Daf Yomi - Yevamos 5 - Highlights

The Gemora seeks to find a source according to the Chachamim (who maintain that the words wool and linen are not extra and therefore the juxtaposition cannot be expounded) that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

The Gemora answers: It is derived from the word rosho, his head, which is written in the verses discussing a metzora shaving his head (part of his purification process). This is a superfluous word because the Torah had stated already that he shall shave off all his hair; why is it said? It is written elsewhere [Vayikra 19:27]: You shall not round the corners of your head (cutting the ‘payos,’ corners of the hair from his temples). I would have thought that this prohibition includes the metzora, and he cannot shave his sideburns, the possuk says rosho, teaching us that he shaves his entire head.

The Gemora explains that this Tanna maintains that one who shaves off all his hair from his head (like the metzora is required to do) has in fact violated the prohibition of rounding the corners on his head.

It emerges that we learn that the positive commandment for the metzora to remove all his hair overrides the prohibition of rounding the corners on one’s head. We derive from here that all positive commandments can override a prohibition.

The Gemora objects: Perhaps the reason the positive commandment can override this prohibition is because the prohibition against rounding the corners of one’s head is a prohibition that is not applicable to all (a woman is not subject to this prohibition). (We cannot derive from here to other instances, where the prohibition is a universal one.) (5a)

The Gemora presents another source: It was taught in a braisa: What is derived from the word rosho, his head? It is written regarding a nazir [Bamidbar 6:5]: A razor shall not pass over his head. (This prohibition forbids him to shave any part of his head with a razor.) I would have thought that one who is a metzora and a nazir would not be permitted to shave his head (even for the purification process), the Torah teaches us that the positive commandment for a metzora to shave his head overrides the prohibition of the nazir against shaving his head with a razor. We can derive from here to all instances that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

The Gemora objects: Perhaps the reason the positive commandment can override this prohibition is because the prohibition forbidding a nazir to shave is a lenient one, for a nazir can release himself from his prohibitions by imploring a sage to annul his vow. (We cannot derive from here to other instances, where the prohibition is a strict one.)

The Gemora returns to the juxtaposition of tzitzis and shatnez. The Gemora explains that there is an extra word in the verse even according to the Chachamim. The Torah could have written: You shall make yourself tzitzis (fringes); why did the Torah write gedilim, twined fringes? It is to make the verse available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: The word gedilim is not extra since it teaches us that each corner of the garment must have four threads.

The Gemora states: There is still an extra word in this verse. The Torah could have written: You shall not wear shatnez, wool and linen. Why did the torah write the word together? It is to make the verse available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: the word together is not extra since it is teaches us that if one fastens a woolen garment to a linen garment with two passes of the needle (forming a complete stitch), he may not wear the garment, but if they are fastened with only one pass of the needle, it is not regarded as a connection, and they may be worn.

The Gemora states: There is still an extra word in this verse. The Torah could have written: You shall not wear wool and linen together. Why did the torah write the word shatnez? It is to make the verse available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: The word shatnez is not extra since it teaches us that one has not violated the prohibition against wearing shatnez unless the wool and linen threads are combed, spun and woven together.

The Gemora answers: The word shatnez teaches us everything. The word is extra and therefore it is available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition. However, if this word were intended only for this teaching, the Torah could have written a more common term, such as kilayim, meaning mixture; why did the Torah use the term shatnez? It is to learn the additional halacha that one has not violated the prohibition against wearing shatnez unless the wool and linen threads are combed, spun and woven together. (5a – 5b)

The Gemora states: We have successfully found a source teaching the principle that a positive commandment overrides a standard prohibition; where do we find that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition that is subject to the penalty of kares, thus requiring the verse aleha to teach that one cannot perform yibum on his wife’s sister?

The Gemora states: Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of bris milah (circumcision), which can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the penalty of kares.

The Gemora objects: Bris milah is different because there were thirteen covenants sealed in regards to this commandment.

Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of korban pesach, which can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the penalty of kares.

The Gemora objects: Korban pesach is different because there is a penalty of kares for one who refrains from offering the korban pesach.

Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of offering the daily korban tamid, which can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the penalty of kares.

The Gemora objects: Korban tamid is different because it is a korban, which is offered constantly.

The Gemora proposes to derive this principle from all three of these mitzvos together. This is rejected because all three mitzvos existed before the Giving of the Torah. (5b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 4 - WHICH IS GREATER? A POSITIVE COMMANDMENT OR A NEGATIVE ONE

The Gemora states that a positive commandment can override a prohibition that carries with it a standard punishment.

The question is asked: Why is it that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition and yet the punishment for transgressing a prohibition is much more severe than the punishment for not fulfilling a positive commandment?

Reb Yossie Schonkopf said over a parable from his Rebbe: A trucker is hired to transport a load across the country and the owner warns him not to go beyond the speed limit, not to crash the vehicle and to follow all the road instructions. If the trucker does everything perfectly but doesn't unload the goods at his destination; rather, he arrives at the destined location and immediately turns around carrying the same load, what is accomplished by the fact that the trucker obeyed the speed limit and followed all the rules?

The meaning is as follows: Our mission in life is to accomplish in this world and 'build the love towards HaShem,’ therefore, this building overrides the transgressions. The prohibitions are only there to protect what has been built and not to suffocate the building.

This concept is elucidated by the Ramban in Parshas Yisro. He states that the fulfillment of a positive commandment is based on ahavas HaShem, loving HaShem and refraining from committing a transgression is based on yiras HaShem fearing HaShem. It is a higher level to serve HaShem through love, but it is worse to violate a prohibition, which is based upon fearing HaShem.

My brother, Reb Ben asked a similar question: The Gemora states that a positive commandment will override a negative commandment when both commandments are performed simultaneously. It is noteworthy that the Gemora in Sota states that a mitzvah cannot extinguish an aveira, a sin, yet an aveira can extinguish a mitzvah. Apparently, the principle that a positive commandment can override a negative commandment is not a contradiction to this Gemora. Perhaps the idea is that when one performs an aveira intentionally, he has rebelled against HaShem, and it is not possible for one to appease HaShem with a mitzvah when he has just committed an act of rebellion. When one is simultaneously overriding the negative commandment by performing a positive commandment, however, he is demonstrating that he is fully aware that he is performing a negative commandment, yet he is permitted by the Torah to override the negative commandment. This principle allows him to perform the positive commandment and be rewarded for its performance.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 4 - SHATNEZ BY TZITZIS

It is written [Devarim 22: 11 - 12]: You shall not wear shatnez (wool and linen together). You shall make for yourself tzitzis (twined fringes). The fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The commentators ask from the Gemora below (4b): The Gemora states: If the Torah would have only written the passuk in Vayikra: and a garment that is a mixture of shatnez shall not come upon you, we would have thought that placing shatnez upon oneself in any manner would be forbidden, and even garment sellers would be prohibited from wearing shatnez (they merely drape themselves with the garments in order to exhibit them without a specific intent for the warmth which these garments offer). This is why the Torah wrote in Devarim: You shall not wear shatnez, teaching us that it is forbidden to wear shatnez only by a wearing that offers physical pleasure (and since a garment seller does not wear the garment for that intent, it will be permitted for him).

Accordingly, what is the proof from the fact that one can wear a garment of tzitzis which contains shatnez that a positive commandment can override a prohibition; perhaps one can don a garment of tzitzis that contains shatnez because the prohibition is only when wearing a garment that provides physical pleasure and his intention is for that purpose? One who is wearing tzitzis should not be regarded as deriving pleasure because of the dictum of “mitzvot lav le’henos nitnu” – mitzvos were not given for the purpose of pleasure.

According to the Ran, this is not a question, for he says that the principle of “mitzvot lav le’henos nitnu” is not applicable when there is a physical pleasure; here, the garment is providing physical warmth and therefore, it should be prohibited if not for the fact that the positive commandment can override the prohibition.

However, the Rashba disagrees and maintains that we don’t consider any benefit that one receives during the fulfillment of a mitzvah; if so, let us say that one is permitted to wear tzitzis containing shatnez because he is not deriving any pleasure?

Reb Shmuel Rozovsky answers: The prohibition of shatnez is merely not to wear a garment containing shatnez; there is a condition that it is only regarded as wearing if he is deriving pleasure.

One who is wearing a garment of tzitzis is wearing the garment and deriving pleasure. While it’s true that the performance of the mitzvah negates the benefit he is receiving, he is still wearing the garment and it should be prohibited, if not for the fact that the positive commandment overrides this prohibition.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 4 - Highlights

The Gemora required a source to teach us that one cannot perform yibum on his wife’s sister.

The Gemora infers from here that otherwise, one would have been permitted to perform yibum on his wife’s sister.

The Gemora asks: Why would this have been allowed?

The Gemora answers: This would have been based on the principle that a positive commandment can override a prohibition. The positive commandment of yibum would have overridden the prohibition against living with ones wife’s sister.

The Gemora objects to this explanation: A positive commandment can override a prohibition that carries with it a standard punishment, whereas a positive commandment cannot override a prohibition that is punishable by kares.

Furthermore, the Gemora inquires as to where the source is that a positive commandment can override even an ordinary prohibition.

It is written [Devarim 22: 11 - 12]: You shall not wear shatnez (wool and linen together). You shall make for yourself tzitzis (twined fringes). The fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

Rabbi Elozar cites a Scriptural source demonstrating that we can expound Scriptural verses through juxtaposition. (3b – 4a)

Rav Yosef says: Even if generally, one does not expound Scriptural verses in the Torah through juxtapositions, in Sefer Devarim, he would. He proves this from Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that we do not expound juxtapositions, but in Devarim, he does.

The Gemora proceeds to prove that Rabbi Yehudah does not expound juxtapositions anywhere in the Torah except in the Book of Devarim. (4a)

The Gemora asks: Why are the verses in Devarim different than the rest of the Torah?

