Daf Yomi - Sukkah 43 - Highlights

1. There is a concern that one who is not proficient regarding the laws of waving the lulav or reciting the blessing will carry the lulav four amos in the public domain on Shabbos, which is a biblical prohibition. For this reason the Chachamim enacted a decree that when Shabbos occurs on one of the last six days of Sukkos, one does not take the lulav in the Bais HaMikdash. (42b3-43a1)
2. The residents of Eretz Yisroel were permitted to take the lulav even when the first day of Sukkos occurred on Shabbos. The reason for this was because they were aware of the institution of the new month. (43a2)
3. There is a dispute whether one can cut a lulav from a tree or tie the lulav with the other species on Shabbos. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that since it is said and you shall take for yourselves on the first day… the word bayom, the first day, teaches us that the preliminaries involved in taking the lulav also override the Shabbos restrictions. The Chachamim, however, maintains that one cannot perform the preliminaries of the lulav on Shabbos, and they use the word bayom to teach us that the lulav obligation only applies during the day and not at night. (43a3)
4. The Gemara concludes that the mitzvah of Sukkah applied by day and by night. This is derived by employing a gezeirah shavah from the Miluim, when Aharon and his sons were inaugurated into the service of the Mishkan, where it is said and at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting you shall dwell day and night for seven days. (43a3-43a4-43b1)
5. The taking of the aravah in the Bais HaMikdash when the seventh day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos was permitted so that everyone would be aware that there is a biblical obligation to take the aravah in the Bais HaMikdash. There was no concern that one would carry the aravah on Shabbos four amos in a public domain because the agents of the Bais Din, the court, would bring the aravos to the Bais HaMikdash. There was also no concern that one would bring the aravos to an expert to learn how to recite the blessing, because only the Kohanim took the aravos, and the Kohanim were knowledgeable regarding the laws of reciting the blessings. (43b1)
6. There is a dispute whether they circled the mizbeiach with the aravah or with the lulav. Abaye maintains that they circled the mizbeiach with the aravah, whereas Rav Yosef maintains that they circled the mizbeiach with the lulav and they performed the biblical obligation of aravah by standing the aravos around the mizbeiach. (43b3-43b4)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 43 - Sukkah and the Mishkan

The Gemara states that the obligation to dwell in a Sukkah is by day and by night. This is derived by employing a gezeirah shavah from the Miluim, the inauguration of Aharon and his sons into the service of the Mishkan. It is noteworthy that the sefarim write that the Sukkah reflects the Bais HaMikdash, so it is appropriate that we derive the mitzvah to dwell in the Sukkah from the Mishkan. A further association between Sukkos and the Mishkan is that the Vilna Gaon is of the opinion that we celebrate Sukkos on the fifteenth of Tishrei because that is when the Clouds of Glory returned to shield the Jewish People. The Clouds of Glory were a sign that HaShem was pleased with the Jewish People, and the building of the Mishkan was also a sign that HaShem had forgiven the Jewish People for worshipping the Golden Calf.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 43 - Hoshanos on Shabbos

The Gemara states that the Chachamim would always ensure that the seventh day of Sukkos, known as Hoshanah Rabbah, would not occur Shabbos. Tosfos wonders why it was more important to ensure that the seventh day of Sukkos not occur on Shabbos as opposed to ensuring that Rosh HaShanah or the first day of Sukkos do not occur on Shabbos. On both Rosh HaShanah and the first day of Sukkos there are biblical mitzvos to perform. The Chachamim should have been more concerned with ensuring the observance of these mitzvos than ensuring the continuity of the aravah mitzvah which is only a rabbinical institution to commemorate the mitzvah that was performed in the Bais HaMikdash. Tosfos answers that there was no concern that people would assume that the mitzvah of blowing shofar on Rosh HaShanah and taking the lulav on the fist day of Sukkos were rabbinical in nature. Regarding the mitzvah of aravah, however, if the seventh day of Sukkos would occur on Shabbos and the aravah would not be taken, people would view the custom as irrelevant and they would not take the aravah in the future. Furthermore, if the seventh day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos, there would not be another opportunity to take the aravah, because one would not be able to take the aravah on Shemini Atzeres because it may be an independent festival and taking the aravah would contradict the theme of the day. Regarding the mitzvah of shofar and lulav, however, one would be able to perform the mitzvah on the second day of the festival.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 43 - Litveshe Kasha / Chasidishe Vort

We posted this before, but with a slight mistake, so we are correcting it now - thanks.

