COHABITATION OF A YAVAM WITHOUT ACQUIRING HER - Yevamos 58 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora is seeking to find a case of a yavam who cohabits with a woman awaiting yibum, but she still remains a woman awaiting yibum. In truth, there are some cases, but for various reasons they don't meet the Gemora’s conditions. For example, Tosfos says that when the yavam does not intend for cohabitation at all, he does not acquire her, yet it does not fulfill the Gemora’s requirement that we only administer the waters when the husband’s cohabitation with her has preceded the adulterer’s cohabitation with her, but otherwise, we do not give her to drink. since the pesukim by sotah imply that the husband had intent for cohabitation before she committed adultery.

How many cases are there of a yavam cohabitating with the yevamah, and not acquiring her?

Reb Avi Lebovitz lists some of them:

1. Any time he does not intend for cohabitation at all, as we see in the Gemora 54a. This includes intent to press against the wall, and falling from a roof, and when he is sleeping (according to Tosfos).

2. Cohabitation with a limp member: Tosfos 53b says that even according to the opinion that you are liable by arayos, you cannot acquire a yevamah (the Gemora couldn't use this case on 58b - see aruch l'ner).

3. When he is sleeping, he does not acquire her because he is not an intelligent being at that time (according to Rashi).

4. There is a discussion between Reb Akiva Eiger and his son regarding one who cohabited with specific intention not to acquire his yevamah.

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WIFE OF A KOHEN - Yevamos 57 - Daf Yomi

Reb Elchonon Wasserman states a distinction between the wife of a Kohen eating terumah and the Kohen’s Canaanite slaves and slavewomen. Although their entitlement to eat terumah is derived from the same verse, “An acquisition of his money,” there is a basic distinction between the two of them.

A Canaanite slave and slavewomen do not have any elevated status by the fact that they now belong to the Kohen. The Kohen is permitted to feed his animals terumah, and so too, he can feed his slaves terumah. This is why there is no halacha regarding a slavewoman of a Kohen committing adultery and thereby disqualifying herself from eating terumah. She does not have an inherent right to eat terumah; the Kohen can feed her terumah if he so desires.

The wife of a Kohen is different. By virtue of the fact that she is married to a Kohen, she assumes an elevated status. She has a privilege of eating terumah; it is not necessary for the husband to feed her terumah. She possesses a higher degree of sanctity, but she can lose that as well. If she becomes a zonah or chalalah, she becomes disqualified, and cannot eat terumah any longer.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 57 - Highlights

The Mishna states: If a widow (daughter of a Yisroel) becomes married to a Kohen Gadol, or a divorcee or chalutzah becomes married to a regular Kohen; from the time of erusin, they are not allowed to eat terumah. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon allow her to eat terumah (she has not become disqualified yet; after cohabitation, she would become disqualified).

If these women become widowed or divorced; if they were divorced or widowed from a state of nisuin, they are disqualified from Kehunah (since they engaged in a forbidden cohabitation). However, if they were divorced or widowed from a state of erusin, they are still qualified for Kehunah. (Even Rabbi Meir, the Tanna Kamma of our Mishna would agree to this. The daughter of a Kohen cannot eat terumah while she is an arusah to a Kohen because she is awaiting a forbidden cohabitation; however, after she is divorced or widowed from the Kohen, she returns to her qualified state.) (56b)

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Meir said: I can support my ruling through a kal vachomer. If a permissible kiddushin (a daughter of a Yisroel to a Yisroel) does not entitle her to eat terumah, certainly a forbidden kiddushin (a widow to a Kohen Gadol, or a divorcee or chalutzah to a regular Kohen) should not allow her to eat terumah.

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon raise their objection to this kal vachomer. A permissible kiddushin does not entitle her to eat terumah because a Yisroel never has the ability to entitle his wife to eat terumah; however, a forbidden kiddushin can entitle her to eat terumah because he has the ability elsewhere to entitle her to eat terumah (if the Kohen marries a permitted woman). (56a)

Rabbi Elozar said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: If a Kohen (petzua daka) with wounded or crushed testicles (who is forbidden to marry a Jewess) performs an erusin with a daughter of a Yisroel; her ability to eat terumah would be dependent on the argument between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon. According to Rabbi Meir, who maintains that one who is awaiting a forbidden cohabitation is forbidden to eat terumah, this woman also cannot eat terumah. According to Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon, who hold that one who is awaiting a forbidden cohabitation is permitted to eat terumah, this woman also may eat terumah.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon would not allow this woman to eat terumah. A Kohen who betroths a divorcee can entitle her to eat terumah because he has the ability elsewhere to entitle a woman to eat terumah (if the Kohen marries a permitted woman); however, a Kohen with wounded or crushed testicles cannot entitle his arusah to eat terumah because he never has that ability (since he cannot marry anyone).

Perhaps you will respond by saying that a Kohen with wounded or crushed testicles does have the ability to entitle his wife to eat terumah elsewhere; namely, if he marries a convert (although a convert is a full-fledged Jew, they are not included in the prohibition against a maimed Kohen marrying someone from the “congregation”). This is not a valid response because Rabbi Yochanan inquired of Rabbi Oshaya regarding this precise issue, and Rabbi Oshaya did not resolve this for him. (It is evident that Rabbi Oshaya was uncertain if a Kohen with wounded or crushed testicles entitles his wife, a convert to eat terumah.) (56b – 57a)

The Gemora presents two responses to the objection to the comparison (between a maimed Kohen and a Kohen marrying a divorcee). Abaye said: A Kohen with wounded or crushed testicles does have the ability to entitle his wife to eat terumah when he becomes a petzua daka after his marriage, providing that he does not cohabit with his wife. (She remains permitted to eat terumah.) Rava said: A Kohen with wounded or crushed testicles does have the ability to entitle others to eat terumah in the case of a Canaanite slave or slavewoman. (Abaye and Rava offer cases where the petzua daka entitles someone to eat terumah, and therefore they can be compared to the case of a Kohen marrying a divorcee, who also entitles his wife to eat terumah elsewhere.)

Abaye did not present Rava’s case because he wanted to compare two cases of kiddushin. Rava did not present Abaye’s case because there she may continue eating terumah only because she originally had permission (prior to her husband’s injury). We are searching for a case where the maimed Kohen entitles someone to eat terumah. (57a)

We stated before: Rabbi Yochanan inquired of Rabbi Oshaya: Does a Kohen with wounded or crushed testicles have the ability to entitle his wife, a daughter of a convert to eat terumah? Rabbi Oshaya was quiet and did not resolve this for him. Afterwards, another great man arrived and inquired of Rabbi Oshaya regarding a different topic, and Rabbi Oshaya resolved this for him. Who was this great man? It was Rish Lakish. Rabbi Yehudah Nesiah asked Rabbi Oshaya: Isn’t Rabbi Yochanan also a great man (doesn’t he too deserve an answer)? Rabbi Oshaya replied: He asked me something that I do not know the answer to. (57a)

The Gemora attempts to resolve this inquiry. If this inquiry is in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion; then whether a maimed Kohen retains his sanctity, or whether he loses his sanctity, he should not have the ability to entitle his wife, the daughter of a convert to eat terumah. If he retains his sanctity, she should not be entitled to eat terumah because Rabbi Yehudah states that the daughter of a male convert is just like the daughter of a male chalal (they are both forbidden to a Kohen, and therefore she would not be able to eat terumah). If he loses his sanctity, she should not be entitled to eat terumah because Rabbi Yehudah maintains that the congregation of converts is considered the congregation of Hashem, and therefore a maimed Kohen would be prohibited from marrying her.

The Gemora continues: If this inquiry is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi’s opinion; then whether a maimed Kohen retains his sanctity, or whether he loses his sanctity, he should have the ability to entitle his wife, the daughter of a convert to eat terumah. If he retains his sanctity, she should be entitled to eat terumah because Rabbi Yosi states that the daughter of a male and female convert is qualified to marry a Kohen. If he loses his sanctity, she should be entitled to eat terumah because Rabbi Yosi maintains that the congregation of converts is not considered the congregation of Hashem, and therefore a maimed Kohen would be permitted to marry her.

The Gemora concludes: The inquiry must be in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov’s opinion. He maintains that a daughter of a convert cannot be married by a Kohen unless her mother is a Jewess. The inquiry is: Although she is qualified to marry a Kohen, perhaps she is not included in the congregation of Hashem. Thus, a maimed Kohen would be permitted to marry her, and she would be entitled to eat terumah. Or perhaps she is included in the congregation of Hashem, and therefore would be forbidden to a maimed Kohen, thereby disqualifying her from eating terumah.

The Gemora says: Come and learn from the braisa which Rav Acha bar Chinana brought with him from the south. The braisa states: How do we know that a Kohen who has wounded or crushed testicles that marries the daughter of a convert, that she is allowed to eat terumah? It is written [Vayikra 22:11]: And a Kohen who shall acquire a person, an acquisition of his money etc. he may eat of it.

The Gemora analyzes this braisa: According to whose opinion is this braisa following? It cannot be Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion, for he maintains that whether a maimed Kohen retains his sanctity, or whether he loses his sanctity, he does not have the ability to entitle his wife, the daughter of a convert to eat terumah. It cannot be representing Rabbi Yosi’s opinion, for what why would we need a special verse to teach us that she can eat terumah; Rabbi Yosi holds that whether a maimed Kohen retains his sanctity, or whether he loses his sanctity, he has the ability to entitle his wife, the daughter of a convert to eat terumah. It is evident that the braisa is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov’s opinion. We can learn from this braisa that although she is qualified to marry a Kohen, she is not included in the congregation of Hashem. Thus, a maimed Kohen would be permitted to marry her, and she would be entitled to eat terumah. (57a)

The Gemora states: Rav maintains that all the Tannaim listed in our Mishna would hold that there is a legal significance for a Kohen’s chupah (the entry of a bride into the husband’s domain for the purpose of nisuin) to those women who are disqualified from the Kehunah. (Rav maintains that entering into a chupah disqualifies a daughter of a Kohen from the Kehunah even though it does not effect any kinyan at all; chupah is a preparation for cohabitation and the Rabbis decreed that she becomes disqualified.)

Shmuel maintains that all the Tannaim listed in our Mishna would hold that there is no legal significance for a Kohen’s chupah to those women who are disqualified from the Kehunah.

Shmuel said: Abba (Rav) will concede to me regarding a girl less than three years old that there is no legal significance to her chupah (and she will be permitted to eat terumah). Since cohabitation with a girl of that age has no legal significance, her chupah is not recognized either.

Rava said: There is a Mishna that can be cited to support Shmuel’s statement. The Mishna states: A girl who is at least three years old can be betrothed with cohabitation, and if a yavam cohabits with her, he has acquired her, and if she is married and someone else cohabits with her, he would be liable for cohabiting with a married woman, and if she is a niddah and someone cohabits with her, he will become tamei. If a Kohen marries her (with nisuin), she is entitled to eat terumah, and if she is a daughter of a Kohen and a disqualified person cohabits with her, she becomes disqualified from eating terumah.