The Gemora answers: Either it is because it is obvious that the two verses were juxtaposed for the sake of expounding them or alternatively, it is because one of the verses is extra and thus available for exposition. (4a – 4b)

The Gemora proceeds to explain why we would be justified to expound the juxtaposition regarding tzitzis and shatnez even according to Rabbi Yehudah.

It is obvious that these two verses were juxtaposed for the sake of expounding them, for otherwise, the passage regarding tzitzis should have been written in Parashas Shelach, which is the primary source for the obligation to wear a four-cornered garment of tzitzis.

Alternatively, it is because the verse here is certainly extra and thus available for exposition. It is written [Vayikra 19:19]: and a garment that is a mixture of shatnez shall not come upon you. It is not necessary to write the verse in Devarim: You shall not wear shatnez. It is apparently extra to teach us that the positive commandment of tzitzis overrides the prohibition against wearing shatnez.

The Gemora asks: These two verses are both necessary. If the Torah would have only written the passuk in Vayikra: and a garment that is a mixture of shatnez shall not come upon you, we would have thought that placing shatnez upon oneself in any manner would be forbidden, and even garment sellers would be prohibited from wearing shatnez (they merely drape themselves with the garments in order to exhibit them without a specific intent for the warmth which these garments offer). This is why the Torah wrote in Devarim: You shall not wear shatnez, teaching us that it is forbidden to wear shatnez only by a wearing that offers physical pleasure (and since a garment seller does not wear the garment for that intent, it will be permitted for him).

If the Torah would have only written the passuk in Devarim: You shall not wear shatnez, we might have thought that there is a prohibition to wear shatnez, which provides a good deal of physical pleasure, but one would be permitted to place a garment on himself without wearing it. This is why the Torah wrote in Vayikra: and a garment that is a mixture of shatnez shall not come upon you, teaching us that even that is forbidden.

It emerges that both verses are necessary and not extra to expound the juxtaposition to tzitzis.

The Gemora answers: While it’s true that both verses are necessary, there are still superfluous words in the verse. The verse stated: You shall not wear shatnez wool and linen together. It is unnecessary to say that shatnez consists of wool and linen. The verse in Vayikra stated: and a garment that is a mixture of shatnez shall not come upon you, and it was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael that whenever the Torah refers to a garment and the Torah does not specify what type of garment we are discussing, it is referring to a garment of wool and linen. Why does the Torah find it necessary to write that shatnez is wool and linen? It is extra to indicate that we can expound the juxtaposition of tzitzis to shatnez to teach us that the positive commandment of tzitzis overrides the prohibition against wearing shatnez. (4b)

The Gemora asks: Why is it necessary to expound the juxtaposition that tzitzis overrides the prohibition against wearing shatnez according to the school of Rabbi Yishmael; they have a much better source than that? It is written regarding the obligation of tzitzis [Bamidbar 15:38]: and they shall make themselves tzitzis on the corners of their garments. The school of Rabbi Yishmael maintains that whenever the Torah says garment, it is referring to wool and linen, and we know that the Torah requires one thread of techeiles wool (blue dye from the blood of the chilazon). It emerges that the Torah is obligating us to place a woolen thread on a linen garment, which would constitute shatnez.

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that one should use a thread of techeiles wool only on a garment of wool, and one should use linen strings when he is wearing a linen garment; the juxtaposition teaches us that one can place woolen strings on a linen garment and linen strings on a woolen garment. (4b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 3 - REB AKIVA EIGER’S VELTZ KASHA

Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks the following question: Why do we need a passuk of "litzror" mentioned in the braisa, to derive the prohibition against marrying a tzaraas tzarah (co-wife’s co-wife)? Once the Torah prohibits performing yibum with a tzarah (co-wife), she remains forbidden to her (deceased) husband's brothers because of the prohibition of eishes ach (the wife of one's brother). Accordingly, her status is the same as that of any other ervah, and her tzarah should be no different from any tzarah of an ervah.

Although the prohibition against marrying ones brother’s wife is normally suspended in situations of yibum, the Mishna teaches in another case (eishes achiv she'lo hayah b'olamo - the wife of his brother who was not in his world (this brother and the yavam were not alive at the same time)) that the prohibition of eishes ach has the capability to prohibit the woman to the brother with whom she otherwise would have performed yibum with, and the Gemora does not find it necessary to seek an extra source for this.

In that case, a brother born after the death of his older (and childless) brother may not perform yibum, because he was "not in the world at the same time" as his brother and thus his brother's wife remains forbidden to him as an eishes ach. Similarly, her tzarah is also forbidden to him because she is the tzarah of an ervah. Just as in this case, an extra source is not required to teach us the prohibition of the tzarah of an ervah, a source should not be required to teach us the prohibition of the tzarah of a tzarah. (Kollel Iyun HaDaf assisted us immensely in the writing of this question.)

Reb Elchonon Wasserman (Kovetz Heoros 2:4) answers: The only time that the ervah of eishas ach can exempt the tzorah from yibum is when the ervah became exempt herself on the account of eishes ach; however, when the yevamah became exempt from yibum on the account of a different reason, resulting in there being a prohibition of eishas ach; she will not exempt the tzorah from yibum.

In the case where the two brothers were not alive at the same time, the yevamah is exempt from yibum on the account of being an eishes ach; she will exempt the tzorah, as well. A tzoras ervah is not exempt because she is an eishes ach; she is only exempt because she is a co-wife of an ervah; consequently, she becomes prohibited on the account of eishes ach, but she cannot exempt her tzorah. The Gemora requires a source to teach us that the tzorah has the ability to exempt her tzorah, as well.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 3 - Highlights

The Gemora states that the exemptions regarding the fifteen women listed in the Mishna are all derived from the verse in the Torah discussing his wife’s sister.

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t the Mishna list the case of his wife’s sister first?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna listed the fifteen women according to the closeness of their relationship with the yavam. The closest ones are his daughter, and his daughter’s daughter and his son’s daughter since these three are his blood relatives. Since the Tanna listed three generations descending from the man, he listed three generations descending from the yavam’s wife, i.e. his wife’s daughter, and her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter. Once the Mishna listed three generations descending from her (yavam’s wife), he decided to list three generations ascending from her, i.e. his mother-in-law, and his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. He then listed the yavam’s maternal sister and his mother’s sister since they are his blood relatives (more than his daughter-in-law, who is only related through her marriage to his son). Once he was discussing prohibitions pertaining to sisters, he mentioned his wife’s sister. Of the three remaining women (his daughter-in-law, his maternal brother’s wife and the wife of his brother who was not in his world, who are all not blood relatives), the Tanna should have listed his daughter-in-law first (because her prohibition is the most severe; stoning compared to kares); however, since we were discussing prohibitions dealing with siblings, the Tanna listed his maternal brother’s wife and the wife of his brother who was not in his world and concluded with his daughter-in-law. (2b – 3a)

The Gemora asks: Why does the Mishna say that these fifteen women exempt their co-wives; let the Mishna say that they forbid their co-wives?

The Gemora answers: If the Mishna would say forbid, one might think that it is forbidden to perform a yibum with her, but one is required to perform chalitzah; the Tanna teaches us that she is exempt from chalitzah, as well.

The Gemora asks: Let the Mishna say that these fifteen women forbid their co-wives from chalitzah?

The Gemora answers: What would be wrong with performing a chalitzah with an ervah?

The Gemora rejects this answer: If we would allow the yavam to perform a chalitzah, an ignorant person might mistakenly think that yibum is also permitted and he will perform yibum with an ervah.

The Gemora concludes: Since a co-wife of the ervah becomes forbidden only in situations which involve the mitzvah of yibum (the deceased was a brother of this person), and not in any other situation (any time that a man is married to someone else’s ervah); the Mishna uses the term “exempt,” indicating that this ruling applies only in situations of yibum. (3a)

The Mishna had stated: Fifteen women exempt their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from chalitzah and from yibum.

The Gemora asks: Would it have not been sufficient for the Mishna to say that they are exempt from yibum?

The Gemora answers: If the Mishna would have only said that they are exempt from yibum, we might have thought that there would be a requirement for chalitzah; the Mishna teaches us that whoever is subject to yibum is subject to chalitzah and whoever is not subject to yibum is not subject to chalitzah.

The Gemora asks: Let the Mishna say that they are exempt from yibum and chalitzah (reversing the order) or it can say that they are exempt from chalitzah (and we would understand that he cannot perform a yibum)?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is following the viewpoint of Abba Shaul, who maintains that the mitzvah of chalitzah takes precedence over the mitzvah of yibum (since he might not have pure intentions); it is for this reason that the Tanna mentions chalitzah before yibum. (3a)

The Gemora asks: From where do we derive all the halachos listed in the Mishna?

The Gemora cites a braisa which provides a Scriptural verse (in the passages discussing the prohibition of living with ones wife sister when his original wife is still alive) teaching us that one cannot perform a yibum on his wife’s sister. It is also derived from those verses that he cannot take the co-wife of his wife’s sister and the co-wife of his wife’s sister’s co-wife. The braisa continues to teach us that we derive from here that he cannot perform yibum on any ervah, her co-wife or her co-wife’s co-wife. (3b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 2 - WHY IS YEVAMOS FIRST?

The Tosafos Yeshanim asks why Seder Nashim begins with Masechta Yevamos, which discusses the marriage laws of a widow whose husband died childless. It would be more appropriate to begin the Seder with Kidushin, which would be a more positive introduction to the laws of marriage.

Tosafos Yeshanim answers that the previous Seder (Moed) ended with Moed Katan, which deals largely with aveilus, and thus leads naturally to Yevamos (which deals with the brother who dies childless).

Alternatively, he answers that this Mishna teaches us all the women that one would be prohibited from marrying; afterwards, we can learn regarding the mitzvah of kidushin, marriage.

Also, the mitzvah of yibum was the first mitzvah pertaining to women mentioned in the Torah, as it is written regarding Tamar.

The Acharonim point out that the first answer of the Tosafos Yeshanim is the opinion of the Rambam (Yibum1:1) and the Chinuch (598), who consider Yibum to be a mitzvah only for the man (i.e. the brother). Consequently, the Rambam and the Chinuch would not agree with the last answer of the Tosfos Yeshanim.