The Gemora states that the Chachamim made a decree not to take the lulav on Shabbos lest one come to carry it four amos in a public domain.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks the following question. Ben Azai maintains that "mehalech k'omed" one who carries an object four amos in a public domain does not violate the Biblical prohibition of carrying for every step he takes. The moment he places his foot down it is considered as stopping and therefore, he is not walking four amos continuously. The only way for him to transgress this prohibition is to jump four amos at one time.

Tosfos in Rosh Hashona states that Ben Azai would agree that there is a prohibition of carrying four amos since it is a halacha l'Moshe misinai and even though it would not be a contiguous four amos, it is nonetheless not allowed. However, the Yerushalmi holds that Ben Azai disagrees with this prohibition. Tosfos cites a proof that the Bavli disagrees. Reb Akiva Eiger asks that Tosfos should bring a clear proof that the Bavli maintains that Ben Azai agrees that there exists a four amos prohibition for otherwise there should not be any injunction against blowing the shofar or shaking the lulav on Shabbos. The sages were concerned of one carrying the shofar or lulav four amos in a public domain and according to Ben Azai this would not be a violation of Shabbos. It is not logical to assume that one might take the shofar and jump four amos?

Reb Leibel Eiger answered that in the person's excitement to for the mitzva of shofar, how can he not jump!

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Highlights

1. Rabbi Yose rules that if the first day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos and one forgot and carried the lulav into a public domain, he is not liable a chatas offering because he was preoccupied with performing a mitzvah. Abaye qualifies this ruling to be referring to a case where one has not yet fulfilled the mitzvah, but once he has fulfilled the mitzvah, he will be liable a chatas for carrying. The Gemara questions this because it would see that he automatically fulfills the mitzvah when he picks up the lulav. Abaye answers that Rabbi Yose refers to a case where he turned the lulav upside down and one only fulfills the mitzvah when holding the lulav straight up in the manner that it grows. Rava answers that Rabbi Yose refers to a case where one took the lulav out in an undignified manner on a plate, in which case he does not fulfill the mitzvah. (41b4-42a1)
2. Rabbi Yose rules that if a Kohen found a bird olah amongst other bird chatas offerings and the Kohen assumed that that this bird was a bird chatas and he ate it, he is not liable a meilah offering, despite the fact the halacha is that a bird olah is entirely burned on the mizbeiach and a bird chatas is eaten entirely by the Kohanim. The rationale for this ruling is that Rabbi Yose maintains that one who is preoccupied with a mitzvah is not liable if he errs. (42a1-42a2)
3. The Mishna rules that the lulav can be returned to water on Shabbos so that it should not wilt. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that on Yom Tov one is even permitted to add water and on Chol HaMoed one would be permitted to change the water. (42a2-42a3)
4. A father is obligated to begin training his child who is a minor in the mitzvah of lulav if the child knows how to wave the lulav. The Gemara enumerates other mitzvos and the age for when a father is required to train his son to perform those mitzvos. (42a3-42a4-42b1)
5. The Mishna records the various mitzvos that are performed on Sukkos and on which days they are performed. The mitzvah of lulav and the mitzvah of aravah can be performed either six days or seven days. If the first day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos, the mitzvah of lulav would be performed but one would not perform the mitzvah of lulav on Shabbos when the first day of Sukkos occurs on any other day of the week. If the seventh day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos, the mitzvah of aravah would be performed but the mitzvah of aravah would not be performed when the seventh day of Sukkos occurs on any other day of the week. The obligation of reciting Hallel and the obligation to eat meat from the shelamim offering when the Bais HaMikdash stood applies for all eight days of Sukkos. The mitzvah to sit in the Sukkah and the mitzvah of the water libation on the mizbeiach apply to the seven days of Sukkos. The mitzvah to play musical instruments at the Simchas Bais Hashoeva, the Celebration of the Place of the Water Drawing, was performed either five or six days of Sukkos. The reason for this ruling is because it is forbidden to play music on Shabbos or Yom Tov. (42b2)
6. When the first day of Sukkos occurred on Shabbos, the people would bring their lulavim to the Beis HaMikdash on Friday and every person would stipulate that if someone else were to receive his lulav, it should belong to that person as a gift. When this procedure became dangerous because everyone would fight in their enthusiasm to receive their lulavim, it was instituted that each person should take the lulav in his house rather than in the Bais HaMikdash. (42b3)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42- Lekavod Shabbos and Shemini Atzeres

