Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 53 - Highlights

Rav Papa and Yehudah

Rav Papa was making arrangements for his son to be married to the daughter of Abba of Sura (his father-in-law; Rav Papa’s son was obviously born to him from a previous marriage, for otherwise, he would be prohibited for him to marry his mother’s sister). Rav Papa went there to write the kesuvah for the bride. When Yehudah ben Mereimar heard of his arrival, he left his house and came before Rav Papa. When they reached the door of Abba of Sura’s house, Yehudah wished to depart. Rav Papa said to him, “Will the Master come in with me?” Rav Papa observed that it was distasteful to him to enter. Rav Papa asked him: What is it that you have on your mind? Are you reluctant to enter because Shmuel said to Rav Yehudah: “Smart one! Do not be present when an inheritance is being transferred (away from the rightful heir) even when it is from a bad son to a good son, because one never knows what offspring will come forth from him (the bad son) and certainly when the transfer is from a son to a daughter (even though the transfer is valid, it should not be condoned).” (Here too, a father is writing a dowry to his daughter and is pledging property that should belong to his sons.) Rav Papa explained to him that providing a dowry is an enactment of the Rabbis, as Rabbi Yochanan stated in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai (and therefore there is nothing wrong if you are present by this transfer).

Yehudah replied: Perhaps this enactment applies only to one who acts willingly; may we force the father to write a dowry?

Rav Papa said: I didn’t mean for you to come in and force the father; I meant that you should come in without forcing him.

Yehudah answered him: If I would go in, it would amount to compulsion (Abba of Sura would be ashamed to offer a small dowry in the presence of a distinguished guest).

Rav Papa urged him to enter, but having sat down, he remained silent. Abba thought that Yehudah was displeased with the amount that he pledged and consequently assigned to his daughter all that he possessed. Finally, however, Abba said to him: Will the Master not speak even now? By the life of the Master, I have left nothing for myself!

Yehudah replied: If you would have listened to me, even the initial amount that you assigned did not give me any pleasure.

Abba asked: May I retract from what I pledged?

Yehudah responded: I do not want that you should become a retractor (he is legally permitted to retract since there was no erusin yet). (52b – 53a)

Selling her Kesuvah

Rav Yeimar Sava inquired of Rav Nachman: If a woman sold her kesuvah to her husband, does she still have the kesuvah condition for the male children or not (perhaps she has no right to sell the rights that her sons have in the dowry)?

Rava asks: Why didn’t you inquire regarding a case where she waives her right to the kesuvah?

Rav Yeimar Sava explains himself: I inquired regarding a case where she sold her kesuvah, for even though her financial situation compelled her to sell it, she still might lose the rights to the conditions in the kesuvah; certainly, she might lose her rights to the kesuvah conditions when she waives her rights to the kesuvah.

Rava said: In a case that she sells her kesuvah to others, she retains the right to the kesuvah conditions for the male children because she only sold the kesuvah due to her financial situation. If she waived the rights to her kesuvah, she has forfeited the right to the kesuvah conditions for the male children because she has willingly waived her right to the kesuvah.

Rava inquired: Is selling the kesuvah to her husband tantamount to selling it to others (and she would retain the right to the kesuvah conditions for the male children) or is it like she waived the rights to the kesuvah to her husband?

Rava resolved the inquiry himself: Selling the kesuvah to her husband is tantamount to selling it to others.

Rav Idi bar Avin challenged Rava by citing a Mishna in Yevamos (87b): If a woman's husband went overseas, and they came (one witness) and said to her, “Your husband died,” and she married, and afterwards her husband returned, she must leave this one and this one. And the heirs of neither this one, nor of this one inherit her kesuvah.

The Gemora there (91a) asked: Why are we mentioning kesuvah here? The Mishna had already taught us that she does not receive a kesuvah.

Rav Papa answered: The Mishna now is referring to the kesuvah conditions for the male children. (Stipulated in the kesuvah is that her sons are entitled to receive her kesuvah from their father's estate when he dies, even if their mother died first and their father married again and had sons with his second wife. They receive her kesuvah in addition to their shares in their father's estate to which the sons of both the first and the second wife are equally entitled. In the case spoken of in our Mishna, however, the sons of the first wife lose their claim to her kesuvah.)

Rav Idi concludes his question: Why do we say that she forfeits the right to the kesuvah conditions? Why don’t we say that her evil inclination compelled her (just as here, her financial situation compelled her to sell the kesuvah) to accept the testimony of one witness because she wanted to remarry and she should not lose the right to the kesuvah condition?

The Gemora answers: The Rabbis penalized her there because she did not investigate the matter thoroughly, and that is why she loses her rights to the conditions of the kesuvah. (53a)
She Waived her Right
Ravin bar Chanina sat before Rav Chisda and he said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: If a woman waives her right to the kesuvah to her husband, she does not receive sustenance from the husband’s estate after she is widowed.

Rav Chisda replied: If you had not reported this halacha to me in the name of a great man, I would have thought that the woman should not lose that right because it is written [Mishlei 17:13]: If one repays good with evil, evil will not depart from his house. (She did a favor to the husband by waiving her right to the kesuvah, he should repay the favor and she should be supported from his estate while she is a widow.) (53a)
Burying an Arusah
Rav Nachman, Ula and Avimi bar Papi were sitting and Rav Chiya bar Ammi was sitting with them. A man, whose arusah had died, came before them. They told him: Go bury her or give her kesuvah to her (this is referring to the statutory amount of the kesuvah, these Rabbis being of the opinion that the husband has been allowed to retain the kesuvah of his deceased wife for the expenses he incurred in the burial).

Rav Chiya asked them from the following braisa: If a wife from erusin dies, the husband is not deemed to be an onein (one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet), he may not become tamei to her if he is a Kohen; and similarly (if he dies) she is not an onein, she does not have to be busy with his burial. If she dies, he does not inherit her and if he dies, she collects her kesuvah. Rav Chiya concluded: The reason why she collects her kesuvah is because the husband died first; however, it is evident that if she dies first, there are no kesuvah obligations (and the husband would not be required to bury her).

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this halacha?

Rav Hoshaya answers: For the following is written in the kesuvah: When you marry another man, you can take what is written for you. This implies that she collects her kesuvah only if she may marry another man and that doesn’t apply when she died first.

Ravin came from Bavel to Eretz Yisroel and said in the name of Rish Lakish: An arusah who dies (before the husband) does not have a right to her kesuvah (the husband is not required to bury her).

Abaye said to the Chachamim: Go tell Ravin: Your favor is taken away and cast onto thorns (the information which he intended to be an assistance to the students was of no use to them), for Rav Hoshaya already explained this ruling in Bavel. (53a – 53b)
Terminating Support for the Daughters
The Mishna had stated: The daughters that I will have from you they will sit in my house and be supported by my estate until they are taken as wives by men is (also automatically) obligatory, as it is a condition of Beis Din.

Rav taught the Mishna in the following manner: The daughters will be supported until they are taken into marriage. Levi taught: The daughters will be supported until they reach the state of bagrus (generally, at twelve and a half).

The Gemora explains: They both agree that if the daughter becomes a bogeres or if she enters into nisuin, her right to support expires. They only argue regarding an arusah who has not reached the state of bagrus yet.

The Gemora cites a braisa: Until when is a daughter supported? Until she becomes an arusah. It was said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: Until she becomes a bogeres. (Rav is following the opinion of the Tanna Kamma and Levi is following Rabbi Elozar’s opinion.)
Support for an Arusah
Rav Chisda said to Rav Yosef: Have you ever heard from Rav Yehudah whether an arusah receives support from her father’s estate or not?

Rav Yosef said to him: I never heard from Rav Yehudah regarding this, but I logically assume that she is not entitled for support. The reason that the Rabbis established that the daughters will be supported by their father’s estate is because we didn’t want them to be compelled to suffer the humiliation of begging for food; however, this is not applicable by an arusah. Her husband would not allow her to beg for food (and he will sustain her) and there is therefore no necessity for her to be sustained by her father’s estate.

Rav Chisda replied: If you did not hear anything regarding this, my logic dictates that she should receive support. Since the husband has not completely decided if he will marry her (perhaps she has defects), he will not throw away his money for nothing.

The Gemora cites another version of this discussion: Rav Yosef said to Rav Chisda: I never heard from Rav Yehudah regarding this, but I logically assume that she is entitled for support. Since the husband has not completely decided if he will marry her (perhaps she has defects), he will not throw away his money for nothing.

Rav Chisda replied: If you did not hear anything regarding this, my logic dictates that she should not receive support. Since her husband would not allow her to beg for food (and he will sustain her), there is therefore no necessity for her to be sustained by her father’s estate. (53b)
Support for a Girl who Performed Mi’un
They inquired of Rav Sheishes: Regarding a minor girl who performed mi’un (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively.); is she entitled to be supported by the father’s estate (because the nisuin has been retroactively nullified) or not (since she left her father’s authority through nisuin)?

Rav Sheishes cited the following braisa to them: A widow in her father’s house (after erusin), a divorced woman in her father’s house or a woman who was awaiting yibum in her father’s house is entitled to be supported from her father’s estate. Rabbi Yehudah said: Only a woman who is still in her father’s house is entitled to support, but a woman who is no longer in her father’s house is not entitled to support. It would seem that Rabbi Yehudah and the Tanna Kamma are ruling in an identical manner. The difference between them must be regarding a minor girl who performed mi’un. The Tanna Kamma maintains that she is entitled to be supported and Rabbi Yehudah disagrees. (53b)
Support for the Daughter of a Yevamah
Rish Lakish inquired: Does the daughter of a yevamah receive support from her father’s estate or not?

The Gemora elaborates: Since the yevamah receives her kesuvah from her initial husband, it would seem logical that she does not receive support from her father’s estate. Or perhaps, since, if there is no available kesuvah from her initial husband, she collects the kesuvah from the yavam, the daughter may receive support from his estate as well?

The Gemora lets this question remain unresolved.

[END]

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Why do Men Live Longer?

The Mishna (Yevamos 38a) states: If while a woman was awaiting yibum, she inherited property from her father, and subsequently sold it or gave it away, Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that it is valid. (Although Beis Hillel rules that a woman who is an arusah may not sell property in which she inherited, the yevamah is permitted to do so.)

