Daf Yomi - Yevamos 95 - Highlights

WILL THE WIFE BECOME FORBIDDEN IF HE COHABITS WITH HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW OR HIS WIFE’S SISTER?

The Gemora cites a braisa which cites a Scriptural source indicating that one’s wife is not Biblically forbidden to him even if he willingly cohabits with her sister. A source is necessary, for otherwise we would have derived from the following kal vachomer (literally translated as light and heavy, or lenient and stringent; an a fortiori argument; it is one of the thirteen principles of biblical hermeneutics; it employs the following reasoning: if a specific stringency applies in a usually lenient case, it must certainly apply in a more serious case) that she would be prohibited to him: If one cohabits with a married woman, which is a lenient prohibition (since a married woman becomes permitted if she gets divorced), and nevertheless, the one who causes this prohibition becomes prohibited (the woman is now forbidden to remain with her husband); how much more so, when one cohabits with his wife’s sister, which is a strict prohibition (even if the husband divorces her, her sister is still forbidden to him), the who causes this prohibition (the man’s wife) should become forbidden herself. (The Torah teaches us that this indeed is not the case, and the wife remains permitted to her husband.)

Rabbi Yehudah said: Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel do not argue in the following case: If one cohabits with his mother-in-law, his wife becomes forbidden to him (and he is required to divorce her). They do argue however, if one cohabits with his wife’s sister. Beis Shamai say: His wife becomes disqualified from remaining with him. Beis Hillel maintains that his wife remains permitted to him.

Rabbi Yosi disagrees: Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel do not argue in the following case: If one cohabits with his wife’s sister, his wife does not become disqualified from remaining with him. They do argue however, if one cohabits with his mother-in-law. Beis Shamai say: His wife becomes disqualified from remaining with him. Beis Hillel maintains that his wife remains permitted to him.

Rabbi Yosi explains why everyone agrees that if one cohabits with his wife’s sister; his wife does not become disqualified from remaining with him. Originally (before the husband and the wife were married), all the women of the world were permitted to him, and all the men of the world were permitted to her. When he married her, he imposed a prohibition upon her and she imposed a prohibition upon him. The prohibition, however, which he imposed upon her, is greater than the prohibition which she imposes upon him, since he caused her to become forbidden to all the men of the world, while she caused him to become forbidden only to her relatives.

Based on the above distinction, Rabbi Yosi presents the following kal vachomer: If he, that caused her to become forbidden to all the men of the world; if she cohabited unwittingly with one who was forbidden to her, she does not become forbidden to the man who was permitted to her (her husband); how much more so, regarding her, who caused him to become forbidden only to her relatives; if he cohabited unwittingly with one who was forbidden to him, he certainly should not become forbidden to the one (his wife) who was permitted to him.

This argument is applicable to one who acted unwittingly. How do we know that the same halacha is applicable to one who acted deliberately? It is written [Bamidbar 5:13]: And a man lay with her. This teaches us that cohabitation with her only causes her to become prohibited; cohabitation with her sister (by her husband), however, does not cause her to be prohibited.

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source for Rabbi Yehudah’s argument that everyone agrees if one cohabits with his mother-in-law, his wife becomes forbidden to him.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: The halacha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah.

The Gemora records an incident: There was a man who cohabited with his mother-in-law. Rav Yehudah administered lashes to him. Rav Yehudah said: Had Samuel not stated that the halacha was not in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah, I would have prohibited your wife to you forever. (95a)

LENIENT PROHIBITION

The Gemora above cites a kal vachomer, that if not for a specific verse in the Torah, we would have thought that one’s wife would become forbidden to him if he willingly cohabits with her sister. The following was the kal vachomer: If one cohabits with a married woman, which is a lenient prohibition, and nevertheless, the one who causes this prohibition becomes prohibited (the woman is now forbidden to remain with her husband); how much more so, when one cohabits with his wife’s sister, which is a strict prohibition, the who causes this prohibition (the man’s wife) should become forbidden herself.

The Gemora asks: What is the lenient prohibition mentioned in the kal vachomer?

Rav Chisda said: It is referring to the prohibition of one who remarries his divorcee. (It is regarded as lenient because it does not involve kares.)