The Gemara states that when the first day of Sukkos occurred on Shabbos, the lulav was taken for seven days in the Bais HaMikdash. The reason for this is because taking the lulav on the first day of Sukkos is of biblical origin and the Chachamim did not enact a decree to that would prohibit one from taking the lulav on Shabbos. It is noteworthy that the Gemara earlier states that one extends the lulav outward and inward to ward off harmful winds, and one raises them up and lowers them down to ward off damaging dews. Although on Shabbos all evil influences depart from our midst, in the time of the Bais HaMikdash there was a requirement to take the lulav on Shabbos. The Sfas Emes suggest that nowadays we do not take the lulav on Shabbos because Shabbos is a day of rest and the Jewish People only are required to battle with the evil forces during the week. The Shem Mishmuel suggests that the reason that they were required to take the lulav on Shabbos in the Bais HaMikdash was because the lulav represents daas, knowledge, and Shabbos itself is daas, and an excess of daas could be detrimental. Nonetheless, in the Bais HaMikdash there were many actions involved with the sacrifices, so there was no concern regarding the taking of the lulav.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Teaching Torah to a child

The Gemara states that when a child knows how to talk, his father teaches him Torah and the recitation of Shema. The Gemara states that Torah means that the father should teach him the verse that states Torah tzivah lanu Moshe morashah Kehillas Yaakov, the Torah that Moshe commanded us is the heritage of the Congregation of Yaakov. There is an allusion to this teaching in the context of the verses themselves. Prior to this verse it is said af choveiv amim kol kedoshav beyadecho veheim tuko leraglecho yisa midabrosecho, indeed, You loved the tribes greatly, all its holy ones were in Your hands; for they planted themselves at Your feet, bearing the yoke of Your utterances. Rashi explains that the word midabrosecho, Your utterances, is derived from the word dibbur, speech. Thus, the verse can be interpreted as follows: midabrosecho, when the child begins to speak, teach him the verse of Torah tzivah lanu Moshe morashah Kehillas Yaakov.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Wrong Place Esrog

Rabbi Yosi rules that if one forgets and carries the lulav to a public domain on Shabbos, he is not liable since he was preoccupied with a mitzva. Abaye qualifies this to be referring to a case where he had not fulfilled the mitzva yet. The Gemora asks that he seemingly would automatically fulfill the mitzva when he picks up the lulav. Abaye answers that he turned it around and therefore did not discharge his obligation.

Rashi explains that he turned the esrog over with the pittum down. Rabbeinu Chananel learns that he took the lulav in his left hand and the esrog in his right hand.

The Ritva asks that even if he placed the lulav in the wrong hand, he nonetheless fulfills the mitzva? Chasam Sofer answers that by switching hands he is indicating that he does not intend to fulfill the mitzva now.

This can be the source for the two options brought down in halacha regarding the reciting of the brocha on the lulav. In Shulchan Aruch, it states that one should hold the esrog upside down during the brocha in order that the brocha will be prior to the performance of the mitzva. The Gra rules that one should have intention that he does not want to fulfill the mitzva at this moment and this will be sufficient even if the esrog is being held correctly.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Shakin'

The Acharonim cite several proofs that the mitzvah of waving the lulav is an integral part of the mitzvah of lulav. One proof is from our Gemara that states that a father is obligated to train his child who is a minor in the mitzvah of lulav when the child knows how to wave the lulav. The proof is from the fact that the Gemara did not state that the obligation begins when the minor knows how to hold the lulav. Rather, the Gemara states that the obligation begins only when the child knows how to wave the lulav.Further proof to this thesis is from the Gemara that we learned earlier that states that a lulav must be four tefachim in height to allow one to wave the lulav. The commentators discuss which waving the Gemara refers to. Is it the waving one performs when reciting the blessing on the lulav or is it the waving that is performed when reciting Hallel?