It can be inferred from this Mishna that only if she is three years old can she become disqualified through cohabitation, and therefore can become disqualified through chupah as well; however, if she is under three years of age, she cannot become disqualified through cohabitation, she cannot become disqualified through chupah either. (57a – 57b)

[END]

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PARTIAL COHABITATION - Yevamos 56 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora Kiddushin (10a) inquires: When does a man inquire his wife; with the beginning of cohabitation or at the conclusion? The Gemora comments that this inquiry would affect the following case: If a man began cohabiting with a woman in order to marry her, and prior to the conclusion of cohabitation, she stretched out her hand and accepted money for kiddushin from another man. Is she married to the man who began the cohabitation or is she married to the fellow who gave her the money? Another case would be dependent on this inquiry. Can a Kohen Gadol effect kiddushin with a virgin through cohabitation? If he only acquires her at the conclusion of cohabitation, he would be prohibited from concluding. A Kohen Gadol is obligated to marry a virgin; this woman has lost her virginity (at the onset of cohabitation) prior to becoming his wife. The Gemora concludes: One who cohabits has in mind the conclusion of cohabitation, and therefore he does not acquire her until the conclusion.

The Ritva writes: A yavam acquires his yevamah at the beginning of cohabitation. This is because we have learned that a yavam does not require intent to acquire his wife; even if he would proclaim that he has no intention of acquiring her until the conclusion, he would acquire her at the onset of cohabitation.

The Ritva proves this: The Gemora above (20a) states: If a woman falls for yibum before a Kohen Gadol, she submits to chalitzah and not yibum. The Gemora infers that this halacha is applicable whether she falls for yibum from a state of erusin or nisuin. The Gemora asks: It is understandable why he can’t perform a yibum if she falls for yibum from a state of nisuin; there is a positive commandment to marry a virgin besides for the negative prohibition against marrying a widow. The positive commandment of yibum cannot override both commandments. However, if she falls for yibum from a state of erusin, there is merely a negative prohibition against marrying a widow; why don’t we say that the positive commandment of yibum should override this prohibition and we should permit the Kohen Gadol to perform a yibum? (The Gemora answers that there is a Rabbinical decree prohibiting this.)

The Ritva writes: If a yavam acquires the yevamah only at the conclusion of cohabitation, what is the Gemora’s question? As soon as he begins cohabitation, she has lost her virginity, and she is not considered his wife yet. How would he be permitted to conclude cohabiting; this would be transgressing two prohibitions, and the mitzvah of yibum cannot override two commandments? It is evident that the yavam acquires her at the beginning of cohabitation.

The Avnei Miluim asks the following question: Rav and Shmuel argue concerning an unintentional cohabitation of a yavam; regarding which matters does he acquire the yevamah? The halacha is in accordance to the second version in our Gemora, which states the following: Others say: There is no argument in a case where she fell for yibum from a state of erusin; everyone would agree that she may not eat terumah since she was not able to eat terumah when she was married to the first husband. Accordingly, what did the Ritva gain by stating that a yavam acquires his yevamah by the beginning of cohabitation since we do not require his intention; in a case where she falls for yibum from a state of erusin, an inferior cohabitation does not effect acquisition to render her a nesuah; she is only regarded as an arusah, and that is why she cannot eat terumah. If so, the Ritva’s original question returns; how can the Kohen Gadol perform a yibum on his yevamah from a state of erusin? As soon as he begins cohabitation, she loses her virginity, and he does not acquire her yet; how can he conclude cohabiting when he is transgressing two commandments?

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 56 - Highlights

The Mishna had stated: If a man cohabited with his yevamah, whether in error or wantonly (not for the sake of the mitzvah), whether under compulsion or willingly; even if he acted in error and she wantonly, he wantonly and she in error, he under compulsion and she not under compulsion, she under compulsion and he not compulsion; whether he has partial cohabitation or he completes cohabitation, he has acquired her.

The Gemora presents a dispute regarding these acts of cohabitation that were not performed with the intent of acquisition. Rav maintains that the yavam acquires her for all matters (if the yavam is a Kohen, she may eat terumah). Shmuel holds that he acquires her only for those matters specifically mentioned in the Torah; he inherits the property of his brother, and she is released from any yibum obligations. (However, she may not eat terumah yet.)

The Gemora qualifies the argument. If she fell for yibum from a state of nisuin, everyone would agree that she may eat terumah now because she was eating terumah when she was married to the first husband. (This inferior yibum renders her a complete nesuah.) They argue only when she fell for yibum from a state of erusin; Rav maintains that she may eat terumah since the Torah equates an unintentional cohabitation with an intentional one. (She is considered his complete wife regarding all matters.) Shmuel holds that an unintentional cohabitation is included to give her the same status as the deceased husband, but the yavam’s relationship with her will not become superior than that of the deceased (unless he performs a proper yibum). (56a)

The Gemora asks on Shmuel from the following braisa: If a mentally competent woman becomes betrothed to a mentally competent Kohen, but he becomes a deaf-mute before he was able to marry her (nisuin), she may not eat terumah. (Rabbinically, an arusah is prohibited from eating terumah, and a deaf-mute cannot effect nisuin.) If he died and she fell for yibum to a deaf-mute yavam, she is permitted to eat terumah. This is a case where the strength of the yavam is superior to that of the husband.

The Gemora asks: According to Shmuel, who states that an inferior yibum does not allow a yevamah to eat terumah, how can the yibum of the deaf-mute (where he is obviously not intending to acquire her as a yevamah) allow her to eat terumah?

The Gemora answers: Shmuel could interpret the braisa to mean as follows: If he married her with nisuin, and afterwards became a deaf-mute, she is still permitted to eat terumah. If he subsequently dies childless, and she fell for yibum before a deaf-mute yavam, and he performs a yibum, she is permitted to eat terumah. This is a case where the strength of the yavam is superior to that of the husband since a deaf-mute’s nisuin will not permit her to eat terumah, but a deaf-mute’s yibum will permit her to eat terumah. (56a)

The Gemora presents a different explanation in the dispute between Rav and Shmuel (regarding an unintentional yibum). Others say: There is no argument in a case where she fell for yibum from a state of erusin; everyone would agree that she may not eat terumah since she was not able to eat terumah when she was married to the first husband. The dispute is only in a case where she fell for yibum from a state of nisuin. Rav maintains that she may eat terumah since she was eating terumah when she was married to the first husband. Shmuel holds that she may not eat terumah because the Torah includes an unintentional cohabitation as if it was intentional only regarding those matters specifically mentioned in the Torah; he inherits the property of his brother, and she is released from any yibum obligations. Regarding all other matters, it is not considered an act of yibum. (she may not eat terumah yet).

The Gemora asks: Rav Nachman said in the name of Shmuel that wherever a husband permits his wife to eat terumah, the yavam also permits her to eat (even in a case of an inferior yibum)?

The Gemora answers: Shmuel meant in this ruling that a type of cohabitation where a husband would entitle his wife to eat terumah with (with intention for nisuin), a yavam will also entitle the yevamah through it; however, a type of cohabitation where a husband would not entitle his wife to eat terumah with (when there was no intention for nisuin), a yavam will also not entitle the yevamah through it.

The Gemora asks on Shmuel from the following braisa: If a mentally competent woman becomes betrothed to a mentally competent Kohen, but he becomes a deaf-mute before he was able to marry her (nisuin), she may not eat terumah. (Rabbinically, an arusah is prohibited from eating terumah, and a deaf-mute cannot effect nisuin.) If he died and she fell for yibum to a deaf-mute yavam, she is permitted to eat terumah. This is a case where the strength of the yavam is superior to that of the husband.

The Gemora explains: Rav would be able to interpret the braisa in the same manner as we interpreted above according to Shmuel (If he married her with nisuin, and afterwards became a deaf-mute, she is still permitted to eat terumah. If he subsequently dies childless, and she fell for yibum before a deaf-mute yavam, and he performs a yibum, she is permitted to eat terumah. This is a case where the strength of the yavam is superior to that of the husband since a deaf-mute’s nisuin will not permit her to eat terumah, but a deaf-mute’s yibum will permit her to eat terumah.). However, this braisa is in direct conflict with Shmuel’s opinion (for Shmuel holds that a yibum without proper intent will never permit her to eat terumah).

The Gemora remains with this difficulty. (56a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: If a mentally competent woman becomes betrothed to a mentally competent Kohen, but he becomes a deaf-mute before he was able to marry her (nisuin), she may not eat terumah. If she gave birth to a child (from this deaf-mute Kohen), she is entitled to eat terumah (on account of her son, who is a Kohen). If the son died, Rabbi Nosson says that she can continue to eat terumah and the Chachamim disagree.

The Gemora asks: What is Rabbi Nosson’s logic?

Rabbah answers: Since she was able to eat beforehand, the permission continues.

Abaye asks: If so, a daughter of a Yisroel that marries a Kohen who died without children, she should still be permitted to eat terumah since she was able to eat beforehand (when she was married to the Kohen)? The answer is: Since her husband died, she loses the sanctity of his Kehunah; so too, when the son died, she should lose the sanctity of his Kehunah?

Rav Yosef answers: The nisuin of a deaf-mute Kohen does entitle her to eat terumah. (Biblically, an arusah is allowed to eat terumah; the Rabbis issued a decree against it because she is still in her father’s house and she might share the terumah with her non-Kohen siblings; this concern is not applicable by a deaf-mute’s nisuin for although she is still legally an arusah, but she is living in the Kohen’s house, and not by her father.) The Rabbis did not issue a decree regarding the nisuin of a deaf-mute out of concern that we will become confused with the case of an erusin of a deaf-mute.

Abaye asks: If this is correct, why does the braisa state that she had a child from the Kohen, and that entitles her to eat terumah; she should be able to eat terumah on account of the nisuin?

Rav Yosef answered: This was only said because of the Chachamim’s opinion (who disagree with Rabbi Nosson regarding the nisuin; they agree if she would have a son from the Kohen). (56a)

The Mishna had stated: So, too, if a man cohabits with any of the arayos listed in the Torah etc.

Rav Amram said: Rav Sheishes told us the following matter, and he enlightened our eyes from our Mishna. He said: If the wife of a Yisroel was violated, even though she is permitted to her husband, she becomes disqualified from the Kehunah. And this can be supported from the Tanna of our Mishna. He said: So, too, if a man cohabits with any of the arayos listed in the Torah, or with those that are disqualified from the Kehunah. What is the Mishna referring to when it says, “So too”? Isn’t the Mishna referring to where one cohabited with one of the arayos, whether in error or wantonly, whether under compulsion or willingly? And the Mishna continued: In any of the above cases, he disqualifies her from the Kehunah. (Since a married woman is one of the arayos mentioned in the Torah, and the Mishna teaches us that one who cohabits with her, she is disqualified from the Kehunah even though it was against her consent.

The Gemora rejects this proof: Perhaps the Mishna is only referring to the halacha of partial cohabitation; this applies to all of the arayos. Thus, there would be no proof that a married woman, who has been violated, becomes disqualified to the Kehunah.

The Gemora asks: According to this interpretation of the Mishna, we are deriving the halacha of partial cohabitation by all arayos from the mitzvah of yibum. As a matter of fact, it is precisely the opposite; partial cohabitation is valid by yibum because we compare yibum to the arayos. It is by the arayos that we originally learned that a partial cohabitation is regarded as a complete one.

The Gemora concludes: The Mishna, when it says, “So too,” can be referring to cohabitation in an unnatural manner regarding those women that are forbidden only by a negative prohibition. (56a – 56b)

Rabbah rules: If the wife of a Kohen has been violated, and her husband cohabits with her, he incurs lashes because she is a zonah (a woman who went astray and committed adultery).

The Gemora asks: Will he only incur lashes on account of cohabiting with a zonah? Shouldn’t he be liable to lashes on account of tumah as well (she has been defiled, and therefore forbidden to her husband)?