The Mishna asks: If she died, what shall they do with her kesuvah and with the property which comes in and goes out with her? (Does the yavam inherit her in the same manner that a husband inherits his wife?) Beis Shamai says: The husband’s heirs divide it with the father’s heirs (the woman’s inheritors). Beis Hillel disagrees: The property remains with those that presently possess it. The kesuvah goes to the husband’s heirs. The property which comes in and goes out with her goes to the father’s heirs.

Tosfos asks: Why is Beis Hillel’s ruling in this case different than the case in Bava Basra? The Mishna there (158a) states: If a house fell on him and on his mother, killing them both, and we are uncertain which one of them died first. The son’s heirs claimed that the mother died first and afterwards the son died. The mother’s heirs claim that the son died first and afterwards the mother died. Beis Hillel rules that the property is divided between them. Why there does he rule to divide the estate and here he rules that the property remains with those that presently possess it?

Tosfos answers: It is more common for a mother to die before the son; the Gemora in Bava Basra (108a) considers it a tragedy when a son dies in the lifetime of the mother. It is for this reason that Beis Hillel rules that the money is divided between them and we do not award the property to the mother’s heirs.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha asks: The Gemora in Bava Basra is referring to a case where the son died from a sickness while the mother was alive; the mother is in tremendous grief and sorrow, and that is when it is regarded as a tragedy. In our case, a house fell on top of both of them, and that is a tragedy in itself. Since both of them died, the tragedy is not any more if the son died moments before the mother?

He continues that Tosfos could have said like he said in Kesuvos (52a) in the name of the Yerushalmi: It is common for women to die faster than men do. This is because women are generally weaker due to childbirth and the raising of children. (Tosfos 83b)

Maharam Schiff asks: The language of the Yerushalmi would indicate that women naturally die early and not on account of being endangered due to childbirth.

The Ibn Ezra (Vayikra 21:2) states that a majority of the time, a male will live longer than a female.

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Ransoming a Captive for More than their Value

The Beraisa states: If she was captured and the kidnappers sought ten times her fair value for redemption, the first time he must redeem her. Afterwards, if he wants he can and if he does not want he does not have to. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that we do not redeem captives for more than they are worth for “the establishment of the world” (that captors should not thereby be encouraged to demand exorbitant prices for the ransom of their captive).

This issue had an extraordinary public application about 700 years ago. The leader of Ashkenazic Jewry at the time was Rabbi Meir ben Boruch of Rottenberg. He was imprisoned by a German ruler, Rudolph, whose voracity knew no bounds. Rabbi Meir (known as Maharam Mi’Rottenberg) was imprisoned until his death, and his body was not released. The community did not ransom him, as he himself had ruled. Many years after his death, a private member of the community paid almost all of his own money to release the body, with the stipulation that he be buried next to him.

There is a question whether according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel a man would be permitted to ransom his wife if the ransom exceeds her worth. The Ritva holds that he may do so and the Chelkas Mechokeik disagrees.

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Food for Thought

*** Do we make a special kesuvah for Kohanim?

*** How do we evaluate the worth of a woman or anyone that is being held captive?

*** If a wife eats certain foods that are unhealthy and because of that she falls ill, is the husband required to pay for the doctor bills?

*** Is one Biblically obligated to provide a dowry for his daughter?

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 52 - Highlights

Argument of Abaye and Rava

Rava says that a kohen who is the husband of a woman who is forbidden to return to him because she is a captive is obligated to redeem her, but if she is forbidden to return to him because of a different prohibition he is not obligated to redeem her.

Let us say that this (argument between Rava and Abaye) is an argument among the Tanaim. The Beraisa discusses a case of someone who vows that his wife cannot benefit from him, and she then becomes a captive. Rabbi Eliezer says that he should redeem her and honor her kesuvah (marriage commitment upon divorce). Rabbi Yehoshua states that he must honor her kesuvah but does not have to redeem her.

Rabbi Nasan says that he asked Sumchus the following question. When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he honors her kesuvah and does not have to redeem her, was it a case where he made the vow against her and she then became captive, or when she became captive and he then made the vow? Sumchus replied: I did not hear anything clearly regarding his position. However, it seems logical that it was when he made the vow first and she then became captive. If she became captive first, men will come to trickery (and take a vow as an excuse not to redeem her).

The Gemora asks: It seems that the argument above is regarding the wife of a kohen, with Abaye holding like Rabbi Eliezer and Rava holding like Rabbi Yehoshua. The Gemora answers that no, the case is where she vowed not to have benefit from him and he upheld that vow. Rabbi Eliezer that he still must redeem her, as he put her finger in between her teeth (so to speak) by upholding her vow. Rabbi Yehoshua says that she put her own finger in her mouth, by making the vow.

The Gemora asks that this explanation seems difficult. If according to Rabbi Yehoshua she is primarily looked upon as the guilty party, why does he say that the husband must honor the kesuvah? Additionally, Rabbi Nasan said that he asked Sumchus the following question. When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he honors her kesuvah and does not have to redeem her, was it a case where he made the vow against her and she then became captive, or when she became captive and he then made the vow? Sumchus replied: I did not hear anything clearly regarding his position. If she is the one who made the vow, why should it make a difference if she made the vow first and then became captive, or became captive and then made the vow!

The Gemora therefore answers that the case must indeed be where he made the vow. Abaye can explain the Beraisa according to his reasoning, and Rava according to his reasoning. Abaye will explain according to his reasoning in the following manner. Everyone will agree that a kohen gadol must redeem his wife who is a widow, and that a regular jew does not have to redeem his wife who is a mamzeres (product of an illicit relationship) or nesinah (from the nation who tricked Yehoshua into letting them become Jewish). Everyone also agrees that a kohen who vowed not to have benefit from his wife must redeem her. The argument is only regarding a regular Jew who made such a vow. Rabbi Eliezer says that the original condition is upheld, while Rabbi Yehoshua says the vow is upheld.

[Being that a kohen does not have the words “I will return you as a wife” only that he will “return her to her county,” he can do so even without taking her back as a wife. The question is only regarding a Yisrael. What is stronger: His having to take her “return her and take her back as a wife,” or does the fact that his vow clearly overrule that option enable him not to fulfill his obligation to redeem as well?]

Rava can explain the Beraisa according to his reasoning in the following manner. Everyone will agree that a kohen gadol with a wife who is a widow, and that a regular Jew with a wife who is a mamzeres or nesinah does not have to redeem his wife. The argument is only regarding any Jew, whether kohen, who made a vow that he will not benefit his wife. Rabbi Eliezer says that the original condition is upheld, while Rabbi Yehoshua says the vow is upheld.

Redeeming a Regular Wife in Captivity

The Beraisa states that if a woman is captured while her husband is alive and he dies while she is in captivity, if he knew about her status when he was alive the inheritors must redeem her. If he didn’t, the inheritors are not obligated to redeem her.

Levi thought to act on the Beraisa in an actual case. Rav told him that Chavivi (Rabbi Chiya) had told him that the halachah does not follow this Beraisa. Rather it follows the Beraisa that states that if she was captured after the death of her husband, the orphans do not have to redeem her. Moreover, even if she was captured in the lifetime of her husband and her husband died while she was in captivity, the orphans do not have to pay to redeem her, as this is not within the requirement of “and I will return you as my wife.”

The Beraisa states: If she was captured and the kidnappers sought ten times her fair value for redemption, the first time he must redeem her. Afterwards, if he wants he can and if he does not want he does not have to. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that we do not redeem captives for more than they are worth for “the establishment of the world” (that captors should not thereby be encouraged to demand exorbitant prices for the ransom of their captive).

The Gemora asks, this implies that for their value they must be redeemed, even if their value is more than their kesuvah is worth. However, a similar Beraisa states that if a woman is captured and the captors sought ten times the value of her kesuvah, the first time he must do so and afterwards, if he wants he can and if he does not want he does not have to. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the price of her redemption is that of her kesuvah, he should redeem her, if not he does not have to redeem her! The Gemora answers that Rabban Gamliel has two separate leniencies in this matter (both are true).

Healing a Widow from the Kesuvah

The Mishna states that if she is stricken, he is obligated to heal her. The Beraisa states that a widow is supported by the possessions of the orphans, and her needing to be healed is akin to basic support. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that healing that for a limited time can be obtained through her kesuvah, but healing that does not have an end in sight is not paid for by the kesuvah.

Rabbi Yochanan says that in Eretz Yisrael they treated bloodletting treatments as healing with no end in sight. Rabbi Yochanan’s relative had a father’s wife who needed treatment every day. They came before Rabbi Yochanan, and he told them that they should come to terms with the doctor on a sum that would cover treatment for the rest of her life. Rabbi Yochanan said that he made himself like the lawyers (it is forbidden for a judge to act, even indirectly, as legal adviser to one of the litigants).

Originally what did he hold (was correct), and in the end what did he hold (was correct)? Originally he held that he should give advice that was beneficial to his relatives, as the passuk say “and from your flesh do not disappear.” In the end he held that an important person like himself cannot use this leniency (a judge must subject himself to greater restrictions in order to be free from all possible suspicion of partiality).
Mishna
If he didn’t write “the male sons that I will have from you they will inherit the money of your kesuvah more than the portion of their brothers” (in the kesuvah) he is still obligated as this is a condition of Beis Din. “The daughters that I will have from you they will sit in my house and be supported by my estate until they are taken as wives by men” is (also automatically) obligatory, as it is a condition of Beis Din. “You will sit in my house and be supported by my estate as long as you are living as a widow in my house” is (also automatically) obligatory, as it is a condition of Beis Din. This is how the people of Yerushalayim would write (a kesuvah, including these conditions). The people of the Galil would write like them. The people of Yehuda would write “until the inheritors wish to give you the kesuvah.” Therefore, if the inheritors wish, they can give her the (value of the) kesuvah and send her off.

Analyzing “Banin Dichrin”
(“Male Sons”)

Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: why did they establish the kesuvah condition (above regarding) of male sons? In order that a person should give a dowry for a daughter like the inheritance inherited by his son. The Gemora asks, is it possible that in a situation where the Torah indicated that a son should inherit and not the daughter, that the sages would institute that a daughter should inherit (by giving her a large dowry, avoiding the potential inheritance by the son)?

