Daf Yomi - Yevamos 98 - Highlights

LEGALLY FATHERLESS
A braisa had stated: If there were twin brothers whose conception was not in sanctity, but their birth was in sanctity (their mother converted after conception, but before they were born), they do not perform chalitzah or yibum, but they would be liable to the punishment of kares if they would cohabit with their brother’s wife.

Rava seeks to explain why these brothers are regarded as maternal brothers (and are liable for the prohibition against cohabiting with a brother’s wife), but they are not regarded as paternal brothers (and that is why they are not subject for yibum and chalitzah). Rava said: The Rabbis said that an Egyptian, who converts has no father. This is so, even if we know with a certainty the father’s identity. This can be proven from the braisa cited above regarding twin brothers, where one drop of semen (from their father) divided into two, and the braisa rules that they are not subject to the laws of yibum and chalitzah. It seems evident from here that the Torah voided their paternity, as it is written [Yechezkel 23:20]: Their flesh (the Egyptians of old) is the flesh of donkeys and their issue is the issue of horses. (A Jewish child that converted is considered halachically fatherless.) (97b – 98a)

TWO BROTHERS BORN FROM A MOTHER WHO CONVERTED AFTERWARDS
The Gemora (97b) had cited a dispute between Rav Acha bar Yaakov and Rav Sheishes regarding whether brothers, who converted are permitted to marry each other’s wives or not. The Gemora attempts to bring a proof to Rav Acha bar Yaakov that such a marriage is permitted from the following braisa: Ben Yasyan related: When I traveled to the coastal towns, I came across a certain convert who had married the wife of his maternal brother. I said to him: My son, who permitted you to marry her? He replied: Behold, there is woman who converted and all her seven children married their brother’s wives. It was on this bench that Rabbi Akiva sat when he made the following two statements: A convert may marry the wife of his maternal brother, and he also stated: It is written [Yonah 3:1]: And the word of Hashem came unto Yonah the second time, saying. The phrase, “the second time” indicates that only a second time did the Shechinah speak to him; a third time, the Shechinah did not speak to him.

The braisa stated here that a convert may marry the wife of his maternal brother. Does this not refer to a case where his brother married her while he was a convert (and nevertheless such a marriage is permitted; this would support Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s opinion)?

The Gemora answers: No! The braisa is referring to a case where he married her while he was still an idolater (and the marriage was subsequently voided when he converted).

The Gemora asks: What was the necessity to state such an obvious law?

The Gemora answers: It might have been assumed that a preventive measure should be enacted in the case of a brother's betrothal while he is still an idolater lest erroneous conclusions be drawn in the case where he is married her while he was already a convert, therefore, the braisa taught us that no such measure was enacted. (98a)
BELIEVING THE CONVERT
The Gemora asks on the aforementioned braisa: How could Ben Yasyan accept the convert’s statement from Rabbi Akiva? Surely Rabbi Abba stated in the name of Rav Huna in the name of Rav: Wherever a scholar issues a halachic ruling (that was previously unknown) and such a point comes up for a practical decision, he is obeyed if he made the statement before the incident occurred, but if the statement was made only after the incident occurred, he is not obeyed.

The Gemora answers: If you wish I might say that the incident occurred after he made his statement.

Alternatively, I might say that it was because he brought proof from the woman and her seven children.

Alternatively, I might say that here it is different because he related another Rabbi Akiva’s other statement together with it (just as he was believed regarding that statement, he was believed regarding the other one as well). (98a)
HASHEM SPEAKING TO YONAH
Rabbi Akiva was cited in the braisa above as saying the following: It is written [Yonah 3:1]: And the word of Hashem came unto Yonah the second time, saying. The phrase, “the second time” indicates that only a second time did the Shechinah speak to him; a third time, the Shechinah did not speak to him.

The Gemora challenges this statement from a verse written elsewhere [Melachim II, 14:25]: He restored the border of Israel from the entrance of Hamas until the sea of Aravah, according to the word of Hashem, the God of Israel, which He spoke by the hand of His servant Yonah the son of Amittai, the prophet, who was from Gas-cheifer. (It seems apparent that Hashem did in fact speak to Yonah a third time?)

Ravina answers: Rabbi Akiva’s statement was specifically referring to the city of Nineveh. Hasham said that He will not speak to him any further regarding Nineveh, but He will speak to him concerning other matters.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answers: He actually only spoke to Yonah twice, and the following is the explanation of the verse in Melachim: According to the word of Hashem … which He spoke by the hand of his servant, the prophet. Just as His intention towards Nineveh was turned from evil to good, so was his intention towards Israel, in the days of Yerovam the son of Yoash, turned from evil to good. (98a)
TWO BROTHERS BORN FROM A MOTHER WHO CONVERTED AFTERWARDS
The Gemora attempts once again to bring a proof to Rav Acha bar Yaakov from the following braisa: A convert whose conception was not in sanctity, but his birth was in sanctity has maternal relatives, but he does not have paternal relatives. If he married his maternal sister, he must separate from her, but if he married his paternal sister, he may remain with her. If he married a maternal sister of his father, he must separate from her, but if he married a paternal sister of his father, he may remain with her. If he married a maternal sister of his mother, he must separate from her, but if he married a paternal sister of his mother, he may remain with her. Rabbi Meir says: He must separate from her (since there is a maternal element to this relationship). The Chachamim say: He may remain with her (it does not resemble a maternal sister). He is permitted to marry his (older) brother’s wife (who was born not in sanctity; the Rabbis did not issue their decree regarding his brother’s wife since she is not a blood-relative) and his father’s brother’s wife and all other arayos are permitted to him. If an idolater marries a mother and a daughter and he subsequently converts, he may marry one of them and he must separate from the other. He should not marry them initially. If his wife dies, he is permitted to marry his mother-in-law. There are those that learn this braisa that if his wife dies, he is prohibited from marrying his mother-in-law.

The braisa stated here that a convert may marry his brother’s wife. Does this not refer to a case where his brother married her while he was a convert (and nevertheless such a marriage is permitted; this would support Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s opinion)?

The Gemora answers: No! The braisa is referring to a case where he married her while he was still an idolater (and the marriage was subsequently voided when he converted).

The Gemora asks: What was the necessity to state such an obvious law?