However, the Pnei Yehoshua (Kesubos 40a) holds that other Rishonim consider the widow to be equally obligated in yibum. As such, they would agree with the last answer. Consistently, when the Rambam (Sefer HaMitzvos 217) asks why the Masechta is called Yevamos, when Chalitzah is also an option; he answers that it is because the Gemara (Yevamos 39b) states that yibum takes precedence over chalitzah. However, if, as the Tosafos Yeshanim’s second answer states, Seder Nashim begins with Yevamos because yibum is the first mitzvah to be mentioned for women, then it follows that the Masechta had to be called Yevamos rather than Chalitzah. But since the Rambam does not consider the woman’s involvement in yibum as her mitzvah, it was necessary for him to explain the Masechta’s name as stemming from yibum’s precedence. [ Pleasant Ridge Newsletter Vol. 16 # 33]

The Rambam asks the Tosfos Yeshanim’s question, as well and offers a different answer. He says that Kesuvos and Kidushin discuss the laws of marriage. Marriage is something that is left up to the willingness of the man and the women; Beis Din cannot force a man to marry a woman. Yibum is compelling; Beis Din informs the yavam that he must either perform a yibum or a chalitzah. It is appropriate to discuss the halachos that are compelling first.

Tosfos Yom Tov cites the Rambam in the fifteenth perek of Hilchos Ishus, who quotes the Gemora in Kidushin 29b, that one who reaches twenty years old and has not married is cursed by Hashem for he will be thinking about sin. It is implicit that there is no halacha that Beis Din can force someone to marry.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 2 - YEVAMOS, YIVUMOS OR YIVMOS

The Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos (217) and the Chinuch state that this tractate is called Yevamos and not Chalitzos because the mitzvah of yibum takes precedence over the mitzvah of chalitzah.

Reb Yaakov Kamenetzky asks: This would be understandable if the name of the Mesechta would be Yivumos, referring to the act of yibum; however, the name is Yevamos, meaning the women who are Yevamos, in the same manner as the brother who is performing the yibum is called the yavam.

He concludes that perhaps the name of the Mesechta is actually Yivmos, referring to the halachos of yibum. This would explain the Rambam and the Chinuch’s question and answer.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 2 - Yibum with a Niddah

The Mishna lists fifteen women that exempt their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from chalitzah and from yibum. One of them is his wife’s sister.

Tosfos asks: Why didn’t the Mishna include a case where the yevamah was a niddah at the time that she fell to yibum? She is forbidden to him at that time and he would be subject to the penalty of kares; wouldn’t there be a prohibition against performing a yibum with her even after she purifies herself?

Tosfos compares this case to the case listed in the Mishna; his wife’s sister. He cannot perform a yibum with her even if his wife would die (one is permitted to marry his wife’s sister after his wife dies). The explanation is: We consider the situation at the time when she falls to yibum; since at that time she was forbidden, she remains prohibited forever. Tosfos’ question is: Why don’t we apply the same logic to a woman who was a niddah at the time that she fell to yibum and just as she is forbidden at that time, she should remain prohibited even after she purifies herself?

Tosfos cites a Gemora in Pesachim (72b) which seems to indicate that a yavam who performs a yibum with a niddah had accomplished a mitzvah, and he has acquired her despite the fact that a transgression was committed.

(Tosfos answers this question by creating a distinction between his wife’s sister, who is only forbidden to him and a niddah, who is forbidden to everyone.)

The Acharonim ask: How can it be that the yavam has fulfilled the mitzvah of yibum by performing a yibum with a niddah; shouldn’t this be considered a mitzvah habaah b’aveirah, a mitzvah that is a result of an aveira that is performed? The positive commandment of yibum cannot override the negative transgression of engaging in relations with a niddah; this transgression is subject to the penalty of kares and cannot be overridden by a positive commandment. There are many Rishonim who maintain that one who performs a mitzvah and simultaneously commits an aveira does not fulfill the mitzvah at all.

Reb Elchonon Wasserman (Kovetz Heoros 11:1) answers: One does not fulfill the mitzvah by a case of mitzvah habaah b’aveirah when the mitzvah is merely an action, such as shaking a lulav or blowing a shofar; he cannot be credited with a mitzvah when that action was an aveira, as well. However, when the mitzvah is more than an action, but rather what the action accomplished, this principle is not applicable. If one circumcises a nine-day old baby on Shabbos, the milah is valid and he has fulfilled a mitzvah, despite the fact that a transgression was committed. This is because the mitzvah is that the child should be circumcised and that result was attained. The mitzvah of yibum is the acquisition of the yevamah through an act of yibum. While one who performs a yibum with a niddah has violated the prohibition of having relations with a niddah, he nevertheless has acquired the yevamah and thus has fulfilled the mitzvah of yibum.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 2 - Highlights

Introduction to Tractate Yevamos

It is written [Devarim 25: 5 – 10]: "If brothers dwell together, and one of them dies, and has no child, the wife of the dead shall not be married abroad to one not of his kin; her husbands' brother shall go into her, and take her to him to wife, and perform the duty of a husband's brother to her. And it shall be, that the firstborn that she bears shall succeed in the name of his brother that is dead, that his name be not blotted out of Israel. And if the man does not want to marry his brother's wife, then his brother's wife shall go up to the gate to the elders, and say: 'My husband's brother refuses to raise up to his brother a name in Israel; he will not perform the duty of a husband's brother to me.' Then the elders of his city shall call him, and speak to him; and if he stands, and says: 'I do not want to marry her'; then shall his brother's wife go up to him in the presence of the elders, and loose his shoe from off his foot, and spit before him; and she shall answer and say, 'So shall it be done to the man that does not build up his brother's house.' And his name shall be called in Israel, 'The house of him that had his shoe loosened'" (Deut. 25:5-10).

Rav Pinchas Kahati has an introduction to this tractate and to the details regarding the mitzvah of yibum. I present it to you in full. Here is the address where one can find the archives of any Mishna http://www.moreshet.net//oldsite/mishna/index.htm.

(1) The mitzvah of yibum applies only to brothers by the same father, and not to brothers by only the same mother, for it is written, "When brothers dwell with one another" – i.e., brothers who inherit with one another, thus excluding brothers who have only the same mother (Yev. 17b). Another opinion in the Gemara (ibid.) learns this law by tradition from the analogous use (gezerah shavah) of the word "brothers" referring to the sons of Jacob ("We are twelve brothers, sons of our father" – Gen. 42:32): just as the passage in Genesis refers to brothers by a common father and not by one mother, this passage also refers to brothers by the same father but not to brothers by the same mother. According to the Jerusalem Talmud, this law is implicit in the word "together" – "those who dwell in one house, excluding brothers by one mother (but different fathers), of whom one goes to the house of his father, and another goes to the house of his father."

(2) The phrase "and has no child [ben, lit., "son"] means, "and has no seed [zera]"; if, however, he does have descendants, even a daughter or a grandchild, the law of yibum does not apply to his widow.

(3) If the brother died without seed and left more than one wife (for formerly a Jew was permitted to be married simultaneously to several wives), one of his brothers marries by yibum, or submits to halitzah from, one of the wives, and thereby exempts all the rest from either yibum or halitzah, as it is written, "So shall it be done to the man that does not build up his brother's house," which it was understood to mean, he builds up one house but he does not build up two houses.

(4) Once a wife is exempt from the mitzvah of yibum, she becomes forbidden to marry her brother-in law under the prohibition of 'the brother's wife', of which it is written, "You shall not uncover the nakedness of your brother's wife" (Lev. 18:16). A baraita teaches: " 'The nakedness of your brother's wife' and 'her husband's brother shall go in to her' were stated in a single commandment" (Jer. Talmud, Ned. 3:2; Mekhilta; Sifri), i.e., the mitzvah of yibum alone exempts the yevamah from the prohibition of marrying the brother's wife, but the prohibition of the brother's wife applies to any woman who was released from the mitzvah of yibum.

(5) If the yevamah is prohibited to the yavam because of ervah (lit. "nakedness," i.e., family relationship), e.g., she is his daughter who had married his brother who died, or she is his wife's sister, then she is exempt from yibum. This is because it is written, "And you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her, to uncover her nakedness beside the other" [aleha] (Lev. 18:18), and in the passage regarding yibum it is written, "her husband's brother shall go in to her [aleha]" – just as the latter is a case of mitzvah, so too is the former. Therefore the Torah stated, "And you shall not marry", i.e., even in order to perform the mitzvah of yibum it is prohibited to marry a woman and her sister; that yibum is prohibited in the other prohibited degrees of relationship is derived from the case of the wife's sister (Yev. 3b; 13a).

(6) Any woman who is exempted by Torah law from yibum is also exempt from halitzah, as it is written, "And if the man does not want to marry his brother's wife, then his brother's wife shall go up to the gate… and say : 'My husband's brother refuses to raise up to his brother a name in Israel…' and loose his shoe" (Deut. 25:7-9), from which it was understood that to whomever yibum applies, halitzah applies, and to whomever yibum does not apply, halitzah does not apply.

(7) If a man's brother died childless and left more than one wife, and one of them is prohibited to the yavam because of ervah, then just as the related woman is exempt from yibum and from halitzah, as was explained above, all the other wives of the dead man, who are called "her rivals" (see I Sam. 1:6), are similarly exempt from yibum and from halitzah, as it is written, "that does not build up his brother's house" – if he can build up the house in its entirety then he may build up part of a house, but he may not build up even part of a house which he cannot build up in it entirety.