The Gemora answers: Let us say that Rabbah meant that he will also incur lashes on account of cohabiting with a zonah (besides the halacha of tumah).

The Gemora cites an alternative version of Rabbah’s ruling: If the wife of a Kohen has been violated, and her husband cohabits with her, he incurs lashes because of tumah.

The Gemora infers that he will not receive lashes because she is a zonah. (56b)

[END]

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CUT OFF WITHOUT CHILDREN - Yevamos 55 - Daf Yomi

Rashi’s opinion is that kares includes two punishments: He will die before his time, and he will die childless.

Tosfos (2a) cites the opinion of the Riva that only where the Torah explicitly uses the term “aririm” will the second punishment apply; otherwise, he will die young, but with children. Tosfos does conclude that all arayos will entail both punishments because they are comparable to each other.

The Ramban writes that the second punishment will not be applicable by other transgressions, such as eating blood or forbidden fats.

The Netziv cites a Yerushalmi that maintains that only by those specific arayos which state “aririm” does the second punishment apply; otherwise, he will die young, but with children.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 55 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a Mishna: They told a married man, “Your wife has died,” and he went and married her paternal sister. Later, they told him, “She (the second wife) has died,” and he went and married her (the second wife) maternal sister. Later, they told him, “She (the third wife) has died,” and he went and married her (the third wife’s) paternal sister. Later, they told him, “She (the fourth wife) has died,” and he went and married her (the fourth wife’s) maternal sister. He found out that in fact, none of them had died. The halacha is that he is permitted to remain married to the first, third and fifth wives. (Since he is legally married to the first wife, that renders his marriage to the second wife (her paternal sister) null and void. He is thus legally married to the third wife because she is not related at all to the first wife. Now that he is legally married to the third wife, that renders his marriage to the fourth wife (her paternal sister) null and void. He is thus legally married to the fifth wife because she is not related at all to the first or the third wives.) If he would subsequently die childless, a yibum or chalitzah with one of these wives will release the others from any yibum or chalitzah obligations. He is forbidden to the second and the fourth wives, and a yibum or chalitzah with one of them will not release the others from a yibum or chalitzah obligation.

The Mishna continues: If the husband cohabited with the second wife after the death of the first one (she indeed did die), he is permitted to remain married to the second and fourth wives. (Since he is legally married to the second wife, that renders his marriage to the third wife (her maternal sister) null and void. He is thus legally married to the fourth wife because she is not related at all to the second wife. Now that he is legally married to the fourth wife, that renders his marriage to the fifth wife (her maternal sister) null and void.) If he would subsequently die childless, a yibum or chalitzah with one of these wives will release the other from any yibum or chalitzah obligations. He is forbidden to the first, third and fifth wives, and a yibum or chalitzah with one of them will not release the others from a yibum or chalitzah obligation.

Implicit in this Mishna is that one is prohibited from taking his wife’s sister, whether she is a paternal or maternal sister.

The Gemora asks: How do we know that one’s maternal sister is prohibited?

The Gemora answers: It can be derived from the prohibition of a sister. Just as one is prohibited from taking his sister, whether she is a paternal or maternal sister, so too, one is prohibited from taking his wife’s sister, she is a paternal or maternal sister.

The Gemora asks: Let us derive from the prohibition regarding one’s father’s brother’s wife? Just as there, the prohibition is only applicable if the husband and the brother are paternal brothers and not maternal, so too, regarding the prohibition of one’s wife’s sister; she should only be forbidden if she is the wife’s paternal sister?

The Gemora answers: It is more logical to derive the halacha pertaining to a wife’s sister from one’s own sister because she is his own relative (a father’s brother’s wife is not regarded as his own relative).

The Gemora asks: It would be preferable to derive the halacha of a wife’s sister from the prohibition regarding one father’s brother’s wife because they are both related through marriage (in contrast to one’s sister, where no marriage is involved).

The Gemora concludes: We derive this halacha from the prohibition regarding one’s brother’s wife. (This prohibition is applicable whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers.) They are comparable because they are related through marriage and are one’s own relatives. (54b – 55a)

The Gemora asks: How do we know that one’s brother’s wife is prohibited, whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers?

The Gemora cites a braisa which discusses this precise issue. It is written [Vayikra 18:16]: The ervah of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover. This verse prohibits one from taking his brother’s wife, whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers.

The braisa asks: Perhaps the prohibition is only applicable if they are paternal brothers?

The braisa presents the source for both options. We could derive this halacha from the prohibition regarding one’s sister. Just as one is prohibited from taking his sister, whether she is a paternal or maternal sister, so too, one is prohibited from taking his brother’s wife, whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers.

Or perhaps, we can derive this halacha from the prohibition regarding one’s father’s brother’s wife. Just as there, the prohibition is only applicable if the husband and the brother are paternal brothers and not maternal, so too, regarding the prohibition of one’s brother’s wife; she should only be forbidden if the husband and the brother are paternal brothers.

The braisa states the reasons as to which prohibition is more comparable to the prohibition regarding one’s brother’s wife. A brother’s wife is his own relative, and his sister is his own relative; one’s father’s brother’s wife is not his own relative. However, there is a counterargument: A brother’s wife is a prohibition which involves a marriage, and a father’s brother’s wife also involves a marriage; one’s sister is a prohibition that occurs automatically, not because of any marriage.

The braisa concludes by citing the end of the aforementioned verse: She is the ervah of your brother. These words (because they are superfluous) teach us that one is prohibited from taking his brother’s wife, whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps one verse is necessary to teach us the prohibition regarding a case where the brother has children, and it is during his lifetime, and the other verse teaches us that the prohibition exists in a case where he has children, and it is after her husband died?

The Gemora answers: It is unnecessary to teach us that the brother’s wife is forbidden in a case where he has children, and the husband died. Since the Torah explicitly permits a brother’s wife when the brother died childless, we can infer that she would be forbidden if he did have children.

The Gemora counters: Perhaps we can say that if he died childless, she is forbidden to marry anyone else, but is permitted to the yavam; however, if he died with children, she would be permitted to everyone? Alternatively, we can say: If he died childless, there is a mitzvah to marry her; if he died with children, it would be voluntary? Alternatively, we can say: If he died childless, he is permitted to marry her; if he died with children, there would be a positive commandment against marrying her (but she would not be subject to the penalty of kares)?

The Gemora answers: There is actually a third verse, which is certainly extra. It is written [Vayikra 20:21]: He has uncovered his brother’s ervah. These words (because they are superfluous) teach us that one is prohibited from taking his brother’s wife, whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers. (55a)

The Gemora cites a Scriptural verse which indicates that although a brother’s wife is prohibited whether the husband and the brother are paternal or maternal brothers, the mitzvah of yibum is applicable only if they are paternal brothers, not maternal brothers. (55a)

The Gemora asks: Why does the Torah mention kares regarding the prohibition of cohabitating with one’s sister (all arayos are subject to the penalty of kares)?

The Gemora answers: It is to teach us the halacha of Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Yochanan states: If one committed all the arayos transgression (mistakenly thinking that she was permitted to him) during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a korban chatas for each and every transgression. (55a)

The Gemora asks: Why does the Torah mention that one will die childless if he cohabited with his father’s brother’s wife; the Torah has already stated that regarding all arayos?

The Gemora answers: It is necessary for Rabbah’s teaching. Rabbah states that one verse teaches us that if one has children, and he has committed one of these transgressions; he will be forced to bury his children. The other verse teaches us that if he does not have children, he will continue to live in that state, and he will eventually die without ever having children. The Gemora comments: This applies to children born prior to transgressing as well as to those that were born afterwards. (55a)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source which indicates that a partial cohabitation is prohibited by a negative prohibition, by a negative prohibition involving the Kehunah and by a positive commandment. The Gemora also cites the source which indicates that a yavam will acquire his yevamah and a man will acquire his wife through partial cohabitation. (55a – 55b)

Rava asks: Why does the Torah mention the words a copulation of seed (a complete cohabitation) regarding a designated slavewoman (a Canaanite slavewoman betrothed to a Hebrew slave is forbidden to cohabit with a regular Jew) regarding a married woman, and regarding a sotah (an adulteress)?

Rava answers: The words a copulation of seed regarding a designated slavewoman is necessary for the ruling we stated above (namely, that one is not liable to bring a korban asham until he cohabits completely with her).

The words a copulation of seed regarding a married woman teaches us that one is not liable for cohabitating with a corpse of a married woman. This is necessary, for we might have thought that since she is still regarded as the husband’s relative (regarding a kohen becoming tamei to his wife), it might be considered adultery; the Torah teaches us that this is not the case.

The words a copulation of seed regarding a sotah teaches us that one who warns his wife not to engage in bodily contact with another man does not render her a sotah. This is necessary, for we might have thought that becoming a sotah is dependent on the objection of the husband, and since he is is obviously objecting to this behavior, perhaps she would be rendered a sotah; the Torah teaches us that this is not the case. (55b)

The Gemora cites different opinions regarding what is considered the beginning of cohabitation. One opinion maintains that even genital contact constitutes partial cohabitation. Others hold that the insertion of the corona is considered the beginning of cohabitation. (55b – 56a)

[END]

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MITZVAH WITHOUT INTENTION - Yevamos 54 - Daf Yomi

The Mishna teaches us that even if the yavam did not have intention for the mitzvah he has nevertheless acquired the yevamah.

The Minchas Chinuch writes that by a Biblical mitzvah, one is required to perform the mitzvah with the intention for the sake of the mitzvah. If the yavam cohabited with the yevamah under the assumption that she was another woman, or he acted wantonly, and did not intend for the mitzvah, he has indeed acquired her, but he has not fulfilled the mitzvah.

The Minchas Chinuch concludes that the yavam will have to cohabit with her again for the sake of the mitzvah in order to fulfill the mitzvah.

Reb Elchonon Wasserman disagrees and holds that intention is a requirement for the fulfillment of a mitzvah only when the mitzvah is to perform a certain action. However, if the mitzvah is to create a chalos, a certain condition, the mitzvah can be fulfilled even without the proper intention. The mitzvah of yibum is to acquire the yevamah; this mitzvah is accomplished even if the yavam did not intend to fulfill the mitzvah.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 54 - Highlights

The Mishna states: If a man cohabited with his yevamah, whether in error or wantonly (not for the sake of the mitzvah), whether under compulsion or willingly; even if he acted in error and she wantonly, he wantonly and she in error, he under compulsion and she not under compulsion, she under compulsion and he not compulsion; whether he has partial cohabitation or he completes cohabitation, he has acquired her. And there is no distinction between one manner of cohabitation and other manners of cohabitation (natural or unnatural).

The Mishna continues: So, too, if a man cohabits with any of the arayos listed in the Torah, or with those women who are disqualified to marry a Kohen, such as a widow to a High Priest, a divorcee or a chalutzah to a regular Kohen, a mamzeres or a nesinah to an Israelite, the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or to a nasin, he has rendered her disqualified from the Kehunah. And there is no distinction between one manner of cohabitation and other manners of cohabitation. (53b)

The Mishna had stated: If a man cohabited with his yevamah, whether in error or intentionally, whether under compulsion or willingly; even if he acted in error and she intentionally, etc.

The Gemora asks: What is the meaning of the word “even”?