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Highlights

1. There is a dispute in the Gemara if the sanctity of Shemittah produce can be deconsecrated onto money by exchanging the money for the produce. All agrees that when the produce is sold, the sanctity rests on the money. The dispute is when the owner attempts to exchange the produce for money. Rav Ashi qualifies this dispute as referring only to the deconsecrating of the money that was exchanged with Shemittah produce. All agree, however, that the Shemittah produce itself cannot be deconsecrated with an ordinary exchange as one can do with hekdesh. Rather, the Shemittah produce must be purchased. (41a1)
2. The Mishna states that originally, the mitzvah of lulav was for seven days in the Bais HaMikdash and for one day outside the Bais HaMikdash. After the destruction of the second Bais HaMikdash, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai instituted that the lulav should be taken for all seven days of Sukkos as a commemoration to the Bais HaMikdash. (41a2)
3. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai also instituted that one is not permitted to eat from the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. In the times of the Bais HaMikdash, the new grain could only be eaten after the omer offering was brought on the sixteenth of Nissan. Subsequent to the destruction of the Bais HaMikdash, one was biblically permitted to eat the new grain on the sixteenth of Nissan in the morning. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai was concerned, however, that the Bais HaMikdash may be built the following year on the night of the sixteenth of Nissan and there would not be enough time to prepare the omer offering. People might then say that the new grain will be permitted in the morning just as it was the previous year. This assumption would be erroneous, because the previous year there was no Bais HaMikdash, thus there was no possibility of offering the omer, and for that reason the new grain was permitted in the morning. During the present year, however, there is a Bais HaMikdash, and one must wait for the offering of the omer or one must wait until the end of the day. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai therefore instituted that one was prohibited from eating the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. (41a2-41a3-41a4)
4. The Mishna states that when the first day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos, the people would bring their lulavim to the synagogue on Friday and the next day, which was Shabbos, they would come early to the synagogue and each person would recognize his lulav and take it. The reason each person was required to take his own lulav is because there is a Halacha that one must fulfill his obligation on the first day of Sukkos with his own lulav, so one was not permitted to take a lulav that belonged to someone else. (41b1)
5. The Gemara relates an incident where Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaryah and Rabbi Akiva were journeying on a boat and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav with him, which he had purchased for a thousand zuz. Rabban Gamliel first fulfilled his own obligation with the lulav and he then gave the lulav to the other rabbis so that they could discharge their obligation. The Gemara states that since it was recorded that Rabbi Akiva returned the lulav to Rabban Gamliel, we can deduce a law that a present given on condition that it be returned is considered a present. Thus, the rabbis were able to fulfill their obligation with the lulav that belonged to someone else, despite the fact that the incident occurred on the first day of Sukkos when one is require to own the lulav. From the fact that the Baraisa mentioned that Rabban Gamliel purchased the lulav for a thousand zuz, it is evident how the sages of those times cherished the mitzvos. (41b2-41b3)
6. The Gemara states that one should not hold Tefillin or a Sefer Torah in his hand while he is praying Shemone Esrei. The reason for this ruling is because he will be concerned about protecting the Tefillin or Sefer Torah and he will not be able to concentrate on his prayers. Ameimar would hold his lulav while praying, and this was also the custom of the people of Jerusalem. The reason that they were permitted to hold the lulav while they prayed is because taking the lulav is a mitzvah and since they cherished the mitzvah, they were not preoccupied by its weight and by the necessity to guard the lulav from falling from their hands. (41b3-41b4)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Building the Gates

Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai instituted that one is not permitted to eat from the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. In the times of the Bais HaMikdash, the new grain could only be eaten after the omer offering was brought on the sixteenth of Nissan. Subsequent to the destruction of the Bais HaMikdash, one was biblically permitted to eat the new grain on the sixteenth of Nissan in the morning. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai was concerned, however, that the Bais HaMikdash may be built the following year on the night of the sixteenth of Nissan and there would not be enough time to prepare the omer offering. People might then say that the new grain will be permitted in the morning just as it was the previous year. This assumption would be erroneous, because the previous year there was no Bais HaMikdash, thus there was no possibility of offering the omer, and for that reason the new grain was permitted in the morning. During the present year, however, there is a Bais HaMikdash and one must wait for the offering of the omer or one must wait until the end of the day. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai therefore instituted that one was prohibited from eating the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. Rashi wonders how the Bais HaMikdash could be built on the night of the sixteenth of Nissan, as the Gemara in Shevuos 15b states that the Bais HaMikdash cannot be built at night. Rashi answers that it is only regarding a Bais HaMikdash built by humans that there is a restriction of building it at night. The third Bais HaMikdash, however, will descend from Heaven miraculously, thus there are no restrictions regarding the building of the third Bais HaMikdash. The Maharil Diskin is troubled by this answer, as the Jewish People have an obligation to build the Bais HaMikdash, so why would HaShem prevent us from performing this mitzvah? The Maharil Diskin answers based on a Medrash in Eicha that states that when the Bais HaMikdash was destroyed, the gates of the Bais HaMikdash sank into the ground and in the future, the Jewish People will excavate the gates and affix them to the Bais HaMikdash. The Gemara in Bava Basra rules that one who secures the gates in an ownerless field is deemed to be the one who acquires the field. Thus, we will fulfill the mitzvah of building the Bais HaMikdash when we secure the gates of the Bais HaMikdash. This can also be the explanation of the words that we recite in the Shemone Esrei of Mussaf on the festivals, show us its rebuilding and gladden us in its perfection. The word for perfection is tikkuno, which can allude to the securing of the Bais HaMikdash gates.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Yekum Purkan

The Gemora states that a person should not daven shmoneh esrei and hold a sefer Torah or tefillin in his hand at the same time. This is because he will be concerned about protecting the torah and tefillin and will detract from his concentration for davening. This is in contrast to the custom in Yerushalayim where they would daven shmoneh esrei and hold the lulav in their hands at the same time. The Gemora explains that holding the lulav will not detract from his concentration since holding the lulav is a mitzva and therefore it is dear to him and not a burden to hold it.

The Mishna Berura 96:2 rules that the chazan can hold the sefer Torah as he is reciting yekum purkan on Shabbos since his intention at the time is to daven for the people learning Torah and not to guard the Torah. This is akin to holding the lulav during shmoneh esrei.

Rav Elyashiv comments that it’s apparent the prominence the tefillah of yekum purkan has if the Mishna Berura is comparing it to shmoneh esrei.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Love perverts accepted conduct

The Gemara records that Mar the son of Ameimar said that his father would pray with the lulav, i.e. Ameimar cherished the mitzvah of lulav so much that he would hold the lulav while praying. The term that the Gemara uses is tzaluyei ka metzalei bei. Regarding the verse that states lo sateh mishpat, you shall not pervert judgment, the Targum renders the translation lo satzlei din. This usage of the word tzalei refers to bending and twisting justice. Perhaps we can interpret the statement of the Gemara here homiletically to mean that normally one should not hold an object while praying because his preoccupation with the object will detract from concentrating on his prayers. Ameimar, however, cherished the mitzvah of lulav so much that he personified the statement of the Medrash that Ahavah mekalkeles es hashurah, the love for Hashem and his mitzvos perverts what is normally accepted behavior, and thus Ameimar held the lulav even while he was praying.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Un...tzum...drite...mol!! Sold!!!

The Gemora relates a story that Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaryah and Rabbi Akiva were journeying on a boat and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav which he had purchased for over a thousand zuz. It is evident from this Gemora how precious mitzvos were to them that Rabban Gamliel spent a thousand zuz on his lulav.

The Aruch Lener asks on the language of the Gemora. Why does it say "How precious mitzvos were to them" when in fact, Rabban Gamliel was the only one who purchased the lulav for that enormous sum?