(8) A widow who is prohibited due to ervah exempts not only her rivals from yibum and from halitzah, but also her rivals' rivals, and so on: e.g., Reuven died childless and left two wives, Leah and Hannah, and he had two brothers, Shimon and Levi, and Leah is the sister of Shimon's wife [Rahel]; in this case both yevamot, Leah and Hannah, are prohibited to Shimon: Leah, because she constitutes ervah for him, and Hannah, because she is the rival of a woman prohibited by ervah, as was explained above. Both of them are dependent upon Levi, however, for they are not related to him, and he must either marry by yibum or submit to halitzah from whicever one of them he wishes (Chart 1). If Levi married as his yevamah Hannah, i.e., the rival of the woman prohibited to his brother Shimon by ervah, and he (Levi) had another wife [Yehudit], and Levi also died childless, and his wives came before Shimon for yibum or halitzah – since Hannah is prohibited to him because of the ervah of her rival, then she also exempts her rival, i.e., Levi's second wife [Yehudit], from yibum and from halitzah. It follows from this that Leah, who is a woman prohibited to Shimon by ervah (since she is his wife's sister), exempts her rival and her rival's rival (Chart 2). This is also the law regarding her rival's rival's rival, ad infinitum. One view in the Gemara learns this from the passage, "And you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival [li-tzror]" – since "li-tzror," and not "la-tzor" is written the Torah includes many rivals, i.e., the rival of the woman prohibited due to ervah, her rival's rival, her rival's rival's rival, and so on, all are exempt from yibum and from halitzah. Other authorities in the Gemara learn this law from other verses (see Yev. 8a). Rambam explains the reason for this law: in any case in which he has no zikah (the tie between a woman requiring yibum and the yavam) with her, she is prohibited to him forever on account of being his brother's wife; it follows from this that the rival of the woman prohibited by ervah is prohibited to him on account of ervah, and therefore she also exempts her rival (Hil. yibum 6:14-15); see also Rav Ashi's reason in the Gemara, Yev. 13a).

The Mishna states: Fifteen women exempt their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from chalitzah (a ceremony by which the brother of the deceased man excuses himself from performing levirate marriage on the widow, which permits her to marry someone other than a brother of the deceased) and from yibum, until the end of the world. And these are the women: 1) his daughter, 2) and his daughter's daughter, 3) and his son's daughter, 4) his wife's daughter, 5) and her son's daughter, 6) and her daughter's daughter, 7) his mother-in-law, 8) and his mother-in-law's mother, 9) and his father-in-law's mother, 10) his maternal sister, 11) his mother's sister, 12) and his wife's sister, 13) his maternal brother’s wife, 14) the wife of his brother who was not in his world (this brother and the yavam were not alive at the same time), 15) and his daughter-in-law.

These women exempt their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from chalitzah and from yibum, until the end of the world.

However, regarding all these women, if they died, or if they refused (a woman's annulment of a Rabinical marriage contracted for her in her minority), or if they were divorced, or if they were found to be an aylonis (an adult woman who did not develop any signs of female puberty and is incapable of bearing children), their co-wives are permitted. But you cannot say of his mother-in-law or his mother-in-law's mother or his father-in-law's mother that they were found to be an aylonis (since an aylonis cannot bear children) or that they refused (since only a minor can refuse).

How do they exempt their wives and co-wives? If his daughter or one of any of these arayos (a woman who it is prohibited to have relations with) was married to his brother, who had another wife, and he died childless, just as his daughter is exempt, so is her co-wife exempt.

If the co-wife of his daughter went and married to the second brother, who had another wife, and he died childless, just as his daughter's co-wife is exempt, so is her co wife’s co wife exempt, even if they are a hundred.

Courtesy of http://chavruta.tripod.com/

[Reuven, Shimon and Levi are brothers. Reuven has a daughter Penina, born out of wedlock. Shimon marries Penina. He has also married a non-related woman, named Chana. Shimon dies childless and his wives fall for yibum to Reuven and Levi. Reuven cannot perform yibum with Penina since she is his daughter. Chana, the co-wife is also exempt. Levi performs a yibum with Chana. Levi has another wife, named Malka. Levi dies childless and his wives fall for yibum to Reuven. The Mishna teaches us that Reuven cannot perform a yibum with Malka since she is the co-wife’s (Chana) co wife.]

How is it that if they died or if they refused, or if they were divorced, or if they were found to be an aylonis, their co-wives are permitted? If his daughter or any other one of these arayos was married to his brother, who had another wife, and his daughter died, or was divorced, and afterwards his brother died childless, her co-wife is permitted.

And whoever could have refused but did not refuse, her co-wifel performs chalitzah but may not marry him by yibum. (2a – 2b)

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 27 - BURIAL CASKETS MADE FROM THEIR TABLE

The Torah specifies (25:23) that the table in the Mishkan was to be made specifically from atzei shitim – acacia wood. Why was this type of wood specifically chosen for this purpose?

Rabbeinu Bechaye notes that the letters spelling the word shitim are short for the words shalom, tovah, yeshuah, mechilah – peace, goodness, salvation, and forgiveness. This type of wood was also used in the Holy Ark and the altar, hinting to us that the Divine Service performed through these vessels was the source of brining down all of these blessings to the world.

In our day, however, when we unfortunately lack all of these items, what do we have in their stead through which we may merit the rewards and bounty that they brought? The Gemora in Chagiga (27a) derives from a verse in Yechezkel that in the absence of the Holy Temple, the generous opening up of a person’s table to serve the poor and other guests serves in lieu of the altar. The Gemora in Berachos (54b) adds that doing so is a merit for long life.

Reb Oizer Alpert cites the Rabbeinu Bechaye, who mentions the fascinating custom of the pious men of France who had their burial caskets built from the wood of their tables. This symbolizes their recognition that upon dying, none of their earthly possessions would be accompanying them and the only item they could take with them was the merit of the charity and hosting of guests that they performed in their lifetimes. In fact, the Minchas Cohen suggests that the letters in the word shulchan are abbreviations for shomer likevurah chesed nedivosayich – preserving for burial the kindness of your giving!

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 27 - Highlights (Mazal Tov on the Completion of Seder Moed!!)

Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish both say: When the Beis HaMikdosh was in existence, the Altar would provide atonement for a person. Now that the Beis HaMikdosh is destroyed, a person’s table atones for him (through acts of kindness, i.e. inviting guests to his house). (27a)

The Mishna had stated: All the vessels which were in the Temple were subject to immersion, except the Golden Altar and the Copper Altar because they were likened to earth (and earth is not susceptible to tumah). These are Rabbi Eliezer’s words.

The Gemora provides the Scriptural verse that the Altars are like earth. (27a)

The Mishna had stated: All the vessels which were in the Temple were subject to immersion, except the Golden Altar and the Copper Altar because they were likened to earth (and earth is not susceptible to tumah). These are Rabbi Eliezer’s words. The Chachamim said: Because they were plated.

It would seem that the Chachamim are in agreement with Rabbi Eliezer that the Altars are not susceptible to tumah; they are just offering another reason.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t the fact that the Altars were plated a reason why they should acquire tumah?

The Gemora answers: The Chachamim are in fact arguing with Rabbi Eliezer and they maintain that the Altars can acquire tumah because they are plated.

The Gemora offers an alternative answer: The Chachamim were asking Rabbi Eliezer on the necessity for citing a verse proving that the Altars cannot acquire tumah because they are likened to earth. What would be the reason to think that they are susceptible to tumah? If it’s because they are plated and treated as a metal utensil, that is incorrect. The metal is subordinate to the wood because Scripture refers to the Altar as an Altar of Wood. Since it is regarded as a wooden vessel, it cannot acquire tumah because it is stationary, and stationary wooden utensils are not susceptible to tumah. (27a)

Rabbi Avahu said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: The fire of Gehinom does not rule over Torah scholars. This is derived through a kal vachomer from the salamandra (a beast created through magic from a fire that was burning for seven uninterrupted years): A salamandra, which is only an offspring of fire, and one who smears himself with its blood, fire cannot rule over him; a Torah scholar whose entire body is fire, how much more so (fire cannot rule over him). (27a)

Rish Lakish said: The fire of Gehinom cannot rule over the sinners of Israel. This is derived through a kal vachomer from the Golden Altar: The Golden Altar had only a dinar’s thickness of gold and nevertheless, the fire of many years did not rule over it; the sinners of Israel, who are full of mitzvos in the same manner as a pomegranate is full of seeds, how much more so (fire of Gehinom cannot rule over them). (27a)

WE SHALLL RETURN TO YOU, CHOMER BAKODESH

AND TRACTATE CHAGIGAH IS CONCLUDED

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 26 - LINGERING TASTE

The Gemora states: The Kohanim would lift the Table and show the festival pilgrims the showbread. They would tell them: “See how beloved you are before the Omnipresent; the bread is just as hot and fresh now (at the time of removal from the Table) as it was when it was arranged.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: There was a great miracle that transpired with the showbread. The showbread was placed on the Table on Shabbos, and it was subsequently removed the following Shabbos. For the bread to remain fresh in such a state was an open miracle.

There were many miracles that transpired in the Beis HaMikdosh; why was this the miracle chosen to show the pilgrims?

The Sfas Emes answers: The pilgrims attained extremely high levels of spirituality when they visited the Beis HaMikdosh during the festival. They felt the Shechina in close proximity. They observed the Kohanim performing the sacrificial offerings and were uplifted.

We wanted to ensure that the heights that they reached during the festival would not be lost and it was for this reason that the miracle regarding the showbread was displayed to them. The bread was placed on the Table the Shabbos before, but it can still remain hot and fresh the following week.

This also explains why we answer the wise son by the seder night; one is forbidden to eat anything after the eating of the afikoman. The discussions of emunah and bitachon, thanking HaShem for redeeming us and becoming the Chosen Nation brings us to spiritual heights that we never achieved before. We tell the wise son, don’t let this slip away. The taste of the matzah should linger in your mouth all throughout the night, demonstrating that it is our wish that the levels of sanctity and purity that have been reached should not be cast away.

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 26 - Highlights

The Mishna states: From the city of Modiim and inwards (towards Yerushalayim), the am haaratzim are trusted regarding small earthenware vessels that they are tahor. From Modiim and outward, they are not believed. (Modiim was a city that was 15 mil away from Yerushalayim.) These utensils could not be manufactured in Yerushalayim and they were used every day. If we would not have allowed them to purchase these vessels from the am haaratzim, the public would not be able to manage; the sages do not issue decrees when many people cannot comply with it.