The Gemora answers: It might have been assumed that a preventive measure should be enacted in the case of a brother's betrothal while he is still an idolater lest erroneous conclusions be drawn in the case where he is married her while he was already a convert, therefore, the braisa taught us that no such measure was enacted. (98a – 98b)
MOTHER-IN-LAW
The braisa had stated: If his wife dies, he is permitted to marry his mother-in-law. There are those that learn this braisa that if his wife dies, he is prohibited from marrying his mother-in-law.

The Gemora explains that these two versions of the braisa correspond to the opinions of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. The version that says that he is prohibited to marry his mother-in-law is following the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who states that a mother-in-law, after the death of his wife is subject to the same prohibition as a mother-in-law while the wife was alive, and therefore, in respect to a convert, a preventive measure was enacted. The version that says that he is permitted to marry his mother-in-law is following the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who states that that a mother-in-law, after the death of his wife is subject to a weaker prohibition than a mother-in-law while the wife was alive, and in respect to a convert, the Rabbis did not decree that a preventive measure should be enacted. (98b)
MISHNA
The Mishna states: If there were five women whose children became intermingled (and it is not known which is the son of which mother, and each of them has another son who did not become intermingled), and grew up, married and died childless, the halacha is as follows: Four submit to chalitzah from one of the widows (since she is possibly his brother's wife), and the remaining one performs yibum (for she is permitted to him either way: if she is in reality his brother's wife, he is fulfilling the mitzvah of yibum, and if not, her yavam has submitted to chalitzah from her and she is permitted to marry anyone in the general population). Then, he (the one who had performed yibum), and three of the others submit to chalitzah from another one of the widows, and the remaining one performs yibum. Thus, there are four chalitzos and one yibum to each one of the widows. (98b)
GEMORA
The Gemora states: The chalitzah must be performed prior to the yibum because if one will perform yibum first, and he is not the actual yavam, he is violating the prohibition of a yevamah marrying someone from the general population without being released by the yavam with a yibum or chalitzah. (98b)

[END]

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Riddles Update

Rabbi Sedley illustrates each and every riddle here. Please take the time to visit that post. It will be extremely beneficial for understanding the Gemora.

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BELZER REBBE: REAPING THE BENEFITS EVEN AFTER DEATH

Rabbi Elozar related a discussion in the Beis Medrash, but did not relate the discussion in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. When Rabbi Yochanan heard about this omission, he was perturbed.

The Gemora asks: Why was Rabbi Yochanan so perturbed in the first place?

The Gemora answered: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, what is the meaning of the following verse? “I will dwell in your tent in many worlds?” Is it possible for someone to dwell in a tent in both worlds? It means that David stated before Hashem: Master of the Universe, it should be Your will that after I die, they should say a statement in my name in this world (as well as my being in the next world), for Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: Any deceased Torah scholar, in whose name a traditional statement is reported in this world, his lips move gently in the grave (it is as if he is living in both worlds).

The Belzer Rebbe said over on the last Shabbos of his lifetime: After a person dies, he is unable to perform any mitzvos or acts of kindness in order to receive reward, as the Gemora in Eruvin (22a) states: Today (this world) is the time designated for performance of His commandments, tomorrow (in the next world) is the time designated for reward.

However, there are ways that a person can receive reward even after his death. If one does a mitzvah with full intention, and as a result of that, others are influenced because of him and they also perform that mitzvah, the mitzvah of others is credited on his account. If one leaves behind Torah insights, and others relate his words, his lips move gently in the grave, and he will be rewarded for the Torah being studied.

This is the explanation of the verse [Devarim 11:21]: That your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children, upon the land which Hashem swore unto your fathers to give them, as the days of the heavens above the earth. How will a person’s days be multiplied when he is in heaven? In the preceding verse, it is written: And you shall teach Torah to your children. If one teaches his children Torah and trains them in the proper method of serving Hashem, their torah studying and mitzvos observance will be credited to the parent. Even when one is residing in heaven, it is regarded as if he is still living on the earth, because he is reaping the benefits of his productive lifetime.

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RIDDLES

(The following are riddles on the possible complications of relatives, proposed in order to arm the Torah scholars against the heretics.) My paternal brother, but not my maternal brother; and he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife. (This may be stated by a daughter who was born as a result of her father violating a woman, where the son of the father by another wife has subsequently married her mother.) Rami bar Chama said: Such a relationship is not halachically possible according to the ruling of Rabbi Yehudah in our Mishna (since Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one may not marry a woman with whom his father violated).

A woman says: He whom I carry on my shoulder is my brother and my son, and I am his sister. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his own daughter, and had a son by her. (This child is her son and her brother.)

A woman says: Greetings to you my son; I am the daughter of your sister. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his own daughter's daughter. (She is the child’s mother and its sister’s daughter.)

Men who draw water with pails, we shall ask you a riddle that defies solution: He whom I carry is my son and I am the daughter of his brother. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his own son’s daughter. (She is the child’s mother and its brother’s daughter.)

A woman says: Woe, woe! For my brother who is my father, who is my husband, who is the son of my husband; he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife; and he provides no food for his orphan brothers, the children of his daughter. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his mother and had a daughter from her. He then cohabited with that daughter (becoming her husband).Then the idolater’s father cohabited with her (thus becoming the grandfather’s husband as well) and had children from her. (The idolater is the daughter’s brother; he is her father; he is her husband; he is the son of her (second) husband; he is the husband of her mother; she is the daughter of his wife.)

A woman says: I and you are brother and sister, I and your father are brother and sister, and I and your mother are sisters. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his mother and had two daughters from her. He then cohabited with one of these and had a son from her. When the son's mother's sister (the other daughter) carries him, she addresses him in this manner.

I and you are the children of sisters, I and your father are the children of brothers, and I and your mother are the children of brothers. This indeed is possible also in the case of a permissible marriage. There were for instance, three brothers; Reuven, Shimon and Levi. Reuven had two daughters, and Shimon came and married one of them. And then came the son of Levi, and married the other. The son of Shimon can address the grandson of Levi in this manner.

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PURPOSE OF THE RIDDLES: AN IDOLATER’S MARRIAGE WITH A WOMAN WHO IS FORBIDDEN TO HIM

The Aruch Lener asks on this from the principle that one prohibition cannot take effect upon another prohibition. The father’s brother’s wife was initially forbidden to the son on account of being an aunt; how can the second prohibition of the father’s yevamah take effect?

