Benefit of Techeiles

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 17a) asks: It is understandable that Tefilin straps were a reward (for this world as well), as the verse states, “And all of the nations of the land will see that the name of Hashem is upon you and they will fear you.” The braisa quotes Rabbi Elazar the Great as saying that this refers to the Tefilin that we wear on our heads. However, what (earthly) reward do we have from Techeiles?

The Gemora answers this question from a braisa. Rabbi Meir taught: Why was Techeiles singled out from all colors (to be used in tzitzis)? This is because Techeiles is a similar color to that of the ocean, which is similar to that of the sky, which is similar to that of the Throne of Glory. This is as the verse states, “And they saw the G-d of Israel, and under His feet was like something made out of a brick of sapphire, and like the purity of the sky.” The verse also states, “like the appearance of a sapphire stone is that of the Throne of Glory. [The Gemora’s answer seems to be that this merit benefits us in this world as well.]

Rashi explains that anyone who fulfills the mitzvah of tzitzis is regarded as if he received the Divine Presence. This is obviously beneficial to the person.

Rashi in Chulin (89a) explains differently. He says that when Hashem looks at His Throne of Glory, He is reminded of the mitzvah of Techeiles that is being performed by the Jewish people. And because of this, Hashem has compassion on Klal Yisroel.

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Halacha Trumps a Verse

Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael (Daf Yomi: Sotah 16a): There are three places that a halacha l’Moshe mi’Sinai trumps the simple meaning of a verse: The Torah states that the blood must be covered with earth, and yet, the halacha is that it may be covered with anything (providing that it is something in which plants can grow). The Torah forbids a nazir from cutting his hair with a razor, and yet, the halacha is that he may not cut it with anything. The Torah says that a get (bill of divorce) must be written on parchment, and yet, the halacha is that it can be written on anything.

The Vilna Gaon in Aderes Eliyahu quotes our Gemora and provides other examples besides those mentioned in our Gemora. It is written with respect to a Jewish slave [Shmos 21:6]: His master shall bring him to the judges, and he shall bring him to the door or to the doorpost, and his master shall bore his ear with a tool, and he shall serve him forever. Based upon the textual reading of the verse, the doorpost would be a valid place to bore his ear, but halacha overrides the verse. Rashi states: I might think that the doorpost is a valid place on which to bore the slave’s ear. Therefore, the Torah says [Devarim 15:17]: “And you shall thrust it into his ear and into the door.” This means that it should be “into the door,” but not “into the doorpost.” What then does “or to the doorpost” mean? The Torah is comparing “the door” to “the doorpost.” Just as the doorpost is upright (attached to the house), so too, the door must be upright. [If the door is detached, it may not be used for the ritual of ear boring.]

The Gaon continues by citing the Gemora in Makkos (22b): How foolish are those who rise for a Torah scroll (to honor it), but they do not rise for a Torah scholar.

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Sinner should not Gain

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 15a) cites a braisa: Rabbi Shimon said: In truth, the sinner’s minchah should require oil and levonah, for we do not want the sinner to gain. Why then does it not require them? It is because we do not want his minchah to be elegant.

The Gemora (Yoma 86b) states that repentance is so great that willful transgressions can be regarded as merits, providing that one is motivated to repent by love.

The question is asked: How can that be? Isn’t the sinner gaining?

The Maharsha answers: The Gemora does not mean that the sin itself converts into a merit; but rather, through his repentance out of love, he will merit performing other mitzvos and good deeds.

Reb Tzadok Hakohen answers: The sin does convert into a merit. This is because once a person has tasted the pleasure of a sin, it becomes more difficult for him to control himself and not sin again. If, after sinning, one can nevertheless restrain himself from transgressing again, he will merit that his sins are converted into merits.

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Moshe and Ba'al Pe'or

Rabbi Chama b’Rabbi Chanina says (Daf Yomi: Sotah 14a): Why was Moshe buried by the house of Pe’or (an idol)? In order to atone on what happened by Pe’or (the Jewish men were enticed by the Moabite women into depravity and idolatry).

Why was Moshe chosen to be buried there to atone for this sin? What level in greatness did Moshe possess that was being used as the counterbalance to Pe’or?

Reb Chaim Shmuelewitz states that the idolatry of Pe’or is the attribute of wantonness. It indicates that a person has no restraint and the feelings or rights of others do not concern him. [The procedure of serving this Avodah Zarah involved defecating before the idol.] He is solely interested in himself. This is why Moshe Rabbeinu was buried opposite Pe’or. Moshe is the epithet of what it means to be interested in his task and mission of leading Klal Yisroel, and his own personal concern is the farthest thing from his mind. Moshe is the faithful servant that Hashem has complete trust in him.

This is why he can receive the “klil tiferes,” - the crown of glory on his head. A king, when he temporarily removes his crown from his head (due to its weight or on account of the heat), will not place it on the head of his vice-minister for several reasons. If someone would walk in and observe that the king’s crown is on his head, they would assume that he is indeed the king. Furthermore, the vice-minister himself would entertain those feelings. The king, therefore, would place it on a “hook on the wall.” No one will consider that the hook became king. The Holy One, Blessed be He, can place His “crown of glory” on Moshe’s head, for he is the ultimate faithful servant. Moshe will not suppose that he became the king, and nobody who sees the crown on his head will think that way.

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Miriam's Steadfastness

It is written: Miriam the prophetess, sister of Aaron, took (her drum in her hand). The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 13a) asks: Was she the sister of Aaron, but not the sister of Moshe? Rav Amram said in the name of Rav, and others say that it was Rav Nachman in the name of Rav: This teaches us that Miriam was saying prophecy while she was only the sister of Aaron (before Moshe was born), and she said, “In the future, my mother will be giving birth to a son, who will save Klal Yisroel.” And once Moshe was born, the entire house became filled with light. Her father stood up and kissed her on her head. He said, “My daughter, your prophecy has been fulfilled.” But when Moshe was thrown into the water, he said to her, “My daughter, where has your prophecy gone?” And that is what’s written: His sister stood at a distance to find out what would happen with him. She wanted to know what would happen with her prophecy.

It was through this that Miriam merited that the entire Jewish people waited for her for seven days.

The commentators ask: What was so significant about waiting around to see how the matter would resolve itself? Wouldn’t any curious person wait around to see what might transpire?

Another question is asked: Why didn’t Yocheved, Moshe’s mother wait there as well to see what would happen with the prophecy?

Reb Meir Bergman writes that even with greatness of Yocheved, her faith in Hashem and her fear of God, at the time that Moshe was cast into the river; she thought that Moshe would certainly die there. This is why the Medrash says that Yocheved, after Moshe was thrown into the river, also asked Miriam, “where is your prophecy now?” According to the natural law, Moshe would not be saved and the river was destined to be his end. As a matter of fact, it took an unusual miracle for Moshe to be saved.

Miriam, on the other hand, was strong in her beliefs and she refused to budge. She received a prophecy that Moshe would be the savior of the Jewish people, and although the odds were not favorable, she knew that somehow, he would survive.

This is why she was rewarded so greatly. She was steadfast in her belief in Hashem that nothing could sway her.

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The Consumption of Non-Kosher Food Causing “Timtum”

The Gemora states (Daf Yomi: Sotah 12b): And his sister said to Pharaoh’s daughter, “Shall I go and call for you a wet-nurse from the Hebrew women?” The Gemora asks: Why was it necessary to summon a Hebrew woman? The Gemora answers: This teaches us that they handed Moshe to all the Egyptian women, but he would not nurse from them. He said: “Shall a mouth that is destined to speak with the Shechinah nurse from something which is not kosher?”

The question is asked: Why does the Gemora state this reason with respect to Moshe, when the halacha clearly rules that all Jews must refrain from having an idolater nurse their child, if a Jewish nurse is available (Rama Y”D 81:7)?
Maharatz Chayos suggests that this halacha only applied after the Giving of the Torah, for then many of the foods consumed by non-Jewish women are forbidden to Jews. Since this reason was not applicable to Moshe in Egypt, it was necessary to provide a different explanation for his refusal to be nursed by an Egyptian woman.

Shulchan Aruch rules that a Jewish baby is permitted to have a non-Jewish wet nurse; however it is not preferable because the non-kosher food will harm the baby spiritually. The Rama adds that a Jewish woman who must eat non-kosher food for health reasons should not nurse her baby because the non-kosher food will be detrimental for the child.

The Gra cites our Gemora that Moshe refused to nurse from an Egyptian woman because he was destined for prophecy, so it would be improper for him to consume non-kosher food. It would seem that the non-kosher food would have affected his soul, and disqualify him to be the Prophet that he became.

Reb Micha Berger gleans from here that non-kosher food is intrinsically harmful for a person’s soul even if it is permissible to eat.

He cites a Ran in his Drashos (11) that states this explicitly. In his discussion as to why halacha is decided by the Chachamim and not by the Prophets, he asks the following question: If a sage errs and permits a forbidden food, it is like a doctor who makes a mistake and gives a patient poison instead of medicine. In both cases, the person is harmed. Accordingly, wouldn’t it be preferable for the Prophets to decide halachic matters, and then, there would be no mistakes?

He answers that prophecy is not always available. He then adds that even though eating non-kosher food is harmful, the mitzvah of listening to our sages may offset the harmful effects. It is however evident from the Ran that the consumption of non-kosher food is objectively poison, and detrimental to one’s soul even if it is done permissibly.

The Abarbanel (Devarim 17:4) disagrees with the Ran. He maintains that it is impossible for harm to befall a person if he is following the Chachamim. If the food is permitted, it cannot be harmful. Reb Micha explains that it would seem from the Abarbanel that he maintains that the consumption of non-kosher food is not intrinsically harmful; rather, it is harmful only because it is prohibited. If for some reason, there is no prohibition, then it is not harmful.

