THE SOTAH PROHIBITION - Yevamos 95 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora above cites a kal vachomer, that if not for a specific verse in the Torah, we would have thought that one’s wife would become forbidden to him if he willingly cohabits with her sister. The following was the kal vachomer: If one cohabits with a married woman, which is a lenient prohibition, and nevertheless, the one who causes this prohibition becomes prohibited (the woman is now forbidden to remain with her husband); how much more so, when one cohabits with his wife’s sister, which is a strict prohibition, the who causes this prohibition (the man’s wife) should become forbidden herself.

The Gemora asks: What is the lenient prohibition mentioned in the kal vachomer?

Rabbi Yochanan says: The lenient prohibition is referring to cohabiting with a suspected sotah (adulterous wife).

The Gemora analyzes this explanation: Perhaps the braisa is referring to a case where the sotah cohabited with her husband. The Gemora explains the terminology of the kal vachomer accordingly: When the husband subsequently cohabits with her before she drinks the bitter waters, she becomes forbidden to the suspected adulterer.

Tosfos s.v. ileima explains that once the husband cohabits with the sotah, she will always be forbidden to the suspected adulterer, even if the husband will later die or divorce her. The reason is because once the sotah cohabited with her husband, she is never allowed to drink from the bitter waters, and therefore her innocence cannot be proven.

The Gemora continues and asks: What compelled the braisa to state a case where the husband cohabited with her? Even if he gave her a letter of divorce, or even if he merely said that he doesn’t want her to drink the bitter waters, she would still become forbidden to the suspected adulterer.

Tosfos cites Rabbeinu Yitzchak who asks the following: From where do we know that once the husband said that he doesn’t want her to drink that he cannot change his mind? He cites a Mishna in Sotah (23a), which states that once the husband says that he doesn’t want her to drink, her flour offering is burned. It would seem that he cannot change his mind afterwards.

Rabbi Mordechai Kornfeld from Kollel Iyun haDaf discusses this topic further.

QUESTION: The Gemara seeks a case that fits the description of a man who lives with a woman who is prohibited to him, "and that man causes her to become prohibited to the one who made her prohibited to him in the first place." The Gemara suggests that this case refers to a Sotah who, after defying her husband's warning not to seclude herself with another man ("Stirah"), has relations with her husband (which is prohibited once she has become a Sotah). The act of prohibited relations with her husband causes her to become prohibited "to the one who made her prohibited [to her husband]" in the first place -- the Bo'el (the suspected adulterer).

The Gemara rejects this suggestion. What causes the Sotah to become prohibited to the Bo'el is not the prohibited act of relations between her and her husband. Rather, she is prohibited to the Bo'el even if her husband does not have relations with her, but instead gives her a Get or refuses to let her drink the Mei Sotah. Hence, it is inaccurate to say that it is the prohibited act of relations with her husband which causes her to become prohibited to the Bo'el.

What was the Gemara's initial intention when it suggested that when the husband lives with his Sotah wife, he prohibits her to the Bo'el? The Bo'el is prohibited to her even before the husband lives with her; once she has secluded herself with him, she becomes prohibited to both her husband and the Bo'el! In what way did the Gemara assume that living with her husband makes her prohibited to the Bo'el?

ANSWERS: (a) TOSFOS explains that although the Bo'el is prohibited to the Safek Sotah, if she drinks the Mei Sotah and verifies her innocence she will become permitted to him. Once the husband lives with her, however, he no longer is "Menukeh me'Avon" and thus the Mei Sotah is not effective in determining the innocence of his wife. Accordingly, living with his wife causes her to become prohibited permanently to the Bo'el by depriving her of the ability to vindicate herself through drinking the Mei Sotah. This is the Gemara's intention in its initial assumption that the prohibited act of relations with her husband causes the Bo'el to become prohibited to her; it causes the Bo'el to become more prohibited to her than he was until now (i.e. permanently prohibited, and not just temporarily prohibited).

However, Tosfos questions this explanation. Why does the Gemara say that even if the husband merely declares that he does not want his wife to drink the Mei Sotah, he also causes her to become prohibited to the Bo'el? His refusal to give her the Mei Sotah now does not mean that she will never be able to prove her innocence. Perhaps her husband will change his mind and decide to give her the Mei Sotah to drink, at which time she will be able to prove her innocence. The possibility remains, therefore, that the Bo'el will become permitted to her.