The Yashreish Yaakov answers that this is an exception to the rule derived from this verse that the second prohibition can in fact take effect, and the son will be liable for both prohibitions.

The Aruch Lener answers that the Gemora does not mean to say that the son will be liable for two prohibitions and he will incur lashes twice. Rather, the Gemora means that he will have violated two transgressions and when he dies, he will be buried among the truly wicked (like the Gemora above 32a stated).

The Mishna L’melech in Perashas Derochim inquires as to what the halacha would be if an idolater cohabits with a woman that is forbidden to him on account of being a close relative, and he has intention to acquire her as his wife. Does the idolater in fact acquire her as a wife, and she will be regarded as a married woman, or perhaps the kiddushin does not take effect, in the same manner that it has no validity by a Jew? He quotes from the Ashkenaz Scholars that the idolater does not acquire her.

The Minchas Chinuch disagrees and maintains that she will be regarded as a married woman. He explains: A verse is required to teach us that kiddushin cannot take effect with a woman who is an ervah; the verse is relevant to a Jew, not to an idolater, and therefore, there is no Scriptural source that will invalidate the kiddushin of an idolater, even if it is with a woman that he is forbidden to have relations with.

The Aruch Lener proves from our Gemora that there is validity to the kiddushin. The Gemora cited the following riddle: A woman says: Woe, woe! For my brother who is my father, who is my husband, who is the son of my husband; he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife; and he provides no food for his orphan brothers, the children of his daughter. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his mother and had a daughter from her. He then cohabited with that daughter (becoming her husband).Then the idolater’s father cohabited with her (thus becoming the grandfather’s husband as well) and had children from her. (The idolater is the daughter’s brother; he is her father; he is her husband; he is the son of her (second) husband; he is the husband of her mother; she is the daughter of his wife.)

It is evident that even though the idolater cohabited with his mother, which he is prohibited from doing, he is nevertheless regarded as her husband. The Aruch Lener concludes that it is quite possible that this novel ruling is precisely what the Gemora is intending to teach us with this obscure riddle.

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REPORTING A STATEMENT IN YOUR OWN NAME - Yevamos 97 - Daf Yomi

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, what is the meaning of the following verse? “I will dwell in your tent in many worlds?” Is it possible for someone to dwell in a tent in both worlds? It means that David stated before Hashem: Master of the Universe, it should be Your will that after I die, they should say a statement in my name in this world (as well as my being in the next world), for Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: Any deceased Torah scholar, in whose name a traditional statement is reported in this world, his lips move gently in the grave (it is as if he is living in both worlds).

The Kinsker Rav in Chelkas Yoav (O”C 46) states that this is applicable even if one relates a Torah statement in his own name. In Heaven, it is known who was the author of this statement, and it will be attributed to him. He does say, however, that the one who said over the statement without attributing it to the proper author, has transgresses the negative prohibition of stealing. He has stolen the honor that the actual author duly deserved.

The Yefeh Mareh in his gloss to the Yerushalmi in Brachos disagrees, and he writes that it is only when the Torah scholar’s name is mentioned that his lips begin to move. From the fact that his name was mentioned in this world, it is regarded as if he is alive and his lips can move. The reason for this is based on a Yerushalmi in Shekalim (7b) which states that when a person is relating a Torah statement from another scholar, he should envision as if that scholar is standing beside him; it is through this that he is considered as if he is alive.

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AUNT AND HIS FATHER’S YEVAMAH

It is written [Devarim 23:1]: A man shall not take his father's wife, and he shall not uncover his father's robe. The Torah is referring to a woman awaiting yibum by his father; and the meaning of his father's robe is: He shall not uncover the robe which is designated for his father.

The Gemora asks: Why is this verse necessary; this woman is prohibited regardless, from the fact that she is his aunt?

The Gemora answers: The verse is necessary to make him liable for two transgressions.

The Aruch Lener asks on this from the principle that one prohibition cannot take effect upon another prohibition. The father’s brother’s wife was initially forbidden to the son on account of being an aunt; how can the second prohibition of the father’s yevamah take effect?

The Yashreish Yaakov answers that this is an exception to the rule derived from this verse that the second prohibition can in fact take effect, and the son will be liable for both prohibitions.

The Aruch Lener answers that the Gemora does not mean to say that the son will be liable for two prohibitions and he will incur lashes twice. Rather, the Gemora means that he will have violated two transgressions and when he dies, he will be buried among the truly wicked (like the Gemora above 32a stated).

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos - Highlights

LIPS OF TORAH SCHOLARS MOVE GENTLY IN THEIR GRAVE
Rabbi Elozar related a discussion in the Beis Medrash, but did not relate the discussion in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. When Rabbi Yochanan heard about this omission, he was perturbed.

The Gemora asks: Why was Rabbi Yochanan so perturbed in the first place?

The Gemora answered: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, what is the meaning of the following verse? “I will dwell in your tent in many worlds?” Is it possible for someone to dwell in a tent in both worlds? It means that David stated before Hashem: Master of the Universe, it should be Your will that after I die, they should say a statement in my name in this world (as well as my being in the next world), for Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: Any deceased Torah scholar, in whose name a traditional statement is reported in this world, his lips move gently in the grave (it is as if he is living in both worlds).

Rabbi Yitzchak the son of Zeira, and others say that Shimon Nezira said: What is the verse? It is written [Shir Hashirim 7:10]: And the utterance of your palate is like the best wine; it goes to my beloved with sincerity, moving gently the lips of those who are asleep. The Sages are likened to a heated mass of grapes. As a heated mass of grapes (sitting in the vat for a week until they become warm; the wine then emerges easily), as soon as a man places his finger upon it, the wine moves immediately, so too with the scholars, as soon as a traditional statement is made in their name in this world, their lips move gently in the grave. (96b – 97a)

STATUS OF A TWENTY-YEAR-OLD WHO IS NOT PHYSICALLY DEVELOPED
The Mishna had stated: These laws do not only apply to a nine-year old, but also to a twenty-year- old man who has not yet developed two pubic hairs which qualify him as a halachic adult.

