Daf Yomi - Yevamos 94 - Highlights

BELIEVING ONE WITNESS TO PERMIT THE YEVAMAH TO MARRY ANOTHER MAN

There are those that say that one witness is certainly believed to enable a woman to fall to yibum, for even the yevamah herself would be believed, as we learned in the following Mishna: A woman that said her husband had died is permitted to remarry. If she said that her husband had died, she is permitted to the yavam. The inquiry to Rav Sheishes was the following: Do we accept the testimony of one witness to permit the yevamah to marry another man (he claims that the only yavam died)? What is the reason that we accept the testimony of one witness? Is it because something that is likely to be revealed to the public, he would not lie about; here too, the witness would not lie. Or perhaps, we believe the single witness because the woman will investigate before she remarries; here, she might not investigate because she hates the yavam.

Rav Sheishes cites our Mishna: The Mishna states: If a woman's husband and (only) son went overseas, and they came and said to her, “Your husband died, and afterwards your son died (as the son was alive when his father died, the widow is not subject to yibum or chalitzah),” and she married, and afterwards they said to her, “The reverse was the case (the son died first, so that when his father died afterwards, the widow was subject to yibum or chalitzah),” she must leave her second husband, and the first (before they knew that the order was reversed) and last child is a mamzer.

What is the case of the Mishna? If both testimonies were given by two witnesses, why would we choose to rely on the second set of witnesses more than the first set? And furthermore, the child born from such a union cannot be a definite mamzer; the child can only be a possible mamzer.

Evidently, the case of the Mishna is where initially one witness testified that she was not subject to yibum, and later two witnesses testified that she was subject to yibum.

Rav Sheishes concludes his proof: The reason why the first witness is not believed that the woman was not subject to yibum is because he was contradicted by two witnesses, otherwise, he would have been believed. This is a proof that one witness is indeed believed to permit the yevamah to marry another man.

The Gemora rejects the proof: Really, the Mishna’s case is where two witnesses testified that she is not subject to yibum, and later, two witnesses testified that she is subject to yibum. (Why do we believe the second set of witnesses, and not the first?) Rav Acha bar Minyomi states that our Mishna is dealing with a case of hazamah. ("Eidim zom'min," conspiring witnesses means that two witnesses testify regarding a certain incident and another set of witnesses disqualify that testimony by saying that the first set of witnesses were with them in a different place at the time that the first set of witnesses claim that the act took place. The first witnesses are termed "eidim zom'min.” The Torah commands that the second set of witnesses are believed, rather than the first.)

Rava said: We can derive that one witness be believed in regards to a yevamah from the following kal vachomer (literally translated as light and heavy, or lenient and stringent; an a fortiori argument; it is one of the thirteen principles of biblical hermeneutics; it employs the following reasoning: if a specific stringency applies in a usually lenient case, it must certainly apply in a more serious case): If you have permitted a woman to remarry on the basis of the testimony from one witness, which involves a kares prohibition, how much more so, when it only involves a mere prohibitory law.

One of the Rabbis said to Rava: The laws concerning the woman testifying herself proves the contrary: When we are dealing with a prohibition involving kares, you have permitted her to remarry (based on her own testimony), whereas in a case that only involves a mere prohibitory law, you have not permitted her (to testify that her yavam died). (This disproves Rava’s kal vachomer.) What is in fact the reason that she is not believed? It is because she may sometimes hate the yavam, she might marry another man without thoroughly investigating the matter, so too, in the case of one witness, she may sometimes hate the yavam, she might marry another man without thoroughly investigating the matter. (93b – 94a)

THE SCENT OF A DIVORCE

The Mishna had stated: If they said to her, “Your husband died,” and she became betrothed to another man, and afterwards her husband came back, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the latter one gave her a bill of divorce, he did not disqualify her from the Kehunah. This was expounded by Rabbi Elozar ben Masya: It is written [Vayikra 21:7]: And nor shall the Kohanim take in marriage a woman divorced from her husband. This teaches us that a woman who is divorced from her legal husband is forbidden to be married to a Kohen, but a woman divorced from a man who is not her husband will not disqualify her.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: Rabbi Elozar could have expounded from this verse a pearl, but instead, he expounded from it only a shard (it is obvious that a letter of divorce received from a man to whom the woman is not married to is pointless, and it would not render her ineligible to marry a Kohen).

What is the pearl that he could have expounded? He could have expounded that which we learned in the following braisa: It is written [Vayikra 21:7]: Nor shall the Kohanim take a woman divorced from her husband. This teaches us that even if she was divorced from her husband alone (if the husband inserted in the letter of divorce a clause forbidding her to marry anyone else), she becomes disqualified from marrying a Kohen. And this is what is meant when it is stated: The scent of the divorce can disqualify a woman from marrying a Kohen. (94a)

THE WIFE WENT OVERSEAS

The Mishna states: If one's wife went overseas, and they came and said to him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife returned, she is permitted to return to him. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second one, and the second one is permitted to his relatives. And if the first one died, he is permitted to marry the second.