Reb Moshe (O”C 2:88) quotes the Chasam Sofer where he was discussing a handicapped girl in the following situation: If she would remain at home, she would not develop properly and remain ignorant her entire life. However, if the parents would send her to a special school, they claimed that she would then reach the potential of a teenager. However, the school was in a non-Jewish area, and there was no possibility of providing kosher food. The Chasam Sofer ruled that it is permitted to send her there, but he recommended against sending her, for the following reason: If they send her to that school, she will become intelligent enough to be obligated in mitzvos. The non-kosher food that she will consume will affect her heart, and she will probably violate Torah and mitzvos. It is therefore preferable for her to remain in her present situation. (He concludes: Her present situation is more preferable than being “b’timtum” before the Holy One, Blessed is He for one moment.)

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Abortions

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 11b) cites a braisa: “Shifrah” is Yocheved; and why was her name called Shifrah? It was because she straightened the limbs of the baby. Another explanation of Shifrah is that the Jewish people were fruitful and multiplied in her days. “Pu’ah” is Miriam; and why was her name called Pu’ah? It was because she would coo to the child. Another explanation of Pu’ah is that she used to cry out through the Divine Spirit and say, “My mother will bear a son who will be the savior of Israel.”

The Maharal (Gur Aryeh) asks: Why does the Torah refer to Yocheved and Miriam as Shifra and Pu’ah, rather than referring to them by their actual names? He explains that prior to the birth of Moshe, the Torah did not want to give any recognition to his family members, especially his parents, because that would indicate that Moshe’s parents were responsible for who he was. Although normally the merits and contributions of the parents form the child, and without these specific parents, the child will not exist; by Moshe, this was not the case. Moshe’s existence was not dependent on Amram and Yocheved as his parents. Moshe was already set and destined from the six days of creation to lead the Jews out of Egypt. That is why the Torah doesn’t even mention Amram and Yocheved when describing Moshe’s birth.

The Chasam Sofer (Torah Moshe), with Reb Avi Lebowitz’s (Heoros – Insights on the Daf) elucidation explains that Pharaoh specifically requested of the Jewish women to murder the children, rather than asking the non-Jewish midwives, because he realized that the Jewish woman do not receive capital punishment for performing an abortion, whereas the non-Jewish woman do. Pharaoh wanted them to use the sign of “stones” to determine when the labor will begin, so that they can be present, and then use the dependable sign of which way the child is facing to determine if it is a boy or a girl, and to abort all the boys before the head comes out while it still has a status of a fetus. Pharaoh’s applied the following logic: Normally one is not allowed to commit murder to save their own life because “who says that your blood is redder than the other one?”, but this would only apply to a murder of a “life.” For an idolater, even the fetus has the status of “life,” since they receive capital punishment for performing an abortion, and the logic of “who says etc.” would apply equally to murder and abortion. But for the Jewish women, the fetus was not considered a full “life,” since they are not liable for abortion, and therefore they should be able to determine that their lives are more precious than that of the child. They would therefore abort the fetus to fulfill the command of the king and save their own lives. However, when confronted by Pharaoh for not following through with this partial birth abortion, their claim was that by the time they arrived, the fetus was fully born, and they were not allowed to kill a born child, even if it would cost them their own lives.

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Preventing Intermarriage

It is written: And they were disgusted because of the Children of Israel. This teaches us that the Jewish people were like thorns in the eyes of the Egyptians (when they saw that the Jewish people were increasing).

It is noteworthy that when we read this portion from the Torah on Mondays and Thursdays, we conclude one of the aliyos with this verse.

The question is asked that the halacha is that we do not end an aliyah on a bad note. Why therefore would we conclude with this verse, which demonstrates the hatred that the Egyptians had for the Jewish people?

The Mattersdorfer Rav, at an Agudah Convention, once answered that on the contrary! The fact that the Egyptians despised the Jews was a blessing. It was through this that the Jews were able to maintain their Jewish identity, and ultimately, this is what brought about the redemption. The Jewish people were able to keep their distance from the Egyptians. This prevented assimilation. When the idolaters befriend the Jews and begin mingling with them, this can have catastrophic results.

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One Sixty-fourth

Rav Chiya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav (Daf Yomi: Sotah 5a): A Torah scholar should have one eighth of an eighth of haughtiness (so that lighthearted people should not play with him and that they will accept his rulings).

The Sheiris Hapeleitah explains this precise measurement as follows: The Gemora in Bava Basra (73b) states that Mount Tabor was four parasangs (parsa’os) high. A parsah is four mil. A mil consists of two thousand amos. Accordingly, a parsah is eight thousand amos. It emerges that Mount Tabor is thirty-two thousand amos high. Chazal tell us that Mount Sinai was five hunred amos tall, which is precisely one sixty-fourth of Mount Tabor.

The following question may be asked: If the Holy One, Blessed be He did not wish to give the Torah on Mount Tabor, for it was haughty, why did He give the Torah on a mountain at all? The Torah could have been given on a flatland, where there would be no concern for haughtiness whatsoever! It was given on Mount Sinai, a mountain which its height was one sixty-fourth of Mount Tabor to teach us that a Torah scholar should possess this small measure of haughtiness.

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His Right from his Left

In the city of Dvinsk, there was a very prestigious and scholarly man named Reb Leib. He was referred to as Reb Leib Charif, the sharp one, due to his intelligent insights in torah. He was extremely close to Reb Meir Simcha, the Ohr Sameach, and they would spend many hours in each others company discussing Torah matters together.

There was once an incident where they were both sitting in the Beis Medrash when a different scholar was delivering a lecture to thirty laymen. Reb Leib heard how the scholar was explaining a certain topic to them and immediately asked a penetrating question that the scholar was incapable of answering.

Reb Meir Simcha arose from his designated seat near the eastern wall, walked to the back of the Beis Medrash and admonished Reb Leib: “Someone that doesn’t know between his right and his left, should be asking questions in the middle of a lecture?” Reb Leib was quiet, left the Beis Medrash in embarrassment and the scholar continued on with his lecture.

All those that witnessed the incident were bewildered. Is it possible that Reb Leib Charif could ask a question that was not fit to be asked? What did he do so terrible that caused Reb Meir Simcha to react in such a manner?

Reb Leib was puzzled as well and he went to Reb Meir Simcha’s house to inquire of him why he took such offense with his question, which was seemingly a legitimate one.

Reb Meir Simcha told him: “Did I say that your question was not a valid one? No, I did not. I was repeating a Gemora in Moed Katan (and in Sotah as well).”

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One who appraises his conduct (he considers the loss he might incur by performing a mitzva against the eternal reward that the mitzva will bring, and the benefit he may obtain by committing a sin against the tremendous loss that will result) will merit in seeing the salvation of Klal Yisroel through Hashem. He cites a verse in Tehillim [50:23]: Vesam derech arenu beyasha Elokim, And to him that sets his way, I will show the salvation of Hashem. Do not read it as Vesam (and to him that sets), rather, read it as Vesham, and one who appraises his way.

Rabbi Yannai had a student who would consistently ask questions during the lecture. On the Shabbos of the festival (within thirty days of the festival, the scholars would teach and discuss the laws of the festival), the student wouldn’t challenge Rabbi Yannai (since there were many people attending and if Rabbi Yannai wouldn’t know how to respond, he would be embarrassed). Rabbi Yannai said in reference to him: And to him that appraises his way, I will show the salvation of Hashem (due to the student’s careful calculation).

Reb Meir Simcha concluded: “You, Reb Leib, should have been cognizant of the difference between the right and the left of the letter sin; it was written vesam, with the letter sin, which has the dot on the left and the Gemora expounds it to mean vesham, with the letter shin, which has the dot on the right. Vesham means that one should appraise his ways and calculate his every move and word. When this scholar was lecturing in front of thirty laymen, you should not have asked a question that quite possibly could embarrass him.

(Margoliyos HaShas – Moed Katan)

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Ben Azzai

Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan (Daf Yomi: Sotah 4b): All of these Tannaim figured out the length of a seclusion based upon their own experience (how long it took each of them to perform the initial act of cohabitation with their own wife).

The Gemora asks: But Ben Azzai never got married (based upon the Gemora in Yevamos 63b, where Ben Azzai explained why he did not marry: “What should I do? My soul desires the Torah. The world can survive through other people.”)?

The Gemora answers: You could say that he got married and later divorced.

Alternatively, you can say that he heard this opinion from his teacher.

And if you prefer, you can say that “The secrets of Hashem are revealed to those that fear him.”

Rabbeinu Avraham min Ha’har explains that due to Ben Azzai’s tremendous desire to study Torah, he did not experience any unclean thoughts, and was therefore not obligated to get married.

Reb Elchanan Wasserman states that Ben Azzai was exempt from the mitzvah of marrying, for he was unable to cease studying Torah even for one moment.

Reb Yosef Engel writes that Ben Azzai discharged his obligation of procreation through his new insights in Torah. This is based upon the Gemora in Brochos (47b), which states that two torah scholars studying together can be regarded as three with respect to the laws of Birchas Hamazon (they could make a mezumen, even though the halacha is that three people are needed). The Rosh explains that the Torah that they are studying is regarded as the third person.

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Spirit of Foolishness

Rish Lakish says (Daf Yomi:Sotah 3a): A person does not sin unless a spirit of foolishness enters him.

Reb Chaim Shmuelitz asks: If so, why should a man be guilty for committing a transgression? If a spirit of foolishness entered him, it should be regarded as if it was unavoidable and he should be exempt from any punishment! It should be compared to a person who is standing on the edge of a pit and a strong wind blows and he falls into the pit. Is that his fault?

Reb Chaim explains that yes it is! It was his fault that he was even in the vicinity of the edge of the pit. Immediately, when he realized that he was near the boundary of the pit, he should have distanced himself from there. If he would have been far away from the pit, no wind, no matter how strong, would have been able to propel him into the pit. So too, it is with the spirit of foolishness that enters a person and causes him to sin. He obviously was too close to the sin in the first place that when a spirit of foolishness entered him, it was able to overpower him and cause him to sin.