The Gemora challenges this ruling from the following Mishna in Niddah (47b): If a man dies childless and leaves a brother who at the age of twenty did not produce two pubic hairs, they (the relatives of the widow who wish to exempt her from chalizah and yibum) must bring evidence that he is in fact twenty years of age and that he is a saris (by a display of the required symptoms). If that happens, he neither submits to chalizah nor performs yibum. If a man dies childless and leaves a wife who at the age of twenty did not produce two pubic hairs, they must bring evidence that she is in fact twenty years of age and that she is an aylonis. If that happens, she does not require chalizah or yibum. (It emerges from this Mishna that a twenty-year- old man who has not yet developed two pubic hairs qualify him as a halachic adult, albeit a saris, but he is not regarded as a minor.)

The Gemora answers: Didn’t Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak say in the name of Rav that this Mishna is applicable only where he has already developes the signs of being a saris; that is when we regard him as an adult. Otherwise, a twenty-year-old man who has not developed two pubic hairs is considered a minor.

The Gemora asks: Up until what age do we regard him as a minor, and not a saris?

The Gemora answers: The Beis Medrash of Rabbi Chiya taught a braisa: Until a majority of his years have passed (until he is thirty-six years of age since man's span of life is taken to be seventy years, as it is written in Tehillim 90:10).

Whenever people came with such a case (twenty without developing pubic hairs) before Rava, he would look at their stature. If the youth was thin, he would say to them: Let him first be fattened; and if he was stout, he would say to them: Let him first be made to lose weight. For pubic hairs, they can disappear sometimes as a result of emaciation and sometimes they disappear as a result of obesity. (97a)

WE WILL RETURN TO YOU,
HA’ISHAH RABBAH

MISHNA
The Mishna states: One may marry the relatives of a woman who was violated or seduced by him. He who violates or seduces a relative of his wife is liable. A man may marry the woman violated by his father, and the woman seduced by his father, the woman violated by his son, or the woman seduced by his son. Rabbi Yehudah prohibits the woman violated by his father or the woman seduced by his father. (97a)

MARRYING THE RELATIVES OF A WOMAN WITH WHOM HE HAD RELATIONS WITH
The Gemora cites the following braisa which supports the ruling of the Mishna: If one violated a woman, he is permitted to marry her daughter. If one married a woman, he is prohibited from marrying her daughter.

The Gemora asks on this ruling from the following braisa: One who is suspected of adultery with a woman is forbidden to marry her mother, daughter, and sister. It is apparent from this braisa that one is forbidden to marry the relatives of a woman he was intimate with, even though he wasn’t married to her.

The Gemora answers that the prohibition mentioned in the second braisa is only a Rabbinical prohibition. (The reason for this prohibition is because the marriage to one of her relatives might bring him closer to that woman, and if he would have relations with her now, it would be violating a Biblical prohibition since he is married to her relatives.)

The Gemora asks: if there is a Rabbinical prohibition to marry the relatives of a woman which he violated, how could our Mishna write that it is permitted to marry the relatives?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is referring to a case where the woman, with whom he had relations, is dead. (There is no longer any reason to be concerned if he marries the woman’s relatives.)

The Gemora cites two Scriptural sources for the Mishna’s ruling that one is permitted to marry the relatives of a woman with whom he had relations with. (97a)

PROHIBITION OF THE WOMAN VIOLATED BY HIS FATHER
The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yehudah prohibits the woman violated by his father or the woman seduced by his father.

Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: What is Rabbi Yehudah’s reason? It is because it is written [Devarim 23:1]: A man shall not take his father's wife, and he shall not uncover his father's robe. Rabbi Yehudah understands this verse to mean that the robe which his father saw, he shall not uncover.

The Gemora asks: And how is it inferred that the Torah is discussing a woman who was violated? It is from the preceding verse, which states [Devarim 22:29]: Then the man that lay with her shall give the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver. (Since that verse is referring to a violated woman, the following verse is also referring to a violated woman; based on the principle of the juxtaposition between two verses.)

The Gemora asks: Why do the Rabbis disagree?

The Gemora answers: If one phrase had occurred in close proximity to the other (if one verse directly followed the other verse without any other phrases in between), your exposition would have been justified. Now, however, that it does not occur in close proximity, the verse is required for an exposition of Rav Anan. For Rav Anan said in the name of Samuel: The Torah is referring to a woman awaiting yibum by his father; and the meaning of his father's robe is: He shall not uncover the robe which is designated for his father.

The Gemora asks: Why is this verse necessary; this woman is prohibited regardless, from the fact that she is his aunt?

The Gemora answers: The verse is necessary to make him liable for two transgressions.

The Gemora persists: Why is this verse necessary; this woman is prohibited regardless, from the fact that she is a yevamah, who is prohibited to the general population?
The Gemora answers: The verse is necessary to make him liable for three transgressions.

Alternatively, you can say that the verse is necessary for the case when his father died; she will not be forbidden on account of being a yevamah, but she will be forbidden on account of being a woman who had once fallen to yibum to his father. (97a)

RIDDLES
(The following are riddles on the possible complications of relatives, proposed in order to arm the Torah scholars against the heretics.) My paternal brother, but not my maternal brother; and he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife. (This may be stated by a daughter who was born as a result of her father violating a woman, where the son of the father by another wife has subsequently married her mother.) Rami bar Chama said: Such a relationship is not halachically possible according to the ruling of Rabbi Yehudah in our Mishna (since Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one may not marry a woman with whom his father violated).

A woman says: He whom I carry on my shoulder is my brother and my son, and I am his sister. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his own daughter, and had a son by her. (This child is her son and her brother.)

A woman says: Greetings to you my son; I am the daughter of your sister. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his own daughter's daughter. (She is the child’s mother and its sister’s daughter.)

Men who draw water with pails, we shall ask you a riddle that defies solution: He whom I carry is my son and I am the daughter of his brother. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his own son’s daughter. (She is the child’s mother and its brother’s daughter.)

A woman says: Woe, woe! For my brother who is my father, who is my husband, who is the son of my husband; he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife; and he provides no food for his orphan brothers, the children of his daughter. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his mother and had a daughter from her. He then cohabited with that daughter (becoming her husband).Then the idolater’s father cohabited with her (thus becoming the grandfather’s husband as well) and had children from her. (The idolater is the daughter’s brother; he is her father; he is her husband; he is the son of her (second) husband; he is the husband of her mother; she is the daughter of his wife.)