The Gemora answers: It isn’t necessary to state the obvious ruling where he acted in error and she intended to fulfill the mitzvah, or he is wanton and she intended to fulfill the mitzvah because at least one of them was intending to fulfill the mitzvah. Rather, the Mishna teaches us that even in the case where he acted in error (thinking that she was another woman) and she is wanton, meaning that they both were not intending for the mitzvah, nevertheless, he acquires her as a wife.

Rabbi Chiya taught in a braisa: Even if they were both in error, both were wanton, or both of them acted under compulsion, the yibum is valid. (53b)

The Gemora asks: What is the meaning when the Mishna says that they acted “under compulsion”?

If you will say that the Mishna is referring to a case where idolaters forced him to cohabit with her, but Rava said that there is no legal claim of coercion regarding an illicit cohabitation because one cannot have an erection unless he is a willing participant.

Rather, the Mishna can be referring to a case where he cohabited with her while he was sleeping. The Gemora asks: Rav Yehudah has said that one cannot acquire a yevamah while he is asleep (since at that time, he is lacking sufficient intelligence to make a kinyan).

Rather, the Mishna can be referring to a case where he cohabited with her accidentally. The Gemora asks: Rabbah has said that if one falls from a roof and cohabits with a woman below (he was on the roof with a woman and was erect), he will be liable to pay for four things (damages, pain, medical bills and loss of income), but he would not acquire his yevamah (since he is not contemplating cohabitation at all).

Rather, the Mishna can be referring to a case where he was intending to cohabit with his wife, and his yevamah grabbed him and he cohabited with her.

The Gemora asks: What is Rabbi Chiya’s case where they both acted under compulsion?

The Gemora answers: He is referring to a case where the yavam intended to cohabit with his wife, and idolaters grabbed him and forced him to cohabit with his yevamah. (53b – 54a)

The Gemora asks: From where are the halachos listed in the Mishna derived?

The Gemora cites a braisa: It is written: Her yavam shall cohabit with her. This teaches us that it is preferable for the yavam to perform yibum (and not chalitzah). Another thing: This verse teaches us that yibum is effective if he cohabits with her, whether in error or wantonly, whether under compulsion or willingly. (54a)

The Gemora cites another braisa: It is written: Her yavam shall cohabit with her. This teaches us that cohabitation in a normal manner effects yibum. The verse continues: And take her. This teaches us that cohabitation in an unusual manner (anal) does not effect yibum. The verse continues: And perform yibum. This teaches us that only cohabitation finalizes the yibum, but giving her money or a document will not finalize the yibum. The words in the verse (And perform yibum) with her teaches us that yibum is valid even without her consent. (54a)

Rav Yehudah said: One cannot acquire a yevamah while he is asleep. The verse states: Her yavam shall cohabit with her. This teaches us that he must intend to cohabit with her in order for the yibum to be valid.

The Gemora asks: It was taught in a braisa otherwise: A yibum is valid whether he was awake or asleep during cohabitation.

The Gemora emends the braisa: A yibum is valid whether she was awake or asleep during cohabitation.

The Gemora cites a different braisa to challenge Rav Yehudah’s opinion: A yibum is valid whether he was awake or asleep, or whether she was awake or asleep during cohabitation.

The Gemora answers: The braisa is referring to a case where the yavam was simply dozing. Rav Yehudah was discussing a case where he was sleeping.

The Gemora asks: What does dozing mean? Rav Ashi clarifies the case. He is asleep and not asleep, awake and not awake; if he is called he responds, but he cannot give a rational answer, though if he is reminded, he remembers. (54a)

Rabbah has said that if one falls from a roof and cohabits with a woman below (he was on the roof with a woman and was erect), he will be liable to pay for four things, but he would not acquire his yevamah.

He will be liable to pay for damages, pain, medical bills and loss of income, but he would not be liable to pay for the embarrassment until he intended to cause an injury. (54a)

Rava said: If the yavam intended to press against a wall, but instead cohabited with his yevamah, he has not acquired her. If he intended to press against an animal, but instead cohabited with his yevamah, he has acquired her because he was intending to perform a type of cohabitation. (54a)

The Mishna had stated: If the yavam performed partial cohabitation with his yevamah, he has acquired her. Ula cites the Scriptural source for this. It is derived from a verse regarding a niddah (menstruant).

The Gemora asks: We cannot learn to other cases of arayos because niddah has a stringency that one who cohabits with a niddah becomes tamei just like the niddah.

The Gemora answers: It can be derived from the verse discussing the prohibition of a brother’s wife which concludes with the words, She is a niddah.

The Gemora asks: We cannot compare the prohibition of a brother’s wife to other arayos; one can marry a thousand wives and will increase the number of forbidden women. We would only be able to learn to other arayos that become forbidden through marriage.

The Gemora answers: It can be derived from the verse discussing the prohibition of one’s father’s sister and mother’s sister which states explicitly that a partial cohabitation is forbidden.

The Gemora asks: We cannot compare the prohibition of a father’s sister to other arayos; she is forbidden automatically without any act of marriage. We would only be able to learn to other arayos that become forbidden automatically.

The Gemora concludes: We cannot derive from one of those sources, but perhaps we can learn from two of them.

The Gemora analyzes as to which two sources we can learn from. Let us derive the halacha (of partial cohabitation) from the prohibition of a brother’s wife together with the prohibition of one’s father’s sister and one’s mother’s sister.

The Gemora asks: We cannot learn to other cases of arayos because these are forbidden on account of being relatives; we would not be able to learn to other arayos, which are not related to the cohabiter.

The Gemora says: Let us derive the halacha from a niddah together with the prohibition of one’s father’s sister and mother’s sister.

The Gemora asks: We cannot learn to other cases of arayos because these are forbidden automatically without any act of marriage. We would only be able to learn to other arayos that become forbidden automatically.

The Gemora says: Let us derive the halacha from a niddah together with the prohibition of one’s brother’s wife, for there is nothing to ask on this.

Rav Acha the son of Rav Ikka asks: One cannot compare these prohibitions to the other arayos. Niddah and a brother’s wife are not permitted during the entire lifetime of that which prohibits them; we cannot derive other arayos, such as a married woman (who can be permitted during the lifetime of that which prohibits her, if the husband divorced her) from them.

Rav Acha from Difti rewords the question: Niddah and a brother’s wife are different; that which prohibits them cannot permit them (a niddah becomes permitted after a certain amount of days, and a brother’s wife could become permitted if the brother died childless). However, by a married woman, that which prohibits her can permit her (therefore she cannot be compared to the others)

The Gemora concludes: Rabbi Yonah, and others say that it was Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yehoshua, said: It is written [Vayikra 18:29]: For if anyone commits any of these abominations, the persons doing so will be cut off. We compare all arayos with a hekesh (a Midrashic juxtaposition, where we can derive from there even when there exists distinctions) to a niddah; just as a niddah is forbidden even with a partial cohabitation, so too, all arayos are forbidden even with a partial cohabitation. (54a – 54b)

The Gemora asks: Why does it say niddah by the prohibition of a brother’s wife?

The Gemora answers: It is needed for Rav Huna’s teaching. One might think that a brother is permitted to marry his brother’s wife even while the brother is alive (he divorced his wife), or that it would be prohibited, but she would not be subject to the penalty of kares; the extra words in the verse teaches us that if there is no mitzvah of yibum, she is forbidden as a brother’s wife under the penalty of kares. This is derived from the fact that the Torah writes the word niddah by the brother’s wife prohibition. Just as a niddah is permitted afterwards, but nonetheless, if one would cohabit with her while she is a niddah, they would be subject to the penalty of kares, so too, regarding a brother’s wife, even though she could be permitted if the brother died childless, she is forbidden under the penalty of kares when the mitzvah of yibum is not applicable. (54b)

Ravina inquired of Rava: What is the halacha if a man partially cohabits with another man?

The Gemora answers: This is certainly forbidden because this prohibition is compared to the copulation of a woman; just as there partial cohabitation is forbidden, so too, regarding a male.

The Gemora states that Ravina’s inquiry was regarding a partial cohabitation with an animal.

Rava answered that it is forbidden. (54b)


[END]

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 53 - Highlights

The Mishna had stated: If he married this one by ma'amar, and that one by ma'amar, they require two bills of divorce and chalitzah.

The Gemora states that this seemingly would be inconsistent with Ben Azzai’s opinion. Ben Azzai maintains that there is validity for a ma’amar after another ma’amar in a case where there were two yevamim and they both performed ma’amar with one yevamah. However, if one yavam performed ma’amar with one yevamah, and then he performed ma’amar with a second yevamah, the second one has no validity (and therefore there would be no necessity for a get to the second one). (53a)

The Mishna had stated: If he married this one by ma'amar, and he submitted to chalitzah from the other one, the first requires a bill of divorce.

The Gemora states that we can infer from the Mishna that when he perform a ma’amar with one, it is proper to submit to chalitzah from the other one; for a chalitzah from the ma’amar recipient will not release the co-wife (since it does not sever the ma’amar attachment). This implication would support Shmuel, for Shmuel had stated: If a yavam performs a ma’amar with one of the widows and then he decides to release her, she needs a get and a chalitzah. If the yavam performs a chalitzah with the woman who received the ma’amar, the co-wife is not released. If he performs a chalitzah with the co-wife, the woman who received the ma’amar is released.

This would be a refutation to Rav Yosef, who maintains that one should always perform a chalitzah with the woman who is anyway disqualified for the Kehunah. (Rebbe taught that a person should not spill out the extra waters from his pit when others may have a need for it. If he is performing chalitzah anyway, which will render her forbidden to a Kohen, he should perform the chalitzah with the widow who is anyway disqualified to marry a Kohen.) (In our Mishna, he should submit to chalitzah from the ma’amar recipient, who will anyway require a get.)

The Gemora answers: The Mishna does not instruct him what to do; rather, the Mishna is discussing that case. Perhaps, he should have submitted to chalitzah from the ma’amar recipient, since she will be receiving a get to sever the ma’amar attachment. (53a)

The Mishna had stated: If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and a bill of divorce to the other one, they require from him chalitzah. The Mishna continued: These halachos apply whether one yavam to two yevamos, or two yevamim to one yevamah.

The Gemora states that this would support Rabbah bar Rav Huna’s opinion. He states: Whenever there is a deficient chalitzah, each brother must submit to chalitzah from that yevamah. (Three sisters who are sisters-in-law (they were married to three brothers) who fall for yibum before two brothers, one brother performs chalitzah to one of them, the other brother performs chalitzah to a different one of them, and the middle one (the other sister) requires chalitzah from both of them.)

The Gemora deflects the proof: Our Mishna does not mean that they both perform chalitzah; rather it (the plural form) means that that Yevamos in general would require a chalitzah in this case (but only from one brother). (53a)

The Mishna had stated: If he submitted to chalitzah and he married her by ma’amar, there is no validity to anything which follows chalitzah, and the ma’amar is not effective. The Mishna continued: These halachos apply whether one yavam to two yevamos, or two yevamim to one yevamah. The implication would be that if one yavam submitted to chalitzah and performed ma’amar with her co-wife, or if the yavam submitted to chalitzah and his brother performed ma’amar with her, there is no validity to anything which follows chalitzah, and the ma’amar is not effective.

The Gemora above (10b) presented a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish. (A man performed a chalitzah with his yevamah and then married her; Rish Lakish said that he is not liable for kares for marrying the chalutzah (the one with whom the chalitzah was performed), but the brothers will be liable to kares for taking her. He (the one who performed the chalitzah) and his brothers will be liable to kares for taking the co-wife. Rabbi Yochanan says: Both he and the brothers will not be liable to kares for taking the chalutzah or her co-wife.)