He answers that from the fact that Rabban Gamliel paid a thousand zuz for the lulav, it is evident that there were other potential buyers that were interested and a bidding war erupted, especially since it is well documented that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva were rich people.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Preferential Treatment

The Gemora relates a story that Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaryah and Rabbi Akiva were journeying on a boat and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav which he had purchased for over a thousand zuz. Rabban Gamliel initially fulfilled his mitzva with the lulav and then gave it to the other Tanaim to enable them to discharge their obligation. The Gemora states that from the extra wording in the story we can derive that a present given with the stipulation to be returned is considered a present and they can fulfill the mitzva even on the first day when the lulav must be yours. It is also evident from this Gemora how dear mitzvos were to them that Rabban Gamliel spent a thousand zuz on his lulav.

The Chasam Sofer asks on the order of the Tanaim. Why did Rabbi Yehoshua who was a Levi receive the lulav before Rabbi Eliezer who was a kohen? He answers that it must be because Rabbi Yehoshua was exceptional in Torah learning and an elder, therefore they honored him first. If so, continues the Chasam Sofer, why wasn't Rabbi Akiva the first? He answers that the merit of being a Talmid Chocham can propel him one level and that is why Rabbi Yehoshua who was a levi and an exceptional Talmid chocham can have preferential treatment over Rabbi Eliezer who was a kohen; however Rabbi Akiva, who was a yisroel cannot skip over two levels and therefore Rabbi Eliezer was before him.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40 -Highlights

1. The Gemara states that if one gathered various leaves for kindling, they do not posses the sanctity of Shemittah. This is derived from the verse that states the Sabbatical produce of the land shall be for you to eat. The words for you have to be akin to the words to eat. This allows only uses whose benefit is equivalent to consuming the item. This excludes wood where the benefit of baking only comes after the wood has been transformed to coals, so the wood will not have the sanctity of Shemittah. Regarding a lulav, however, whose primary use is as a broom, its benefit is equivalent to its consumption, i.e. becoming worn from use, so a lulav will have the sanctity of Shemittah. (40a2)
2. There is a dispute whether firewood has the sanctity of Shemittah. One opinion maintains that firewood has sanctity of shemittah. (40a2-40a3)
3. Rabbi Yose maintains that one is allowed to use Shemittah produce for washing clothing but one cannot use Shemittah produce for medicinal purposes. (40a2-40a3-40b1)
4. There is a dispute in the Gemara whether the sanctity of Shemittah produce can be deconsecrated onto money, and this would be accomplished by exchanging the money for the produce. All agree that when the Shemittah produce is sold, the sanctity carries over to the money. The dispute is only regarding a case where the owner seeks to exchange the produce for money. (40b1-40b2)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40- The dust of their feet

The Gemara discusses the harsh punishment that one incurs when he treats the laws of Shemittah lightly. The Gemara uses the term avak shel sheviis, the dust of Shemittah, to refer to the less stringent laws of Shemittah. We find elsewhere that the Gemara uses the term avak Lashon hara to describe slander that is rabbinically prohibited, and the term avak ribbis in describing rabbinically prohibited interest on a loan. Why does the Gemara use the word avak, dust, in these instances? It is noteworthy that when Yaakov struggled with the angel of Esav, it is said vayeiavek ish imo, and a man wrestled with him. The Gemara in Chullin 91a states that the angel of Esav appeared to Yaakov like a Torah scholar. Perhaps the meaning of the Gemara is that the angel of Esav attempted to convince Yaakov that although one must follow the mitzvos that are stated explicitly in the Torah, one can be more lenient regarding the rabbinical prohibitions. This is alluded to in the word vayeiavek, which is derived from the word avak, dust. For this reason the Gemara refers to certain rabbinical prohibitions with the term avak, to allude to the idea that it is the evil inclination, a.k.a. the angel of Esav, who is attempting to convince the person that he can be lenient regarding rabbinical prohibitions. We must adhere to the dictum recorded in Pirkei Avos 1:4, where it is said vehevay misabak bafar ragleihem, literally translated as sit in the dust of their feet, and homiletically interpreted that one should adhere to even the less stringent rabbinical prohibitions.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40 - Reverse Situation

The Gemora explains that wood which is projected to be used for kindling a fire does not have the sanctity of shemitah. This is derived from a possuk which states that only something which its pleasure and destruction from the world are simultaneous have shemitah sanctity; however firewood where the pleasure comes only after the wood transforms into coals does not have kedushas shemitah. A lulav is not projected to be used for kindling, rather as a broom for sweeping a house and therefore will have limitations due to shemitah.