The Gemora explains the terminology of the kal vachomer accordingly: When the second husband cohabited with her, he caused her to become forbidden to the first husband, and when the first husband subsequently cohabits with her (after her second husband had divorced her), he causes her to become forbidden to the second husband.

The Gemora asks: How can the two prohibitions (marrying one’s divorcee and cohabiting with one’s wife’s sister) be compared? The prohibition of marrying one’s divorcee is a case where her body has been defiled, and her prohibition lasts forever (which is not the case by cohabiting with one’s wife’s sister, and it cannot be classified as a lenient prohibition).

Rish Lakish says: The lenient prohibition is referring to cohabiting with a yevamah.

The Gemora analyzes this explanation: Perhaps the braisa is referring to a case where the yevamah cohabited with another man, and the braisa is following the viewpoint of Rav Hamnuna. For Rav Hamnuna stated: A yevamah who is awaiting yibum, who has an illicit relationship with another man is prohibited to be married to the yavam. This cannot be the case, because if so, the kal vachomer can be refuted as follows: How can the two prohibitions (a yevamah marrying another man and cohabiting with one’s wife’s sister) be compared? The prohibition of a yevamah marrying another man is a case where her body has been defiled, and her prohibition is applicable to many men (which is not the case by cohabiting with one’s wife’s sister, and it cannot be classified as a lenient prohibition).

Perhaps the braisa is referring to a case where the yevamah cohabited with one of the brothers of her deceased husband (after a different brother performed ma’amar with her).

The Gemora explains the terminology of the kal vachomer accordingly: When one of the brothers performed ma’amar with her, he caused her to become forbidden to the other brothers, and when one of the other brothers subsequently cohabits with her, he causes her to become forbidden to the first brother.

The Gemora asks: What compelled the braisa to state a case where the second brother cohabited with her? Even if he only performed ma’amar with her, she would become forbidden to the first brother.

The Gemora answers: The braisa can be following Rabban Gamliel’s opinion, who maintains that there is no validity to a ma’amar performed after another ma’amar.

The Gemora asks: But even if the second brother gave a letter of divorce to her, or submitted to chalitzah from her, the first brother would become prohibited to her. What compelled the braisa to state a case where the second brother cohabited with her?

Rabbi Yochanan says: The lenient prohibition is referring to cohabiting with a suspected sotah (adulterous wife).

The Gemora analyzes this explanation: Perhaps the braisa is referring to a case where the sotah cohabited with her husband. The Gemora explains the terminology of the kal vachomer accordingly: When the husband subsequently cohabits with her before she drinks the bitter waters, she becomes forbidden to the suspected adulterer (since her innocence cannot be proven any longer).

The Gemora asks: What compelled the braisa to state a case where the husband cohabited with her? Even if he gave her a letter of divorce, or even if he merely said that he doesn’t want her to drink the bitter waters, she would still become forbidden to the suspected adulterer.

Rather, the braisa is referring to a case where the sotah cohabited with the adulterer. She becomes prohibited to her husband.

The Gemora asks: How can this case be classified as a lenient prohibition? This is a strict prohibition of cohabiting with a married woman.

Rava said: The lenient prohibition is referring to cohabiting with a married woman. And so said Ravin in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. Why is the prohibition of a married woman classified as a lenient prohibition? It is because her husband does not cause her to become forbidden to other men for his entire lifetime (since a married woman becomes permitted if she gets divorced).

The Gemora cites a braisa that supports this interpretation of the kal vachomer. Abba Chanan said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: If one cohabits with a married woman, which is a lenient prohibition because her husband does not cause her to become forbidden to other men for his entire lifetime, and nevertheless, the one who causes this prohibition becomes prohibited (the woman is now forbidden to remain with her husband); how much more so, when one cohabits with his wife’s sister, which is a strict prohibition because the sister is prohibited during the duration of the husband’s lifetime, the who causes this prohibition (the man’s wife) should become forbidden herself. The Torah teaches us that this indeed is not the case. It is written [Bamidbar 5:13]: And a man lay with her. This teaches us that cohabitation with her only causes her to become prohibited; cohabitation with her sister (by her husband), however, does not cause her to be prohibited. (95a – 95b)

RABBI YOSI’S RULING

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yosi says: Whoever disqualifies others, disqualifies himself as well, and whoever does not disqualify others, does not disqualify himself either.