The Gemora answers: The inheritance of a daughter also has its roots in the Torah, as the passuk says “take wives and give birth to sons and daughters, and take for your sons wives and your daughters give to men.” It makes sense that he takes a wife for his son (as men actively search out wives), but a daughter is not normally in his hands (to actively search out for her a husband)! The passuk must be teaching us that a man should dress his daughter well and give her a dowry, in order that other should jump at the chance to marry her.

How much should he give her? Abaye and Rava say up to a tenth of his possessions.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps the money given by her father for her marriage purposes should be given to her sons from the marriage, but the kesuvah money from the husband’s side should not? The Gemora answers that if this would be the case, her father would also refrain from pledging money.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps only when the father gives a dowry, the husband’s kesuvah money should automatically go to her sons. If the father does not give a dowry, perhaps the husband’s pledge should also not go to her sons? The Gemora answers that the Rabbanan did not make a distinction between cases in their standard conditions of kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: Let this also be true regarding a daughter (from this wife) among sons (of a different wife) as well? The Gemora answers that the Rabbanan made it like the laws of inheritance regarding sons.

The Gemora asks: Let this also be true regarding a daughter (from this wife) among daughters (of a different wife) as well? The Gemora answers that the Rabbanan did not make such a distinction.

The Gemora asks: Let them also be able to collect from movable possessions (unlike the Gemora implied on 50b)? The Gemora answers that the Rabbanan made it have the regular laws of kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: Let them collect from properties that have a lien on them? The Gemora answers that the stipulation was based on inheritance (not seizure).

The Gemora asks, let this even be true when there is not a dinar worth of property (see 91a)? The Gemora answers that the Rabbanan did not institute this condition when it would conflict with a Torah law of inheritance.

[END]

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Spending More than a Fifth

Rabbi Ila said: It was decreed in Usha that one who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his wealth (for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself).

A braisa is cited to support this ruling: One who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his money, for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself. There was an incident with a fellow who wished to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth and his friend did not allow him to. Who was this friend? Rabbi Yesheivav. Others say: Rabbi Yesheivav wished to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth and his friend did not allow him to. Who was this friend? Rabbi Akiva.

The Rosh writes that this halacha applies by all mitzvos; one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on any specific mitzva, such as esrog or lulav. The Rambam and Rema seem to rule accordingly.

The Rishonim ask: Why would someone be exempt from performing a mitzvah just because it costs more than a fifth of his wealth? The Ra’avad answers that this is similar to halacha that one should make his Shabbos like an ordinary weekday, and not be forced to be supported from charity. This is because poverty is regarded as death, and one is not obligated to give up his life for an ordinary mitzvah.

The Ra’avad adds that this halacha applies only to a positive commandment; however, one would be required to spend his entire wealth in order not to transgress a negative precept.

The Gemora stated that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth to fulfill a mitzvah; is one halachically required to spend up to that amount, or is it only regarded as a mitzvah?

The Beis Yosef (Y”D; 249) writes that it is considered a mitzvah in the preferable manner if one spends up to a fifth of his wealth in order to perform a mitzvah. The Beis Yosef adds that although one can imply from the Gemora that it is not even a mitzvah to spend that amount because the Gemora states: One who spends liberally should not give more than a fifth of his wealth; however, even less than that would be regarded as spending liberally, and there would be no mitzvah whatsoever to spend that amount. Nevertheless, there is a Yerushalmi in Pe’ah that seems to indicate that there is a mitzvah to spend up to one-fifth of his wealth for a mitzvah.

In the sefer Ahavas Chesed, the Chafetz Chaim cites a Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos, who writes that there is a halachic obligation to spend up to one-fifth of one’s wealth for charity. He asks form our Gemora, which would seem to indicate that there is no such obligation. He answers that our Gemora is discussing a case where the poor people are not present and someone is searching to find them in order to give them charity. In such a situation, there is not even a mitzvah to give up to one-fifth. However, the Yerushalmi and the Rambam are speaking about a case where the poor person is in front of you; then, there would be a halachic obligation to give up to one-fifth.

WHEN CAN ONE SPEND
MORE THAN A FIFTH ?

What if one wants to spend more than a fifth? Is he allowed to? It is evident from the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos that it is regarded as virtuous (midas chassidus) for one to spend more than a fifth. However, it can be inferred from the Rambam in halachos that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on a mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim reconciles the two rulings of the Rambam in the same manner as before. If the poor person is present, it would be regarded as midas chassidus to spend more than a fifth, and that is what the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos is discussing. However, when the poor people are not present and one is chasing after them, he should not spend more than a fifth.

The Shitah Mekubetzes writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth if it is to support the studying of Torah. The Ahavas Chesed explains the reasoning for this. One who supports another fellow to learn Torah is creating a partnership with him; the supporter receives a reward together with the one who is learning the Torah. One is permitted to purchase this reward for himself even if it will cost him more than a fifth.

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe (Y”D, 4:37) rules that this is correct only if the supporter specifically negotiates with the one studying Torah to create a partnership of Yissochar and Zevulun. However, if the provider is just donating money to support Torah, he is not permitted to give more than a fifth.

The Ibn Ezra in Mishlei (4:7) writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth in order to study Torah himself. The Chafetz Chaim in Likutei Halachos (Yoma 12a) also rules like that. However, the Netziv in the Shiltos states that this is a matter of dispute between two Amoraim. The Gemora in Eruvin cites the verse that Torah is not in the Heavens. Rav Avdimi says: If it would be in the heavens, one would be obligated to go there and learn. It is evident that one would be forced to spend more than a fifth of his wealth to study Torah, for otherwise, he could claim that it costs too much to travel to the Heaven. However, Rava disagrees regarding the interpretation of that verse, and according to him, one would not be allowed to spend more than a fifth in order to study Torah.

The Rema (Y”D, 249:1) seems to hold that one can give away more than one-fifth of his wealth to charity right before he dies. It is brought in the name of Rabbeinu Yonah that even then, he should not.

It is written in Ahavas Chesed that one who is a free-spender in regards to himself and his family, i.e., he splurges on expensive clothing, builds for himself a fancy mansion and generally leads a luxurious lifestyle; it is permitted for him to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth.

Some say that if one finds himself in dire straits, he is permitted to spend more than a fifth with the intention that it should be on account of this deed that he will merit a salvation. It is brought in the name of the Bnei Yissoschar that one who requires atonement on a specific sin is also permitted to give away more than a fifth.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 50 - Highlights

One Fifth to Charity

Rabbi Ila said: It was decreed in Usha that one who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his wealth (for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself).

A braisa is cited to support this ruling: One who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his money, for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself. There was an incident with a fellow who wished to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth and his friend did not allow him to. Who was this friend? Rabbi Yesheivav. Others say: Rabbi Yesheivav wished to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth and his friend did not allow him to. Who was this friend? Rabbi Akiva.

The Gemora cites a Scriptural verse which alludes to the one-fifth figure in regards to charity. (50a)

Age to Study Torah
Rav Yitzchak said: It was decreed in Usha that one should bear with his son who declines to study Torah (have patience with him and employ gentle means to induce him to study) until he is twelve years old. Afterwards, he may employ drastic measures (hitting him with a strap and withholding support to him) in order to force him to study.

The Gemora asks: Can this be correct? But Rav said to Rav Shmuel bar Shilas: Do not accept a student under the age of six; you shall accept a student of the age of six and stuff him like an ox!?

The Gemora answers: While it’s correct that a six year old should be stuffed like an ox, but he may not employ drastic measures until after he has reached twelve years of age.

Alternatively, I may say: This is no difficulty, since Rav’s ruling may have referred to studying Scripture, whereas the decree enacted in Usha was referring to the study of Mishna; for Abaye stated: Mother (referring to his nurse; his mother died while he was an infant, and his upbringing was entrusted to a nurse from whom he learned many proverbs, maxims, legends and folklore) told me that a child of six is ready for Scripture; a child of ten is ready for Mishna; a child in his thirteenth year is ready for a full twenty-four hours fast, and, in the case of a girl, one who is in her twelfth year (a girl is not weakened by studying Torah).

Rav Katina said: One who brings his son to study Torah under the age of six will run after him, but he will not succeed (in his efforts to restore his child to his normal health; his health will remain irrevocably ruined).

Others say: The young boy’s friends will run after him, but they will not succeed (in reaching his level of knowledge and scholarship).

The Gemora comments: Indeed, both versions are correct. He will be weak, but well learned.

Alternatively, you can say that the first version is referring to a boy that is week; the second version is referring to a healthy one. (50a)
Wife Selling Melog Property
Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina said: In Usha they decreed that a wife who sells her melog property (usufruct property - the property which the woman brings in with her from her father's house, and which is not recorded in the kesuvah, as well as property which comes to her by inheritance or as a gift after the marriage; this property is hers, and her husband is not responsible for it, since he may only usufruct (the right to use and enjoy the profits and advantages of something belonging to another as long as the property is not damaged or altered in any way) it; the term nikhsei melog is derived from the Aramaic word meligah, plucking, i.e., the husband plucks the property just as a chicken is plucked) while her husband is alive and she dies, the husband may take the land from the purchasers (since he is regarded as a purchaser from the time of his marriage; his purchase of the property predates their purchase).

Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef once met Rabbi Avahu who was standing among a crowd of people in Usha. Rav Yitzchak asked him: who is the master of the ruling of Usha? Rabbi Avahu replied: It is Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina. Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef learned this from him forty times, and afterward it was as if he had put it into his pocket (he memorized it). (50a)
Scriptural Expositions
It is written [Tehillim 106:3]: Praiseworthy are they that keep justice, who perform charity at all times. The Gemora asks: Is it possible to perform charity at all times? Our Rabbis of Yavneh explained, and others say that it was Rabbi Eliezer: This refers to a man who maintains his sons and daughters while they are still young (it is regarded as a charitable act since they are not legally obligated to support them). Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini said: This refers to a man who raises an orphan boy or orphan girl in his house and enables them to marry.