If the potter who is selling the pots enters Modiim (heading towards Yerushalayim), you can purchase these small vessels only from him, and only those pots, provided that you observed him entering. If he left Modiim, he is not believed. (25b)

The Gemora cites a braisa regarding the status of Modiim itself: Sometimes it is regarded as being inward of Modiim (and one can purchase from him) and sometimes it is regarded as being outwards of Modiim. When the potter is leaving Modiim and the chaver is coming in, Modiim is like the inside and the chaver may purchase from the am haaretz (since if he delays, he will not have the opportunity to purchase later).

When both the potter and chaver are coming in, or for that matter both are going out, it is like outside and he may not purchase from him. (In the former case, he can wait until they are inward from Modiim and in the latter case, the chaver was penalized for not purchasing the vessels when they were both inwards.)

The Gemora derives the above halachos from the language of our Mishna. (25b – 26a)

It was taught in a braisa: An am haaretz is trusted (within Modiim) regarding small earthenware vessels that they are tahor for kodesh.

Rish Lakish says: A vessel is considered small if it can be held in one hand. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and maintains that it is regarded as small even if it is bigger than that. (26a)

Rish Lakish maintains that the vessels are regarded as tahor provided that they are empty. Rabbi Yochanan holds that the vessels are tahor even if they contain liquids that are chulin.

Rava said: It emerges according to Rabbi Yochanan that the vessels are tahor despite the fact that the liquids are tamei. (26a)

The Mishna states: Tax agents that entered a house or thieves that returned the earthenware vessels that they stole are believed to say that they did not touch the interior of the vessel and thus are deemed to be tahor. (This halacha is only in respect to kodesh, but not for terumah.)

The Mishna continues: In Yerushalayim, the am haaratzim are believed regarding the tahara of kodesh, but not for terumah. During the festival, they are believed even for terumah. (26a)

The Gemora asks a contradiction from a Mishna in Taharos (7:6): If the tax agents enter a house, the entire house is deemed to be tamei.

The Gemora answers: The Mishna in Taharos is referring to a case where there is a gentile among them. Our Mishna is referring to a case where there are no gentiles with them.

The Gemora asks: Why are they not believed if there was a gentile among them?

Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Eliezer offer answers. One of them said: The other agents are afraid that the gentile will punish them for being lazy and not searching the house thoroughly; that is why they are not believed that they didn’t come into contact with the vessels. The other answered: They are afraid that the gentile will report on them to the king and therefore they perform a thorough search. (26a)

The Mishna had stated: In Yerushalayim, the am haaratzim are believed regarding the tahara of kodesh, but not for terumah.

The Gemora cites a braisa: They are believed regarding large earthenware vessels that will be used for kodesh. The Gemora explains the reasoning for this: We do not make kilns in Yerushalayim (so that the smoke shouldn’t blacken the walls of the city); earthenware vessels were scarce and there was no alternative, but to allow the chaveirim to purchase those vessels from them. (26a)

The Mishna states: If a chaver opens his barrel of wine or commences selling his dough during the festival; Rabbi Yehudah says: He may continue selling it after the festival. The Chachamim maintain that he cannot conclude the selling of this barrel or dough (because it has already been rendered tamei on account of the am haaratzim). (26a)

Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha were sitting on the porch of the latter. One began and said: According to the Chachamim, may he keep it for another festival? The other one answered: Every one's hand has been handling it, and you say, he shall keep it for another festival (it is certainly tamei)? The first one said to him: But until now as well, has not every one's hand been handling it (and nevertheless, the chaver was permitted to sell it)? He replied: What comparison is that? During the festival, it was understandable why the chaver could sell the food because the am haaretz was regarded as tahor; however, now that the festival has passed, the food is tamei retroactively.

The Gemora cites a braisa which would indicate that he would be allowed to set the food aside until the next festival. (26a)

The Mishna states: As soon as the festival is over, they remove the Temple vessels to purify them. (The am haaratzim were able to touch the vessels during the festival, and once the festival has passed, they become tamei retroactively.) If the festival was over on a Friday, they do not remove the vessels on that day on the account of the honor of Shabbos (the Kohanim were preoccupied with their Shabbos preparations at home). R. Yehudah said: They would not remove the vessels on Thursday either, since the Kohanim are not at leisure then. (26a)

The Gemora explains Rabbi Yehudah’s reasoning: The Kohanim were not at leisure because they were occupied with removing the ashes that accumulated on the Mizbeach during the festival. (The ashes from all the korbanos brought during the festival were piled onto the mound at the center of the Mizbeach and were only removed after the festival.) (26a)

The Mishna states: How was the purification of the Courtyard done? They immersed the vessels which were in the Temple. During the festival, they would say to the kohanim who were am haaratzim, “Be careful not to touch the Table.” (The Table could not be immersed after the festival.)

All the vessels that were in the Temple had second and third sets, so that if the first became tamei, they would be able to bring the second ones instead of them.

All the vessels which were in the Temple were subject to immersion, except the Golden Altar and the Copper Altar because they were likened to earth (and earth is not susceptible to tumah). These are Rabbi Eliezer’s words. The Chachamim said: Because they were plated. (26a – 26b)

The Gemora cites a braisa: During the festival, they would say to the kohanim who were am haaratzim, “Be careful not to touch the Table and the Menorah.”

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t our Mishna teach this halacha regarding the Menorah, as well?

The Gemora answers: It is written “tamid” by the Table, indicating that the Table must be in its place continuously and it cannot be moved. There is a Tannaic dispute if this halacha applies to the Menorah, as well. (26b)

The Gemora asks: We can infer from the Mishna that there is the possibility of the Table becoming tamei; how can this be? We have learned that any wooden utensil which is intended to remain stationary is not susceptible to tumah through contact. How could the Table become tamei?

The Gemora answers: The Table did indeed move; they would lift the Table and show the festival pilgrims the showbread. They would tell them: “See how beloved you are before the Omnipresent; the bread is just as hot and fresh now (at the time of removal from the Table) as it was when it was arranged.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: There was a great miracle that transpired with the showbread. (The showbread was placed on the Table on Shabbos, and it was subsequently removed the following Shabbos. For the bread to remain fresh in such a state was an open miracle.) It emerges that the Table was moved and thus can become tamei.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps the Table is susceptible to tumah because it is coated with gold? Rabbi Yochanan said: A wooden utensil is subordinate to the coating whether the coating is anchored or not and whether the coating covers the rim or not.

The Gemora answers: The Table in the Beis HaMikdosh is different; we find that Scripture refers to the Table as a Table of Wood. It is regarded as wood despite the fact that it was plated with gold. (26b – 27a)

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 25 - WOMEN ENTERING A SYNAGOGUE AND PRAYING WHILE THEY ARE A NIDDAH

The Rema in Orach Chaim 88 quotes sources who maintain that a woman should not enter a synagogue while she is a niddah. Furthermore, a woman who is a niddah should not pray, mention the Name of Hashem or even touch a sefer. The Rema also quotes sources who disagree with this ruling. The Rema concludes that the custom is in accordance with the first opinion. However, the Rema limits this restriction to a woman who is still menstruating whereas a woman who has ceased to see a flow but is in the stage of becoming pure is not restricted from entering a synagogue, praying, reciting the Name of HaShem or from touching a sefer. He concludes that even in places that are strict in these matters, it would be permitted for them to come to the synagogue on the High Holy Days and any time that that there are a multitude of people going since otherwise, they would feel distressed.

The Magen Avraham writes: Since it is permitted for them to enter the synagogue, they are allowed to pray, as well. He cites a Gemora in Yevamos as a support (hint) for this ruling. The Gemora states that one who is a metzora and also a baal keri is still permitted to insert parts of his body into the Courtyard of the Temple. One who has tzaraas is prohibited from entering the Courtyard except to have the blood placement procedure on the eighth day. Since the Torah waives the restriction for a regular metzora, it is waived for a baal keri, as well.

The Chasam Sofer in his notes on Orach Chaim asks on the Magen Avraham: One who is tamei cannot enter the Courtyard; if the Torah waives this action despite the fact that he has tzaraas, it stands to reason that the same action will be permitted despite the fact that he is also a baal keri. Regarding a woman entering a synagogue while she is a niddah and also praying; there are two prohibitions that we need to override. Just because we permit her to enter the synagogue, what is the proof that she will be permitted to pray, as well?

The Rav Peolim (I, O”C 23) cites our Gemora as support for the Magen Avraham.

The Mishna had stated: If the wine-pressing and olive-pressing season has passed, and the am haaretz said to the Kohen, “I have set apart a quarter-log of oil to be kodesh,” he is deemed trustworthy even in regards to the terumah.

The Gemora cites a Mishna in Oholos (18:4): Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel agree that we check a beis haperas (a field in which the grave had been plowed over) for bone chips on the account of people who are on their way to offer the korban pesach (the sages decreed that the field is tamei since there might be bone fragments there, but the decree is removed in this situation), but we do not check on the beis haperas for people wishing to eat terumah.

The Gemora asks: How do we accomplish this checking? Rav Yehudah says in the name of Shmuel: The person blows on the beis haperas and then he can walk through it. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba says in the name of Ula: A beis haperas that has been sufficiently trampled on by many people is tahor (the bone pieces will be pushed to the side); they would check to see if this indeed was the case.

The Gemora explains why the decree was removed on the account of the people who are on their way to offer the korban pesach and not for the people wishing to eat terumah.

One who doesn’t offer a korban pesach is subject to the punishment of kares and therefore the sages waived the regular decree; they did not waive the decree to allow people to eat terumah since one who eats terumah while tamei is subject to death at the hands of Heaven (and there is no hurry to eat the terumah).

The Gemora inquires: If he checked the beis haperas because he wished to perform the korban pesach, can he eat terumah based upon that checking?

