere), and it emerges that he is indirectly receiving pleasure from the fellow?

This question is actually dependent upon a different question: Can someone pay up the debt of his fellow and cause that the debt has been paid? Or, perhaps only the borrower can repay a debt; his friend may give money to the lender with the stipulation being that the lender will forgive the borrower from the debt which he owes?

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Placing Money on the Horns of a Deer

The Mishna (Kesuvos 107b) had stated: If a person went overseas and someone supported his wife in the interim, Chanan ruled that he has lost his monies. The sons of the kohanim gedolim argued that the supporter may swear how much he gave his wife and collect the monies from him. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinu agreed. Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai said: Chanan is correct; the supporter has placed his money on the horn of a deer.

What is the meaning of the expression, “He has placed his money on the horn of a deer”?

The Tosfos Yom Tov explains: Just as a deer runs very fast, and one chasing it will probably not catch it; so too, one who “lends” money in this manner will be unlikely to recover the money.

Tosfos Chadashim offers a different explanation: It is common for a deer to bob its head back and forth when it is running. One who places his money on the horn of a deer is likely to lose the money for the money will fall off the horns of the dear.

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Inheritance Based Upon the Testimony of only One Witness

The Gemora (Kesuvos 107a) cites the following case: If one witness said that the husband had died; since she is also allowed to remarry with one witness, she can be supported on the basis of this witness. However, his sons and daughters cannot split the estate based on the testimony of a single witness. They therefore do not have right to receive support from the estate.

Tosfos comments: That the Gemora in Bava Metzia (38b) states that when we hear that he has died, we can send down relatives to his estate; that is only to eat the produce, but he is not permitted to sell the property. So too, over here; we allow them to be sustained from the produce, but they are not allowed to sell the estate in order to be supported.

The Tashbatz writes that one witness is believed to allow the relatives to inherit the estate since it is something that will become public knowledge, and we are not concerned that he will lie. That which the Gemora says that we do not allow an inheritance based upon the testimony of one witness; that is only when the witness testifies that he heard about the death from another witness. Nevertheless, even this testimony will be valid to permit the wife to remarry.

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Praying during a Famine

The Gemora records an incident (Kesuvos 106a):In the days of Rav Yosef there was a famine. The Rabbis asked Rav Yosef, “Will the master beseech God for mercy?” He replied, “If Elisha, with whom, when his students had departed, there still remained two thousand and two hundred students (who depended on him for their sustenance), did not offer up any prayers for mercy in a time of famine, should I (who have fewer students) offer prayers for mercy?

The commentators ask: Why didn’t Elisha and Rav Yosef pray for rain? Didn’t we learn in Meseches Taanis that there is a mandatory obligation for a series of fasts in the time of a famine?

The Maharsha answers: This was not actually a famine; there was a minimal amount of rain and the price of produce was extremely high. It therefore, was not regarded as a severe famine, and the series of fasts described in Taanis would not apply.

The Pnei Yehoshua answers: This was not the proper time for prayer since the Gemora states that it was a time of “Divine anger.”

The Chasam Sofer answers: The Gemora is referring to cases where the correct time for rain has already passed. It is not regarded as proper to pray for a miracle. We do not pray that Hashem should alter the normal course of nature.

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Rebbe and the Laundryman

The Gemora (Kesuvos 103a) records: On the day that Rebbe died, a Heavenly voice went forth and announced: “Whoever has been present at the death of Rebbe is destined for the life of the World to Come.” A certain laundryman who used to come before Rebbe every day, failed to come on that day. When he heard this (the announcement), he went up upon a roof, jumped to the ground and died. A Heavenly voice came forth and announced: “That laundryman also is destined for the life of the World to Come.”

The commentators ask: Who permitted him to commit suicide; it is evident from the Gemora that this laundryman was a wise man and a Torah scholar?

Ben Yehoyadah answers: This roof was not high off the ground and his intention was to fall on his feet. He did not wish to kill himself. His plan was to injure his feet that it should serve as an atonement for not attending Rebbe’s funeral procession. Heaven turned his plans around and he fell backwards, breaking his neck and bringing about his immediate death.