It is written [ibid. 112:3]: Wealth and riches are in his house, and his charity endures forever. Rav Huna and Rav Chisda expounded the text in different ways. One said: It refers to a man who studies the Torah and teaches it to others. The other one said: It refers to a man who writes the Torah, Prophets and the Writings scrolls and lends them to others.

It is written [ibid. 128:6]: And you shall see your children's children; peace upon Israel. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Once your children have children there will be peace upon Israel; for they will not be subject to chalitzah or yibum. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini said: Once your children have children, there will be peace for the judges of Israel, for doubtful claimants regarding inheritance will not come to quarrels. (50a)
Kesuvah for the Male Children
The Mishna had stated: This teaching Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah taught in front of the sages in Kerem Be’Yavneh: The sons should inherit and the daughters should be supported. Just as sons only inherit after their father dies, so too daughters should only be supported after their father dies.

Rav Yosef sat before Rav Hamnuna, and Rav Hamnuna sat and said: Just like the sons only inherit land from their father, so too, the daughters are supported (from the male heirs) only from land.

Everyone screamed at Rav Hamnuna: Do you mean to say that if a father does not leave over land, the children do not inherit anything?

Rav Yosef said to Rav Hamnuna: Perhaps the master was referring to the kesuvah for the male children (if their mother dies first, they have exclusive rights to the land which was guaranteed by their father to their mother in her kesuvah, and they are not required to share this land with children born to their father from a different marriage)?

Rav Hamnuna replied: Master, who is a great man, knows what I am saying. (50a – 50b)
Supporting Orphan Girls with Moveable Property
Rav Chiya bar Yosef said: Rav would support orphan girls from the wheat of the aliyah (their father had no land and they needed to be maintained).

They inquired: Did Rav give them from that which they were promised for their diary (from their father, which can be collected even from moveable property) and what is the meaning of aliyah? Does it mean that we estimate the upper limit of their father’s generosity, and this would follow Shmuel’s opinion. For Shmuel said: With regard to a dowry, we estimate according to the disposition of their father (if he would be liberally generous or perhaps stingy; and accordingly, we can collect even from moveable property since it is not something which was designated in the kesuvah). Or perhaps, Rav was providing basic maintenance for the orphan girls and aliyah would mean according to the good things which were said in the upper chamber? For Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef said: It was decreed upon in the upper chamber that the daughters should be maintained even from moveable property (unlike all other obligations stipulated upon in the kesuvah, which may only be collected from land).

The Gemora cites the following proof: Rabbi Banai, the brother of Rabbi Chiya bar Abba had moveable property of orphans in his hands. The orphaned daughters came before Shmuel to claim them. Shmuel told Rabbi Banai: Go and support them (with the moveable property). The Gemora notes: Are we not speaking about their sustenance, and this would be following the opinion of Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef (who allows them to collect even from moveable property)?

The Gemora rejects the proof: It is referring to their dowry, and Shmuel is following his own opinion, for Shmuel said: With regard to a dowry, we estimate according to the disposition of their father (if he would be liberally generous or perhaps stingy; and accordingly, we can collect even from moveable property since it is not something which was designated in the kesuvah).

The Gemora records several related incidents: In Nehardea, they collected moveable property to sustain orphan girls. Rav Nachman disagreed with them and told them to return the property.

Rav Ami and Rav Assi wanted to collect moveable property to sustain orphan girls. They were told: if Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish did not do like this, they shouldn’t either.

Rabbi Elozar wanted to collect moveable property to sustain orphan girls. Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim told him: I know, my teacher that you are not acting according to the line of justice; rather, you are acting with compassion. However, there is a concern that the students will observe your judgment and they will think that this indeed is the correct halacha.

Rav Yosef once told inheritors to give dates that are on the mats to sustain an orphan girl. Abaye challenged him: Would you collect from dates for a creditor (obviously not; you would only collect from land)?

Rav Yosef responded: I was referring to dates that are fit to be used for mats (but they are still on the tree and are therefore regarded as land).

Abaye was not satisfied and he asked him: Since the dates are ready to be harvested, shouldn’t they be considered as if they already were harvested?

Rav Yosef replied: I was referring to dates that still require the palm tree. (50b – 51a)

[END]

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Supporting your Children (scroll to the bottom to see Reb Moshe's opinion)

The Mishna (Kesuvos 49a) states: A father is not obligated to provide food for his daughter. This teaching Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah taught in front of the sages in Kerem Be’Yavneh: The sons should inherit and the daughters should be supported. Just as sons only inherit after their father dies, so too daughters should only be supported after their father dies.

The Gemora comments: This implies that he is not obligated in supporting his daughters, while he is obligated to support his sons. Additionally, it implies that there is no obligation to support one’s daughter but there is a mitzva to do so.

The Gemora asks: Who is the author of our Mishna? It does not seem to be Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, or Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah, as we shall see from the following Beraisa.

The Beraisa states that it is a mitzva to support girls, and certainly sons who learn Torah. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says that it is a mitzva to support sons, and certainly daughters, as it is degrading for the girls. Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says that it is an obligation to support girls after the father dies, but both (girls and boys) do not have to be supported during the father’s lifetime.

Who is the author of our Mishna? It is difficult to say that it follows Rabbi Meir's opinion, as he says it is only a mitzva (not obligation) to support boys. It is difficult to say it follows Rabbi Yehuda's opinion, as he says that boys are also a mitzva. It is difficult to say it follows Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka's opinion, as he says it is only a mitzva to support boys after the father dies.

The Gemora answers that the author could be any of these three Tanaim. Our Mishna could be Rabbi Meir, and it would read as follows: A father is not obligated to support his daughter and similarly his son, but there is a mitzva to support one’s daughter and certainly his son. Why did it only say “daughter” in the Mishna? This teaches us that it is even a mitzva to support a daughter (though she does not learn Torah), but it is not obligatory.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that it could also be Rabbi Yehuda. The Mishna would read as follows: A father is not obligated to support a daughter and certainly a son, but it is a mitzva to support a son and certainly a daughter. Why does the Mishna only discuss a son? This teaches us that there is no obligation to support one's children, even regarding a daughter.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that it could also be Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka. The Mishna would read as follows: A father is not obligated to support a daughter or a son, and it is not even a mitzva to do so. The Mishna only used the term “obligation” (not to imply it is a mitzva, but rather) because there is an obligation to support daughters after their father dies.

Rabbi Ila said in the name of Reish Lakish in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Chanina: In Usha they decreed that a person must support his sons and daughters when they are minors.

The Gemora inquires: Does the halachah follow this decree or not? We can answer this from Rav Yehuda, who would tell people who came before him with this question, “The alligator has children, and throws them on the people of the city?!” [This implies that he would tell people they should do so, but not enforce it.] Rav Chisda would tell people who came before him: “Turn over a grinder in public stand on top of it and say: “a raven feeds its kin, and this person does not want to do so!”

The Gemora asks, does a raven indeed feed its kin? Doesn’t the passuk say “He feeds the sons of the raven who call out to Him?” This is not difficult, for the passuk is talking about the white ravens babies, while Rav Chisda meant the older black raven children (see Rashi).

When people would come before Rava, he would say: “Are you happy that your children should be supported from charity?” All of this is only referring to a case where the person is not wealthy. If he is wealthy, we force him to support his children. This is as in the case where Rava forced Rav Nasan bar Ami (regarding giving proper amounts of charity), and took from him four hundred zuz (type of coin) for charity.

Tosfos comments: If one has children less than six years old, he has an obligation to feed them, and it is enforceable. It would seem that this is a Rabbinical obligation.

Reb Moshe Feinstein in his sefer Dibros Moshe on Gittin (fourth perek; heora 83)writes the following novel halacha: If one has only one son and only one daughter, he is halachically required to support them. His reasoning is as follows: There is a mitzva of procreation. We hold according to Rabbi Yochanan, who states that if one has children and they die, he has not fulfilled his mitzva of procreation. Accordingly, if one does not sustain his children and they consequently die, he will be lacking his mitzva of peru u'revu. It is therefore incumbent upon him to be concerned about the welfare of these children; not necessarily for their sake, but for his mitzva.

He adds: When the Mishna says that one is not obligated to sustain his children, that is only if he has more than one son and one daughter. He concludes that he is bewildered why none of the poskim rule accordingly.

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Count the Stars

In this week's parsha, Avrohom was told to look up at the heavens and count the stars. How was it possible for him to fulfill such an unattainable task? Reb Meir Shapiro whose yahrtzeit is today, explains that an inteligent person would have obviously been perplexed when receiving such an overwhelming instruction, knowing that it is impossible to complete. Avrohom was also well aware of this, but he knew that by following Hashem's commandment, he would receive a special syata dishmaya and with that knowledge, he began counting 1, 2, 3 .... Hashem, recognizing this enthusiasm and Avrohom's willingness to fulfill His commandments immediately blessed him with the brocha of children.

Anyone can join the learning of Daf haYomi; all you have to do is start, one day at a time.

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Husband Imposing Stringencies on his Wife

Rav Yosef taught the following braisa (Kesuvos 48a): Her she’eir implies close bodily contact. This means that he must not treat her in the manner of the Persians who perform their conjugal duties in their clothing. This provides support for a ruling of Rav Huna who stated that a husband who said, “I will not perform my conjugal duties unless she wears her clothes and I mine,” must divorce her and give her a kesuvah also.

The Ritva comments: Even though he is wearing his clothes for modesty purposes, and even if she would do the same, this would have the status of rejecting relations since it is not in an intimate manner and is therefore grounds for divorce.

Reb Avi Lebowitz points out that the Ritva does not seem to reject the notion that it would be more modest in this way; rather, it seems from the Ritva that in truth, one can make a legitimate claim that they want to maintain this stringency for the sake of modesty, nevertheless, she is not bound to keep his stringencies, and he therefore cannot impose this stringency on her without her consent.

Shulchan Aruch (YD 185:3) issues the following ruling: If a woman told her husband that she is a niddah, and later she retracts and says that she is not, she is not believed. If she gives an amasla, e.g. an excuse, such as, at first she said that she is niddah because she did not have strength for cohabitation, then, she is believed.

The Rama states that if the husband wants to be stringent on himself not to believe her, it is regarded as virtuous (midas chassidus).