Ula says that he may eat terumah and Rabbah bar Ula says that he is forbidden from eating terumah.

There was an elder who said to Rabbah bar Ula that he should not disagree with Ula for the Mishna is proof to him. The Mishna had stated: If the wine-pressing and olive-pressing season has passed, and the am haaretz said to the Kohen, “I have set apart a quarter-log of oil to be kodesh,” he is deemed trustworthy even in regards to the terumah. It is evident that since he is believed in regards to the oil which is kodesh that it is tahor, he is believed regarding the terumah, as well; so too here, since we rely upon the checking for the korban pesach, it can be relied upon for terumah, as well.

It emerges that we apply this principle even though it involves two actions. We trust the am haaretz regarding the kodesh portion of the oil and because of that, we trust him on the terumah portion, and one would be permitted to partake in the terumah, as well.

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 25 - Highlights

The Mishna states: There is a stringency of terumah over kodesh. In Judea the am haaratzim are trustworthy throughout the year in respect to the purity of the wine and oil (for sacrificial use), but in regards to terumah, they are trustworthy only during the wine-pressing and olive-pressing season.

If the wine-pressing and olive-pressing season has passed, and they brought to the Kohen a barrel of terumah wine, he may not accept it (since it is in all probability tamei); but the owner may leave it until the next season.

If the wine-pressing and olive-pressing season has passed, and the am haaretz said to the Kohen, “I have set apart a quarter-log of oil to be kodesh,” he is deemed trustworthy even in regards to the terumah.

They are trusted concerning the jars of wine and jars of oil that are mixed with terumah during the wine-pressing and olive-pressing season and seventy days prior to the season. (24b – 25a)

The Mishna had stated: There is a stringency of terumah over kodesh. In Judea the am haaratzim are trustworthy throughout the year in respect to the purity of the wine and oil (for sacrificial use), but in regards to terumah, they are trustworthy only during the wine-pressing and olive-pressing season.

The Gemora asks: it can be inferred from the Mishna that they are only trusted in Judea, but not in Galilee; why would this be so?

Rish Lakish answers: It is because there was a strip of Cuthean (those who converted to Judaism after an outbreak of wild animals in Eretz Yisroel and their conversion was debated as to its validity) land between the provinces of Judea and Galilee. The sages issued a decree that land belonging to non-Jews was considered tamei because of unmarked graves, and anyone who walked or was carried over this lane became tamei. It was therefore impossible to transport the wine and the oil from the Galilee to the Beis HaMikdosh without it inevitably becoming tamei.

The Gemora asks: Why couldn’t it be carried in a box (the box should act as a barrier between the tumah of the land and the produce inside the box)?

The Gemora answers: Our Mishna is in accordance with Rebbe who maintains that a moving ohel (roof) is not considered a ohel and therefore it will prevent the tumah of the land from rendering the wine or oil tamei.

The Gemora asks: Couldn’t they bring the wine or oil in an earthenware vessel that is completely sealed: this will certainly protect the wine and oil from becoming tamei?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Eliezer said: An earthenware vessel that is completely sealed will protect its contents from becoming tamei only if they are chulin, but not kodesh items. (25a)

We had stated above that it was impossible to transport wine and oil from the Galilee to the Bais HaMikdosh without it inevitably becoming tamei because of the strip of Cuthean land in between the provinces.

The Gemora asks: Ula said that in Galilee, the chaveirim (people that are meticulous regarding the performance of mitzvos) would prepare the wine and oil in a state of purity in order to be able to offer them on the mizbeach when the Beis HaMikdosh will be rebuilt; what was the point if the Cuthean land was blocking their way?

The Gemora answers: After they prepared it, they would leave it by them until Eliyahu comes; he will show them a path that is not tamei and they will then transport the wine and oil to the Beis HaMikdosh. (25a)

The Mishna had stated: In regards to terumah, the am haaratzim are trustworthy only during the wine-pressing and olive-pressing season.

The Gemora asks a contradiction from a Mishna in Taharos (9:4): An am haaretz who is completing the gathering of the olives should set aside one box of olives as terumah and give it to a Kohen. Since the olives do not become susceptible to tumah until after the gathering, the Kohen is secure that this box is tahor.

Why was it necessary to do this; our Mishna stated that they are believed during the olive-pressing season?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna in Taharos is referring to the late crop of olives, which is after the pressing-season and therefore the am haaretz is not trusted. (25a)

The Mishna had stated: If the wine-pressing and olive-pressing season has passed, and the am haaretz said to the Kohen, “I have set apart a quarter-log of oil to be kodesh,” he is deemed trustworthy even in regards to the terumah.

They inquired of Rav Sheishes: If the Kohen transgressed and accepted them (after the pressing season), may he keep it until the next pressing season and use it then?

He answered: This can be answered from a braisa regarding a Mishna in Demai (6:9). The braisa states that a Kohen who is a chaver must burn the terumah that he inherited from his father who was an am haaretz. Why should he burn it; let him keep it until the next pressing season and then he can eat it?

It is evident from here that a Kohen who accepts terumah from an am haaretz after the pressing season may not keep them until the next pressing season and they must be destroyed.

The Gemora rejects the proof: Perhaps the braisa is referring to an item such as date beer that does not have a pressing season.

The Gemora asks: Let him keep it until the festival when the am haaratzim are trusted? The Gemora answers: We are referring to items that will not last until the festival. (25a – 25b)

The Mishna had stated: If the wine-pressing and olive-pressing season has passed, and the am haaretz said to the Kohen, “I have set apart a quarter-log of oil to be kodesh,” he is deemed trustworthy even in regards to the terumah.

The Gemora cites a Mishna in Oholos (18:4): Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel agree that we check a beis haperas (a field in which the grave had been plowed over) for bone chips on the account of people who are on their way to offer the korban pesach (the sages decreed that the field is tamei since there might be bone fragments there, but the decree is removed in this situation), but we do not check on the beis haperas for people wishing to eat terumah.

The Gemora asks: How do we accomplish this checking?

Rav Yehudah says in the name of Shmuel: The person blows on the beis haperas and then he can walk through it.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba says in the name of Ula: A beis haperas that has been sufficiently trampled on by many people is tahor (the bone pieces will be pushed to the side); they would check to see if this indeed was the case.

The Gemora explains why the decree was removed on the account of the people who are on their way to offer the korban pesach and not for the people wishing to eat terumah.

One who doesn’t offer a korban pesach is subject to the punishment of kares and therefore the sages waived the regular decree; they did not waive the decree to allow people to eat terumah since one who eats terumah while tamei is subject to death at the hands of Heaven (and there is no hurry to eat the terumah).

The Gemora inquires: If he checked the beis haperas because he wished to perform the korban pesach, can he eat terumah based upon that checking?

Ula says that he may eat terumah and Rabbah bar Ula says that he is forbidden from eating terumah.

There was an elder who said to Rabbah bar Ula that he should not disagree with Ula for the Mishna is proof to him. The Mishna had stated: If the wine-pressing and olive-pressing season has passed, and the am haaretz said to the Kohen, “I have set apart a quarter-log of oil to be kodesh,” he is deemed trustworthy even in regards to the terumah. It is evident that since he is believed in regards to the oil which is kodesh that it is tahor, he is believed regarding the terumah, as well; so too here, since we rely upon the checking for the korban pesach, it can be relied upon for terumah, as well. (25b)

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 24 - TOUCHING THE MEZUZAH

The Gemora (Shabbos 14a) states that people would place food of Terumah next to Torah scrolls. The reason they did this is they claimed that both the Terumah and the Sifrei Torah are Kodesh, so they should be kept together. The Chachamim realized that the Sifrei Torah were becoming damaged because mice would eat the food and then chew on the scrolls. They sought to put a halt to the practice of placing Terumah next to Sifrei Torah, so they enacted a decree that scrolls are considered tamei and render Terumah unfit.

To ensure that people would not touch a Sefer Torah with bare hands, the Chachamim decreed that one who touches a sefer with bare hands; his hands are rendered tamei and will render Terumah pasul.

There is a debate in the Rishonim if the decree only applies to one who touches Sifrei Torah, or to one who touches any sefer. Tosfos in Shabbos (ibid) maintains that this decree applies to all holy writings. Tosfos (Chagigah 24b) disagrees and holds that it is restricted to a Sefer Torah. The Rama (O”C 146) rules according to the Tosfos in Shabbos.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Teshuvah I, 58) questions the practice of placing one’s hand on top of a mezuzah, when the mezuzah is without any covering. He comments that the concept of placing one’s hand on the mezuzah is without a Talmudic source and should not take precedence over this halacha; it would be considered a mitzvah haba’ah b’aveirah. Thus, he recommends, if the mezuzah is uncovered, one should extend his sleeve over his hand.

The Rama (O”C 285) quotes the custom of placing one’s hand on the mezuzah from the Maharil.

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah Daf 24 - Highlights

The Mishna had stated: A vessel combines all of its contents together for kodesh (if one piece becomes tamei, they all become tamei even if they are not touching each other), but not for terumah.

Rabbi Chanin cites the Scriptural source for this: It is written [Bamidbar 17:14]: One gold ladle of ten shekels, filled with incense. By the fact that the Torah said “one ladle,” and not “a ladle,” this teaches us that all the incense of kodesh was regarded as one. Since the verse is referring to kodesh, the rule is restricted to kodesh and not to terumah.

Rav Kahana asks from a Mishna in Eduyos [8:1]: Rabbi Akiva added the fine flour of kodesh, the incense, the frankincense and the coals to the rule that if a tevul yom (one who has immersed in a mikvah but still has tumah on him until nightfall) touched part of it, it renders all of it unfit.

It is evident from Rabbi Akiva that this is a merely a Rabbinic injunction and yet Rabbi Chanin derived this rule from a verse in the Torah, which would indicate that the rule is a Biblical one?