If they said to him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and afterwards they said to him, “She was alive (when you married the sister), and she died (since then),” the first child (the one conceived prior to his wife’s death) is a mamzer, and the last one (the one conceived after his wife’s death) is not a mamzer.

Rabbi Yosi says: Whoever disqualifies others, disqualifies himself as well, and whoever does not disqualify others, does not disqualify himself either. (This statement will be explained on Daf 95b.) (94a – 94b)

HIS WIFE AND BROTHER-IN-LAW WENT OVERSEAS

The Mishna had stated: If one's wife went overseas, and they came and said to him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife returned, she is permitted to return to him.

The Gemora comments: This halacha would be correct even if his wife and his wife’s sister’s husband both went overseas. He heard that they died (through two witnesses), and married his wife’s sister. They both subsequently returned. The halacha is as follows: His wife’s sister is forbidden to remain with her previous husband (as we previously learned, that a woman who marries on the basis of testimony that her husband died, and then he returns, she cannot return to her husband), but his own wife is permitted to him. We do not say that since his wife’s sister is forbidden to remain with her husband, his wife should be prohibited to him. (94b)

RABBI AKIVA’S ADDITIONS

The Mishna had stated: If one's wife went overseas, and they came and said to him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife returned, she is permitted to return to him.

The Gemora comments: It would seem that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, for if the Mishna would be following Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, the wife should be forbidden to him on account of being the sister of his divorcee. For it was taught in the following braisa: All of the women involved in an incestuous marriages forbidden in the Torah, do not require a letter of divorce from the man who married them except a married woman who remarried in accordance with a decision of a Beis Din. Rabbi Akiva adds: Even a brother’s wife and his wife’s sister. And since Rabbi Akiva has stated that one who marries his wife’s sister will require a letter of divorce, his wife should be forbidden to him because his wife is now the sister of his divorcee. (This proves that the Mishna does not follow Rabbi Akiva’s opinion. The Tanna of the Mishna would maintain that one who marries his wife’s sister does not require a letter of divorce.)

The Gemora objects to this proof: Did we not learn the Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav Chiya bar Yosef in the name of Rav: What is Rabbi Akiva's case of his brother’s wife? It is where a man's brother, betrothed (but did not consummate the marriage with nisuin) a woman and went overseas, and the husband, upon hearing that his brother died, married his brother’s wife. If the brother should return, Rabbi Akiva rules that the husband is required to issue a letter of divorce to his brother’s wife. The reason that this is required is because people might say that the brother had attached a certain unfulfilled condition to the betrothal and that the husband had lawfully married her. (And so, in order that it should not be suspected that a lawful marriage had been dissolved without a letter of divorce, it was enacted, as a preventive measure, that a letter of divorce be issued.) And what is the case of the wife’s sister? It is where a man betrothed a woman and she went overseas, and the husband, upon hearing that his wife died, married her sister. If the wife should return, Rabbi Akiva rules that the husband is required to issue a letter of divorce to his wife’s sister. The reason that this is required is because people might say that the husband had attached a certain unfulfilled condition to the betrothal of his original wife and that the husband had lawfully married her sister. (And so, in order that it should not be suspected that a lawful marriage had been dissolved without a letter of divorce, it was enacted, as a preventive measure, that a letter of divorce be issued.)

However, in respect to our Mishna’s case, which is dealing with a nisuin, there is no such concern. (It is highly unlikely that a person will attach a condition to a nisuin because nisuin involves marital relations between the husband and the wife. If the condition was not fulfilled, all of their cohabitations would be retroactively rendered illicit.) Even Rabbi Akiva would admit that a letter of divorce is not required. (Our Mishna can therefore be in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.) (94b)

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE
WIFE TRANSGRESSING
AND THE HUSBAND

The Mishna had stated: If one's wife went overseas, and they came and said to him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife returned, she is permitted to return to him.

The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t the wife become forbidden to the husband because he engaged in cohabitation with her sister, in the same manner that a woman whose husband went overseas becomes forbidden to him if she had cohabitation with another man?

The Gemora answers: The two cases are not comparable. If one’s wife willingly commits adultery, she is Biblically forbidden to her husband; therefore, if she transgresses inadvertently, the Rabbis decreed that she is also forbidden to her husband. However, regarding the case of one’s wife’s sister, where his wife is not Biblically forbidden to him even if he willingly cohabits with her sister, the Rabbis did not decree that his wife should be prohibited to him in a case where he transgresses inadvertently. (94b – 95a)

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