The Chasam Sofer (Y”D, 149) discusses a case where a woman showed her garment to a Rav to determine if she is a niddah or not, and she was told by the Rav that she is permitted, but the husband who is a Torah scholar wishes to be stringent. The Chasam Sofer elaborates to explain that the nature of being married to a Torah scholar is to accept his stringencies, and his stringency may be imposed on her.

Reb Avi explains that by analyzing the context of the Chasam Sofer, it becomes evident that he cannot impose any stringency that he chooses on her. He is speaking of a situation where it should have been expected that he would keep these types of stringencies, but in cases where at the time of the marriage, there was not any expectation for him to act stringently, he cannot impose his stringencies on her, which would conform with the implication of the Ritva.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 48 - Highlights

She’eir, Kesus and Onah

It is written [Shmos 21:10] regarding a man’s obligations to his wife: He may not reduce her she’eir, her kesus, or her onah. A braisa is cited which defines these words. She’eir is referring to support. Kesus means clothing. Onah is referring to conjugal relations in their proper time.

Rabbi Eliezer understands these words differently. She’eir is referring to conjugal relations in their proper time. Kesus means clothing. Onah is referring to support.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov explains the words differently. She’eir is written next to kesus to teach us that the husband should provide his wife with clothing that is suitable to her age. Kesus is written next to onah to teach us that he should provide her with clothing according to the season.

Rav Yosef taught the following braisa: Her she’eir implies close bodily contact. This means that he must not treat her in the manner of the Persians who perform their conjugal duties in their clothing. This provides support for a ruling of Rav Huna who stated that a husband who said, “I will not perform my conjugal duties unless she wears her clothes and I mine,” must divorce her and give her a kesuvah also. (47b – 48a)

Flutes and Lamenter
The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yehudah said: Even the poorest man in Israel may not hire less than two flutes and a wailing woman to lead the mourning at his wife’s burial.

The Gemora infers from here that the Tanna Kamma disagrees and holds that a husband is not required to provide these things for his wife’s funeral.

The Gemora explains the dispute: The Mishna is referring to a case where it is the custom in the husband’s family to have flutes and a wailing woman by the funeral of a woman; however, it is not the custom of the wife’s family. The Tanna Kamma maintains that we say, “A woman rises to the husband’s standards, but does not descend to his standards” only while she is alive, but not after her death. Therefore, the husband is not required to provide the flutes and wailing woman for her burial because it is not his custom. Rabbi Yehudah, however, holds that the principle is applicable even after her death, and he must provide for her burial according to the standards of her family.

Rav Chisda says in the name of Mar Ukva that the halacha follows Rabbi Yehudah. (48a)

Support if he Became Insane or if he Went Overseas
Rav Chisda said in the name of Mar Ukva: If a man became insane, Beis Din takes possession of his estate and provides food and clothing for his wife, sons and daughters, and he also provides something else.

Ravina asked Rav Ashi: Why should this case be different from that which was taught in the following braisa: If a man went to a country overseas and his wife claims that she wants to be provided for, Beis Din takes possession of the husband’s estate and provides food and clothing for his wife, but not for his sons and daughters or for something else?

Rav Ashi replied: Do you not draw a distinction between one who departs intentionally and one who departs without knowing it? (In the case where he went overseas, the man, if he so desired, could have left instructions that his wife and family should be provided for; since, he did not leave any instructions, it is obvious that he had no intention of providing for them. This explains the ruling that his wife, whom he is under a legal obligation to maintain must be provided for by the Beis Din out of his estate; his sons and daughters, however, who have no legal claim upon their father's estate will not be provided for. However, a man who becomes insane, it may well be assumed that it was his wish that both his wife and family shall be properly provided for out of his estate.)

The Gemora asks: What is the “something else” mentioned in the braisa?

Rav Chisda says that it means perfume. (If he went insane, they provide perfume for his wife; however, if he went overseas, they do not.) Rav Yosef says that it is referring to charity. (If he went insane, they tax his property; however, if he went overseas, they do not.)

Rav Chiya bar Avin said in the name of Rav Huna: If a man went to a country overseas, and his wife died, Beis Din takes possession of the husband’s estate and buries her even according to his standard. He is teaching us that that we say, “A woman rises to the husband’s standards, but does not descend to his standards” even after her death. (48a)

Mishna
The Mishna states: She (a bride) always remains under the jurisdiction of her father until she enters the authority of her husband at marriage. If her father delivered her to the agents of her husband (and certainly if he delivered her directly to the husband), she is under the authority of her husband. If her father went with the agents of her husband, or the agents of her father went with the agents of her husband, she remains under the jurisdiction of her father. If the agents of her father delivered her to the agents of her husband, she is under the authority of her husband. (48a – 48b)

“Always”
The Gemora asks: What is the Mishna teaching us when it uses the word “always”?

The Gemora answers: It is coming to exclude that which we learned in a different Mishna. For we learned in a Mishna: If the time arrived (In former times the betrothal (kiddushin) and the marriage (nisu'in) ceremonies were not performed at the same time as is our practice today. Rather it was customary for the bridegroom to first betroth his bride and make her his arusah (betrothed) and only later did he take her to the chupah (bridal canopy) for the marriage ceremony. During the period intervening between the betrothal and the marriage, the arusah lived in her father's house, and the arus was not liable for her maintenance, and if she was the daughter of an Israelite, who had been betrothed by a Kohen, she was not allowed to eat terumah, although, by Torah law, the daughter of an Israelite betrothed to a kohen is allowed to eat terumah, as it is written, "But if a Kohen buy any soul, the acquisition of his money, he may eat of it" (Lev. 22:11), and the arusah is an "acquisition" effected by him with the money of the kiddushin, nevertheless, since she lives in her father's home, the Sages prohibited her from eating of the terumah, "lest they pour a cup of terumah for her in her father's home, and she offer it to her brothers and sisters." According to another opinion the prohibition was enacted "because of a blemish," i.e., if he found a physical defect in her, her kiddushin would be considered erroneous, and would be annulled retroactively and thus a non-kohen will have partaken of terumah. This Mishna discusses the case of one who betroths a woman without specifying a marriage date and teaches how they set the marriage date subsequently, and the law regarding an arusah whose bridegroom (arus) does not wed her when the marriage date arrives. Kehati) and they (the virgin or the widow) were not married by the husband, they eat from his food and they eat of the terumah. Our Mishna is teaching us that the halacha is not like that; she never eats of terumah, even if the time designated for nisuin has passed, until the husband marries her. (48b)

Delivery to the Husband
The Mishna had stated: If her father delivered her to the agents of her husband (and certainly if he delivered her directly to the husband), she is under the authority of her husband.

Rav said: She is under the authority of her husband in all respects except for the permission to eat terumah. (Rav maintains that the reason an arusah is prohibited from eating terumah is "because of a blemish," i.e., if he found a physical defect in her, her kiddushin would be considered erroneous, and would be annulled retroactively and thus a non-kohen will have partaken of terumah. Since, in this case, he still has not determined if she has any defects, she is still prohibited from eating terumah.)

Rav Assi said: She is under the authority of her husband in all respects even for the permission to eat terumah. (Rav Assi maintains that the reason an arusah is prohibited from eating terumah is "lest they pour a cup of terumah for her in her father's home, and she offer it to her brothers and sisters." Once she is delivered to her husband’s house, this is not a concern any longer.)

Shmuel said: She is under the authority of her husband only in respect to inheritance (if she died, her husband inherits her dowry).

Rish Lakish said: She is under the authority of her husband only in respect to her kesuvah. Ravina explains this to mean that if her husband died and she marries another man, her kesuvah is only a manah (because it is regarded as if she entered nisuin with her former husband).

The Gemora challenges these opinions from the following braisa: If the father went with the agents of the husband, or if the agents of the father went with the agents of the husband, or if she had a court-yard on the way, and she entered it with her husband to rest there for the night, even if her kesuvah is already in the husband’s house, her father inherits her if she died. If, however, her father delivered her to her husband’s agents, or if her father’s agents delivered her to her husband’s agents, or the husband had a court-yard on the way, and she entered it with him with an intention of nisuin, even if her kesuvah is in her father’s house, her husband inherits her if she died. This ruling was only said in respect of her inheritance, but in respect of terumah, the halacha is that a woman is not allowed to eat terumah until she enters the chupah.

Does not this represent a refutation of all (except for Shmuel)? This is indeed a refutation. (48b)

[END]

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Chupah on Shabbos and Yom Tov

The Mishna had stated: The father is entitled to the earnings of his daughter.

The Gemora (Kesuvos 47a) asks: What is the source for this?

The Gemora answers: It is learned from that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: How is it known that a daughter’s earnings belong to her father? It is because it is written [Shmos 21:7]: When a father shall sell his daughter as a maidservant. The Torah juxtaposes the words “daughter” and “maidservant” to teach the following: Just as the earnings of a maidservant belong to her master, so too, the earnings of a daughter belong to her father.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps, the Torah is only referring to a minor, whom a father may sell as a maidservant; however, in respect to a na’arah, whom the father may not sell, her earnings belong to her?

The Gemora answers: It can be derived through the following logical argument: If it would be imagined that her earnings does not belong to him, how would the father have the right to deliver his daughter to the chupah (bridal chamber)? How could he consign her when he thereby prevents her from doing her work (during her preparations for chupah and its ceremony)?

Rav Achai objects to this line of reasoning and asks: Perhaps the father pays her compensation for her loss of work during the time of the chupah? Alternatively, he may deliver her to the chupah at night (when she is not working anyway)! Alternatively, he may deliver her to the chupah on Shabbos and Yom Tov (in which time, it is forbidden to perform any labor)!

Tosfos asks: How can we be discussing a case where he married her on Shabbos or Yom Tov? The Gemora in Moed Katan (8b) states that one may not get married even during Chol Hamoed, for one is not permitted to intermingle one source of joy with another. It is evident from a Gemora in Chagigah (8b) that this is a Biblical halacha. Certainly, it should be forbidden to marry on Yom Tov!?