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Heavenly Voice Regarding Marriage

The Gemora states: Every day, a Heavenly voice pronounces: “The daughter of this individual is designated for that man.”

Why when it is referring to the woman does it say, “The daughter of this man,” and when it is referring to the man, it says “that man”?

Tal Chaim answers: The Torah gives the right to the father to marry off his daughter and to receive the money; this right does not apply for his son.

Others answer based on Tosfos, which states that this Heavenly voice is issued forty days before the formation of the boy. At this point in time, the girl is not in existence yet and therefore it only mentions her father.

Kometz Mincha offers an alternative answer: The Gemora Bava Basra (109b) states that a man should investigate the woman’s father and her family. Regarding a woman, on the other hand, the Gemora in Kiddushin (7a) states: A woman would rather grow old together with a husband than alone; no matter whom the man might be, and therefore his family is not mentioned.

Sotah during Sefirah

It is written in the sefer, Minchas Ha’omer that it is fitting to learn Tractate Sotah, which contains forty-nine blat during the days of Sefirah, when we are counting forty-nine days.

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An Idolater is Stricter than a Jew

The Rishonim ask: It is evident from our Gemora that according to the one that holds that an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, can only Rabbinically pronounce a vow, but Biblically, it will not be effective; nevertheless, with respect to an idolater, an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, may pronounce a vow and it will be Biblically binding. Why would this be? How can an idolater be more stringent that a Jew?

The Mefaresh explains that there are other examples where we find that the law is stricter with an idolater than it is with respect of a Jew. The Mishna in Bava Kamma teaches us that if the ox of idolater gores an animal belonging to a Jew, the idolater is liable to pay full damages, even if the ox gored for the first time. A Jew, however, whose ox gores for the first time, will only be liable to pay half-damages.

Tosfos suggests the following: A Jewish adult is subject to the prohibition against desecrating his word. Accordingly, we expound that any Jew who is not included in this prohibition cannot pronounce a vow. A minor, who is not subject to this commandment, cannot therefore utter a vow, which would be Biblically valid. An idolater, however, who is not included in this prohibition, cannot be excluded from pronouncing a vow based on this, and therefore, even a minor’s vow would be Biblically binding.

It is evident from Tosfos that the prohibition against desecrating his word is not applicable to an idolater. The Mishna L’melech cites proofs that an idolater is obligated to keep his word based upon the prohibition against desecrating his word.

The Ohr Sameach answers this question by citing the Chasam Sofer, who says that any idolater, even a minor is obligated to observe their commandments. This explains why with respect to idolaters, an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, can pronounce a vow and it will be Biblically valid, whereas a Jewish minor cannot. By an idolater, there is no distinction whatsoever between a minor and an adult. Proof to this is from the Rosh, who states that the guidelines for a minor to reach adulthood are learned from an oral tradition that was transmitted to Moshe at Sinai with respect to all measurements. These laws were given to the Jewish people; not for the idolaters.

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Accepting Charity from an Idolater

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 62a) cites a Scriptural source to teach us that an idolater can vow vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings just like Jews.

The Haga’os Ashri (in Bava Basra) brings the following question in the name of the Maharich: Why are we not allowed to accept charity from an idolater, but we are permitted to accept his korbanos?

He answers in the name of his Rebbe: A voluntary korban is not brought to serve as atonement, and therefore, we are not concerned if they offer a sacrifice, for those do not bring about forgiveness and they will not serve as a protection for them. However, one who gives charity receives atonement for his sins, and merits protection for his good deed. It is not in our best interests to assist them in this matter.

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Depilatory

Rami bar Chama’s Inquiry

Rami bar Chama inquired (Daf Yomi: Nazir 61a): Is the reason that these four shavings are done because of the mitzvah of shaving, or is the purpose merely to remove the hair? The difference between these two reasons is whether or not they can be done with a depilatory. If they have the same laws as shaving when it is a mitzvah, it must be done with a razor. If it is just a matter of removing the hair, it can be done with a cream. What is the law?

Rami bar Chama’s question cannot be with respect to all the shavings, for a metzora and a nazir tahor are definitely required to shave with a razor. His inquiry can only be relevant to a nazir tamei.

Furthermore, Tosfos explains, he cannot be discussing the precise case of the braisa, for there, all four shavings must be done with a razor, since we are uncertain which of the four shavings is for the nazir tamei. He must be referring to a case where it was definitely known that the nazir was tamei. In truth, Rami bar Chama could have inquired simply: Does the shaving of a nazir tamei require a razor or not!

The Gemora brings a proof from the braisa which explicitly states that four shavings are required. Tosfos explains: Since in the braisa’s case, he would not be permitted to drink wine until after the fourth shaving; if a razor would not be necessary for the shaving of a nazir tamei, we would not have required a razor for the third shaving out of the concern that he might be concluding his nezirus with this shaving.

Depilatory

The Rambam rules that a nazir who shaves will receive lashes, whether he used a razor, and even if a different type of implement was used. However, if he used a depilatory, he will not incur lashes; rather, he will have negated the nazir’s positive commandment of growing his hair.

The Brisker Rav notes that it is evident from the Rambam that using a depilatory does not constitute a shaving at all! Accordingly, Rami bar Chama’s inquiry regarding a nazir tamei is not merely if a razor is required for his shaving; rather, his inquiry is if a nazir tamei has an obligation to shave! Perhaps, it is not necessary for him to shave at all; as long as his hair is removed, that is sufficient.

Based on this understanding, we can understand Rava’s proof from the braisa which states that a nazir, who might be tamei, is obligated to “shave” four times. The Gemora had stated earlier that he must shave four times, and not less, because one shaving cannot count for the other. This would only be understandable if a nazir tamei has an obligation to shave. However, if the halacha merely is that the hair of a nazir tamei must be removed, and this can even be done by means of a depilatory, which does not constitute a shaving at all, it would not be necessary to require a special shaving for the nazir tamei. When he shaves his hair for the tzaraas, it should automatically be valid for his “removal of hair,” needed for a nazir tamei. By the fact that the braisa rules that four shavings are required and not one of them can count for the other, this proves that a nazir tamei also has a mitzvah of shaving, and therefore, a depilatory may not be used.

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Two for One

Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai said (Daf Yomi: Nazir 60b): The shaving of a nazir, whether he is tahor or tamei cannot count for the shaving of a metzora. This, he explains, is because each of the shavings are different than the other (either because one is to remove hair and one is to grow hair, or because one is before the korbanos and one is afterwards, or because one is after immersion in a mikvah and the other is before immersion).

Shulchan Aruch rules that on Purim, one must cease from learning Torah in order to go and hear the Megillah.

The Beis Efraim asked the son of the Noda B’Yehuda as to why this would be considered bitul Torah. Isn’t the reading of the Megillah also considered learning?

The Chachmas Shlomo answers according to our Gemora, which states that one action cannot count for two different things. If he will be intending to fulfill the mitzvah of studying Torah, it cannot count for the mitzvah of reading the Megillah. And if he intends to discharge his obligation for reading the Megillah, it cannot count for learning Torah. This is why it is regarded as bitul Torah. (This, he says, is according to those that rule that one needs intent in order to discharge his obligation; it is impossible to have in mind for two mitzvos when he is only performing one action.)

This answer is perplexing in light of the halacha that one who recites kerias shema is also fulfilling his mitzvah of studying Torah! We see that one action can accomplish two things.

The Beis Efraim maintains that one who reads the Megillah or listens to it will not be fulfilling a mitzva of studying Torah. The Avnei Neizer (O”C 517) disagrees with him vehemently to such an extent that he writes: “I do not believe that those words came out of the mouth from such a righteous person as the Beis Efraim.”

Reb Chaim Voloziner talks at great length that there is a concept of neglecting to study Torah in depth and not only time. According to this, the Gemora can be explained to mean that even though reading the Megillah is considered learning, nonetheless it would be regarded as bitul Torah since he is not delving into the depths of Torah; if not for the special halacha that one is obligated to close the Gemora and hear the Megillah.

The Beis Efraim himself speculates that perhaps one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of learning Torah through the reading of the Megillah because it is part of Tefillah. This is based on the viewpoint of the Beis Yosef, who rules regarding one who had forgotten to recite birchas hatorah in the morning. The blessing of Ahava Rabbah can be utilized as a birchas hatorah, providing that he learns immediately after Shemoneh Esrei. The recital of kerias shema will not be sufficient because that is part of Tefillah. Perhaps, the same logic can be used for the reading of the Megillah.

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Wearing the Clothing of a Woman

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said (Daf Yomi: Nazir 59a): How do we know that a woman shall not go out wearing weapons of war? It is because it’s written: A man’s attire shall not be on a woman. And the verse, nor may a man wear a woman’s garment teaches us that a man is prohibited from beautifying himself with the adornments of a woman (included in this prohibition would be the removal of his hair).

The Beis Yosef rules that even according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, the Torah only forbade something that is in the open and recognizable to all; however, something that is hidden from the eye, it will only be Rabbinically forbidden. Therefore, he explains, that although the Rambam rules according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, it is not Biblically forbidden to shave the hair by the underarms and the pubic area, for that is something that is not seen.

The Bach wonders where the Beis Yosef saw such a distinction in the Gemora.

The Bach himself explains the Rambam as follows: Only things which are done for the sake of beauty is forbidden. This is why it would be Biblically forbidden for a man to wear make-up, eye shadow or wear colorful garments of a woman; however, shaving his body hairs is only removing things that are repulsive to him. That is why the Rambam rules that it is only Rabbinically forbidden.

The Bach rules that it is permitted for a man to wear the clothing of a woman if his purpose is not to appear like a woman. It is therefore permitted for a man to wear a woman’s clothing in order to protect himself from the rain or to shield him from the sun.