The Gemora asks: It is understandable why the Mishna mentioned these halachos according to Rabbi Yochanan; although he holds that (after chalitzah) the entire house is only subject to a negative prohibition, nevertheless, kiddushin does not take effect with her (and the Mishna would be following Rabbi Akiva’s opinion that kiddushin does not take effect with a woman subject to a negative prohibition). However, what is the novelty of these rulings according to Rish Lakish? He maintains that (after chalitzah) the entire house is subject to a penalty of kares; does the Mishna need to teach us that kiddushin does not take effect with women subject to a penalty of kares?

The Gemora defends Rish Lakish’s position, and asks: Is it any better according to your reasoning? The Mishna had stated: If he cohabited with her and he married by ma’amar, there is no validity for the ma’amar. The Mishna continued: These halachos apply whether one yavam to two yevamos, or two yevamim to one yevamah. The implication would be that if one yavam cohabited with her and a second yavam performed ma’amar with her, the ma’amar will not be valid. What is the necessity of this ruling? Does the Mishna need to teach us that kiddushin does not take effect with a married woman?

The Gemora concludes: It is obvious that this is the explanation of the Mishna. The Mishna taught all the halachos pertaining to releasing one yavam and one yevamah, and then it taught us the halachos pertaining to two yevamos and one yavam. Since we mentioned the halachos regarding two yevamos and one yavam, the Mishna also mentioned the halachos regarding two yevamin and one yavam. (53a)

The Mishna had stated: There is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah. This would apply whether he submitted to chalitzah at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end. However, regarding cohabitation, when it is at the beginning, there is no validity for anything which follows it, whereas if it was in the middle, or at the end -- there is validity to something which follows it. Rabbi Nechemia said: It is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, there is no validity for anything which follows it.

The Gemora cites a dissenting opinion from a braisa: Abba Yosi son of Yochanan, a man from Yerushalayim said in the name of Rabbi Meir: It is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah; if it is done in the beginning, there is no validity for anything which follows it. However, if it is done in the middle (a get preceded it, and ma’amar followed it) or in the end (following a get and ma’amar), there is validity for that which follows it.

The Gemora states all the opinion: There are three viewpoints. The Tanna Kamma of our Mishna maintains that there is a distinction between cohabitation and chalitzah. If one cohabits (in the middle or at the end), there is reason to decree that something which follows should have validity, for we are concerned that people might say: Just as cohabitation following a ma’amar effects acquisition, so too, cohabitation after cohabitation should acquire her. And just as cohabitation after a get effects acquisition, so too, cohabitation after chalitzah should acquire her. It was for this reason that the Rabbis decreed that cohabitation does not acquire her. However, regarding chalitzah which is performed between get and ma’amar or afterwards, there is no reason to be concerned, therefore there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah.

Rabbi Nechemia said: It is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, there is no validity for anything which follows it.

Rabbi Nechemia disagrees with the Tanna Kamma’s logic: There is no reason to be concerned. The Gemora explains: That which the Tanna Kamma said, that just as cohabitation after a get effects acquisition, so too, cohabitation after chalitzah should acquire her; this is not a concern. Everyone knows that chalitzah releases the yevamah Biblically, and they will not think that cohabitation after chalitzah will acquire her. That which the Tanna Kamma said, that just as cohabitation following a ma’amar effects acquisition, so too, cohabitation after cohabitation should acquire her; this is also not a concern. Everyone knows that cohabitation acquires the yevamah Biblically, and they will not think that cohabitation after cohabitation will acquire her.

Abba Yosi son of Chanan (who holds that it is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah; if it is done in the beginning, there is no validity for anything which follows it; however, if it is done in the middle (a get preceded it, and ma’amar followed it) or in the end (following a get and ma’amar), there is validity for that which follows it) holds like the Rabbis that there is sufficient reason to decree by cohabitation (that it is not completely effective), and he decrees by chalitzah because of the concern regarding cohabitation. (53b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 52 - Highlights

The Mishna had stated: If he married by ma'amar and cohabited with her, then this is according to the mitzvah.

The Gemora states that this seemingly would provide support for Rav Huna’s ruling. Rav Huna said: The mitzvah of yibum should be performed in the following manner: The yavam should perform a kiddushin and then he should cohabit with her.

The Gemora deflects the proof: Perhaps the Mishna means that performing ma’amar and then cohabitating is also in accordance with the mitzvah (but not necessarily the preferable method).

The Gemora asks: Isn’t it obvious that that he is performing the mitzvah; why was it necessary for the Mishna to state it?

The Gemora answers: Since we previously learned that one who perform ma’amar with his yevamah, the zikah-attachment that had previously existed leaves him, and an erusin and nisuin attachment takes effect (he may not cohabit with her now without her consent), it might enter your mind to say that one who cohabits with a yevamah after a ma’amar does not fulfill the mitzvah of yibum; the Mishna teaches us that this method is in accordance with the mitzvah. (52a)

Rav Huna said: The mitzvah of yibum should be performed in the following manner: The yavam should perform a kiddushin and then he should cohabit with her. If he cohabited and then he performed ma’amar, he has nevertheless acquired her.

The Gemora asks: If he cohabited and then he performed ma’amar, he has nevertheless acquired her. Isn’t that obvious; he certainly acquired her through cohabitation?

The Gemora revises Rav Huna’s ruling: If he cohabited with her without performing ma’amar, he has nevertheless acquired her.

The Gemora asks: We have learned in a braisa that one who cohabits with his brother’s wife without performing ma’amar first incurs lashes; this would indicate that he does not acquire her as his wife.

The Gemora answers: The lashes incurred are Rabbinical lashes. The Rabbis decreed that the yavam should perform ma’amar prior to cohabiting with her; otherwise, it would be acting immorally.

The Gemora proves that the lashes incurred are Rabbinical, for Rav gave lashes to one who betroths a woman with cohabitation (without giving money or a document beforehand), and one who would betroth a woman in the marketplace, and one who would betroth a woman without a prior arrangement to marry her, and one who would nullify a get, and one who would pronounce that the get is being written without his consent, and one who is disrespectful towards a messenger from the Rabbis, and one who has been under an excommunication for thirty days and does not come to Beis Din to have it nullified, and a groom who lives in his father-in-law’s house.

The Nehardeans said: Rav only gave lashes in the case of the man who betroths a woman with cohabitation, and without a prior arrangement to marry her. Others said that he would administer lashes even if there was an arrangement to marry beforehand (betrothing through cohabitation is regarded as licentious behavior). (52a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: How is ma’amar performed? The yavam gives the yevamah money or objects worth money. Abaye explains the braisa’s next question: What is the text of the kesuvah to the yevamah? (The text of the ma’amar would be the same as a regular betrothal, i.e. he would write on a paper or on a piece of earthenware, Behold, you are betrothed to me.) The braisa answers: The yavam writes: I so-and-so the son of so-and-so have accepted so-and-so, my yevamah, upon myself, to feed and support her as fitting, except that her kesuvah obligation rests upon the property of the first husband.

The Gemora adds: But if there are no assets available from the deceased, the Rabbis established that there should be a kesuvah from the yavam as well, in order that she should not be so easy to divorce. (52a)

Abaye asked Rabbah: If a yavam gave a get to his yevamah and said, “You are divorced from me, but you cannot marry anyone else,” what is the halacha? (Can she still be taken for yibum by the yavam or any of his brothers?) Do we say that a get which would be effective to a married woman will also be effective to a yevamah, but one that will not be effective to a married woman will also not be effective to a yevamah; or perhaps, people might confuse this case with a legitimate get, and therefore the get should be considered effective?

Rabbah answered: We are concerned that people might confuse this case with a legitimate get, and therefore the get is considered effective.

Rabbah bar Chanan asked: If the yavam would give her a blank piece of paper and say to her, “you are divorced,” will you say that he disqualified her?

Abaye answers: There is a valid distinction between the two cases. In the case when he gives her a blank piece of paper, he does not disqualify her from the Kehunah whereas here, he would disqualify her from the Kehunah. (52a)

Rami bar Chama said: They had stated: If one told a scribe, “Write a get for my arusah, and when I perform nisuin with her, I will divorce her,” this get is valid because he has the ability to use the get now to divorce her. However, if he would tell the scribe, “Write a get for this woman (who is presently not his arusah), and when I perform nisuin with her, I will divorce her,” this get is not valid because he does not have the ability to use the get now to divorce her (since he isn’t married to her now).

Rami bar Chama inquired: What would the halacha be if a yavam would tell the scribe, “Write a get for my yevamah, and when I perform yibum with her, I will divorce her”? Do we say that since she is attached to him with a zikah, the get is valid, or perhaps, we would say that the get is not valid since he did not perform ma’amar with her yet?

The Gemora states: Let the inquiry stand (without a resolution). (52a – 52b)

Rav Chanania inquired: If a yavam gave a get to the yevamah, but he wrote that the get should be effective for the zikah-attachment, but not for the ma’amar, or for the ma’amar, but not for the zikah, what is the halacha? Do we say that the ma’amar adds to the zikah-attachment, and the yavam is attempting to divorce half of his wife, and thus the get will not be valid? Or perhaps, the ma’amar and the zikah-attachment are independent of each other, and the get will be valid?

The Gemora answers: Let this inquiry be resolved from Rava’s statement; Rava said: If one gave a get for the ma’amar, but not for the zikah-attachment, the get is considered valid.

The Gemora states: This halacha was obvious to Rava, but not to Rabbi Chanania.

The Gemora concludes: Let the inquiry stand (without a resolution). (52b)

The Mishna had stated: If he submitted to chalitzah and then either married by ma'amar, or he gave a bill of divorce, or he cohabited with her, there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: This follows Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, who maintains that kiddushin cannot take effect upon a woman who is subject to a negative prohibition (once chalitzah has been performed, she becomes forbidden on account of the prohibition of Once he did not build, he shall never again build). However, according to the Chachamim, there is validity to something that follows chalitzah.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting this interpretation of the Mishna. Rebbe said: The words of the Mishna follows Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, who maintains that kiddushin cannot take effect upon a woman who is subject to a negative prohibition. However, according to the Chachamim, there is validity to something that follows chalitzah. Rebbe states his own opinion: Kiddushin will take effect on a chalutzah when he betroths her for the sake of regular kiddushin; however, if he betroths her for the sake of yibum, there will not be any validity to the yibum after chalitzah. (52b)

The Gemora cites another braisa: If one performed a chalitzah with his yevamah and then betrothed her; Rebbe said: If he betrothed her for kiddushin, she would require a get from him. If he betrothed her for the sake of yibum, she would not require a get. The Chachamim say: In either case, she will require a get.

Rav Yosef explains Rebbe’s opinion: It would be similar to a case where one would hoe in the property of a convert (that died, and his property is ownerless), but he thinks it is his own property; the halacha is that he does not acquire the property. (The yavam mistakenly thought that he can perform yibum after chalitzah; he does not acquire her as a wife.)

Abaye asked: The two cases cannot be compared; here, at least, he had intention to acquire her, but by the hoeing, he wasn’t thinking of acquiring the property at all (since he thought it was his). (52b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 51 - Highlights

The Gemora states: Rabban Gamliel and the Chachamim only argued regarding a get after a get and a ma’amar after a ma’amar; but a get given to one yevamah or a ma’amar performed with one will certainly be effective.