A woman says: I and you are brother and sister, I and your father are brother and sister, and I and your mother are sisters. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his mother and had two daughters from her. He then cohabited with one of these and had a son from her. When the son's mother's sister (the other daughter) carries him, she addresses him in this manner.

I and you are the children of sisters, I and your father are the children of brothers, and I and your mother are the children of brothers. This indeed is possible also in the case of a permissible marriage. There were for instance, three brothers; Reuven, Shimon and Levi. Reuven had two daughters, and Shimon came and married one of them. And then came the son of Levi, and married the other. The son of Shimon can address the grandson of Levi in this manner. (97b)

MISHNA
The Mishna states: The sons of a female convert who converted with her do not submit to chalitzah and do not marry by yibum (since they are not regarded as brothers). Even if the conception of the first one was not in sanctity (prior to her conversion) and his birth was in sanctity (post-conversion), and the conception and the birth of the second were in sanctity, the same halacha applies. And so too, the same halacha would apply regarding the sons of a slavewoman who were freed together with her. (97b)

TWO BROTHERS BORN FROM A MOTHER WHO CONVERTED AFTERWARDS
When the sons of the slavewoman, Yudan were emancipated, Rav Acha bar Yaakov permitted them to marry each other's wives (since a convert has the status of a newly born child, all his previous family relationships are dissolved; the prohibition against marriage with a brother's wife does not, therefore, apply). Rava said to him: But Rav Sheishes forbade such marriages? Rav Acha bar Yaakov replied: He forbade, but I allow.

The Gemora elaborates on their dispute. When they are brothers from the same father, but not from the same mother, everyone agrees that it would be permitted for them to marry each other’s wives. When they are brothers from the same mother, but not from the same father, everyone agrees that it would be forbidden for them to marry each other’s wives (since they have the same mother, it appears as if they truly are brothers). They argue in a case where they have the same father, and the same mother. Rav Acha bar Yaakov would permit them to marry each other's wives because we ascribe them to their father, since people refer to them as the sons of Mr. So-and-So. Rav Sheishes would prohibit them from marrying each other’s wives because people also refer to them as the sons of Mrs. So-and-So.

Others say: Rav Acha bar Yaakov would even argue in a case where they have only the same mother. What is his reason that they would still be permitted to marry each other’s wives? It is because one who converts is regarded as a newborn child.

The Gemora asks on Rav Acha bar Yaakov from our Mishna, which stated the following: The sons of a female convert who converted with her do not submit to chalitzah and do not marry by yibum. What is the reason for prohibiting the brother and the other brother’s widow to marry each other? Is it not because they are forbidden to marry each other? (This would be inconsistent with Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s opinion.)

The Gemora answers: No! The Mishna is stating that the widow is not subject to the laws of yibum and chalitzah here (since they are not regarded as brothers). The widow can marry into the general population, and she may marry the remaining brother as well.

The Gemora asks: But how would we explain the next part of the Mishna? The Mishna states: Even if the conception of the first one was not in sanctity (prior to her conversion) and his birth was in sanctity (post-conversion), and the conception and the birth of the second were in sanctity, the same halacha applies. If you learn that the Mishna is teaching us that the widow and the brother are forbidden to marry each other, it would be understandable for the Mishna to state that the prohibition is applicable even in the second case. One might think that since the first brother’s conception was prior to the mother’s conversion and the second one’s conception was after her conversion, it should be regarded as if they had two different mothers (and they should be permitted to marry). The Mishna teaches us that nevertheless, they are prohibited to marry each other. However, if you learn (like Rav Acha bar Yaakov) that the Mishna is teaching us that she is permitted to marry into the general population, what is the Mishna’s point that she is even permitted when the brothers were born in sanctity? (The brothers being born in sanctity have no bearing on her permission to marry into the general population; that is solely dependent on the fact that they are not paternal brothers.)

The Gemora answers: The novelty of this case is that even though both brothers were born in sanctity, and therefore, they might be mistaken for full-fledged Jews, nevertheless, she is permitted to marry into the general population (since people know that the first brother, who was conceived prior to the mother’s conversion, is not an actual halachic brother).

Others said this discussion in reverse: The Mishna supports Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s opinion. The Mishna taught the second case to teach us that even though both brothers were born in sanctity, and therefore, they might be mistaken for full-fledged Jews, nevertheless, she is permitted to marry into the general population.

However, if the Mishna is teaching us that they are prohibited from marrying each other, how can the Mishna say that even when both brothers were born in sanctity, they are still forbidden to marry each other? (The brothers being born in sanctity is more of a reason to prohibit them from marrying each other, not less.)

The Gemora answers: One might think that since the first brother’s conception was prior to the mother’s conversion and the second one’s conception was after her conversion, it should be regarded as if they had two different mothers (and they should be permitted to marry). The Mishna teaches us that nevertheless, they are prohibited to marry each other. (97b)

[END]

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A RIGHTEOUS PERSON IS NOT ALLOWED TO STUMBLE

The Gemora (Yevamos 96b) records the following incident: Rabbi Elozar went and related a discussion in this Beis Medrash, but did not relate the discussion in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. When Rabbi Yochanan heard about this omission, he was perturbed. Rabbi Ami and Rav Asi went up to Rabbi Yochanan and said: “Did it not happen, once in the Beis Medrash of Teveryah, that there was a discussion between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosi regarding the door lock which had a thick head (and could be used for grinding things, see Rashi), and they debated the matter with such intensity that they tore a Sefer Torah?”

The Gemora explains that they certainly did not intentionally tear a Sefer Torah. Rather, the Sefer Torah divided. Rabbi Yosi Ben Kisma was present at the time, and he declared that he would be astonished if as a result of this discussion which became inappropriate, the shul would not turn into a house of idol worship! Indeed, the Gemora states, the shul eventually became a house of idol worship. [Rabbi Ami and Rav Asi were apparently trying to tell Rabbi Yochanan not to be so particular with Rabbi Elozar, because such behavior could lead to disastrous consequences.]

The Ramban wonders how it is possible that a Sefer Torah was torn because of the dispute of the Sages. Does not the Gemora in Chullin (7a) state that Hashem does not bring a stumbling block to righteous people? How could a Sefer Torah become torn and the synagogue turn into a house of idolatry on account of these sages?