The Shach qualifies this ruling to be referring only to the embellishments of a woman; however, if he wears a woman’s garment in a manner that it would not be recognizable that he is a man, even the Bach would prohibit this.

The Darkei Moshe rules that this prohibition is not applicable on Purim. A man may wear the garment of a woman and a woman may wear the garment of a man. He explains: Whenever there is a custom for a man and a woman to wear the same clothing, there is no prohibition. (This is why the Rashba rules that in a place where it was the custom for the men to remove the hair by their underarms, there is no prohibition.) Since on Purim, it became the custom to switch clothing, there is no prohibition. Additionally, since it is being done for the joy of Purim, it is permitted.

The Yereim writes that a man may not wear a woman’s clothing, even if it just temporary and even if it is being done just for fun. The Mishna Berura rules like this.

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Reasons for a Mitzvah

The Tur (Y”D 181) cites the Rambam who writes that the Torah prohibits rounding the corners of one’s head and destroying one’s beard because it was the practice of idolaters.

The Tur writes that we do not need to seek out the reasons for mitzvos, for they are the King’s commandments, even if we do not understand the reason.

The Beis Yosef defends the Rambam, and he writes that there is no one who is concerned for the honor of the Torah and its mitzvos more than the Rambam. Although the laws of the Torah can be decrees from the King, nevertheless, wherever a reason for the mitzvah is found, it may be said. Whenever a reason cannot be found, it should be attributed to our shallow understanding. We are, nonetheless, obligated to fulfill those mitzvos that we do not understand its reasons in the same manner as we are obligated to fulfill those mitzvos that we do understand.

He concludes that the Rambam did not think up the reason for these mitzvos himself; rather, he saw from the juxtaposition of the verses that this is the reason for these prohibitions.

The Rama explains the Tur: Heaven forbid to think that the Tur suspected the Rambam to mean that if one does not understand the rationale for a mitzvah, he is not obligated to fulfill it. No sage will believe such a thing! However, those heretics who deny the truth of the Torah only believe in a mitzvah that they understand its reason. Rather, the following is the way that the Tur understood the Rambam: It is only if one shaves his head or destroys his beard in the same manner that the idolaters do; that is when one has transgressed this prohibition. The Tur writes that it is forbidden in any fashion whatsoever. Since the reason is not explicit in the Torah, the prohibition always applies. There is no room for leniency in a place where the reason is not applicable!

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Merely Growing his Hair

Rav Sheravya asks from our Mishna, which stated that he does not have to redo the days of nezirus that he had already observed and he can start counting right away. Now, if the Mishna is referring to a case of a thirty-day nezirus, how can it rule that he does not forfeit the days that he had already observed? He needs to count another thirty days in order for him to have a thirty-day growth of hair! It must be referring to a case where he declared a long nezirus, but the Mishna states that he can start counting right away. [This implies that the days of tzaraas are not counted towards his term of nezirus. This is direct contrast to Rav Chisda’s ruling!]

Rav Sheravya himself answers the question: The Mishna is referring to a case where he declared to be a nazir for fifty days, and he became a metzora after twenty days. He must undergo the purification process for a metzora and then he counts another thirty days, for then he will have a thirty-day growth of hair.

Tosfos notes that the Gemora could have stated a case where he declared to be a nazir for forty days, and he became a metzora after ten days. He must undergo the purification process for a metzora and then he counts another thirty days, for then he will have a thirty-day growth of hair.

The Brisker Rav asks: Couldn’t the Mishna be referring to a case where he declared to be a nazir for one hundred days, and he became a metzora after seventy days. He would not forfeit the original days, and the days that he was a metzora will not count towards his nezirus, for he needs to have a thirty-day growth of hair. When the purification process is completed, he will be compelled to count another thirty days!

He answers that if there are not thirty days remaining from the time that the purification process is completed, the days that he was a metzora will not count at all, and the days that he observes afterwards will be days of an actual nezirus; not only days where he is growing his hair. This is true only if he did not have a fulfillment of thirty days before he became a metzora; however, if he became a metzora after thirty days, then even if when the purification process is completed, he does not have thirty days remaining, the days that he was a metzora counts towards the nezirus, and the days of waiting afterwards are merely days where he is growing his hair. They are not regarded as days of nezirus!

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Leaving Eretz Yisroel

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir Daf 55a) cited a braisa: If one enters the land of the nations inside of a carriage, chest or closet, Rebbe rules that he is tamei and Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that he is tahor.

The Gemora suggested that the basis for their argument is as follows: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that since traveling inside a chest is uncommon, the Rabbis did not intend for the decree to apply in such a situation. Rebbe holds that although it is unusual, the Rabbis decreed tumah in this case as well.

The question is asked: How can this be their argument? Do we not find all throughout Gemora that the Rabbis did not intend that their decree should be applicable in cases that are uncommon? We do not find any Tanna that disagrees with this principle! Why in this specific case would they dispute this well-established principle?

The Mishna L’melech answers: In this case, the Rabbis decreed a tumah on anyone entering the land of the nations, even if they enter in an unusual manner. This is because they wished to prevent people from leaving Eretz Yisroel. Their original decree was on all situations!

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Mummies and Kohanim Entering the Land of the Nations

By: Reb Avi Lebovitz (Heoros al Hadaf)

The Mishna L'melech (Avel 3:1) has a teshuva where he discusses Kohanim going into the mummy business. He begins by saying that although they may consist of very dry bones, theywill still transmit tumah. However, his reason to be lenient is based on the opinion of the Yerai'im that we follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai that aside from idolaters not transmitting tumah through roof association, they also do not transmit tumah via “touching.” (Tosafos 54a clearly rejects this and says that even according to Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, they will transmit tumah via “touching.”) Based on the combination of the Yerai'im, and the Ra'avad who says that any Kohen who is already tamei (even after he separates from the corpse) has no prohibition of becoming tamei again, the Mishna L’melech creates a s'fek sfeika (double doubt) to be lenient, but eventually rejects it, since it is clear from the many places, including our Tosfos, in the name of Rabbeinu Chaim Cohen that a Kohen cannot make himself tamei even if he is already a tamei meis.

The issue that is related to our Gemora is that the Gemora in Avoda Zara (13a) says that a Kohen cannot enter into the Land of the Nations except for a mitzvah because of the decree of tumah on the Land of the Nations. The Rambam in Hilchos Ohalos (2:3) seems to understand that the concern of the Land of the Nations is because of the fetuses of idolaters that are buried there. This would clearly indicate that there is at least a prohibition of touching and carrying for Kohanim even related to the corpses of idolaters. However, the Mishna L'melech rejects this proof based on Tosfos, who says that the decree of tumah on the Land of the Nations is due to “the many Jews that were killed outside of Eretz Yisroel,” not because of the idolaters.

Practically speaking, what happened to the prohibition for a Kohen to go from Eretz Yisroel to the Land of the Nations (other than for mitzvah purposes)? The Shulchan Aruch (369) rules that a Kohen cannot go into the Land of the Nations, but the Shach (3) writes that it only applies when Eretz Yisroel is presumed to be in a state of taharah, but nowadays, this does not apply. This opinion is also quoted in the b'er hagola from the maharshal. The Shevus Yakov (brought in pischei teshuva) argues and claims that it applies even nowadays. Reb Akiva Eiger justifies the custom to be lenient about this, either because “sustaining one’s family” is a significant enough of a mitzvah (but this would not justify those who travel to chutz la'aretz for vacation) or because we are all tamei meisim. The second rationale seems to be either based on the opinion of the Ra’avad that the prohibition of tumas meis in general only applies when the Kohen is tahor, and although we are not lenient for a Biblical tumah, we rely on the Ra'avad for the Land of the Nations, which is only Rabbinical. But more likely he means to say that the entire decree of the Land of the Nations is in order to maintain the taharah of the Kohen, and it would not apply when the Kohen is a tamei meis.

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Kohen’s Sanctity based upon his Service

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 49) answers: Both words are necessary. For if the Torah would have only written for his father (that the nazir may not become tamei to), we would have thought that it is only the father that he cannot become tamei to for there is merely a presumption of paternity (for perhaps his mother committed adultery), but regarding his mother, whom we know gave birth to him, he could become tamei to her (the Torah therefore has to write “his mother” to teach us that he cannot become tamei to her). And if the Torah would have only written for his mother (that the nazir may not become tamei to), we would have thought that it is only the mother that he cannot become tamei to for her children’s lineage is not reckoned through her, but regarding his father, where the halacha is that family is determined by the father, he could become tamei to him (the Torah therefore has to write “his father” to teach us that he cannot become tamei to him).

The following question is asked: Why is the fact that we cannot prove for certain that the Kohen Gadol’s father is truly his father grounds to suggest that the Kohen Gadol may not become tamei to his father? If his father is not his actual father, for that very reason he should be permitted to become tamei to him! If the deceased man (a Kohen) is not his father, the Kohen Gadol is in all probability a Yisroel! Why would we think that he cannot become tamei to him, for he might not be his father? That is precisely the reason why he should be able to become tamei to him!

The Rashba ask a similar question on the Toras Kohanim (Parshas Emor). The verse states that an ordinary Kohen is permitted to become tamei to his father and mother. The Toras Kohanim notes that had the verse said only that he may become tamei to his mother, we might have thought that he would be forbidden to become tamei to his father, because his father is only his father based upon a presumption. He asks that the possibility that the man is not his father should not be a reason to forbid him from becoming tamei to him. On the contrary, it is precisely the reason to permit him to become tamei to him, because if this man is not his father, he is not a Kohen altogether!

The Chasam Sofer (based on Rishonim) explains it as follows: We are dealing with a case where this man was presumed to be a Kohen. He performed the service in the Beis Hamikdosh for many years. When his father dies, if not for the fact that the Torah explicitly permits him to become tamei to him, it would be forbidden. Even though on the chance that the deceased is not his father, he would be a Yisroel, he still would be forbidden to become tamei to him. This is because the verse states: You shall sanctify him, for he offers up the food offering of your God. Since he was allowed to perform the service in the Beis Hamikdosh (based on the presumption that he is indeed a Kohen), he is forbidden to contaminate himself with corpse tumah, even if he is a Yisroel. His sanctity comes about because of his service. This would be the explanation in our Gemora as well.