The Rama Mipano in his sefer Gilgulei Neshomos writes that Rebbe was the reincarnation of Avraham Avinu and the laundryman was the gilgul of Lavan. A laundryman whitens clothes as the name Lavan connotes. This was Lavan’s rectification.

He also says, along with many other commentators that Rebbe was a reincarnation of Yaakov Avinu and that is why the Gemora relates that Rebbe came back to life even after his death; this is because we know that Yaakov did not die.

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Meriting the World to Come

The Gemora (Kesuvos 103a) records: On the day that Rebbe died, a Heavenly voice went forth and announced: “Whoever has been present at the death of Rebbe is destined for the life of the World to Come.”

The commentators are bewildered: How can it be that one can merit a share in the World to Come just by being present when Rebbe departed this world? The World to Come is a spiritual level that one may attain through his actions; how can it be given away for free?

Rav Dessler writes: We are compelled to say that those who were present when Rebbe died elevated themselves to an extremely high level. The passing on of such a righteous and holy person caused them to mend their ways and transform themselves into completely different people. They removed themselves from a world of falsehood and became children that merited the World to Come.

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Rebbe: “Gather my Children”

The Gemora (Kesuvos 103a)cites a braisa: When Rebbe was about to depart this world, he said, “I require the presence of my sons.” He then proceeded to give them instructions regarding the arrangements of matters after his death.

The Yalkut Gershuni explains: As long as Rebbe was alive, he made the utmost effort to increase his Torah studying, his observance of mitzvos and performance of good deeds, so he will be destined to merit his share in the World to Come. It was not necessary for anyone to assist him in this endeavor. As he was dying, he realized that after his death, he will no longer be able to help himself and elevate his soul; it was this realization that caused him to call his sons and inform them that now they will be needed.

The Aruges Habosem adds: Rebbe was making an introspection of his life and realized that he still was lacking in his task of rectifying his soul. His time was passing and he would not have the ability to fill this void. His only hope was to call his sons and give them instructions in how they should act after his death. A son’s good deeds, says the Gemora in Sanhedrin (104a), can provide merit for a father even after his death.

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The Day that Rebbe Died

Rabbi Chiya said (Kesuvos 103a) : “On the day that Rebbe died, holiness ceased.” This is why he was known as Rabbeinu Hakodosh.

The Gemora in Sotah (49a) states: When Rebbe died, humbleness and fear of Hashem ceased.

The Maharal writes that there is a distinction between the two statements. The Gemora in Sotah does not say, “On the day that Rebbe died, humbleness and fear of Hashem ceased.” This is because these traits still continued after Rebbe died for those people that were in his generation. Those people that were humble and Feared Hashem in the times of Rebbe continued doing so even after his death. However, the trait of holiness completely ceased on the day that Rebbe died. Even if there were those that were regarded as being holy in Rebbe’s lifetime, as soon as he died, their holiness ceased. This is why our Gemora says: “On the day that Rebbe died, holiness ceased.”

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Blood Libel

The Gemora (Kesuvos 102b) relates an incident where they placed the orphan young son with his relatives. The very first evening, the relatives killed him (in order to take the inheritance; it is this very concern that causes us to say that the girl should reside with her mother and not with her relatives because she also receives a tenth of her father’s property).

The Meiri and the Hagahos Yavetz state this incident actually transpired on Erev Pesach. It is interesting that the Gemora uses a strange abbreviation for this. Rabbi Yosef Dov Karr and later I found this in the Mesifta Gemora explain that blood libels were common at the time of the Gemora and it would be a grave desecration of Hashem’s name if it would be known that Jews killed a young boy Erev Pesach as the idolaters would start persecutions of the Jews, and accuse the Jews of using the blood for the baking of matzah. The blood libels were marked by constant and unrelenting Christian persecution so it was understandable why an abbreviation was used. It is next to impossible to explain the accusations that were hurled at the Jews during this time. Jews were persecuted not only for being "Christ-killers" but as "baby-killers." The libels were not logical and occurred when a Jewish or Christian baby was killed. This is why the printers wrote this word in this manner.

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