The Ramban quotes Rabbeinu Tam who states that the principle that HaShem does not bring a stumbling block on account of the righteous is applicable only to the inadvertent consumption of forbidden foods. The reason for this is because it is degrading for the righteous to eat forbidden foods. The principle does not apply, however, to other types of sins.

The Ramban challenges this interpretation from a Gemara in Kesubos (28b) that clearly indicates that this principle applies by other sins as well.

The Ramban quotes his teacher who states that the explanation of this principle cannot mean that the righteous do not sin, for we know that there is no righteous person in the land that doesn’t sin. Rather, it means that Hashem does not allow a righteous person to inadvertently cause other to stumble and sin.

The Ramban himself answers that this principle is only applicable for inadvertent transgressions, as Hashem does not allow a righteous person to stumble in such a manner. One who strives to be completely pure, the Holy One, Blessed is He assists him. However, if a righteous person places himself in a situation where he is susceptible to sin, he is in danger just like everyone else. In instances where there were calamities, it was due to the Sages being provoked to anger, and it is known that where there is anger, the Divine Presence does not rest, subsequently leading to disastrous consequences.

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DISPLAYING ANGER

Rav Ashi states that a Torah scholar who is not as hard as iron is not considered to be a true Torah scholar. Ravina says that nevertheless, he should conduct himself calmly as the Torah teaches us to avoid anger.

The Gevuros Ari asks from a Gemora in Pesachim which states regarding one who becomes angry; if he is a Torah scholar, his Torah will depart him and yet our Gemora states that a Torah scholar who is not harsh like iron is not considered a talmid chocham.

He answers that if he becomes angry for the honor of Hashem and if it would have been impossible to accomplish this without getting angry; it is not only permitted but warranted. An example for this would be to instill fear into one’s students ensuring that they will not stumble into sin.

The Acharonim ask from the Gemora in Taanis (20) which states that a person should always strive to be soft like a reed and not harsh like a cedar tree. It is brought in the name of Reb Yonason Eibshitz that if a person needs to get angry, he should make sure that the anger is only on the surface but inside he should remain soft. This is what Ravina meant when he said that one should conduct himself calmly as the Torah teaches us to remove anger from one’s heart.

The Mishna in Avos (5:10) states that it should be difficult for a person to get angry and easy to be appeased. Rabbeinu Gershom explains our Gemora to mean that a person should get angry and it should be difficult to appease him. This is seemingly not consistent with the Mishna in Avos.

Harav Moshe Feinstein in Igros Moshe (O”C 54) answers that here the Gemora is referring to a talmid chocham that issues a ruling. He is required to exhibit anger in order to ensure that the listeners will adhere to the halacha. He should not be easily appeased so people will not say that his ruling was actually a mistake but he is too embarrassed to admit it. This is what Rav Ashi meant when he said that a Torah scholar who is not as hard as iron is not considered to be a true Torah scholar. If he is appeased readily, they will not rely on his rulings in the future.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 96 - Highlights

FIVE SISTERS
The Mishna states: They told a married man, “Your wife has died,” and he went and married her paternal sister. Later, they told him, “She (the second wife) has died,” and he went and married her (the second wife) maternal sister. Later, they told him, “She (the third wife) has died,” and he went and married her (the third wife’s) paternal sister. Later, they told him, “She (the fourth wife) has died,” and he went and married her (the fourth wife’s) maternal sister. He found out that in fact, none of them had died. The halacha is that he is permitted to remain married to the first, third and fifth wives. (Since he is legally married to the first wife, that renders his marriage to the second wife (her paternal sister) null and void. He is thus legally married to the third wife because she is not related at all to the first wife. Now that he is legally married to the third wife, that renders his marriage to the fourth wife (her paternal sister) null and void. He is thus legally married to the fifth wife because she is not related at all to the first or the third wives.) If he would subsequently die childless, a yibum or chalitzah with one of these wives will release the others from any yibum or chalitzah obligations. He is forbidden to the second and the fourth wives, and a yibum or chalitzah with one of them will not release the others from a yibum or chalitzah obligation.

The Mishna continues: If the husband cohabited with the second wife after the death of the first one (she indeed did die), he is permitted to remain married to the second and fourth wives. (Since he is legally married to the second wife, that renders his marriage to the third wife (her maternal sister) null and void. He is thus legally married to the fourth wife because she is not related at all to the second wife. Now that he is legally married to the fourth wife, that renders his marriage to the fifth wife (her maternal sister) null and void.) If he would subsequently die childless, a yibum or chalitzah with one of these wives will release the other from any yibum or chalitzah obligations. He is forbidden to the first, third and fifth wives, and a yibum or chalitzah with one of them will not release the others from a yibum or chalitzah obligation.

The Mishna concludes: A nine year old yavam can render the brothers unfit for yibum if he does so first, and his adult brothers can render him unfit if they perform yibum. The difference between the minor and his adult brothers is that he can render them unfit “at first,” while they can do so “at first and at the end.” What is the case? If the nine year old cohabits with the yevamah, he renders his brothers unfit to perform yibum. However, if any of the adult brothers cohabit with the yevamah, or they performed a ma’amar, gave her a letter of divorce, or submitted to chalitzah, they render their minor brother unfit to perform yibum. (96a)

GEMORA
The Gemora asks: How could the (the end of the first case of the) Mishna state the second wife alone is considered married to the husband, if the first wife was found to be dead only after he married all of the women?

Rav Sheishes answers that the Mishna means that it was later determined that the second wife married her husband after the first had definitely already passed away. The kiddushin was therefore valid, and she becomes his true wife. (96a)

STATUS OF A NINE-YEAR OLD
The Mishna stated that a nine-year old only renders his brothers unfit for yibum if he is the first one to perform any action of yibum. However, Rav Zevid bar Rav Oshaya quoted a braisa stating that if an adult brother did ma’amar to a yevamah, and then his nine-year old brother cohabited with her, the nine-year old indeed renders the older brother unfit for yibum. How can we reconcile this with our Mishna?

The Gemora answers that when the Mishna said that a nine-year old can only render his brothers unfit if he is the first one, it was talking about ma’amar, not actual yibum.

The Gemora asks, this seems difficult to reconcile with a different braisa that seems to make the same statement as our Mishna and clearly mentions a case of actual yibum.