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The Nazir's Allowance to Become Tamei

It is evident from the Rambam in Hilchos Nezirus (7:12) that the reason that a nazir may become tamei to a meis mitzvah is because of the mitzvah of burial. However, from Tosfos, it would seem that there is a different reason. Tosfos writes that it is permitted for the nazir to move the corpse from the sun to the shade. This would indicate that the allowance for the nazir to become tamei is not on account of the mitzvah of burial, but rather it is due to the obligation of respecting the dead.

The Rogatchover Gaon notes the following distinction between the two reasons: If a father imposed nezirus upon his son, and the son, as a minor, comes upon a meis mitzvah. If the reason for the permission to becoming tamei is because of the mitzvah of burial, a minor who is not obligated in mitzvos, would not be allowed to become tamei to the corpse. However, if the allowance is based upon respecting the dead, the minor would also be obligated to bury him, for he is also responsible to see that a corpse does not lie in degradation.

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Nezirus from Birth

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir Daf 47) states: A Kohen Gadol and nazir cannot become tamei to their relatives, but they can become tamei to a meis mitzvah. If they were traveling together and they happened across a meis mitzvah, (who should become tamei)? Rabbi Eliezer says: The Kohen Gadol should become tamei and not the nazir. The Chachamim say: The nazir should become tamei instead of even an ordinary Kohen becoming tamei. Rabbi Eliezer told them: Let a Kohen become tamei as he does not have to bring a korban for becoming tamei, and do not let the nazir become tamei, as he will have to bring a korban! They answered him: Better that the nazir should become tamei, as his holiness is not forever, as opposed to a Kohen, whose holiness is forever!

The Tosfos Yom Tov asks in the name of his son: We learned above (28b) that a father can impose upon his son a nezirus vow, and he is even allowed to render him a permanent nazir, like we find by Shmuel. It emerges that a nazir can be a nazir forever! Why did the Mishna not differentiate between a nazir forever and an ordinary nazir? The halacha that the nazir should become tamei before the Kohen Gadol should only apply by an ordinary nazir!

The Tosfos Yom Tov answers: We are compelled to say that the nezirus does not take effect immediately upon birth, for as long as the son does not know how to be careful with respect to the halachos of nezirus, how can he be rendered a nazir? And even though, when he is first born and his mother is watching him in a crib, but as soon as he is capable of walking, his mother’s surveillance will not be sufficient, for she is preoccupied with her daily chores. Not everyone has the means to hire a full-time babysitter, who will ensure and guarantee that the child will not violate any of the laws of nezirus. We therefore must say that nezirus does not become effective upon the child until he reaches the age of chinuch, where he has the ability himself to make certain that he will not violate the halachos of nezirus. It emerges that there is no case where someone can be a nazir forever, and a Kohen is therefore regarded as one who has a higher level of sanctity.

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Once a Nazir; Always a Nazir

It is written: And afterwards, the nazir may drink wine. The Gemora cites several opinions as to when precisely is he permitted to drink wine and become tamei to the dead. According to one opinion, he only has to wait until after one of the korbanos have been brought, and according to another opinion, he is required to wait until all the korbanos have been brought.

The question is asked: Why does the Torah say that the nazir is permitted to drink wine? He is no longer a nazir!

Reb Moshe Feinstein answers that the inspiration that a nazir attains from abstaining from some of the worldly pleasures remains with him his entire life. Although the halachos of nezirus no longer apply to him, he is nevertheless in an elevated state, similar to the sanctity he had imposed upon himself during the term of his nezirus.

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Post # 1,500!!! Reciting Korbanos in the Morning and the Reason for the Nazir's Chatas

Shulchan Aruch (O”C 1:5) rules that it is beneficial to recite every morning the portions in the Torah dealing with the korban olah, mincha, shelamim, chatas and asham.

The Magen Avraham asks: Shouldn’t the chatas be mentioned before the olah, since the chatas always takes precedence?

The Chidah offers the following answer: The Gemora in Menachos (110a) states that whoever recites the portion in the Torah discussing the korban chatas is recognized as if he offered a chatas on the Altar. This, he explains, is only applicable to the portions of the korban which are burned on the Altar; however, with respect to the portion that is given to the Kohanim, and that which they eat which provides atonement for the owner, the recital of the relevant verses does not help for this. Therefore, he says, that which our Gemora said that a chatas takes precedence over an olah, that is only with respect to the sacrifice; however, with respect to the recital of the korbanos, it is preferable to recite the olah portion prior to the portion dealing with the chatas. When one recites the verses of the chatas, he only receives credit for the portion that was to be brought on the Altar, but he does not receive credit for the portion of the korban which was to be eaten by the Kohanim; however, with the recital of the olah verses, it is regarded as if he offered the entire korban, for an olah is completely burned on the Altar. This is the reason that the olah is recited before the chatas.

The Nazir’s Chatas

The nazir brings three animals; a chatas, olah and a shelamim.

It is not explained why a nazir brings a korban chatas. The Ramban writes that it is for the following reason: A nazir separates himself to serve Hashem in a manner of extreme sanctity. It is only fitting, that after he has reached such a high level, he should strive to remain on that level for the remainder of his life. Since he concluded his nezirus and he reverted back to the desires of this world, he is required to offer a korban chatas to atone for this reversal.

The Meshech Chochmah writes that the accepting of nezirus upon oneself results in the forfeiture of many mitzvos, such as involving himself with the burial of his close relatives, reciting kiddush over wine and making havdalah. Although, a nazir accomplishes much in his abstainment and he is considered praiseworthy for this, he nevertheless is required to bring a korban chatas to atone for the mitzvos that he has lost.

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The Nazir's Barber and Hair that will be Cut Off

The Torah states, “A razor should not pass over his head.” This can be read as not allowing a razor to be passed over his head by anyone, whether it is him or someone else.

The Rishonim learn that the one who gives the nazir a haircut has violated this prohibition.

The Haflaah asks: How do we know from this verse that the one who gives the haircut has violated this prohibition? Perhaps it is the nazir who is transgressing by allowing the other fellow to give him a haircut, but the “barber” has not violated anything!

Hair that will be cut off is still not a Chatzitzah

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 44b) cites a braisa: If he cuts his hair on the eighth day, he brings his korbanos on the ninth day.

Rava explains that the braisa is talking about a case where he did not go the mikvah on the seventh day.

It is evident from this Gemora that the immersion of a nazir is valid, even though it occurred prior to his haircut! One might argue that his hair should be regarded as a chatzitzah (interposition), since it will shortly be cut off.

The Chasam Sofer (Y”D 195) derives from here the following halacha: Although a bride will be shaving her hair immediately after she marries (for her head will be covered), nevertheless her hair is not regarded as a chatzitzah when she immerses in the mikvah before her marriage.

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Buried on the Land where he Died

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 43b) states that if a person dies and has no one to bury him, he is considered a meis mitzvah. The halacha is that he is buried on the land where he died, even if the land is privately owned. This is one of the ten conditions that Yehoshua made upon the division of Eretz Yisroel.

Why did Yehoshua make such a condition? Would it not be more appropriate to bury a person in a regular cemetery? The Chazon Ish writes that there was a concern that one who dies without relatives would be left to the devices of other people who would neglect the dead body on the road, thus leaving the corpse unprotected. Yehoshua therefore decreed that a person who dies and has no one to attend to his burial should be buried where the body was found.

The Taz and Shach write that nowadays in lands outside of Eretz Yisroel, we must bury an unattended corpse in the cemetery, because even if the person was buried at the site of his death, we are not certain that the site will be undisturbed.

Perhaps there is another aspect to burying an unattended corpse at the site of his death. It is said: v’chiper admaso amo, and He will appease His Land and His people, and this can be interpreted to mean that the land itself atones for the person. Burial is a sign of respect for the dead body, and although one normally buries a corpse in a cemetery, Eretz Yisroel is unique that anywhere in the Land is considered a respectful location. This would explain why Yehoshua was the one who set this condition, because the condition was unique for Eretz Yisroel.

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Distinction between a Kohen and a Nazir

The halachic distinction between a nazir and a Kohen is noteworthy. A nazir is forbidden to become tamei to anyone, including his close relatives, whereas a Kohen is permitted. Why is that?

The following explanation is brought in the name of the Avnei Neizer: The sanctity of a Kohen emanates from his ancestors. It is fitting therefore that he should be allowed to contaminate himself by involving himself in the burial of his close relatives, for it was them (his father) that brought about his kedushah. The kedushah of a nazir, on the other hand, he imposed upon himself, and it does not create any type of bond between him and his relatives.

The Beis Yisroel suggests an alternative explanation. The sanctity of a Kohen emanates from heaven, and there is no concern that by becoming tamei to his relatives that he will tarnish that kedushah. However, a nazir, where his sanctity was self-imposed, the Torah was concerned that contaminating himself in any manner, even to his relatives, could blemish his kedushah.

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A Woman Shaving

The Torah writes [Vayikra 19:27]: Lo sakifu pe’as rosheichem. You shall not round the corners of your head. Here, it is written in a plural form “rosheichem.” Yet, by the destruction of one’s beard, it is written: V’lo sashchis pe’as z’kanecha. And you shall not destroy the corners of your beard. There, it is written in the singular form, “z’kanecha.” Why does the Torah change?

The Meshech Chochmah explains according to the following Rambam (Avodah Zarah 12:5): Although a woman is permitted to shave the corners of her head, she is prohibited from shaving the corners of a man’s head. However, with respect to the prohibition of destructing one’s beard, the Rambam (12:7) writes: A woman is permitted to destroy her own beard if she has beard hair, and if she destroys the beard of a man, she is exempt. It emerges that there is a clear distinction between the halacha of a woman rounding the corners of a man’s head and her shaving a man’s beard.