The Gemora asks: Why do the Rabbis say that a get given to a yevamah is effective (resulting in the prohibition of Once he did not build, he should never again build)?

The Gemora answers: It is because the giving of a get is effective elsewhere (by a divorce from a man to his wife). If it would not be effective by a yevamah, people would equate chalitzah with a get, and say that just as a get will not release the yevamah, chalitzah also won’t, and then the yavam will cohabit with the yevamah after chalitzah. (It was therefore decreed that one cannot cohabit with a yevamah after a chalitzah.)

The Gemora asks: Why do the Rabbis say that a ma’amar to a yevamah is effective (and he and his brothers can no longer perform a yibum)?

The Gemora answers: It is because ma’amar is effective elsewhere (by a marriage – either through money or a document). If it would not be effective by a yevamah, people would equate ma’amar with cohabitation, and say that just as a ma’amar does not acquire the yevamah, cohabitation also won’t, and then the yavam will cohabit with a second yevamah after cohabitation. (50b)

The Gemora asks: Why do the Rabbis say that there is validity to something after a deficient cohabitation? (Why is there still a need for chalitzah; shouldn’t the cohabitation nullify the zikah?)

The Gemora answers: We say as follows: Regarding the case where he gave a bill of divorce to one yevamah, and he cohabited with the other widow, she (the one with whom he cohabited with) requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah; the chalitzah is required because otherwise, people might equate cohabitation after chalitzah with cohabitation after a get. They would see that cohabitation after a get does not require chalitzah, and would assume that this cohabitation is ideal. This would lead people to allow cohabitation even after chalitzah. It is for this reason that the Rabbis decreed that cohabitation after a get requires chalitzah.

And regarding the case where the yavam married this one by ma'amar, and cohabited with a second widow, they require two bills of divorce and chalitzah; the chalitzah is required because otherwise, people might equate cohabitation after ma’amar with cohabitation after cohabitation. They would see that cohabitation after ma’amar does not require chalitzah, and would assume that this cohabitation is ideal. This would lead people to allow cohabitation (with one widow) even after cohabitation was performed with a different widow. It is for this reason that the Rabbis decreed that cohabitation after ma’amar requires chalitzah. (50b)

The Gemora asks: Why do the Rabbis say that there is no validity to something after a deficient chalitzah? (Why is it different that a deficient cohabitation, which is only partially effective?)

The Gemora answers: We say as follows: Why should we be concerned? Should the Rabbis decree that chalitzah after a get should not be fully effective because of the case of chalitzah after chalitzah? There is nothing to be concerned about. Let them perform chalitzah incessantly; there is no prohibition against that. Should the Rabbis decree that chalitzah after ma’amar should not be fully effective because of the case of chalitzah after cohabitation? There is nothing to be concerned about. Chalitzah after ma’amar requires a get because of the ma’amar, so too, a chalitzah after cohabitation will require a get for the cohabitation. (50b)

Rava asks: What is the reasoning of Rabban Gamliel? (Rabban Gamliel says: There is no validity for a get after a get. If two wives (e.g., Leah and Chanah) of a dead, childless man came before his brother for yibum, and he gave a bill of divorce to Leah, and afterwards he gave a bill of divorce to Chanah, the latter's bill of divorce is not valid, and he is not forbidden to marry her relatives. Rabban Gamliel says further: And no ma'amar after ma’amar. If one yavam married by ma'amar two yevamos from one brother who came before him for yibum, i.e., he married one of them and afterwards married the other; or if two yevamim married by ma'amar, one yevamah; the second ma'amar is void, and she does not require a bill of divorce from him to annul the ma'amar, and he is not forbidden to marry her relatives.)

He answers: Rabban Gamliel is uncertain whether a get to a yevamah effects full rejection of the yevamah or none at all. He is also uncertain whether ma’amar to a yevamah effects full acquisition of the yevamah or none at all.

Regarding a get: If the first get given effected a full rejection, what would the second one accomplish? If the first get given didn’t accomplish anything, the second one will not accomplish anything either.

Regarding ma’amar: If the first ma’amar effected a full acquisition, what would the second one accomplish? If the first ma’amar didn’t accomplish anything, the second one will not accomplish anything either.

Abaye asks from the following braisa: Rabban Gamliel admits that a get (to one widow) has validity after a ma’amar (to the co-wife), and the yavam will be prohibited from performing a yibum with them or marrying the get-recipient’s relatives. He also admits that a ma’amar (to one widow) has validity after a get (to the co-wife), and the yavam will be prohibited from marrying the ma’amar-recipient’s relatives. He also admits by a get given to a third yevamah after a cohabitation with a second yevamah followed a ma’amar to the first. He also admits by a ma’amar to a third yevamah after a cohabitation with a second yevamah followed a get given to the first.

If a get or ma’amar does not accomplish anything, let the cohabitation afterwards be regarded as a cohabitation at the beginning (as if the ma’amar or get was nonexistent), and we learned in the Mishna regarding cohabitation, when it is at the beginning, there is no validity for anything which follows it?

Abaye offers his own explanation: Rabban Gamliel maintains that a get does effect a partial rejection and ma’amar accomplishes a partial acquisition. One get after another get has no validity because the first get given effected a partial rejection, and the second get cannot add to that rejection. One ma’amar after another ma’amar has no validity because the first ma’amar effected a partial acquisition, and the second ma’amar cannot add to that acquisition. However, regarding a get after a ma’amar or a ma’amar after a get; there can be validity since one is effecting a partial rejection, and one is accomplishing a partial acquisition.

The Chachamim disagree and maintain that the Rabbis decreed that there is the ability for a get or a ma’amar to take effect with each and every yavam and yevamah. (Since it is only a partial rejection or acquisition, the zikah-attachment still exists.)

Abaye concludes by explaining Rabban Gamliel’s opinion in the braisa. A deficient cohabitation is stronger than a ma’amar and weaker than a ma’amar. It is stronger because a ma’amar after a ma’amar has no validity, but cohabitation after a ma’amar is effective. It is weaker because a ma’amar after a get is completely effective (and a second ma’amar will not accomplish anything), but cohabitation after a get is not completely effective (and a ma’amar afterwards will have validity). (50b – 51a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabban Gamliel says: There is no validity for a get after a get. If two wives (e.g., Leah and Chanah) of a dead, childless man came before his brother for yibum, and he gave a bill of divorce to Leah, and afterwards he gave a bill of divorce to Chanah, Rabban Gamliel maintains that he should perform chalitzah with the first yevamah (Leah), and he is forbidden to marry her relatives. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second yevamah (Chanah). The Chachamim hold that he is forbidden to marry the relatives of both of them, and he is required to perform chalitzah with one of them. And a similar halacha applies if two yevamim give each a bill of divorce to one yevamah.

The braisa continues: If one yavam married by ma'amar two yevamos from one brother who came before him for yibum, i.e., he married one of them and afterwards married the other; Rabban Gamliel maintains that he should give a get to the first yevamah and perform a chalitzah with her, and he is forbidden to marry her relatives. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second yevamah. The Chachamim hold that he is required to give a get to both of them, and he is forbidden to marry the relatives of both of them, and he is required to perform chalitzah with one of them. And a similar halacha applies if two yevamim perform ma’amar to one yevamah. (51a)

The Gemora asks on Shmuel from this braisa: The braisa had stated: If two wives (e.g., Leah and Chanah) of a dead, childless man came before his brother for yibum, and he gave a bill of divorce to Leah, and afterwards he gave a bill of divorce to Chanah, Rabban Gamliel maintains that he should perform chalitzah with the first yevamah (Leah), and he is forbidden to marry her relatives. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second yevamah (Chanah). Shouldn’t this be a refutation of Shmuel? Shmuel said: There were two brothers, one of them had two wives and died childless. The yavam gave a get (bill of divorce) to one of the women. He is now prohibited from performing yibum with any of these women, but he is required to perform a chalitzah. (Although giving a get to a yevamah does not accomplish anything (for the Torah prescribes only a yibum or a chalitzah with a yevamah), the Rabbis decreed that it should be treated similar to a chalitzah.) If the yavam performs a chalitzah with the woman who received the get, the co-wife is not released.

Why then does Rabban Gamliel maintain that the chalitzah performed with the first yevamah releases the co-wife; the chalitzah is deficient since it follows the giving of a get?

The Gemora answers: Shmuel could say that he is issuing his ruling in accordance with those that hold that there exists a zikah-attachment between the yavam and the yevamah; a deficient chalitzah will not release the co-wife. Rabban Gamliel would hold that there is no zikah-attachment, and a deficient chalitzah can release the co-wife. (51a)

The Gemora assumes that if Rabban Gamliel maintains that there is no zikah-attachment, it is evident that the Chachamim hold that there is a zikah-attachment. If so, let the braisa be a refutation of Rabbah bar Rav Huna in the name of Rav.

The braisa had stated: And a similar halacha applies if two yevamim give each a bill of divorce to one yevamah. (If each yavam gave the yevamah a get, only one of them is required to perform a chalitzah with her.)

Rabbah bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: Three sisters who are sisters-in-law (they were married to three brothers) who fall for yibum before two brothers, one brother performs chalitzah to one of them, the other brother performs chalitzah to a different one of them, and the middle one (the other sister) requires chalitzah from both of them. (Since there is a zikah-attachment between the widows and the brothers, and the chalitzah performed with the middle sister is a deficient chalitzah (because she cannot be taken for yibum since she is the sister of his chalutzah), and a deficient chalitzah requires that she goes for chalitzah to all of the brothers.)

Why do the Chachamim rule that only one chalitzah is necessary?

The Gemora answers: Rabbah bar Rav Huna would answer that both Rabban Gamliel and the Chachamim would hold that there is no zikah-attachment; their dispute is only regarding the validity of a get following a get or ma’amar following a ma’amar. (51a – 51b)

Rabbi Yochanan said: Rabban Gamliel, Beis Shamai, Rabbi Shimon, Ben Azzai and Rabbi Nechemia all maintain that ma’amar accomplishes a complete acquisition of the yevamah.

Rabbi Yochanan explains: Rabban Gamliel’s view is evident from the Mishna. (There is no validity for a ma'amar after a ma’amar; the first ma’amar leaves no room for the second one to accomplish anything.)

Beis Shamai’s opinion can be derived from the following ruling: There were three brothers, two of whom were married two sisters, and one is unmarried. If one of the husbands of the sisters died, and the bachelor performed a ma'amar, and afterwards his second brother died. Beis Shamai said: His wife stays with him, and the other is released because she is his wife's sister. (Beis Shamai maintains that ma’amar is Biblically valid and the sister is regarded as his wife’s sister.)

The Gemora demonstrates that Rabbi Shimon and Ben Azzai also hold that ma’amar accomplishes a complete acquisition of the yevamah.

Rabbi Nechemia’s position regarding ma’amar can be proven from his opinion cited in the Mishna (50b). Rabbi Nechemia said: It is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, there is no validity for anything which follows it. The Rabbis equated a deficient cohabitation with a ma’amar, and Rabbi Nechemia maintains that there is no validity for anything which follows a deficient cohabitation. It can thus be proven that he holds that ma’amar accomplishes a full acquisition. (51b)

[END]

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COMPLETING ONE'S LIFESPAN OR ADDING TO IT - Yevamos 50 - Daf Yomi

brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Yerushalayim

QUESTION: The Gemara (27b-28a) records a number of incidents wherein the Talmidim of a Tana or Amora asked their teacher how he merited living such a long life. In each case, the Tana or Amora answered by relating an act (or acts) of especially upright conduct which he practiced. In the middle of the Sugya, the Gemara relates that Rebbi Akiva once asked Rebbi Nechunya ha'Gadol how he merited to live so long. Rebbi Nechunya's attendants thought that Rebbi Akiva asked his question mockingly, as though he was upset that Rebbi Nechunya had lived so long, and they began to hit him. Rebbi Akiva escaped to the top of a tree from where he called to Rebbi Nechunya, "If the Torah says, '[You shall prepare] a lamb' (Bamidbar 28:4), then why does it add the word 'one (Keves Echad)'?"