Tosfos suggests a novel ruling based on this question. Tosfos suggests that if a husband says that he does not want his wife to drink the Mei Sotah, he may not change his mind. He is given only one opportunity to let her drink the Mei Sotah. Once he forfeits that opportunity, he may not bring her to the Beis ha'Mikdash to drink the Mei Sotah.

This novel proposal is problematic. As Tosfos himself points out, there is no source for such a law. Moreover, if this is the intention of the Gemara, the Gemara should not need to mention that her husband may prevent her from drinking the Mei Sotah in one of two ways -- by giving her a Get, or by declaring that he does not let her drink the Mei Sotah. The Gemara does not need to add that he can prevent her from drinking the Mei Sotah by giving her a Get; giving a Get is essentially the same as refusing to let her drink, and they are not two distinct ways of preventing her from drinking the Mei Sotah.

(b) RASHI makes no mention of the requirement that the husband be "Menukeh me'Avon" in order for his wife to be allowed to drink the Mei Sotah. ("Menukeh me'Avon" is the rule that Tosfos invokes to explain why the husband may not have his wife drink the Mei Sotah once he has had relations with her after she became a Sotah.) Rashi apparently follows his own view as expressed elsewhere (58b and 85b; see Insights there). Rashi maintains that there is a Tana who does not agree with the requirement that the husband be "Menukeh me'Avon" in order to have his wife drink the Mei Sotah. Rather, even after he lives with his wife he may give her the Mei Sotah to drink. Several Sugyos seem to follow the opinion of that Tana.

Accordingly, the Gemara here means that the husband is able to give the Mei Sotah to his wife even after he lives with her, in which case the original question returns: Why does the Gemara initially assume that when the husband lives with her, he causes her to become prohibited to the Bo'el? She already is prohibited to the Bo'el because she is a Safek Sotah!

The Gemara must mean that in a normal case of a Safek Sotah, when the husband does not live with his wife wrongfully, it is assumed that he plans to give her the Mei Sotah so that her innocence will be proven and she will become permitted to him again. An additional consequence of proving her innocence is that she becomes potentially permitted to the Bo'el. When, however, the husband has relations with her before her innocence is proven, he shows no regard for the fact that she is a Sotah and that he has no intention to give her the Mei Sotah to drink. Consequently, she remains prohibited to the Bo'el. The fact that her husband lives with her and shows that he does not care that she is a Sotah establishes a Chazakah that he will not give her the Mei Sotah. In that sense, he prohibits her to the Bo'el by having relations with her.

When the Gemara rejects the suggestion that it is the husband's act of relations which prohibits her to the Bo'el, because "even if he says, 'I will not give her to drink,' and even if he divorces her" she is still prohibited to the Bo'el, the Gemara means that she is prohibited to the Bo'el merely by virtue of her status as a Safek Sotah, without any act on the part of her husband. The husband's act does not create a prohibition to the Bo'el.

"Even if he divorces her" and permits her to all other men in the world, the Bo'el may not marry her, even if her husband did not live with her after she became a Sotah. "Even if he says, 'I will not give her to drink'" means that even if the husband dies without agreeing to give her the Mei Sotah, and she now becomes permitted to the rest of the world, she is still prohibited to the Bo'el. (See Rashi, end of DH Iy Neima.)

Consequently, according to Rashi (in contrast to Tosfos' understanding of the Gemara), the Gemara provides no proof that a husband may not change his mind when he declares that he does not want his wife to drink the Mei Sotah. (The Gemara also provides no proof that the husband may not give her the Mei Sotah to drink after he divorces and remarries her; see Tosfos to 85b, DH ul'Rebbi, and Insights there.) The Gemara merely says that if he does not give her the Mei Sotah to drink and, as a result, she does not prove her innocence, she becomes prohibited to the Bo'el simply because of her initial act of Stirah with him. The fact that her husband had relations with her and shows that he does not intend to give her the Mei Sotah does not create any new prohibition to the Bo'el; it just shows that he does not plan to give her the opportunity to become permitted. That is why the Gemara rejects the suggestion that the Bo'el is "the one who made her prohibited to him (the husband) in the first place."

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