Accordingly, it can be understood why the Torah uses the plural form when discussing the prohibition of rounding one’s head, for a man and a woman are included in this prohibition. However, with respect to the prohibition of destroying one’s beard, the Torah uses the singular form, because only the man is liable, not the woman.

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The Holiness of a Nazir

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 41b) asks: How then (since “his head” is used to teach us that a metzora must shave his head with a razor) does Rabbi Eliezer derive that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition?

The Gemora answers: He derives it from tzitzis. For we learned in a braisa: It is written [Devarim 22:11]: You shall not wear shatnez (wool and linen together). But the next verse states: You shall make for yourself twisted cords from them. (If the garment is linen, we are obligated to place woolen strings of techeiles on them; we see from here that the positive mitzvah of tzitzis overrides the prohibition of shatnez.)

Tosfos explains why this exposition is necessary only according to Rabbi Eliezer, and not according to the Chachamim.

Tosfos makes mention of the fact that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it is possible for a nazir to petition a sage to have his nezirus annulled.

The Acharonim challenge this from a Gemora in Eruchin (23a) where it is evident that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one cannot petition a sage to annul a neder of hekdesh. Accordingly, one should not have the ability to annul his nezirus, for according to Beis Shamai (9a), nezirus and hekdesh have the same halachos. This, Tosfos explains, is because it is written by nezirus: You shall be holy; grow the growth of your hair. Thus we see that the laws of hekdesh apply by nezirus. If so, why does Rabbi Eliezer make a distinction between nezirus and hekdesh with respect to the laws of annulment?

The Asvon D’oraysa suggests the following to explain this: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer holds that a nazir tahor cannot petition a sage to have his nezirus annulled, for he is regarded as being holy (like hekdesh). However, a nazir tamei would have the ability to petition a sage to have his nezirus annulled; for he presently is not regarded as being holy (this is predicated upon the Rambam, who holds that the positive commandment of “kodosh yih’yeh” does not apply to a nazir tamei).

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Positive Commandment Overriding Two Prohibitions

Reb Moshe Rozmerin in Dvar Moshe states that the Rambam maintains that one who rounds the corners of his head has violated two prohibitions; one for cutting his payos (corners), and another for following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

Our Gemora states that the positive commandment for the metzora to remove all his hair overrides the prohibition of rounding the corners on one’s head. According to the Rambam, it is actually overriding two prohibitions. Tosfos in Yevamos (3b) discussed this issue and did not cite our Gemora as a proof. Other Rishonim maintain that a positive commandment cannot override two prohibitions.

A question is brought in the name of the Lubliner Gaon: The Gemora in Yevamos (20b) states regarding a widow falling to yibum to a Kohen Gadol that it is a situation where the positive commandment of yibum can possibly override the prohibition of a Kohen Gadol marrying a widow. He asks: There are two prohibitions for a Kohen Gadol to marry a widow; one is lo yikach (he shall not take her), and the other is lo yechallel (he shall not desecrate the kehuna). How can the positive commandment of yibum override two prohibitions?

Reb Chaim Ozer in Achiezer (Even Ezer, 4) answers: The Rishonim concede that when the two prohibitions are dependent on each other, the positive commandment can override both prohibitions. The basis for the prohibition of desecrating the kehuna is because it is an illicit relationship; once the mitzvah of yibum overrides the prohibition of lo yikach, it becomes a permitted relationship and there will be no prohibition of lo yechallel.

[It would seem to me that this is dependent on how we understand that a positive commandment cannot override two prohibitions. We can explain that each prohibition strengthens one another and the positive commandment cannot override any of them; or perhaps the positive commandment does override one of the prohibitions, but it does not have the capabilities to override the second one. Reb Chaim Ozer would be in accordance with the latter explanation.]

According to the Achiezer, we can answer the Dvar Moshe’s question. The positive commandment for the metzora to cut his hair overrides the prohibition against rounding the corners of one’s head, and consequently, there will be no prohibition of following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

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Shaving on Shabbos

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 40a) cites the verse regarding the Levi’im [Bamidbar 8:7]: And they shall pass a razor over their entire skin. The Chasam Sofer asks: According to the calculation, this occurred on Shabbos. How was it permitted for them to shave on Shabbos?

He answers: They shaved in a manner that was less than the amount required for one to be liable.

A similar question is asked regarding Yosef. How was he permitted to shave on the day that he emerged from prison? Chazal say that Yosef was summoned to Pharaoh on Rosh Hashanah! Chasam Sofer answered that it was permitted due to the honor of the king.

Accordingly, the Pardes Yosef said that this answer can be used to explain the Levi’im’s permission to shave as well. Since this shaving was part of the process of anointing and sanctifying the Levi’im, which prepared them to serve Hashem in the Mishkan, it would certainly be permitted, even on Shabbos.

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Stubble Left Behind

They inquired (Daf Yomi: Nazir 39a): Does the new growth of hair grow from the bottom or from the top (and the hairs closest to the head do not move at all)?

The Gemora explains a halachic difference between them. The case is as follows: Bandits shaved a nazir’s head and they left over enough hair to bend the top of the hair to its root. If hair grows from the bottom, they have removed his hairs of nezirus (and his days are forfeited). However, if hairs grow from the top, the hair which he sanctified still remains (and his days are not forfeited).

It is evident from this Gemora that if the bandits left less than enough to bend the top of the hair to its root, the nazir will forfeit all his previous days.

Tosfos HaRosh asks that this would seemingly be inconsistent with Rav Chisda’s ruling below (40a), who states that a nazir is only liable if he cuts his hair similar to that of a razor. This means that he cuts the hair down to the skin, leaving no stubble at all!

He answers that Rav Chisda is only referring to a case where the nazir shaved most of his head (but not all the hairs on his head). That is when the halacha is that the hairs must be completely cut in order to forfeit the previous days. However, if he (or the bandits) cuts all the hairs on his head, he will forfeit his previous days even if the hairs are not completely cut.

The Sfas Emes (and others) say that Rav Chisda disagrees with our Gemora.

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The Novelty of the Midianite Utensils

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 37b) had concluded regarding the emissions of utensils used by idolaters that have been used within twenty-four hours, it is impossible that the absorption is not deemed slightly bad, and although with respect to all prohibitions, such a taste would be permitted, nevertheless, the Torah states that one is prohibited from using such a pot unless it is first scalded.

The Ramban asks: If in regards to those utensils used by idolaters, the flavor is regarded like the substance, how is it possible to say that with respect to other prohibitions, the flavor is not forbidden like the substance? Are the emissions from the idolaters’ utensils a distinct class of prohibition, different from any other prohibitions? The Midianite utensils were forbidden out of the concern that there were non-kosher foods cooked inside of it!

He answers that the Torah elevated its prohibition with respect of utensils that a utensil that absorbed flavor from a forbidden food is forbidden. And although the flavor that will be emitted from this pot will be slightly spoiled, and is not equivalent to the substance, nevertheless the Torah decreed that the flavor is not nullified and is forbidden. This is similar to the halacha that one must immerse in water a utensil purchased from an idolater even though it has not been used. There, if one would use it without immersion, the food would not be forbidden; here, it would be.

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Drinking Bread

The Maharil writes that if one eats bread that wine fell into it, he should recite the blessing made over wine, i.e. borei peri hagafen. In the footnotes, the following verse is mentioned as support to this halachic novelty: Anything which is soaked in wine, he may not drink. Although he is eating something which was steeped in wine, the Torah refers to it as “drinking,” not “eating.”

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Blessing after Coffee

The Tosfos Yom Hakippurim (Yoma 79b) wonders as to the necessity of reciting a blessing after one drinks coffee. Perhaps it should not require a blessing at all since a person does not drink a revi’is at once; rather, he drinks a little at a time, and it emerges that he does not drink a revi’is within the amount of time it takes to eat a peras (half a loaf of bread). Or, perhaps one might counter and say that this principle should only apply to other liquids, where one has the ability to drink it at once, but he chooses not to. However, coffee, which one cannot drink at one time, and on the contrary, it is natural to take short sips with long intervals in between, perhaps the entire drinking will combine to the required amount for the blessing to be recited.

He resolves this question from our Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 36b) which states that if one eats the Babylonian kutach (a dip that has a minimal amount of chametz in it) in a “dip-like” fashion, he will not be liable for eating chametz on Pesach. This is because he did not eat it a k’zayis within the amount of time it takes to eat a peras. Now, it is not normal to eat a dip at once, and nevertheless, one is not liable for eating the dip in its normal fashion. This would prove that one should not recite a blessing after drinking a cup of coffee.

The Minchas Chinuch rejects the proof: One would not be liable because of the kutach. It is because of the chametz that is mixed into it. Chametz by itself is normal to eat a k’zayis within the amount of time it takes to eat a peras. Therefore, he is not liable on the dip when he eats it in a normal manner. However, with respect to coffee, it is usual to drink the coffee slowly, and therefore, one would be obligated to recite a blessing afterwards.

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Summary of the Specifications, Generalizations, Limitations and Extensions

Generalization and a specification – only the specifics mentioned are included.

Specification and a generalization – everything is included.

Generalization, specification and a generalization – other cases must resemble the specifications mentioned at least in one way.

Specification, generalization and a specification - other cases must resemble the specifications mentioned in two ways.

Limitation and extension – everything except for one thing is included.

Extension and limitation - other cases must resemble the limitations mentioned.

Extension, limitation and extension - everything except for one thing is included.

Limitation, extension and limitation – there is no such type. (Hame’or)

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Benefits of a Nazir

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 34a) had stated: There are three different types of prohibitions relevant to a nazir. He is forbidden to become tamei through corpse tumah; he may not shave his head; he is prohibited from eating grapes or drinking wine and anything that comes from a vine.