Rebbi Nechunya understood from Rebbi Akiva's question that he was a genuine Talmid Chacham, and he ordered his attendants to leave Rebbi Akiva alone. Rebbi Akiva then answered his own question: the Torah adds the word "Echad" (one) to teach that the lamb must be the most special lamb of its flock.

Rebbi Nechunya informed Rebbi Akiva why he merited living so long. "I never accepted any presents, I never stood up for my due (to get back at someone who had wronged me), and I was forgoing with my money."

This incident needs clarification. Why were the attendants so upset with Rebbi Akiva's question to Rebbi Nechunya, and what did Rebbi Nechunya see that changed his viewpoint about Rebbi Akiva's question?

ANSWER: RAV YAKOV D. HOMNICK (in MARBEH B'SIMCHAH on Maseches Megilah)
explains as follows. The Gemara in Yevamos (49b) records a dispute among the Tana'im about the meaning of Hashem's blessing to His people, "The number of your days I shall fill" (Shemos 23:26). The Beraisa there says that the blessing refers to the days of a person's lifespan. Rebbi Akiva says that if a person is worthy, Hashem lets the person live his entire allotted time. If a person is unworthy, Hashem cuts his life short and takes him before his allotted time is completed. The Chachamim disagree and say that if a person is worthy, Hashem adds to his allotted time (and not that Hashem merely keeps the person alive for his allotted time). Since Rebbi Akiva is the minority opinion, the Halachah should follow the Chachamim.

For this reason, the attendants of Rebbi Nechunya became upset with Rebbi Akiva when he asked how their master merited living so long. Since his extra years were a blessing of addition to his allotted lifespan, it was not proper to speak about it openly because a "blessing [of addition] exists only upon something which is hidden from the eye" (Bava Metzia 42a). They feared that by revealing the extra years granted to Rebbi Nechunya and discussing why he was blessed, the blessing would become one that was no longer hidden and, as a result, cease to continue.

Rebbi Akiva, however, was acting according to his own opinion (in Yevamos) that when a person lives for a very long time, those years are
not an addition to his allotted life but rather a blessing from Hashem to live out his allotted time (which, in Rebbi Nechunya's case, happened to be a very long time). Therefore, Rebbi Akiva wanted to know the proper manner of conduct which brings merit to complete one's allotted lifespan. Since that does not involve a blessing of extra, additional years, it is not subject to the requirement that it remain "hidden from the eye."

Rebbi Akiva conveyed his intention by hinting to the lamb of the Korban Tamid. One who consistently uses each day of his life to carry out
Hashem's will -- thereby fulfilling his "daily obligation" like the Korban Tamid -- will merit living for his entire allotted lifespan.

Rebbi Akiva's intent is also evident in Rebbi Nechunya's response. When Rebbi Nechunya understood that Rebbi Akiva was asking how he managed to live for his allotted time (and not how he merited to have additional years added to his lifespan) he answered, "I never accepted any presents," meaning that he felt full and satisfied with his portion in life and needed nothing else. Measure for measure, he was awarded with the full portion of his lifespan. Similarly, "I never stood up for my due, and I was forgoing with my money" -- he trusted in Hashem to repay his due in full measure, for which he was rewarded with fully living out his allotted years.

This is the only incident of all of the incidents recorded by the Gemara which discusses the ways to merit fully living one's allotted lifespan,
since the question in this incident was posed by Rebbi Akiva. All of the other cases are in accordance with the view of the Chachamim in Yevamos, and thus they discuss how to add to one's lifespan.

A remarkable support for this understanding can be found in the words of the MESILAS YESHARIM. The Mesilas Yesharim (ch. 19) writes that these stories teach how to act with the attribute of Chasidus (adding to the requirement of the law) for which one will be rewarded measure for measure by having more time added to his allotted lifespan. The Mesilas Yesharim cites a number of the stories mentioned in the Gemara before the incident with Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Nechunya, and he also cites the story of Rebbi Zeira which follows the one with Rebbi Akiva. Why does he entirely omit the story of Rebbi Akiva?

According to the above approach, the reason for the omission is that the story of Rebbi Akiva does not demonstrate how to add to one's lifespan, but rather how to merit completing one's allotted time.

This explains why -- when Rebbi Nechunya said that he never accepted any presents -- the Gemara cites an example for this attribute from the conduct of Rebbi Zeira, who never accepted presents. In the very next case of the Gemara, however, Rebbi Zeira was asked how he merited livingso long. He answered with six reasons but he did not mention that he never accepted presents! It must be that the conduct of not accepting presents is a reason to have one's allotted time completed, but not a reason to have more years added, and thus Rebbi Zeira did not mention that attribute when he was asked how he merited having more time added to his life.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 50 - highlights

The Gemora addresses the third apparent contradiction of which Menasheh had asked Yeshaya. (Moshe Rabbeinu stated, “I (HaShem) shall fill the number of your days,” which implies that HaShem will not add to ones lifespan, whereas you said to King Chizkiyah, “I (HaShem) will add fifteen years to your life.”)

The Gemora answers that this matter is in fact a Tannaic dispute. We have learned in a braisa: I (HaShem) shall fill the number of your days, these are the years that a person is granted to live at the beginning of his life. If he merits, those years will be completed. If he does not merit, they will decrease years from his lifetime; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. The Chachamim say: If one merits, they will increase years to his lifetime, but if he does not merit, they will decrease years from his lifetime.

The Chachamim said to Rabbi Akiva: Behold it is written: I (HaShem) will add fifteen years to your life. (This proves that years can be added to one’s life.) Rabbi Akiva responded to them: Those fifteen years were originally his (fifteen years was deducted from his life on account of a sin, but it was returned to him after he repented).

He proves this from the fact that (many years earlier) the prophet prophesied (to Yeravam) that a son will be born to the house of David; Yoshiyahu will be his name. And Menasheh (Yoshiyahu’s grandfather) was not yet born (at the time of Chizkiyah’s illness). (Obviously, Chizkiyah’s original life span was not complete at this time.)

The Gemora asks: How do the Chachamim understand this prophecy?

The Gemora answers: The prophet did not say explicitly that Yoshiyahu will come from Chizkiyah; it was possible that he would come from some other descendant of King David. (49b – 50a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, HACHOLEITZ LIYIVIMTO

The Mishna states: (This Mishna is extremely technical and we have included explanations from the Kahati Mishnayos (with our editing) for the sake of clarity.)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 1 – 6}
Rabban Gamliel says, There is no validity for a get (bill of divorce) after a get, and no ma'amar after ma'amar, and no cohabitation after cohabitation, and no chalitzah after chalitzah. But the Chachamim say: There is validity for a get after a get, and there is ma'amar after ma'amar, but after cohabitation or after chalitzah there is no validity to anything.

In order to understand this chapter, it is first necessary to explain a number of principles, some of which have already been mentioned in the preceding chapters:

(1) By Torah law, the yevamah is married by yibum to the yavam, to be the wife in every respect, only by bi'ah, an act of cohabitation, as it is written, "her husband's brother shall go in [yavo] to her, and take her to him as a wife, and perform the duty of a husband's brother to her" (Deut. 25:5). The Sages, however, enacted that the yavam may not cohabitate with his yevamah until he marries her with money or a document, in the manner in which this is done for all other women. Such marriage with money or document is called "ma'amar." Ma'amar effects only a partial contract of marriage, involving its restrictions for the yevamah, as taught in the preceding chapters.

(2) The yevamah is released form her zikah (attachment to the yavam), and permitted to marry any man, only by chalitzah. If her yavam gave her a bill of divorce, the Sages enacted that the bill is restrictively effective as far as chalitzah is concerned, disqualifying her from yibum (for "since he did not build up, he may no longer build up"), prohibiting her co-wives to him and to the other brothers, prohibiting her relatives to him, and disqualifying her from marrying a Kohen, as is the law regarding a divorced woman, but she nevertheless is not permitted to marry another until he submits to chalitzah from her.

(3) If a yavam married his yevamah by ma'amar, but he does not want to consummate the marriage, he must give her a bill of divorce and also to submit to chalitzah from her: the bill of divorce -- in order to release her from the ma'amar marriage, and chalitzah -- in order to release her from the yibum tie, and to release her so that she may be married to another.

Rabban Gamliel says: There is no validity for a get (bill of divorce) after a get -- if two wives (e.g., Leah and Chanah) of a dead, childless man came before his brother for yibum, and he gave a bill of divorce to Leah, and afterwards he gave a bill of divorce to Chanah, the latter's bill of divorce is not valid, and he is not forbidden to marry her relatives. This is because when he gave a bill of divorce to Leah, he was released from the zikah-attachment to both of them (as stated in the introduction to the Mishna), for the bill of divorce is effective for the yevamah, by Rabbinic law, as a kind of chalitzah, to remove her from yibum and to prohibit her co-wives to him and to the other brothers (since a bill of divorce effects divorce for a married woman). And similarly, if two yevamim give each a bill of divorce to one yevamah, the bill of the second one is void, and he is permitted to marry her relatives.

And no ma'amar after ma'amar -- if one yavam married by ma'amar two yevamos from one brother who came before him for yibum, i.e., he married one of them and afterwards married the other; or if two yevamim married by ma'amar, one yevamah; the second ma'amar is void, and she does not require a bill of divorce from him to annul the ma'amar, and he is not forbidden to marry her relatives.

And no cohabitation after cohabitation -- if one yavam cohabited with two yevamos, or if two yevamim cohabited with one yevamah, the first act of cohabitation counts as yibum, and the second is an act of licentiousness; she does not require a bill of divorce as a result of this second cohabitation, and the second yavam is not forbidden to marry her relatives.

And no chalitzah after chalitzah -- if one yavam submitted to chalitzah from two yevamos, or if two yevamim submitted to chalitzah from one yevamah, the second chalitzah is void, and she is permitted to marry a Kohen, and he is permitted to marry her relatives.

But the Chachamim say: There is validity for a get after a get -- since the bill of divorce does not completely release the yevamah from her zikah-attachment, for she still requires chalitzah to be permitted to be married to another (as explained in the introduction to this Mishna), therefore the second bill of divorce is valid, and he is forbidden to marry her relatives.

And there is ma'amar after ma'amar -- as ma'amar does not constitute a complete contract of marriage with the yevamah as does consummation, but only a partial contract of marriage, therefore the second ma'amar is also valid and she requires a bill of divorce, and he is forbidden to marry her relatives.

But after cohabitation or after chalitzah there is no validity to anything -- as the consummation constitutes a complete contract of marriage for the yevamah, and chalitzah completely dissolves the zikah-attachment, whatever yavam does to the yevamah's co-wife after cohabitation, or after the chalitzah, or whatever another yavam does to this yevamah, has no legal significance. (50a)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 6 – 9}
The Mishna continues: How so? If he married his yevamah by ma'amar, and he gave her a bill of divorce -- she requires of him to submit to chalitzah. If he married by ma'amar and submitted to chalitzah -- she requires a bill of divorce from him. If he married by ma'amar and cohabited with her -- then this is according to the mitzvah.