Tosfos answers that we are referring to a case where he married her an hour before Yom Tov; in respect to performing labor, it is regarded as Yom Tov, for one is Biblically obligated to add time before Yom Tov and to treat it as if the Yom Tov began; however, it is not considered Yom Tov for the obligation of simcha yet, and therefore, one is permitted to marry during that time. It is at this time, where she anyways may not perform any labor, the father would deliver her to the chupah, and he would not be causing her any loss whatsoever.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks: Not all labor is forbidden to do on Shabbos and Yom Tov; isn’t the father still preventing her from performing that type of work? The fact that it is forbidden to receive compensation for work performed on Shabbos will not be a sufficient explanation in our Gemora, for that is only a Rabbinical prohibition, and we are discussing a Biblical one!

Reshash answers that our Gemora does not mean that it is forbidden to perform labor on Shabbos, for there are many types of permitted labor that one may perform on Shabbos. Our Gemora means that it is not common for one to be working and receiving compensation for labor on Shabbos and Yom Tov. This is why it is not considered that the father is causing her to lose by marrying her off; she probably would not have been working anyway!

This could be proven from the Gemora’s alternative answer that the father delivered her to the chupah at night. It is not forbidden to perform labor at night; however, it is uncommon. The father is not causing her to lose by delivering her to the chupah at night.

It would seem from Tosfos, however, that we are searching for a time where performing labor would be forbidden, and that is why Tosfos explained the case to be referring to the additional time added before Yom Tov, when it is Biblically forbidden to perform labor at that time.

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Food for Thought

*** How can we (Kesuvos 47a) be discussing a case where she was delivered to the chupah on Shabbos and Yom Tov? Isn’t it forbidden to make a kinyan then?

*** Tosfos asks: How can one get married on Yom Tov; there is an obligation for simcha, and we may not intermingle one source of joy with another? Perhaps, we can answer that the Gemora is referring to Rosh Hashanah, where there is no obligation for simcha (according to some commentators)?

*** Why does Tosfos have to explain the case to be referring to one where they got married in the time that was added on to Yom Tov, and therefore, there is no obligation for simcha; couldn’t we have said that they got married on the first night of Yom Tov, and the Gemora Pesachim (71a) states that there is no obligation for simcha on the first night?

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 47 - Highlights

Rights to her Finds

The Mishna had stated: The father is entitled to that which his daughter finds. The Gemora explains that this was a Rabbinic decree established because we did not want there to be animosity between father and daughter (which might happen if she would be allowed to keep that which she finds and he would no longer support her). (46b – 47a)

Earnings to the Father

The Mishna had stated: The father is entitled to the earnings of his daughter.

The Gemora asks: What is the source for this?

The Gemora answers: It is learned from that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: How is it known that a daughter’s earnings belong to her father? It is because it is written [Shmos 21:7]: When a father shall sell his daughter as a maidservant. The Torah juxtaposes the words “daughter” and “maidservant” to teach the following: Just as the earnings of a maidservant belong to her master, so too, the earnings of a daughter belong to her father.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps, the Torah is only referring to a minor, whom a father may sell as a maidservant; however, in respect to a na’arah, whom the father may not sell, her earnings belong to her?

The Gemora answers: It can be derived through the following logical argument: If it would be imagined that her earnings does not belong to him, how would the father have the right to deliver his daughter to the chupah (bridal chamber)? How could he consign her when he thereby prevents her from doing her work (during her preparations for chupah and its ceremony)?

Rav Achai objects to this line of reasoning and asks: Perhaps the father pays her compensation for her loss of work during the time of the chupah? Alternatively, he may deliver her to the chupah at night (when she is not working anyway)! Alternatively, he may deliver her to the chupah on Shabbos and Yom Tov (in which time, it is forbidden to perform any labor)!

The Gemora concludes: It would not be necessary for the Torah to teach us that a father is entitled to his minor daughter’s earnings, for since he has a right to sell her as a maidservant, it is evident that her earnings belong to him. It emerges that the verse mentioned above is teaching us that the father is entitled to the earnings of his daughter, who is a na’arah. (47a)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural sources indicating that a father annuls his daughter’s vows and that he receives her get. (47a)

Fruits for Ransom

The Mishna had stated: The father does not eat the fruit of her property during her lifetime (if she had inherited property from her mother’s family).

The Gemora cites the following braisa: The father does not eat the fruit of her property during her lifetime. Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah says: The father does eat the fruit of her property during her lifetime.

The Gemora explains the argument: The Tanna Kamma holds that it is understandable why the Rabbi established that a husband may eat the fruit from his wife’s property, for otherwise, he would redeem her if she was being held for ransom (the Rabbis obligated the husband to redeem her and as a tradeoff, instituted that he eats the fruit from her property). However, in respect to her father, it was not necessary to make such a decree, for the father will redeem her anyways; therefore, he does not eat the fruit of her property. Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah, however, maintains that if not for the fact that father may eat the fruit of her property; he also would refuse to redeem her, for he would think, “Let her use her purse full of money (that is being held for her in trust from the fruit of her property) to redeem herself.” (47a)

A Dowry and an Addition

The Gemora cites a braisa: If a father wrote for his daughter in writing fruit, clothing or other movable objects that she may take with her from her father's house to that of her husband (this is known as tzon barzel – ironclad property; the property which the wife brings in to her husband in the dowry, and which the husband records in the kesuvah; the husband makes use of this property as he wishes, its profits or losses are his, and he is responsible for it; hence the name, “ironclad property”: The principal remains as does iron, for if it is lost, the husband is required to pay), and she died (during her betrothal before the marriage was consummated), her husband does not acquire these objects. It was said in the name of Rabbi Nosson: The husband does acquire them.

The Gemora attempts to link this argument with another: Can we assume that they differ on the same principles as those on which Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah and the Rabbis differed? For we learned in a Mishna: A woman who was widowed or divorced, either after marriage or after betrothal, is entitled to collect everything (the basic obligations of the kesuvah, plus any additions that the husband included). Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah ruled: Only a woman widowed or divorced after nisuin collects everything, but if it is only after her betrothal, a virgin collects only two hundred zuz and a widow only one maneh, for the husband wrote the addition for her with the sole objective of marrying her (and since he did not marry her, she may not claim it).

The Gemora explains the connection: May we assume that the one who ruled that ‘her husband does not acquire (the movable objects written into the dowry)’ upholds the same principle as Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah (as he makes the woman’s right to the additional money written into the kesuvah dependent on marriage, so also does the Tanna Kamma make the husband's right to the dowry that his wife brings from her father's house dependent on marriage), whereas the one (Rabbi Nosson) who ruled that ‘the husband does acquire (the movable objects written into the dowry)’ upholds the same principle as the Rabbis (as they both maintain that betrothal provides the same rights as the marriage)?

The Gemora objects to the linkage: No! The Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Nosson both may hold like Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah. For the one who ruled that ‘her husband does not acquire (the movable objects written into the dowry)’ obviously upholds the same principle as Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah. And as to the one (Rabbi Nosson) who ruled that ‘the husband does acquire (the movable objects written into the dowry),’ it may be explained that only in respect of commitments from him towards her did Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah maintain his view, for the husband wrote the addition for her with the sole objective of marrying her (and since he did not marry her, she may not claim it). However, in respect of commitments from her towards him, even Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah may admit that betrothal has the same force as marriage since commitments of such a nature are due to a desire from the bride’s father for matrimonial association with the groom, and such association, even with a betrothal alone, has surely taken place. (47a – 47b)
Providing Maintenance

The Mishna had stated: After nisuin, the husband is obligated to provide for her maintenance.

The Gemora cites a braisa: The Rabbis established that the husband should provide for her maintenance in return for his entitlement to her earnings, and the husband provides for her burial in return for his inheriting the dowry items written into her kesuvah. Therefore, the husband eats the fruit from his wife’s property.

The Gemora asks: Who mentioned fruits?

The Gemora answers: There are missing words in the braisa, and this is what it should say: The Rabbis established that the husband should provide for her maintenance in return for his entitlement to her earnings, and the husband is obligated to redeem her if she was held captive, and as a tradeoff, instituted that he eats the fruit from her property, and the husband provides for her burial in return for his inheriting the dowry items written into her kesuvah. Therefore, the husband eats the fruit from his wife’s property.

The Gemora asks: What is the meaning of the word “therefore”?

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that a husband should not eat the fruits, but should rather leave them (letting them accumulate as a fund for his wife’s ransom if it should be necessary) since, otherwise (if he would eat the fruits), he might refrain from ransoming her. The braisa informs us that it is preferable for the husband to eat the fruit, for sometimes, the accumulation of the fruit might not suffice and he would refuse to ransom her from his own expenses.

The Gemora asks: How do we know that the husband should provide for her maintenance in return for his entitlement to her earnings, and the husband is obligated to redeem her if she was held captive, and as a tradeoff, instituted that he eats the fruit from her property; perhaps, the husband should provide for her maintenance in return for the right to eat the fruit from her property, and the husband is obligated to redeem her if she was held captive in return for his entitlement to her earnings?

Abaye answered: They established the obligation for a common need (maintenance) in return for a common occurrence (her earnings), and an obligation for an uncommon need (her being held captive) in return for an uncommon occurrence (her owning her own property).

Rava cites a braisa indicating that the husband’s obligation to provide maintenance for his wife is Biblical. (47b – 48a)

[END]

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Lashes without an Action

The Gemora (Kesuvos 46a) states: If the husband defames his wife, he receives lashes. This is true even though this prohibition does not entail any action.

Tosfos in Shavuos (21a) asks: The Gemora there lists three prohibitions that one violates without performing an action, and nevertheless, one incurs lashes for transgressing them. They are: Violating an oath, making a temurah (attempting to exchange an animal that possesses sanctity with one that does not) and one who curses his fellow using the name of Hashem. Why doesn’t the Gemora include the case of a husband who defames his wife? It is also a prohibition that does not involve an action, but yet, one incurs lashes for its violation.

Tosfos answers: It is not necessary for the Gemora to include this case in the listing because the fact that the husband receives lashes is explicitly written in the Torah. Tosfos adds that even if you say that this case should be included in the listing, it is not a question as to why it was omitted because the Gemora wasn’t listing every applicable case.

The Ramban answers that the Gemora is in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah who rules that the husband does not receive any penalties unless he has hired the witnesses. Accordingly, this prohibition does involve an action, and that is why it is not included in the listing.