The Gemora answers that this second braisa is missing words, and should actually read that this is only in case of ma’amar, not actual yibum.

The Gemora continues that there is another braisa which seems to say that a nine-year old’s ma’amar is insignificant. The braisa states that such a child only renders his brothers unfit to perform yibum through actual relations, while his brothers can do this through relations, ma’amar, get, and chalitzah. The Gemora answers that this braisa did not discuss the ma’amar of a nine-year old because, as stated above, his ma’amar is only effective if his brothers have not yet done anything (“at first, not at the end”). (96a)


GET OF A NINE-YEAR OLD
TO A YEVAMAH
Rav Yehudah stated in the name of Shmuel that a nine-year old can also make his brothers unfit to do Yibum by giving the Yevamah a Get. Rav Tachlifa Bar Avimi states that he only has Ma’amar. Rabbi Meir states in a Braisa that he has both Ma’amar and Get.

The Gemora asks, does Rabbi Meir indeed hold that his Get is effective?

The Gemora quotes a Braisa which states that a nine-year old’s relations (regarding Yibum) is like the Ma’amar done by an adult. Rabbi Meir argues that his Chalitzah is like the Get of an adult. Rabbi Meir’s statement in this Braisa implies that his Get is not effective, as even his Chalitzah is only like the Get of an adult. If his Get was effective, Rabbi Meir should say that (regarding Yibum) his Chalitzah is like his Get!

Rav Huna, the son of Rabbi Yehoshua, answers that Rabbi Meir indeed holds that his Get is effective, but not as effective a regular Get, as opposed to his Chalitzah which is indeed as effective as a regular Get.

What is the difference between the Chalitzah and Get of a nine-year old?

The Gemora explains the difference both according to the opinion of Raban Gamliel and the Rabanan (see Mishna on 50a-b at length). Raban Gamliel who holds that there is no validity in a Get after one brother has already given a Get to the Yevamah, only holds this when both brothers are either adults or minors. However, if an adult brother would give a Get after a younger brother, it would be effective. The Rabanan who hold that there is a purpose in giving another Get would similarly hold this when both people involved were adults or minors. However, the Get of a nine-year old after an adult would be ineffective. (96a)

MISHNA
The Mishna states that if a nine-year old brother has relations with a Yevamah, and then his nine-year old brother later has relations with her, the first brother becomes unfit for Yibum due to the actions of his brother. The Tanna Kamma holds that the relations of a minor are akin to Ma’amar, and therefore both have validity and require a Get (see Rashi). Rabbi Shimon argues that he does not become unfit. The Tanna Kamma also states that if a nine-year old had relations with one of his dead brother’s widows, and then proceeded to have relations with her co-wife, they both become unfit for Yibum. Rabbi Shimon argues that he does not become unfit. (96b)

RABBI SHIMON’S CLAIM
The Braisa states that Rabbi Shimon asked the Rabanan: “If the first act of Yibum was valid, this means the second act was invalid. If the first act was invalid, the second act should likewise be invalid!” (96b)

UNLIKE BEN AZAI
Our Mishna, the Gemora states, is unlike the opinion of Ben Azai. This is because the Tanna Kamma of our Mishna understands that two Ma’amar’s are valid (see italics above), both in a case of two Yavam’s and one Yevamah (the first case of our Mishna), and two potential Yevamos with one Yavam who does Ma’amar to both of them (second case of our Mishna). Ben Azai argues that when there is only one Yavam, Ma’amar is only effective one time to one Yevamah, not to the second potential Yevamah. (96b)

MISHNA
If a nine-year old has relations with his Yevamah and dies, his Yevamah can only receive Chalitzah, not Yibum, from the other brothers. If he would have married a regular woman, she does not fall to Yibum (as his Kidushin is essentially invalid, see Rashi). If he both had relations with a Yevamah and then married another unrelated woman after he became an adult, the Yevamah only requires Chalitzah if he did not have relations with her after he became an adult, while his regular wife can have either Yibum or Chalitzah. Rabbi Shimon argues that the brothers can do Yibum to either one, and give the other one Chalitzah. The Mishna concludes that these Halachos not only apply to a nine-year old, but also to a twenty-year man who has not yet developed two hairs which qualify him as a Halachic adult. (96b)

ZIKAH OF TWO YEVAMOS
Rava stated that our Mishna proves that when the Rabanan decreed that in a case where there are two yevamos only Chalitzah should be done and not Yibum, it is not only in case where there are two proper co-wives. [The allowance of Yibum to more than one woman would cause people to think that if Yibum can be done in this special case (such as the case of the Mishna on 31b), then many widows of one husband may be taken simultaneously through Yibum (see Rashi)]. This is apparent from the fact that our Mishna discusses one regular wife and one woman who was not really married to this man at all, and even so the Mishna codifies that only Chalitzah can be done to her and not Yibum (see Ritva).

The Gemora quotes a Braisa that similarly states that if a Shoteh (fool) or minor marry, their widows are exempt from Chalitzah and Yibum.

The Gemora asks, why isn’t the relations that the husband had with the Yevamah when he was a minor sufficient to cause the husband’s real wife to not be able to have Yibum (like a regular case of Zikah of two yevamos, as explained above)? His relations when he was a minor should be akin to the Ma’amar of an adult, which can cause Zikah from two yevamos and therefore not provide an option for Yibum?

The Gemora states that Rav states that the premise of the question is false, as a minor’s relations are not akin to the Ma’amar of an adult. However, Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan say that they are. How would they answer this question?

The Gemora answers that they understand that there is an argument between our Mishna and the Mishna earlier (31b). Indeed, the author of the Mishna earlier (31b) would say that the regular wife cannot have Yibum due to the aforementioned decree regarding two Zikos, even when this involves a minor. The only reason he did not discuss a minor in the Mishna earlier is because the author of the Mishna did not want to change the types of cases that were discussing adults, and not minors. The author of our Mishna argues that no such decree exists, and therefore allows the brothers to perform Yibum on the regular wife in our Mishna. He similarly did not discuss the decree in regards to adults, as he was not dealing with cases of adults. (96b)

RABBI YOCHANAN’S ANGER WITH RABBI ELOZAR
Rabbi Elozar went and related this discussion in this Beis Medrash, but did not relate the discussion in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. When Rabbi Yochanan heard about this omission, he was perturbed. Rabbi Ami and Rav Asi went up to Rabbi Yochanan and said: “Did it not happen, once in the Beis Medrash of Teveryah, that there was a discussion between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosi regarding the door lock which had a thick head (and could be used for grinding things, see Rashi), and they debated the matter with such intensity that they tore a Sefer Torah?”