How so -- is the law regarding the bill of divorce, ma'amar, etc., which was taught above? The Gemora explains that this "How so?" does not refer to the disagreement between Rabban Gamliel and the Chachamim taught above, but is an independent topic, and serves as an introduction to the next portion of the Mishna. Thus, this Mishna explains the law of ma'amar, bill of divorce, chalitzah and cohabitation where there is one yavam and one yevamah.

If he -- the yavam, married his yevamah by ma'amar -- he married her with money or a document, and afterwards he gave her a bill of divorce -- she requires of him chalitzah -- in order to release her from the yibum tie. He is prohibited, however, from wedding her as his yevamah because of the bill of divorce that he gave her.

If he married by ma'amar and submitted to chalitzah from his yevamah, she requires a bill of divorce from him -- to cancel his ma'amar marriage, since chalitzah does not dissolve the ma'amar, but only the yibum tie.

If he married by ma'amar and cohabited with her -- then this is according to the mitzvah -- although the Torah states, "her husband's brother shall go in to her" (Deut. 25:5), and (by Torah law) he is not required to wed her ceremonially first, the Sages nevertheless enacted that the yavam may not cohabit with a yevamah until he marries her by ma'amar. This yavam has indeed first fulfilled the obligation imposed by the Sages, and afterwards he performed yibum on her according to the command of the Torah. (50a)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 9 – 2 (50b)}
The Mishna continues: If he gave a bill of divorce, and he married by ma'amar -- she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah. If he gave a bill of divorce and he cohabited with her -- she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah. If he gave a bill of divorce, and he submitted to chalitzah – there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah. If he submitted to chalitzah and then either married by ma'amar, or he gave a bill of divorce, or he cohabited with her; or if he first cohabited with her and then either married by ma'amar, or he gave a bill of divorce or he submitted to chalitzah – there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah. It is all the same, whether one yevamah to one yavam, or two yevamos to one yavam.

If he first gave a bill of divorce -- to his yevamah, and afterwards he married -- her, by ma'amar, she requires a bill of divorce -- to cancel the ma'amar marriage, and chalitzah -- to dissolve her yibum tie, and he may not wed her as his yevamah after the ma'amar, because of the bill of divorce which he had given her initially.

If he gave a bill of divorce -- to his yevamah, and he afterwards cohabited -- with her, she is ineligible for yibum from the time that he gave her a bill of divorce and is prohibited to him, and the cohabitation with her after the bill of divorce is unlawful (but is akin to performing ma’amar), therefore she requires a bill of divorce -- because of the cohabitation, and chalitzah -- because of her tie to him.

If he gave a bill of divorce -- to his yevamah, and afterwards he submitted to chalitzah -- from her, there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah -- and she is completely released. (The Gemora explains that this Mishna teaches that if afterwards he married her by ma'amar or by cohabitation, she does not require a bill of divorce, for this Mishna is according to Rabbi Akiva, who holds that a marriage involving a Torah prohibition punishable by lashes is void.)

If he submitted to chalitzah, and then either married by ma'amar -- after the chalitzah, or -- if after the chalitzah -- he gave a bill of divorce, or -- after the chalitzah, he cohabited with her; or if he first cohabited with her -- with his yevamah, and then either married by ma'amar -- after cohabitation, or he gave a bill of divorce -- after cohabitation, or he submitted to chalitzah -- after cohabitation, there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah -- whatever he did after the chalitzah is of no legal significance. (The Mishna stated "there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah," and did not also state "there is no validity to anything that follows cohabitation," in order to be concise, and it preferred to teach the law whereby the yevamah is freed to marry any man.

It -- the law, is all the same, whether one yevamah to one yavam, or two yevamos to one yavam -- whether one yevamah or two yevamos from one brother, who came before one yavam for yibum, something can effectively follow after the first bill of divorce or after the first marriage by ma'amar, but nothing can effectively follow after cohabitation or after chalitzah. (50a – 50b)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 2 – 10}
The Mishna explains the case of two Yevamos: How so? If he married this one by ma'amar, and that one by ma'amar, they require two bills of divorce and chalitzah. If he married this one by ma'amar and he gave a bill of divorce to that one -- she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah. If he married this one by ma'amar, and cohabited with that one -- they require two bills of divorce and chalitzah. If he married this one by ma'amar, and he submitted to chalitzah from that one -- the first requires a bill of divorce. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and a bill of divorce to that one -- they require from him chalitzah. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and he cohabited with that one -- she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and ma'amar to that one -- she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and he submitted to chalitzah from that one -- there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah.

How so -- is the law regarding two yevamos tied to one yavam? If he married this one by ma'amar, and afterwards that one -- the second one, they require two bills of divorce -- each one requires a bill of divorce, according to the opinion of the Sages before that ma'amar after ma'amar is effective, and one of them requires chalitzah -- and she exempts her co-wife.

If he married this one by ma'amar, and afterwards he gave a bill of divorce to that one -- the second one, she -- the one whom he married by ma'amar, requires a bill of divorce -- because once he gave a bill of divorce to the other one, she is prohibited to him, and one of them requires chalitzah -- and she exempts her co-wife.

If he married this one by ma'amar -- he married one of them, and afterwards cohabited with that one -- the other one, they require two bills of divorce -- one because of his ma'amar, and the other because of his cohabitation with her, and chalitzah -- from one of them. If he married this one by ma'amar -- one of them, and afterwards he submitted to chalitzah from that one -- the other, the first requires a bill of divorce -- to annul the marriage effected by his ma'amar.

If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and a bill of divorce to that one -- if he gave a bill of divorce to each of them, they require from him chalitzah -- to dissolve their yibum tie (he submits to chalitzah from one of them and she exempts her co-wife). If he gave a bill of divorce to this one -- one of them, and afterwards he cohabited with that one -- the other, she -- the one with whom he cohabited with, requires a bill of divorce -- as the act of cohabitation was unlawful once he had given the bill of divorce to the first one, and one of them requires chalitzah -- and she exempts her co-wife.

If he gave a bill divorce to this one -- one of them, and afterwards was married by ma'amar to that one --- the other, she -- the one whom he married by ma'amar, requires a bill of divorce -- because of the ma'amar, and one of them requires chalitzah -- and she exempts her co-wife.

If he gave a bill of divorce to this one -- one of them, and afterwards he submitted to chalitzah from that one -- the other, there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah -- and if he once again betrothed his chalutzah or her co-wife, the marriage is void, according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that a marriage involving a Torah prohibition punishable by lashes is void. (50b)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 10 – 14}
The Mishna continues: If he submitted to chalitzah and he submitted to chalitzah, or he submitted to chalitzah and he either married by ma'amar, or gave a bill of divorce or cohabited with her; or if he cohabited with her and he cohabited with her, or he cohabited with her and either he married by ma'amar, or he gave a bill of divorce or he submitted to chalitzah – there is no validity to anything which follows chalitzah, whether one yavam to two yevamos, or two yevamim to one yevamah.

The Mishna continues to discuss the case of two yevamos who were married to one brother and are tied to one yavam.

If he submitted to chalitzah -- from one, and afterwards he submitted to chalitzah -- from the other or he submitted to chalitzah -- from one, and afterwards he either married by ma'amar -- the other one, or if he gave a bill of divorce to, or he cohabited with her -- with, the second; or if he cohabited with her -- with one, and afterwards he cohabited with her -- with the other, or if he cohabited with her -- with one, and either married by ma'amar -- the other, or he gave a bill of divorce to, or he submitted to chalitzah -- from, the second one, there is no validity to anything which follows chalitzah -- i.e., whatever he did to the second one after he submitted to chalitzah from the first is of no legal significance, and he is permitted to marry the relatives of the second. And likewise, nothing follows the act of cohabitation, i.e., what he did to the second one after he cohabited with the first is of no legal significance, and he is permitted to marry the relatives of the second,

Whether one yavam to two yevamos, or two yevamim to one yevamah -- also in the case of two yevamim and one yevamah, if one of the yevamim married her by ma'amar, or gave her a bill of divorce, or submitted to chalitzah from her, or cohabited with her, and afterwards his fellow did one of these acts, the same laws apply to her, that there is no validity to anything which follows chalitzah and no validity to anything which follows cohabitation, whereas after ma'amar or a bill of divorce, she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah or only chalitzah, as was explained regarding the case of one yavam and two yevamos. (50b)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 14 – 21}
The Mishna continues: (The Mishna repeats one of its earlier halachos, and qualifies it.) If he submitted to chalitzah and then either married by ma'amar, or he gave a bill of divorce, or he cohabited with her; or if he first cohabited with her and then either married by ma'amar, or he gave a bill of divorce or he submitted to chalitzah – there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah. This would apply whether he submitted to chalitzah at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end. However, regarding cohabitation, when it is at the beginning, there is no validity for anything which follows it, whereas if it was in the middle, or at the end -- there is validity to something which follows it. Rabbi Nechemia said: It is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end -- there is no validity for anything which follows it.

The Mishna repeats a portion of the Mishna mentioned before in order to qualify it.

If he submitted to chalitzah, and then either married by ma'amar -- after the chalitzah, or -- if after the chalitzah -- he gave a bill of divorce, or -- after the chalitzah, he cohabited with her; or if he first cohabited with her -- with his yevamah, and then either married by ma'amar -- after cohabitation, or he gave a bill of divorce -- after cohabitation, or he submitted to chalitzah -- after cohabitation, there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah -- whatever he did after the chalitzah is of no legal significance. This would apply whether he submitted to chalitzah at the beginning -- and afterwards married by ma'amar or gave a bill of divorce, or in the middle – e.g., he gave a bill of divorce, submitted to chalitzah, and married by ma'amar, the ma'amar after chalitzah is not valid at all, and she does not require a bill of divorce from his ma'amar, or at the end -- if he married by ma'amar and gave a bill of divorce, and afterwards he submitted to chalitzah, there is no validity for anything which follows chalitzah, and if he again married by ma'amar after the chalitzah, she does not require a bill of divorce, for the chalitzah releases her completely from her yibum tie.

However, regarding cohabitation, when it is at the beginning -- e.g., in the case of one yavam and two yevamos, he first cohabited with one, and afterwards married by ma'amar the other, there is no validity for anything which follows it -- for the yibum tie has already been entirely cut. Whereas if it was in the middle -- e.g., he gave a bill of divorce, cohabited, and married by ma'amar, or at the end -- e.g., he gave a bill of divorce, married by ma'amar, and cohabited, there is validity to something which follows it -- since unlawful cohabitation does not effect yibum and she is still tied to the yavam, she requires chalitzah.

Rabbi Nechemia said: It is all one whether cohabitation and -- or -- chalitzah, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end -- even if cohabitation followed the bill of divorce and ma'amar, there is no validity for anything which follows it -- and she goes forth with a bill of divorce without chalitzah. If he married by ma'amar after cohabitation, e.g., in the case of two yevamos, after he cohabited with one woman, he married the other by ma'amar, the ma'amar is not effective (Rashi; Bartenura). Other commentators state that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Nechemia, unlawful cohabitation does not completely cut the yibum tie, and she requires chalitzah, and the clause "there is no validity for anything which follows it" means that ma'amar is invalid after the act of cohabitation (Maharshal, Ramban). (50b)

[END]

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