Reb Tzadok in Pri Tzadik (Naso) explains that abstaining from these three things can be a remedy for the three things that can cause a person to be driven out of this world. Growing one’s hair can be a cure for the character traits of jealousy and anger. Refraining from eating or drinking any product that comes from a vine can be a remedy for desire. Withholding from becoming tamei can be an antidote for someone who chases after his own honor. This is because of the fact that one who pursues honor can be punished with death. This can be proven from the Torah, where after the snake convinced Adam and Chava to eat from the tree of knowledge, where they were told that would be like Hashem, the concept of death was brought into this world.

K’zayis and Revi’is

The Mishna had stated: And he will not be liable for lashes until he eats a k’zayis (size of an olive) from the grapes. According to the earlier Mishna, a nazir will not be liable until he drinks a revi’is (one-fourth of a log) of wine. Rabbi Akiva said: Even if he soaked his bread in wine and there is enough in it to equal a k’zayis, he will be liable. (Rabbi Akiva disagrees with the earlier Mishna, and holds that even regarding drinking wine, the amount for which a nazir incurs lashes is a k’zayis, which is the amount displaced from a full cup of wine when an olive is placed within it; therefore, edibles combine with liquid to equal a k’zayis. He also teaches us that a permissible item can combine to equal the amount needed to be liable.)

The Bartenura explains the first opinion of the Mishna to be like Rabbi Akiva that a nazir will be liable for eating a k’zayis of grapes or drinking a k’zayis of wine. The early Mishna maintains the exact opposite that he will only be liable if he eats a revi’is of grapes or drinks a revi’is of wine.

Rabbeinu Tam asks on this explanation: Why would the Tanna of the Mishna first state the later Mishna’s opinion, then teach the early Mishna’s ruling and then return to the later teaching? He asks other questions as well.

Tosfos therefore explains that when the Mishna taught that the required amount to be liable for grapes is a k’zayis, that is according to everyone. There is only an argument regarding drinking. According to the early Mishna, it is a revi’is, and according to Rabbi Akiva, it is a k’zayis.

The Rambam rules that a nazir is liable if he eats a k’zayis of grapes, and he would be liable if he drinks a revi’is of wine. It would emerge that he is ruling according to the earlier Mishna. This is extremely odd, for the ruling is usually according to the later teaching!

The Brisker Rav explains that the Mishna actually lists three opinions. The Tanna Kamma holds that grapes are a k’zayis and wine is a revi’is. The Rambam rules that this is indeed the halacha. The second opinion is the early Mishna which rules that he is not liable unless he eats or drinks the equivalent of a revi’is. Rabbi Akiva holds that everything is a k’zayis.

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The Annonymous Man

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 32b) had stated: They (six people) were walking on a road, and there was one person coming towards them. One of them said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is So-and-so,” and a second one said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is not So-and-so.” The third one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is a nazir,” and the fourth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is not a nazir.” The fifth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that both of you (the first two) are nezirim.” The sixth person said, “I am hereby a nazir that all of you (the first five) are nezirim.”

Tosfos explains the rationale of each person: They (six people) were walking on a road, and there was one person coming towards them, who could not be identified from afar. One of them said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is So-and-so,” for he was convinced that he recognized the far away person to be Reuven.

The second one said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is not So-and-so,” for he was in fact certain that the person was not Reuven.

The third one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is a nazir,” for he figured that one of them was certainly correct.

The fourth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is not a nazir.” He is in essence saying the same as the third one, except it is the converse of his declaration.

The fifth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that both of you (the first two) are nezirim,” for he thinks that both of them should be a nazir since they both accepted upon themselves nezirus according to what they honestly thought to be the truth.

The sixth person said, “I am hereby a nazir that all of you (the first five) are nezirim,” for in his opinion, they should all be nezirim.

Retracting from Nezirus and Hekdesh

The Mishna had stated: Beis Hillel rules that none of them are nezirim except the one whose words were not fulfilled.

The Gemora asks: Why is he a nazir if his words were not fulfilled?

Rav Yehudah emends the Mishna to say that none of them are nezirim except the one whose words were fulfilled.

Abaye says: The case is where he added, “If it is not So-and-so, I am hereby a nazir.” (The novelty of this ruling is that he may retract from his original statement if his retraction was within the time of an utterance.) [Accordingly] What does Beis Hillel mean when they said, “His words did not come to fruition?” They meant that his first words did not come to fruition; only his second words.

The Tiferes Tziyon writes that this would be a distinction between the halachos of a nazir and the halachos regarding hekdesh. If one vows to become a nazir under a certain condition and immediately retracts, we accept his second declaration, for his intention is to become a nazir. However, regarding hekdesh, we would not allow one to retract from a vow declaring something to be hekdesh.

The Be’er Moshe disagrees and states that just like one may immediately retract from his nezirus vow, he may retract from a hekdesh declaration as well. He concludes that since the Rambam rules that one may not retract from hekdesh, even within the time of an utterance, it is apparent that he does not rule like our Gemora, and one may not retract from a nezirus vow either.

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Chanah and Elkanah

The Mishna had stated: A father can impose upon his son a nezirus vow, but a mother cannot impose a nezirus vow on her son.

The Redak (Shmuel I, 1:11) asks: How could Chanah’s vow of nezirus for Shmuel her son be effective? Our Mishna rules explicitly that only a father can impose upon his son a nezirus vow, but a mother cannot impose a nezirus vow on her son! Furthermore, he is astounded that Chazal do not discuss this matter at all; not in the Medrash or Gemora!

In the sefer Ziv Halevanon, he cites the Sforno, who says that when Elkanah (Shmuel’s father) said (ibid. v.23), Do whatever is good in your eyes, he was in essence agreeing to his wife. By demonstrating his consent, it was regarded as if he declared the nezirus for his son.

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Sheitel

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 28) had stated: This ruling only applies upon the conclusion of her nezirus; however, if she was bringing the korbanos because she became tamei, the husband may revoke her nezirus, for her husband can say, “I am not interested in having an abstinent wife.” Rabbi Meir said: Even upon the conclusion of her nezirus taharah, he may revoke her vow, for the husband can say, “I am not interested in having a wife with a shaven head.”

The Gemora explains the Tanna Kamma of the Mishna: Since it is possible for her to wear a wig, he cannot claim that he is not interested in having a wife with a shaven head.

Rabbi Meir would hold that the husband is not interested in having his wife wear a wig (his wife wearing someone else’s hair is repulsive to him).

The Beis Yitzchak asks on the Tanna Kamma: Even though she can wear a wig, it will still not be pleasing for the husband, because she will not be permitted to go outside in a public domain on Shabbos with it!

The Mishna Lemelech answers: The reason why a woman is forbidden to walk outside on Shabbos with a wig is because she might take it off and carry it four amos in a public domain. Here, where she has no hair, we are not concerned that she will show her wig to her friends because it is humiliating to her.

It is brought in the name of the Shiltei Geborim that our Gemora is a proof that married women are permitted to be seen publicly with a wig on their head. Some poskim held that it was forbidden because the hair of a woman is regarded as ervah, and cannot be seen.

The Be’er Sheva disagrees and refutes the proof. He maintains that it is only permitted if she wears a covering besides the wig. And on the contrary; it is evident from our Gemora that only women without hair would wear a wig. This was to appease the husband, for otherwise she would be repulsive to him. An ordinary woman, however, would not wear a wig, and it is in fact forbidden.

The Magen Avraham rules that a wig is permitted.

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Bull Refuses to Budge

The Medrash (Vayikra Rabbah 3:5) cites the following incident: There was an animal that was being brought to the Beis Hamikdosh to be brought up on the Altar as a korban. As they got near the final destination, the animal refused to budge. A pauper came by and fed the animal a bundle of truksima (a certain type of grass that is known to cause animals to sneeze). As the animal sneezed, a needle discharged from inside its throat. The animal then allowed itself to be pulled towards the Altar and be brought as a korban (if the needle would have stayed inside, it would have punctured one of the animal’s vital organs rendering it a treifa, which would invalidate it from being used as a korban). The poor person appeared to the animal’s owner in a dream and said, “The offering of a pauper (my bundle of vegetables) is regarded as being more significant than your bull.

The Drush Shmuel explains the following verse accordingly [Vayikra 1:3]: An unblemished male you shall offer it according to his will. Only if the animal is going willingly should it be brought as a korban; otherwise (if it refuses to budge), do not offer it as a sacrifice, for it might be because it has a blemish (that the owner is not aware of).

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Pauper Acting Rich

The braisa (Daf Yomi: Nazir 25b - 26a) states: Other people who are obligated to bring bird offerings by the Torah (because they cannot afford to buy animal offerings) who already designated the money to buy the birds (and then became rich), if they now want to bring a chatas or olah offering instead, they may do so.

The Mefaresh understands this Gemora to be referring to a rich woman who has given birth, where her chatas is a bird.

It is noteworthy that after the Torah discusses the korban that a rich woman who has given birth brings, it says [Vayikra 12:7]: This is the law of a woman who gives birth to a male or to a female. The question is asked: Immediately following this verse, the Torah teaches us the korbanos that a poor woman who has given birth brings. Why would the Torah say regarding the rich woman’s korbanos that “this is law of a woman who gives birth”? It would seem from the verse that only the rich woman’s korbanos are the law, and not the korbanos from the poor woman.

The Kli Chemdah (Parshas Tazria) cites a Gemora in Menochos (110a): It is written: This is the law of an olah. The Gemora expounds: Anyone that studies the laws of an olah is considered as if he brought a korban olah. What would be if a poor person would recite the portion dealing with the rich person’s korbanos? Would it be regarded as if he brought the korban? The answer may be gleaned from the fact that the Torah concluded the portion dealing with the rich woman’s korbanos with the following verse: This is the law of a woman who gives birth. The Torah is informing us that the recital of this portion is sufficient for anyone, even for a poor woman.