The Gemora asks: What is the meaning of Rabbi Yosi’s statement?

The Gemora attempts an explanation: If you will suggest that the Tanna Kamma was saying that if a man's wife and his wife's sister's husband went overseas (and on the strength of the testimony of one witness who testified that they were both dead, be had married his wife's sister, and subsequently they both returned), the sister is forbidden to her husband, but his own wife is permitted. Rabbi Yosi said to him: Just as his own wife is permitted (since he was not compelled to give the sister a letter of divorce because everyone knows that one may not marry his wife’s sister, they therefore realize that he was not married to her), so too, the sister is also permitted to her husband (because it does not appear as if he is remarrying his divorcee). If so, why would Rabbi Yosi use have used the following expression: “Whoever does not disqualify others, does not disqualify himself either”? He should have said the following: “Whoever does not disqualify himself (from returning to his wife), does not disqualify others (the sister from returning to her husband) either.”

Perhaps Rabbi Yosi meant exactly the opposite: Just as the sister is forbidden to her husband, so too, his wife is forbidden to him.

The Gemora asks: If so, what is the meaning of the expression “Whoever does not disqualify others”?(The Tanna Kamma ruled that the sister is forbidden to her husband!)

Rav Ami answers: This expression is stated with respect to the ruling of an earlier Mishna (87b), which stated the following: If she married with the consent of Beis Din (through the testimony of one witness), she must leave both men (if the husband returns), and she is exempt from an offering (since a person who sins in consequence of a ruling of Beis Din is exempt from a sin-offering). If she did not marry with the consent of Beis Din (there were two witnesses that her husband died), she must leave both men, and she is liable to bring a sin-offering. Such is the power of Beis Din that it exempts her from an offering.

The Tanna Kamma of our Mishna said: The wife may return to him irrespective of whether the marriage (of the husband with the wife’s sister) took place based on the testimony of two witnesses (who testified that his wife and his wife’s sister’s husband both died) where his wife’s sister is permitted to remain with her husband, or whether it took place based upon a decision of the Beis Din (the testimony of one witness) where his wife’s sister is forbidden to remain with her husband.

Rabbi Yosi said to the Tanna Kamma: If they married based upon a decision of the Beis Din (the testimony of one witness), where he disqualified others (his wife’s sister is forbidden to remain with her husband), he disqualifies himself as well (and his wife is forbidden to remain with him). However, if they married based on the testimony of two witnesses, where he does not disqualify others (his wife’s sister may remain with her husband), he does not disqualify himself either (his wife is permitted to remain with him).

Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha presents an alternative explanation of Rabbi Yosi’s statement: Rabbi Yosi is actually referring to the latter part of the Mishna, where the sister remarried based on the testimony of one witness. Rabbi Yosi’s two statements are referring to two scenarios of this case. One is where his arusah (the woman he betrothed) and his wife’s sister’s brother went overseas, and the other case is where his nesuah (the wife that he consummated the marriage with) and his wife’s sister’s brother went overseas.

Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha proceeds to explain the argument. The Tanna Kamma maintains that it doesn’t make any difference whether the case is discussing his nesuah and his wife’s sister’s brother went overseas, or whether it was his arusah and his wife’s sister’s brother. In both cases, his wife’s sister’s brother is forbidden to remain with her husband, and his wife is permitted to remain with him.

Rabbi Yosi said to the Tanna Kamma: If the case occurred with his nesuah and his wife’s sister’s husband, where there is no concern that he made any conditions upon the nisuin (and therefore the marriage with her sister is obviously not valid), and therefore he doesn’t disqualify others, he is not disqualified either. However, if the case occurred with his arusah and her sister’s husband, where there is a concern that he made a conditions upon the marriage (and therefore the marriage with her sister could possibly be valid), and therefore he does disqualify others, he disqualifies himself as well.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: The halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi. (95b)

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