The Brisker Rav (Temurah 3a) answers that the lashes received is not because the husband violated the prohibition of slandering, for anyone who talks lashon harah does not receive lashes. The lashes are one of the laws for one who defames his wife; he is required to pay a fine, he may not divorce her and he receives lashes. The Gemora required a verse for the warning only because there is a rule that one may not receive lashes unless the Torah states a warning. Accordingly, this is why it is not included in the listing; he does not receive lashes because he violated a negative prohibition, but rather, it is one of the components of the laws for one who defames his wife.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 46 - Highlights

Punishment for Slandering

The Gemora cites a braisa discussing the punishment administered to one who slanders. The braisa cites the Scriptural sources proving that he receives lashes and he is required to pay a fine. (46a)

Warning against Slandering

The Gemora asks: From where do we derive that the Torah issues a warning against slandering (in order to receive punishment for a sin, the Torah must explicitly state a warning prohibiting that particular action)?

Rabbi Elozar said: It is from the following verse: You shall not go about as a talebearer. Rabbi Nosson said: It is from the following verse: Beware of any evil word.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Elozar does not use the other text?

The Gemora answers: That text is required for the deduction made by Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair: Beware of any evil word. Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair deduced that a man should not indulge in immoral thoughts by day that might lead him to uncleanness (seminal emission) by night.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Nosson does not use the other text?

The Gemora answers: That text is required to warn the court that it must not be lenient with one of the litigants and harsh to the other. (46a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: If a (slandering) husband did not say to the witnesses, “Come and give evidence for me,” but rather, they volunteered to give it, he does not receive lashes, nor is he required to pay the hundred sela. If the accusation is true, she or her false witnesses that became zomemim (witnesses who other witnesses proclaim could not possibly have seen the event, as they were together in a different location, see Makos 2a) are hurried to the place of stoning.

The Gemora asks: How can we think that she would receive stoning together with false witnesses? It must mean that either she, or her false witnesses that became zomemim receive stoning.

The Gemora comments: The reason that he does not receive lashes is because he did not tell them to give their evidence. Had he, however, told them to testify, he would have been subject to the prescribed penalties even though he did not hire them. This ruling comes to exclude the viewpoint of Rabbi Yehudah, for it was taught in the following braisa: Rabbi Yehudah ruled: A husband does not receive any penalties unless he has hired the witnesses.

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source as the reason for Rabbi Yehudah’s ruling.

Rabbi Yirmiyah inquires: What is the law if the husband hired the witnesses with land (the Scriptural source would seem to indicate that he will only be liable if he hires them with money, food or any movable object)? What is the law if he hires them with less than a perutah? What is the law if he hired them both with a single perutah?

Rav Ashi inquired: What is the law if he slandered her on account of his first marriage (he married her, divorced her and married her again)? What is the law if he slandered her on account of his brother’s marriage (his brother died childless and he performed yibum; he now claims that she was not a virgin when she married his brother)?

The Gemora resolves one of the inquiries, for Rabbi Yonah taught a braisa: It is written: I gave my daughter to this man. We may infer from here that the law of slandering is applicable only when the father gave his daughter to this man, and not to the yavam. (46a)
The Laws of the Defamer

The Gemora elaborates on the dispute mentioned above (45b) between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov as to whether the laws of the slanderer applies even if the couple did not cohabit. It was taught in the following braisa: What is the case of the slanderer? The husband comes to Beis Din and says to his wife’s father, “I did not find your daughter to be a virgin.” If there are witnesses that she committed adultery, she is subject to stoning. If she cohabited before the erusin, she receives a kesuvah of a manah. If his accusation is found to be a false one, he incurs lashes and he is required to pay one hundred selaim. These laws are applicable whether he cohabited with her or whether he did not cohabit with her. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: These words were only said if he did cohabit with her.

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, one can well understand why the Torah stated: And he comes to her … and I came near to her, but according to the Rabbis, what is the meaning of that expression?

The Gemora answers: And he comes to her means with wanton charges, and I came near to her means with words.

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, one can well understand why the Torah stated: I did not find signs of virginity on your daughter, but according to the Rabbis, what is the meaning of that expression?

The Gemora answers: It means that the husband could not find witnesses to confirm her virginity.

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, one can well understand why the Torah stated: And these are the signs of my daughter's virginity (her parents produce the bloodstained sheet and bring them to Beis Din, proving that she was indeed a virgin), but according to the Rabbis, what is the meaning of that expression?

The Gemora answers: It means that her father produces witnesses who confirm her virginity (presenting witnesses who testify that the husband’s witnesses are zomemim).

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, one can well understand why the Torah stated: And they shall spread out the sheet, but according to the Rabbis, what is the meaning of that expression?

Rabbi Avahu answered: They explain the charge which he submitted against her, as it was taught in the following braisa: And they shall spread out the sheet teaches us that the witnesses of this one and those of the other one come, and the matter is clarified like a new sheet. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: The words are to be taken in their literal sense; they produce the actual sheet.

Rabbi Yitzchak the son of Rav Yaakov bar Giyorei sent in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Even though we do not find elsewhere in the Torah that there is a distinction between cohabitation in an ordinary manner and cohabitation in an unnatural manner in respect to lashes and fines, in regards to a husband who slanders, there is the following distinction: He is subject to the punishments of slandering even if he cohabits with his wife in an unnatural manner, provided that he accuses his wife of committing adultery in an ordinary manner.

The Gemora asks: According to which Tanna was this ruling issued? It cannot be according to the Rabbis, for they hold that the husband is subject to the punishments of slandering even if he does not cohabit with her. It can also not be following Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov’s opinion, for he holds that the husband is subject to the punishments of slandering only if he cohabits with his wife in a natural manner.

The Gemora retracts and cites another version: Rav Kahana sent in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The husband is subject to the punishments of slandering only if he cohabits with his wife in a natural manner and only if he accuses his wife of committing adultery in an ordinary manner. (46a – 46b)

Mishna

The Mishna states: A father has jurisdiction over his daughter regarding her betrothal; he receives the money, he accepts the document, or he can give his daughter to him for cohabitation. The father is entitled to that which she finds, and to her earnings and to annul her vows. He receives her get, but he does not eat the fruit of her property during her lifetime (if she had inherited property from her mother’s family).

Once she is married (nisuin), the husband exceeds the father in that he does eat the fruit of her property during her lifetime. He is obligated to provide for her maintenance, for her ransom and for her burial. Rabbi Yehudah says; Even the poorest man in Israel may not hire less than two flutes and a wailing woman to lead the mourning at his wife’s burial. (46b)

Scriptural Sources

The Gemora asks: How do we know that a father is entitled to his daughter’s betrothal money?

Rav Yehudah says: It is written concerning a Jewish maidservant who becomes a na’arah: She shall leave free of charge, without payment. Since the words without payment are seemingly superfluous, we derive from here the following exposition: There is no payment paid to this master, but there is a payment made to a different master (when a na’arah leaves his jurisdiction). Who is that? It is her father (when the na’arah gets married, the father is entitled to the betrothal money).

The Gemora asks: Perhaps there is a payment, but the payment belongs to her and not to her father?

The Gemora answers: Since the father is empowered to give his daughter in marriage, it stands to reason that he receives the payment as well.

The Gemora persists in its questioning: Perhaps the father is entitled to her betrothal money only when his daughter is a minor, at a time that she does not have a hand (capable of making legal transactions); however, a na’arah, who has a hand (capable of making legal transactions), let her betroth herself and receive the money?

The Gemora answers: It is written [Bamidbar 30:17]: In her naarus, in her father’s house. We derive from here that all profits generated by a na’arah belong to the father. It is therefore evident that the betrothal money goes to him, and not to her.

The Gemora objects to this drasha: Let us examine that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: How is it known that a daughter’s earnings belong to her father? It is because it is written [Shmos 21:7]: When a father shall sell his daughter as a maidservant. The Torah juxtaposes the words “daughter” and “maidservant” to teach the following: Just as the earnings of a maidservant belong to her master, so too, the earnings of a daughter belong to her father. The Gemora asks: Why is it necessary to expound the verse in this manner? Let us derive this halacha from the verse mentioned above, namely, In her naarus, in her father’s house?

Rather, it is evident that this verse cannot be the source for this halacha. This is because the aforementioned verse is discussing the annulment of vows (and we cannot derive from there that the payments for embarrassment and depreciation belong to the father).

The Gemora asks: Why can’t we compare the two halachos, and say that just like the father has control over his daughter’s vows, he should receive the betrothal money?

The Gemora answers: We cannot derive a monetary halacha from a prohibitory one.

The Gemora asks: Let us derive the halacha from the fact that the fine belongs to the father?

The Gemora answers: We cannot derive a monetary halacha from a fine.

And should you suggest that that this should be inferred from the law of compensation for embarrassment and depreciation, it could be retorted that embarrassment and depreciation are different, since the father has a right to betroth his daughter to a repulsive man or one who is afflicted with boils (thereby embarrassing her and depreciating her value) and receive the betrothal money in exchange. It is therefore evident that the payments for her embarrassment and depreciation belong to her father.

This, however, is the explanation: It is logical to conclude that when the Torah excluded another case of “going out,” the exclusion was meant to be understood in a manner similar to the original (just as in the verse concerning the maidservant who became a na’arah, it is the master, and not the maidservant, who, in the absence of the specific text to the contrary, would have received the money for the latter's redemption, so too in the implication it must be the father (who corresponds to the master), and not his daughter, who is to receive the money when she leaves his jurisdiction at betrothal).

The Gemora asks: But one “going out” is not like that of the other, for in the case of the master, the maidservant departs his jurisdiction completely, whereas in the “going out” from the jurisdiction of her father, she still lacks being given over for chupah?

The Gemora answers: In respect of the annulment of vows, she does depart from her father’s jurisdiction, for he cannot annul her vows by himself any longer. As we have learned in the following Mishna: Concerning a betrothed na’arah, her father and her husband are both necessary to annul her vows. (46b)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source indicating that the father accepts the betrothal document and that he can give his daughter to a man for betrothal by cohabitation. (46b)

[END]

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Uncertain Warning

The Gemora states: If witnesses appeared when she was betrothed that she had been unfaithful during the betrothal, she is stoned at the doorway of the city gates. If she had been unfaithful while betrothed but then became a bogeres (older than twelve and a half), she is killed with strangulation.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks: Rabbi Yehudah in Sanhedrin (8b) maintains that in order for a person to be subject to a death penalty, they must be warned and informed precisely death they will be receiving if they transgress the prohibition. If so, Reb Akiva Eiger asks: How can the bogeres be executed through strangulation; when she was warned, the witnesses informed her that she would die by stoning since she was a na’arah at the time?