[The Gemora states that Hashem told Avraham Avinu that whenever Klal Yisroel will read the Torah portions pertaining to the korbanos, it will be regarded as if they brought korbanos and their sins will be forgiven.

The commentators discuss if this concept applies by other mitzvos as well. Perhaps it can be said that the studying of any mitzvah that cannot be performed nowadays will be regarded as if one fulfilled the mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim cites the Gemora in Bava Metzia (114b) that the Amoraim were fluent in Seder Kodoshim in the same manner as Seder Moed, Nashim and Nezikin. This is because Kodoshim was relevant to them since the learning about the korbanos was regarded as if they actually brought a korban. Implicit in his words that for some reason this was only true regarding Seder Kodoshim and not to Seder Zeroim or Taharos which also has many halachos that do not apply outside of Eretz Yisroel and after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Taz in his sefer Divrei Dovid maintains that the concept applies to all mitzvos and one who studies the laws of Zeraim, it will be regarded as if he gave terumos and ma’asros to the kohanim and levi’im and it will be considered as if he gave all the presents to the poor people. This is the explanation in Yaakov’s words to Esav "Im Lavan garti," which Chazal understand to mean that Yaakov kept all 613 mitzvos in Lavan’s house. There were many mitzvos that he was not able to fulfill at that time; it is evident that the studying of these mitzvos are regarded as if he fulfilled them all.

The Ben Ish Cahi explains the verse in Nitzavim: "Ki Korov eilecha hadavar meod b’ficha u’vilvov’cha la’asoso." It is possible to fulfill all the mitzvos with your mouth (by studying them) even those mitzvos that you cannot actually perform.]

We can add that the Mishna in Negaim compliments this explanation. For the Mishna says that if a poor person who is a metzora brings the korban that a rich person is supposed to bring, he fulfills his obligation. The Chinuch (123) states by a korban olah v’yoreid - (certain sins which require a korban chatos, he either brings an animal, bird or flour offering depending on his status - this is called a fluctuating korban) if a poor person brings the korban of a rich person, he does not fulfill his obligation. The Chinuch explains the reason: the Torah had compassion on the poor person, it is not proper for him to compel himself to bring a korban which he cannot afford. How can the Chinuch hold against the Mishna, which explicitly states that he does fulfill his obligation?

The Chasam Sofer answers based on the following Gemora in Shabbos: Hashem punishes each person according to what he can afford. A rich person who sins will lose his cow. A poor person, on the other hand, will lose his chicken or some eggs. Therefore, there is a distinction between the korban of a metzora or a woman who gave birth and the korban olah v’yoreid. A metzora is not required to bring a korban because he sinned, it is to purify him and allow him to eat kodoshim. If a poor metzora decides to bring the rich man’s korban, he will have discharged his obligation. Conversely, a sinner who does that will not have discharged his obligation, for here the Torah prescribed for him the korban which will give him atonement according to his status. The korban is in place of the punishment. It is not decided by the pauper what his punishment should be, and therefore when he brings the korban of a rich person, he does not fulfill his obligation.

The Sfas Emes (here and quoted in Moadim U’zmanim as a story which occurred by a Kenesiya Gedola) answers that there is a basic distinction. A metzora disregarding if he is rich or poor, is required to bring a chatas and an olah. The rich man brings animals and the pauper brings birds. If a poor person brings the korban of a rich person, he fulfills his obligation, for he brought the prescribed amount. A korban olah v’yoreid is different. A rich person brings an animal for a korban chatas and a poor person brings two birds, one for a chatas and one for an olah. If a poor person will force himself to bring the korban of a rich person, he will not fulfill his obligation because he cheated the Altar out of one korban - namely the olah.

There are two questions on this explanation (look in Shemuas Chaim and in Mitzvas Hamelech from Harav Ezriel Cziment). Firstly, the Chinuch says a different reason for his not fulfilling his obligation. He says because the Torah doesn’t want a poor person to overburden himself. He does not say the reason of the Sfas Emes that he missed a korban? Secondly, one must ask, why is it that a poor person is required to bring two korbanos and a rich person only brings one? The Ibn Ezra explains the reason for this: A chatas bird is completely eaten and an olah bird is completely burned on the Altar. These two birds together replace a regular korban which entails a human consumption and the Altar’s consumption. They are actually one korban. Therefore, one can say that a poor person is not missing a korban by bringing one animal instead of two birds?

It would seem, however, that this question can be answered. Even according to the Ibn Ezra, the two birds are not one korban. They are two korbanos complimenting one another. The rationale behind bringing the two korbanos could be because the Torah wants human consumption and the Altar’s consumption; nevertheless, it is still two korbanos and a poor person is missing one korban when he brings the korban of a rich person.

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Halfway Nezirus

It is evident from our Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 24a) that if a woman made a neder to become a nazir, and she did not designate the animals for her korbanos (that were to be brought upon conclusion of her nezirus), and then the husband revoked her neder, she is not obligated to bring those korbanos.

The Reshash notes: The Gemora in Nedarim 83a discusses the concept of a halfway nezirus and that there are no korbanos for a partial nezirus (since the Torah only required korbanos upon completing a nezirus). The Rosh and Ran explain the case as follows: If a woman became a nazir and counted fifteen days, and then her husband revoked it, she has not completed her nezirus and therefore is not obligated to bring korbanos.

It can be inferred that it is only in a case where she observed nezirus for fifteen days that she would be exempt from bringing the korbanos, since that is not regarded as a complete nezirus, however, if she would have declared to become a nazir for sixty days, and her husband revoked it after thirty days, perhaps she would be obligated to bring the korbanos, for she has completed a full, standard term of nezirus.

The Reshash concludes that this is not the halacha. Anytime that the woman does not complete her nezirus, she is not obligated to bring the nazir’s korbanos.

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Lashes without an Action

Rava inquires (Daf Yomi: Nazir 17a): What is the law if a nazir is in a cemetery? Is there a certain amount of time that he needs to be there in order to receive lashes (one who became tamei in the Beis Hamikdosh and lingered there for the amount of time it would take for a person to prostrate himself is liable; is there a defined time for the nazir as well)?

The Gemora analyzes the case: If he is speaking about a case where he declared the vow while he was in the cemetery, and people warned him before his vow, “Do not utter this vow,” why would loitering be necessary? A nazir who enters a cemetery is punished without lingering because he was warned against entering (and he refused to listen); so too, here, he was warned (and he intentionally went against it)!

Tosfos asks: Shouldn’t this be regarded as a violation without performing an action? Why would he receive lashes for declaring himself to be a nazir?

Tosfos in Shavuos writes that the Gemora is in accordance with the opinions that maintain that one can receive lashes even without committing an action.

Tosfos here answers: Although he cannot receive lashes for the acceptance of the nezirus while inside the cemetery (for that does not entail an action), he will receive the lashes for continuing to remain in the cemetery after the acceptance of nezirus. That does constitute an action.

The Steipler Gaon asks: Where is the action? Why is the fact that he refused to leave regarded as an action?

He explains: Anytime an action is performed through a person, and he has the ability to eliminate it, but willingly refrains from doing so, this is considered as if he has committed an action, even though it happened by itself. The fact that the nazir is standing in the cemetery refusing to leave, that constitutes an action.

The Mishna Lamelech explains Tosfos differently: Tosfos maintains that although the transgression was committed without an action, he may receive lashes for the entering into the cemetery. Although no violation occurred at that time (since he was not yet a nazir), he receives lashes, since that was the action that led to the transgression.

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Yosef's Hair Cut

When Yosef was summoned to Pharaoh to interpret his dreams, it is written [Breishis 41:14]: and he shaved and changed his clothes, and he came to Pharaoh. Onkelos translates the word “shaved” as “vesaper.” It is noteworthy that every other place in the Torah, Onkelos translates it as “yegalchinei.” What is the explanation behind this?

The Rogatchover Gaon answers: It is written [ibid. 49:26]: May they come to Yosef’s head and to the crown of the head of the one who was separated from his brothers. Rabbi Levi understands this verse to mean that Yosef was a nazir. And so we find that from the day that Yosef was separated from his brothers, he did not taste any wine.

Onkelos is therefore troubled: How could it be that Yosef the nazir shaved before he came to Pharaoh? A nazir is forbidden to cut his hair! Onkelos answers that here it was not an actual giluach (hair cutting). His hair was trimmed without the use of a razor, and this is permitted for a nazir to do.

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Thirty Complete Days

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 16a) had stated: If one says, “I am hereby a nazir for thirty days,” and he shaves his head on the thirtieth day, he has not discharged his obligation.

According to Bar Pada, this halacha is understandable. For since he explicitly said that he will be a nazir for thirty days, his nezirus is for thirty days, and Bar Pada does not hold that a partial day is regarded as a complete day. This is why he would be required to take his haircut on the thirty-first day. However, according to Rav Masna, his haircut should be valid, for he holds that part of a day is like the entire day!

The Gemora (5b) answered: The Mishna is referring to a case where he said, “I am hereby a nazir for thirty complete days.” The Rosh explains that everyone would agree that a partial day is not regarded as a day in a case where he explicitly said “complete days.”

Tosfos explains differently: One who says, “I am hereby a nazir for thirty days” is regarded as if he said, “I am hereby a nazir for thirty complete days.” The reason is as follows: Since it has been established that a standard nezirus is for thirty days, why would he say “for thirty days”? It would have been sufficient for him to have said, “I am hereby a nazir”! By the fact that he added, “for thirty days,” this indicates that he wishes to be a nazir for thirty complete days.

The Keren Orah and the Brisker Rav explain the Gemora according to the Rambam: We do not use the principle of “a partial day is regarded as an entire day” in any case where the person mentions a specific number. If he accepts nezirus upon himself without specifying a number, we would say that a partial day is regarded as an entire day. However, in this case, he specified an amount, and therefore, the principle is not applicable.

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