The Chachamim were not concerned about purchasing the lulav since the lulav blossomed in the sixth year, it is not bound by the shemitah limitations. The esrog, even though it grew in the sixth year, is regarded as a shemitah fruit because it was plucked off the tree in the seventh year.

The Commentators ask as to what the halacha would be in a reverse situation from the Gemora. In the eighth year of the shemitah cycle, it should be forbidden to purchase the lulav because it grew in the seventh year and the esrog should be permitted to purchase since it was cut from the tree in the eighth year? (According to some, this case is a more frequent one than the Gemora’s.) The Kapos Temorim states that the halacha would be the same in reverse and it is inferred from the Mishna’s case.

Dayan Weiss in Minchas Yitzchok states (I believe) that the solution of the Gemora would not apply in this case. One can purchase a lulav and have the cost of the esrog absorbed in the lulav since in those days the lulav was more expensive than the esrog; however the reverse does not work. One cannot absorb the cost of the more expensive item i.e. the lulav into the cost of the inexpensive esrog.

There are those that state in the Rambam that a lulav does not have the sanctity of shemitah at all. This would seemingly be inconsistent with our Gemora, however it would explain why the situation is not addressed.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40 - Meticulous about Shemitah

The Gemara states that if one is not meticulous even regarding the lenient laws of Shemittah, i.e. one sells Shemittah produce, he will be forced to sell all of his possessions and eventually he will be forced to sell himself as a slave. Rashi at the end of Parshas Behar quotes the full text of the Baraisa that is mentioned in Arachin 30b and Kiddushin 20a. The Ramban in the beginning of Parshas Behar writes that one should be careful to adhere to the laws of Shemittah just as one would be meticulous in observing the laws of Shabbos, as Shemittah is the secret of Creation. When one treats the laws of Shemittah lightly, he will be the catalyst that causes the Jewish People to be exiled for he is demonstrating that he does not affirm the belief that HaShem created the world and he also denies the concept of the World to Come.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Highlights

1. Rava rules that when responding to the recital of Kaddish, one should not pause between the words yehei shmei rabbah and the word mevarach because this will give the appearance that the word mevarach is disconnected and does not have its own meaning. Rav Safra disagreed with Rava and Rav Safra maintains that even if one were to pause in his response, the meaning of his response would still be the same, i.e. may His great Name be blessed. (39a1)
2. The recital of the blessing upon the completion of Hallel depends on the particular custom of that area, whereas there is an obligation upon everyone to recite a blessing before reciting Hallel. (39a1)
3. The Gemara rules that one should always recite a blessing before performing a mitzvah. (39a1)
4. One is not allowed to purchase a fruit that grew in the Shemittah year. The Mishna therefore rules that if one is purchasing a lulav and esrog from his friend during the Shemittah year, he must purchase the lulav and receive the esrog for free. (39a2)
5. The Gemara explains that it is preferable to receive the esrog for free. If the seller does not agree, however, then the cost of the esrog should be incorporated into the cost of the lulav. (39a2)
6. The reason one cannot purchase an esrog of the Shemittah year outright is because one is not permitted to conduct business with the fruits of the Shemittah year or with the money that was exchanged for the fruits. During the Shemittah year one is required to consume the fruits and the money that was exchanged for the fruits. When an ignorant Jew sells the esrog, we are concerned that he will save the money for after Shemittah. One should thus not purchase the esrog from the ignorant Jew because he would be causing the seller to stumble and transgress the prohibition of saving the money for after Shemittah. (39a2)
7. One is permitted to purchase fruits of the Shemittah year as long as the price of the food does not exceed the cost of three meals. This is only permitted for fruits that were not guarded during the Shemittah year. Fruits that were protected during the Shemittah year cannot be purchased at all. (39a3-39b1)
8. The Chachamim were not concerned about one purchasing a lulav during the Shemittah year because a lulav that one purchases during the Shemittah year grew during the sixth year, and subsequently the lulav is not confined to the Shemittah year restrictions. Regarding the esrog, however, even if it grew in the sixth year, it is deemed to be a Shemittah fruit because it was plucked from the tree in the seventh year. (39b2)

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