We are compelled to say that our Gemora is following the opinion that holds that one who is warned for a stricter punishment is automatically regarded as being warned for a more lenient punishment. Since she was warned that she will be stoned if she commits adultery, Beis Din may execute her through strangulation if she becomes a bogeres because stoning is stricter than strangulation.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks on any na’arah; how can we execute her by way of stoning? We cannot inform her that she will certainly be stoned, for perhaps, her judgment will not be complete until she becomes a bogeres, and then her death penalty is strangulation, not stoning!?

We are forced to say that Rabbi Yehudah is in accordance with his own opinion, for he holds that an uncertain warning is a valid one. Accordingly, we warn her that she might get stoned or strangled; it all depends on what her status is at the time of Beis Din’s verdict.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 45 - Highlights

Three Types of Na’aros

Shilo taught that there are three types of deaths of a betrothed girl who was unfaithful. If witnesses appeared when she was already married that she had been unfaithful during the period of her betrothal (45a), she is stoned at the doorway of her father’s house. This is as if to state: “see the (bad) growth that you have grown!” If witnesses appeared when she was betrothed that she had been unfaithful during the betrothal, she is stoned at the doorway of the city gates. If she had been unfaithful while betrothed but then became a bogeres (older than twelve and a half), she is killed with strangulation. (44b – 45a)

Does Physical Change Affect the Type of Punishment?

The Gemora asks: This last statement implies that whenever her body changes her punishment changes as well. However, the Braisa states that if a betrothed na’arah is (possibly) unfaithful and then her husband states that she has a bad name when she is a bogeres (as he only married her then), he does not receive lashes or pay one hundred sela (assuming the accusation is false). If the accusation is true, her and her false witnesses proceed to receive stoning. How can we think that she would receive stoning together with false witnesses? It must mean that either she, or false witnesses that became zomimim (witnesses who other witnesses proclaim could not possibly have seen the event, as they were together in a different location, see Makos 2a) receive stoning. [The Gemara’s question is therefore that in the Braisa she receives stoning, despite the fact that she became a bogeres and should, according to Shilo, seemingly deserve strangulation.]

Rava answered: you are asking from a case of a husband giving a bad name to a wife? A case of a husband accusing a wife of infidelity is novel Torah law. This is obvious from the following comparison. If a woman marries without having been unfaithful but then would be unfaithful after marriage, she would receive strangulation. This is in contrast to typical cases of such accusations from a new husband, where his new wife always receives stoning (if the accusations were true, as she must have been unfaithful while betrothed). [Accordingly, accusations regarding a new wife are always punished by stoning, as opposed to a regular case of being unfaithful which can be dependent on whether or not the girl is a bogeres, as stated by Shilo.]

Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua said to Rava: perhaps this novel Torah law is only where her body did not change in the interim, but if it did the Torah would not say a novel law (that she should receive stoning)!

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak therefore advanced a different answer, that whether or not changing from a na’arah to a bogeres changes punishment is an argument among the Tanaim. The Mishna states that if a prince/king or an anointed kohen gadol sin before they attain this status and then they are appointed, they have the status of a regular person (who brings a regular sin offering to atone for his sin). Rabbi Shimon states if they knew that they had sinned before they were appointed they are indeed obligated like a regular person. However, if they did not know until they were appointed, they are exempt from bringing a regular sin offering. [This seems to imply that because they have changed their korban changes as well.]

The Gemora asks, it is possible that Rabbi Shimon says that knowing about the sin also makes a difference. However, we do not know that he would say that the time of the sin is inconsequential (as Shilo does by saying that she is judged as a bogeres)! If this opinion follows that of Shilo, let them bring korbanos fitting to their current status. The kohen gadol should bring an ox normally brought as the korban for his sin, and the prince/king should bring a goat that is the appropriate animal for his sin!

The Gemora answers that Rabbi Yochanan indeed told the Tana who was teaching the Braisa in the name of Shilo that he should teach that the bogeres receives stoning (not strangulation).

The Gemora asks: Why should this be? Didn’t the torah say that only a betrothed “na’arah” receives stoning, not a bogeres?

Rabbi Ila answers that when the Torah states “the na’arah” it teaches us that it could even be a girl who was a na’arah when she sinned.

Rabbi Chananya said to Rabbi Ila: if this is the case, then let the husband who makes a false accusation about his new wife (who just became a bogeres) receive lashes and pay one hundred sela as well! Rabbi Ila replied: “Heaven save us from such an (incorrect) opinion.” Rabbi Chanina replied: “One the contrary: Heaven should save us from your opinion.!”

What was his reasoning? Rav Yitzchak bar Avin said, and some said Rav Yitzchak bar Abba said that the girls actions caused her to be punished, while the movement of his lips (accusing her of being unfaithful) causes him to be punished. The girl’s actions caused her to be punished. When did that happen? It happened when she was a na’arah. The movement of his lips caused him to be punished. When did he become obligated? At the time he moved his lips, which is when she was a bogeres. (45a – 45b)

Where is she Stoned?

The Braisa taught that a betrothed na’arah who is unfaithful is stoned on the doorway of her father’s house. If no such doorway exists, she is stoned at the opening of the city gates. In a city where there are mostly idolaters, she is stoned at the gates of Beis Din.

How do we know this law? The Braisa states “your gates” refers to the gate where the person committed idol worship. You might say it is the gate where he worshipped, or perhaps it is referring to the gate where he was judged? It says “your gates” below and says it above: just as the passuk below is referring to the gate where the worship happened, also the passuk above is talking about where the worship happened. Another teaching derived from this passuk is that “your gates” excludes the gates of gentiles.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t we already used “your gates” for a teaching above! The Gemora answers, for that teaching it would be sufficient to merely say “gates” Why does it say “your gates?” This shows that we can learn both lessons from this word.

The Gemora observes that the Braisa above only teaches us a lesson regarding idol worship. How do we know this law regarding a betrothed na’arah?

Rabbi Avahu answers that we derive this through the common word of “opening,” the “opening” and “gate” (stated by a betrothed na’arah and the mishkan), and “gate” from the passuk above “your gates” (regarding idol worship, see Rashi).

The Braisa states that a new husband who gives his wife a bad name receives lashes and must pay one hundred sela. Rabbi Yehuda says that he always receives lashes. However, if he had relations with her already he must pay, but if he did not he does not have to pay the one hundred sela. They essentially argue in the same argument of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yakov and the Rabbanan. The Braisa means to say that a new husband who gives his wife a bad name receives lashes and must pay one hundred sela whether or not he had relations with her as per the opinion of the Rabbanan. Rabbi Yehuda says that he always receives lashes. However, if he had relations with her already he must pay, but if he did not he does not have to pay the one hundred sela, as per the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

Some say that the entire Braisa is in fact according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. The Braisa is stating that a new husband who gives his wife a bad name receives lashes and must pay one hundred sela on condition that he had relations with her. Rabbi Yehuda states that he receives lashes in any event (even if he did not have relations with her). (45b)

[END]

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Perhaps they Repented

The Maharik (shoresh 33) writes concerning a case where one witness testifies that a certain shochet was slaughtering improperly and the shochet himself contradicts the witness; since the witness is not believed, he himself is permitted to eat all future meat slaughtered by this shochet. This is not comparable to a case where a witness testifies regarding wine that is forbidden on account of it being yayin nesech because here there is a possibility that the shochet will repent and slaughter properly.

The Pri Chadash (Y.D. 1, 14) asks: Why don’t we apply the principle of “shavya a’nafshei chaticha d’issura,” one who states that something is forbidden, even if he is not believed in respect to everyone else, renders the object forbidden to him (as is evident from the Gemora in Kesuvos 9a)? All the meat slaughtered by this shochet should be forbidden to this witness!?

The Pri Megadim (Sifsei Daas, ibid, 41) answers that the Maharik is referring to a case where the witness retracted and said that he had testified falsely. In such cases, the principle of “shavya a’nafshei chaticha d’issura” does not apply.

Rav Elyashiv answers: The reason why one can render the object forbidden with the principle of “shavya a’nafshei” is not because he is believed in respect to himself; rather, it is because it is regarded as an oath. The witness is taking a vow forbidding himself from this particular object. Accordingly, he explains that the witness who testified regarding the shochet it making a vow that he will not eat the meat from this animal, however, he will not be prohibited, on account of his vow, against eating from any other animal that this shochet slaughters.

The Mishna Lemelech (Hilchos Shechitah 1:26) challenges the ruling of the Maharik from our Gemora (Kesuvos 44a) which discusses a case where two deeds were given over regarding the same field. The ruling is that the second deed cancels the first one. Rafram explains that the recipient has admitted to the other that the first deed is invalid. Accordingly, the Gemora continues that these witnesses must be regarded as legally unfit for further evidence concerning this recipient since he is stating that they put their signatures to an invalid document. We do not say that they should be valid witnesses later, for perhaps they repented. What is the difference between the two cases?

The Shaar Hamishpat (92:7) answers: The Maharik rules that all meat slaughtered by this shochet will be permitted to eat by the witness because there is a double doubt; perhaps, he has slaughtered the animal properly and perhaps he repented. Just because he slaughtered improperly (according to the witness’ testimony) one time, it is not logical that we should prohibit his slaughtered meat forever. However, in respect to testimony, once the recipient has stated that these witnesses testified falsely, they will be disqualified to offer testimony for him forever. Even according to those that hold that we can apply the principle of a double doubt in regards to monetary judgments, here, it will not apply. What can be said? Perhaps the witnesses will testify truthfully and perhaps they repented. This logic is not applicable by testimony, for testimony functions as a proof, and if we are uncertain if the witnesses repented or not, they cannot be accepted as witnesses because we have no proof that they are testifying truthfully. Therefore, they will not be believed for all future testimonies regarding this recipient.

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