Rish Lakish answers in the name of Bar Kappara: It is indeed a Biblical rule, but only when a vessel is required for that particular substance, however, when a vessel is not required, the rule that the vessel combines all of its contents is only a Rabbinic one. Rabbi Akiva is referring to the remainder of the mincha, where there is no necessity to place it in a vessel.

The Gemora asks: This explains Rabbi Akiva’s testimony regarding flour; how would we explain his testimony regarding the incense and the frankincense?

Rav Nachman answered in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: Rabbi Akiva is referring to a case where the incense or the frankincense was placed on a leather-spread (which is not a receptacle). The Biblical rule that a vessel can combine all of its contents is limited to a vessel that has an inside, but one that doesn’t (such as this leather-spread) will only combine its contents Rabbinically. (23b – 24a)

The Mishna had stated: Tumah of kodesh extends to a fourth level (revii), while that of terumah extends only to a third level (shlishi).

Rabbi Yosi taught in a braisa: How do we know that a revii by kodesh is pasul? (The term “tamei” describes something that it itself is contaminated and it can transmit tumah to another item; “pasul” means that it itself is contaminated, but it cannot transmit tumah to another item.) He answers that this is derived through a kal vachomer: We find by a mechusar kippurim (one who is lacking atonement) that he is permitted to eat terumah, nevertheless, he is forbidden from eating kodesh (this indicates that we are stricter in respect to kodesh than we are in regards to terumah); so a shlishi, which is pasul by terumah should certainly have the ability to render a revii by kodesh.

The Gemora states: A shlishi by kodesh is derived through a Scriptural verse. (24a)

The Mishna had stated: Regarding terumah, if one’s hand becomes tamei, the other hand remains tahor, while for kodesh, one must immerse both hands, because one hand contaminates the other for kodesh but not for terumah.

Rav Shizbi says: The Mishna’s rule only applies when the hand which is tamei is touching the hand which is tahor while the tahor hand is holding a consecrated item (the Chachamim were concerned that his tamei hand might come into contact with the kodesh); however, the consecrated item will not become pasul if the tamei hand touches the hand which is tahor and afterwards the tahor hand touches a consecrated item.

Abaye asks on Rav Shizbi from a braisa which would indicate that one hand can render the other hand tamei even if the tahor hand is not in contact with the kodesh. (24a)

Rish Lakish maintains that a hand which is tamei can render his other hand tamei, but it cannot render someone else’s hand tamei. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and states: The hand which is tamei can render his own hand tamei and the hand of his friend, as well. Only the original hand which was tamei can render his friend’s hand tamei. When we say that one hand can render his other hand tamei, the meaning is that the second hand can now render kodesh unfit, but it cannot make kodesh tamei. (His second hand is regarded as a shlishi and it can only bring about a revii, which is pasul, but not tamei.)

The Gemora states: Rish Lakish retracted from his initial opinion and follows Rabbi Yochanan’s viewpoint. (24a – 24b)

The Mishna had stated: One may eat dry terumah foods with hands that are tamei, but not kodesh foods.

Rabbi Chanina ben Antignos taught in a braisa: (The significance of the food being dry is that it is not susceptible to become tamei – only food which was wet can become tamei.) What is the novelty in teaching that the kodesh can become tamei even though it is dry; kodesh can become tamei even without becoming wet through the principle of “the esteem for kodesh” prepares the foods to become tamei?

The Gemora answers that the Mishna is referring to a case where one’s friend stuck kodesh foods into his mouth or he stuck them in himself using a toothpick or a stick, and he wanted to eat a radish or onion of chulin with them. The Chachamim decreed that this should not be done when his hands are tamei because his hands which are tamei might come into contact with the kodesh in his mouth; they were not concerned regarding terumah and relied on the fact that he will be careful. This was only permitted if the chulin food was dry. If the chulin was wet, it would be forbidden for him to simultaneously eat the terumah since his tamei hand (a sheini) might touch the liquid on the chulin, rendering it a rishon, which will then make the chulin food into a sheini. Subsequently, the chulin food which is a sheini will render the terumah which is in his mouth into a shlishi. (24b)

The Mishna had stated: An onein (one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet), a mechusar kippurim (one who is lacking atonement) require immersion for kodesh, but not for terumah.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this?

The Gemora answers: Since they were forbidden from eating kodesh up until now, The Chachamim required them to immerse in a mikvah before eating kodesh. (They were concerned for the following: Just like they had diverted their attention from eating kodesh, they might also divert their attention from guarding themselves not to become tamei in a manner that would prevent them from eating kodesh.) (24b)

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 23 - JUSTIFYING A CUSTOM REGARDING GEBROCHTS

Shoel U’meishiv (I: 1:130) issues a novel ruling based on our Gemora.

The Mishna had stated: One may carry terumah while he is carrying a midras (objects that became tamei when a zav, zavah or niddah place their weight on them – they are classified as an av hatumah and have the ability to contaminate people or utensils), but one may not carry kodesh while carrying a midras.

The Gemora asks: What is the reasoning for this prohibition?

Rav Yehudah says in the name of Shmuel: There was once an incident where a person was transporting a barrel of consecrated wine from one place to another and a strap from his sandal (which was tamei through midras) broke off, and he took it and placed it on the top of the barrel and it fell into the airspace of the barrel, and rendered the barrel and the consecrated wine tamei. It was at that time that they said: One may carry terumah while he is carrying a midras, but one may not carry kodesh while carrying a midras.

The Gemora asks: If so, they should have decreed regarding terumah, as well?

The Gemora answers: This Mishna is following the opinion of Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya, who maintains that when a decree was impelled because of a certain incident, it is limited to the same situation as the original incident, and since it occurred by kodesh, the decree was issued only in regards to kodesh and not to terumah.

The Shoel U’meishiv says: The obligation of eating matzah on Pesach, which is lechem oni, poor man’s bread (water and flour) is only on the first night of Pesach and not any other nights or days, including the second night. Eating lechem oni is because the Jewish people baked the dough before it had a chance to rise on the way out of Egypt. Since the mitzvah is based upon that incident and that occurred on the night of the fifteenth of Nissan, that is the only night that we have this obligation.

We know when the night of the fifteenth is, and we are not uncertain regarding the days of the new month. The Chachamim instituted that we must observe two days of Yom Tov since that it what they did in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh. Accordingly, we must fulfill all mitzvos on the second night, as well.

However, that is only regarding mitzvos that if we wouldn’t fulfill, it would be degrading for the Yom Tov. We are required to eat matzah and marror since otherwise, it would be apparent that we are not recognizing this night as a Yom Tov; however, matzah which is not lechem oni would not degrade the Yom Tov at all and therefore it would not be necessary. He cites a Beis Yosef as proof to this.

I heard that this could be the justification for the custom of not eating gebrochts only on the first night of Pesach. If the reason for not eating gebrochts on Pesach is because there is a concern that it might result in chametz, there is no distinction between the first night and all the other nights; but if the reason is based on lechem oni, there can be logic to say that it is only applicable on the first night.

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 23 - Highlights

The Mishna had stated: One may carry terumah while he is carrying a midras (objects that became tamei when a zav, zavah or niddah place their weight on them – they are classified as an av hatumah and have the ability to contaminate people or utensils), but one may not carry kodesh while carrying a midras.

The Gemora asks: What is the reasoning for this prohibition?

Rav Yehudah says in the name of Shmuel: There was once an incident where a person was transporting a barrel of consecrated wine from one place to another and a strap from his sandal (which was tamei through midras) broke off, and he took it and placed it on the top of the barrel and it fell into the airspace of the barrel, and rendered the barrel and the consecrated wine tamei. It was at that time that they said: One may carry terumah while he is carrying a midras, but one may not carry kodesh while carrying a midras.

The Gemora asks: If so, they should have decreed regarding terumah, as well?

The Gemora answers: This Mishna is following the opinion of Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya, who maintains that when a decree was impelled because of a certain incident, it is limited to the same situation as the original incident, and since it occurred by kodesh, the decree was issued only in regards to kodesh and not to terumah.

The Gemora inquires: The decree was issued regarding a sandal which was tamei; would the decree extend to one which is tahor (out of concern that this will lead to carrying one which was tamei)?

The decree was issued regarding an open barrel; would the decree extend to a closed barrel (out of concern that this will lead to carrying an open one)?

The Gemora inquires further: What would happen if one transgressed and did carry kodesh while carrying a midras? Does the kodesh become tamei?

The Gemora presents a dispute regarding this: Rabbi Ila says: It is tamei. Rabbi Zeira says: It is tahor. (22b – 23a)

The Mishna had stated: Utensils that were completed in a state of tahara still require immersion for kodesh, but not for terumah.

The Gemora inquires: Who completed these utensils? If a chaver completed them, there is no necessity for immersion. If an am haaretz completed them, why does the Mishna consider this a case where they were “completed in a state of tahara”?

Rabbah bar Shila answers in the name of Rav Masnah, who said in the name of Shmuel: The Mishna is referring to a case where a chaver completed it, but we are concerned that the utensil became tamei through the spittle of an am haaretz, and that is why an immersion is required.

The Gemora proceeds to analyze this explanation: When did the spittle fall on the utensil? If it fell prior to the completion of the utensil, it cannot become tamei at that time because it is not yet a utensil. He cannot mean that it fell afterwards because the chaver would certainly be careful that it shouldn’t become tamei.

The Gemora answers: Shmuel is referring to a case where the spittle fell on the utensil prior to its completion (when the chaver was not careful) and it was still moist at the time of completion (thus rendering the utensil tamei). (23a)

The Gemora infers from the Mishna that the utensil which is completed in a state of tahara requires immersion, but it does not require the passage of nightfall. (A person or utensil that becomes Biblically tamei and immersed in a mikvah is required to wait until the passage of nightfall to become completely tahor. After the immersion and prior to nightfall, he is referred to as a tevul yom.)

The Gemora states: The Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer. We have learned in a Mishna in Parah (5:4): Regarding a reed tube that one cut for putting the ashes of the Parah Adumah in it, Rabbi Eliezer says that he should immerse it immediately and Rabbi Yehoshua says that he first should render it tamei and then he should immerse it. This was done in order to negate the opinion of the Sadducees who maintained that the person burning the Parah Adumah and all its utensils must be completely tahor, i.e. having experienced nightfall. The Chachamim disagreed and maintained that even a tevul yom is valid to perform the services of the Parah Adumah.

The Gemora explains: It is understandable according to Rabbi Yehoshua that the utensil is rendered tamei first as a demonstration against the Sadducees since the utensil will be used despite the fact that it is a tevul yom; but according to Rabbi Eliezer, how is using this utensil that has not been contaminated negating the Sadducees viewpoint? If we will say that every utensil completed in a state of tahara requires the passage of nightfall, then it is understandable how we are repudiating their opinion because we are using this utensil after immersion, but prior to nightfall, despite the fact that it is a tevul yom; however, if every utensil completed in a state of tahara does not require the passage of nightfall, using this utensil will not serve as a demonstration to negate the Sadducees viewpoint. It is evident that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that every utensil completed in a state of tahara requires immersion and the passage of nightfall, and this is the proof that our Mishna does not follow Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion.

Rav said: Perhaps our Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer. Even though every utensil completed in a state of tahara does not require the passage of nightfall, the tube cut for the Parah Adumah will require the passage of nightfall in order to be considered completely tahor since the Chachamim considered it like a corpse-contaminated object on the seventh day of its purification process. Using this tube without the passage of nightfall negates the opinion of the Sadducees. (23a – 23b)

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It now appears that Daf Notes will be heading to the final round of voting in two out of the three categories that we were nominated in. If you would like to cast a vote for us in the remaining one (or any others, for that matter), you can go here at the JIB Awards to vote. Thank you.

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 22 - AVOIDING STRIFE

There are numerous places throughout Chazal, where the sages permitted various things (that should have been prohibited) because otherwise it would crate animosity amongst each other. Here, in brief, are some of these situations.

*** If a Kohen Gadol became unfit on Yom Kippur and we appointed another Kohen Gadol to replace him for that day; the first one returns to his position and the second one cannot serve as a Kohen Gadol or as a Kohen Hedyot (common Kohen). He cannot serve as a regular Kohen because of the principle that one can ascend in matters of sanctity but one cannot descend in matters of sanctity. He cannot serve as a Kohen Gadol because this would create animosity between him and the original Kohen Gadol. There is an opinion that disagrees and allows the substitute Kohen Gadol to serve as a Kohen Gadol. (Yoma 12a)

*** Even according to the opinion mentioned above that we allow the substitute Kohen Gadol to serve as a Kohen Gadol, that is only by a similar type of Kohen Gadol; however, we do not allow the Kohen Gadol who was appointed to lead the battle to serve in the Bais HaMikdosh together with the other Kohen Gadol; this would create certain animosity.

*** We do not anoint two Kohanim Gedolim simultaneously because it will create animosity. (Yerushalmi Yoma 1:1)

*** One who makes a vow that his friend should eat with him (otherwise, he will be forbidden to derive benefit from him) and the friend does not trust the one who took the oath in regards to maaser; he is permitted to eat by him the first Shabbos (a marital feast) because otherwise it would create animosity. (D’mai 4:2)

*** One who is particular not to eat bread baked by a non-Jew is permitted to eat the bread if he is eating at the same table along with those that are not particular on this stringency. This is because otherwise, it would create animosity. He is not permitted to eat the butter of a gentile because it is not considered the primary part of the meal and he could say that he is not interested in eating butter now. (Beis Yosef in the name of Rabbeinu Simcha Y”D 112)

*** We are required to make Eruvei Chatzeros with a full loaf of bread and not with pieces since this will lead to strife among the partners; those who give full loaves might resent those who give pieces. (Eruvin 81a)

*** We should not have festivities for two brides in the same city unless there are enough people to bring about joy to each of them. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar says: Even in that case it’s forbidden because one might be pretty and the other not; they might bestow more honor on one than the other and this will lead to animosity.

*** The Mishna in Taanis ruled that if it still did not rain after the seven fasts, they should conduct less business. They should not become involved with building, planting, marrying or greeting their friends. They should conduct their lives as if they were condemned by Hashem.

The Gemora elaborates on the ruling of the Mishna that one should not greet his friend. The Gemora states that Torah scholars should not greet each other at all. If an unlearned man greets a Torah scholar, he should respond in a low tone and in a somber manner because otherwise it would lead to strife amongst them.

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 22 - Highlights

The Gemora continues its discussion of the Mishna regarding the reason that the Chachamim issued a decree against immersing one utensil inside the other for kodesh.

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between the explanation of Rabbi Ila (It is because the weight of the inside utensil prevents the water from circulating freely between the two utensils; if this would occur, the immersion would not be valid because the water must touch every part of the utensil.) and the explanation of Rava (They were concerned that people might immerse needles or spinning hooks (small items) inside a utensil whose opening is not the required size of a skin bottle’s tube (if the opening is less than that, the immersion is not valid because we view the water inside the utensil as separate from the water in the mikvah).

The Gemora answers: A case that there would be a difference between them would be if one would fill a large basket or strainer with utensils and immerse them. There still would be a concern for a chatzitzah because the inner utensil would weigh down on the outer one; however, there would be no concern that people might immerse needles or spinning hooks inside a utensil whose opening is not the required size of a skin bottle’s tube because a large basket or strainer will always have a large opening and they would not be included in the decree. (22a)

The Gemora qualifies the ruling: One cannot immerse one utensil inside another if the opening is less than the size of a skin bottle’s tube is only when the outer utensil is tahor; however, if the outer utensil is tamei, we can utilize the principle of migu and say that since the immersion is valid in regards to the outside utensil (and it is evident that the water from the mikvah is connected to the inside of the outer utensil), it will be valid for the inner utensil, as well. The Gemora proves this from a Mishna in Mikvaos (6:2). (22a)

The Gemora states that the argument between Rava and Rabbi Ila is in fact a Tannaic dispute. We have learned in a braisa: If one would fill a large basket or strainer with utensils and immerse them, the utensils are tahor whether they will be used for terumah or even kodesh. (This is consistent with Rava’s viewpoint that the concern in the Mishna is because one might immerse needles or spinning hooks inside a utensil whose opening is not the required size of a skin bottle’s tube, and this is not applicable by a large basket or strainer since they will always have a large opening and there is no reason for a Rabbinic injunction.) Abba Shaul maintains that that the immersion is only valid for terumah, but not for kodesh. (This is consistent with Rabbi Ila’s viewpoint that the concern in the Mishna is on the account of chatzitzah and this would apply by a large basket or strainer, as well.)

The Gemora asks: If we are concerned that the inside utensil weighs down on the outer one and thus prevents the water from circulating freely between them, why is the immersion valid for terumah?

The Gemora answers: Who is this decree for? Obviously, for the chaveirim (people that are meticulous regarding the performance of mitzvos), since the am haaretz (one who is not particular in regards to the laws of tumah and tahara) will not be listening to us regarding how to make a valid immersion. Accordingly, there is no basis for issuing a decree regarding terumah for the chaveirim will ensure that the inside utensil is not weighing down on the outer one resulting in a chatzitzah, and if he observes that there is a concern, he will undoubtedly raise the inside utensil.

The Gemora asks: If so, let it be valid for kodesh, as well?

The Gemora answers: We are concerned that an am haaretz will observe a chaver immersing one utensil inside of another and he will not know that the chaver is making certain that there is no chatzitzah, and he will subsequently do the same.

The Gemora asks: If so, we should disqualify the immersion for terumah, as well (perhaps an am haaretz will observe a chaver immersing one utensil inside of another and he will not know that the chaver is making certain that there is no chatzitzah, and he will subsequently do the same and use the utensil for terumah)?

The Gemora answers: Regarding terumah we have an option, that we will not accept terumah from an am haaretz.

The Gemora asks: If that is an option, why don’t we say the same thing by kodesh and not accept kodoshim from them?

The Gemora answers: This would create animosity between the am haaratzim and the chaveirim.

The Gemora asks: Won’t there be animosity by the fact that we are not accepting terumah from them.

The Gemora answers: No, because the am haaratzim always have the alternative of giving their terumah to a Kohen am haaretz. (22a)

The Gemora asks: Why do we permit the immersion of one utensil inside another for terumah; perhaps an am haaretz will observe this and do the same for his utensils, and subsequently a chaver will borrow the utensil from the am haaretz and use it for terumah? The Gemora cites a Mishna in Idiyos (1:14) where it emerges that the Tannaim maintain that we are concerned for borrowing.

The Gemora answers: If we borrow from them, we will immerse the utensil prior to using it.

The Gemora asks: Why is it necessary for the chaver to immerse the utensil after borrowing it; didn’t we learn in a braisa that an am haaretz is believed that an immersion was done in regards to corpse tumah?

Abaye answers: He is believed in respect to his body but not in regards to his utensils.

Rava answers: He is believed to say that he never immersed one utensil inside another, but he is not believed to say that he immersed the utensil inside another one, but the opening was at least the size of a skin bottle’s tube.

The Gemora cites a braisa to support Rava: An am haaretz is believed that his produce is not in a state where it is susceptible to become tamei (it never got wet), but he is not believed to say that it was susceptible to become tamei, but it didn’t occur. (22a – 22b)

The Mishna had stated: Different parts of the utensil are considered separate for terumah, but not for kodesh (if one part becomes tamei, the rest of the utensil becomes tamei).

The Gemora explains this by citing a Mishna in Keilim (25:6): If a wooden or metal utensil becomes tamei from a liquid that touches the outside of the utensil (this tumah is only Rabbinic because a utensil can only become tamei from an av hatumah, i.e. any original source of tumah, such as the spit or urine from a niddah or a zav); only the outside of the utensil will become tamei; the inside, the lip, and its handles will remain tahor. (If the situation would involve a Biblical tumah, the entire utensil would become tamei.) If the utensil became tamei on the inside, the entire utensil becomes tamei. (22b)

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