The Gemora explains that they certainly did not intentionally tear a Sefer Torah. Rather, the Sefer Torah divided. Rabbi Yosi Ben Kisma was present at the time, and he declared that he would be astonished if as a result of this discussion which became inappropriate, the shul would not turn into a house of idol worship! Indeed, the Gemora states, the shul eventually became a house of idol worship. [Rabbi Ami and Rav Asi were apparently trying to tell Rabbi Yochanan not to be so particular with Rabbi Elozar, because such behavior could lead to disastrous consequences.]

Rav Yakov Bar Idi came him, and quoted the Pasuk “Like Hashem commanded his servant Moshe, so commanded Moshe to Yehoshua, and so did Yehoshua do. He did not remove anything from that which Hashem commanded.” He asked Rabbi Yochanan, do you think that every time Yehoshua quoted a Halachah he said it in the name of Moshe? Yehoshua just said over Halachos, and everyone knew they were from Moshe! Similarly, everyone knows that Rabbi Elozar is your student, and whatever he says comes from you! After hearing this, Rabbi Yochanan turned to his other students and said “Why don’t you know how to make peace like the son of Idi, our friend?”

Why was Rabbi Yochanan so upset in the first place? Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav, what is the meaning of the Pasuk “I will dwell in your tent in many worlds?” Is it possible for someone to dwell in a tent in both worlds? It means that David stated to Hashem, “Master of the Universe, it should be Your will that they should say a statement in my name in this world (as well as my being in the next world).” (96b – 97a)

[END]

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THE SOTAH PROHIBITION - Yevamos 95 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora above cites a kal vachomer, that if not for a specific verse in the Torah, we would have thought that one’s wife would become forbidden to him if he willingly cohabits with her sister. The following was the kal vachomer: If one cohabits with a married woman, which is a lenient prohibition, and nevertheless, the one who causes this prohibition becomes prohibited (the woman is now forbidden to remain with her husband); how much more so, when one cohabits with his wife’s sister, which is a strict prohibition, the who causes this prohibition (the man’s wife) should become forbidden herself.

The Gemora asks: What is the lenient prohibition mentioned in the kal vachomer?

Rabbi Yochanan says: The lenient prohibition is referring to cohabiting with a suspected sotah (adulterous wife).

The Gemora analyzes this explanation: Perhaps the braisa is referring to a case where the sotah cohabited with her husband. The Gemora explains the terminology of the kal vachomer accordingly: When the husband subsequently cohabits with her before she drinks the bitter waters, she becomes forbidden to the suspected adulterer.

Tosfos s.v. ileima explains that once the husband cohabits with the sotah, she will always be forbidden to the suspected adulterer, even if the husband will later die or divorce her. The reason is because once the sotah cohabited with her husband, she is never allowed to drink from the bitter waters, and therefore her innocence cannot be proven.

The Gemora continues and asks: What compelled the braisa to state a case where the husband cohabited with her? Even if he gave her a letter of divorce, or even if he merely said that he doesn’t want her to drink the bitter waters, she would still become forbidden to the suspected adulterer.

Tosfos cites Rabbeinu Yitzchak who asks the following: From where do we know that once the husband said that he doesn’t want her to drink that he cannot change his mind? He cites a Mishna in Sotah (23a), which states that once the husband says that he doesn’t want her to drink, her flour offering is burned. It would seem that he cannot change his mind afterwards.

Rabbi Mordechai Kornfeld from Kollel Iyun haDaf discusses this topic further.

QUESTION: The Gemara seeks a case that fits the description of a man who lives with a woman who is prohibited to him, "and that man causes her to become prohibited to the one who made her prohibited to him in the first place." The Gemara suggests that this case refers to a Sotah who, after defying her husband's warning not to seclude herself with another man ("Stirah"), has relations with her husband (which is prohibited once she has become a Sotah). The act of prohibited relations with her husband causes her to become prohibited "to the one who made her prohibited [to her husband]" in the first place -- the Bo'el (the suspected adulterer).

The Gemara rejects this suggestion. What causes the Sotah to become prohibited to the Bo'el is not the prohibited act of relations between her and her husband. Rather, she is prohibited to the Bo'el even if her husband does not have relations with her, but instead gives her a Get or refuses to let her drink the Mei Sotah. Hence, it is inaccurate to say that it is the prohibited act of relations with her husband which causes her to become prohibited to the Bo'el.

What was the Gemara's initial intention when it suggested that when the husband lives with his Sotah wife, he prohibits her to the Bo'el? The Bo'el is prohibited to her even before the husband lives with her; once she has secluded herself with him, she becomes prohibited to both her husband and the Bo'el! In what way did the Gemara assume that living with her husband makes her prohibited to the Bo'el?

ANSWERS: (a) TOSFOS explains that although the Bo'el is prohibited to the Safek Sotah, if she drinks the Mei Sotah and verifies her innocence she will become permitted to him. Once the husband lives with her, however, he no longer is "Menukeh me'Avon" and thus the Mei Sotah is not effective in determining the innocence of his wife. Accordingly, living with his wife causes her to become prohibited permanently to the Bo'el by depriving her of the ability to vindicate herself through drinking the Mei Sotah. This is the Gemara's intention in its initial assumption that the prohibited act of relations with her husband causes the Bo'el to become prohibited to her; it causes the Bo'el to become more prohibited to her than he was until now (i.e. permanently prohibited, and not just temporarily prohibited).

However, Tosfos questions this explanation. Why does the Gemara say that even if the husband merely declares that he does not want his wife to drink the Mei Sotah, he also causes her to become prohibited to the Bo'el? His refusal to give her the Mei Sotah now does not mean that she will never be able to prove her innocence. Perhaps her husband will change his mind and decide to give her the Mei Sotah to drink, at which time she will be able to prove her innocence. The possibility remains, therefore, that the Bo'el will become permitted to her.

Tosfos suggests a novel ruling based on this question. Tosfos suggests that if a husband says that he does not want his wife to drink the Mei Sotah, he may not change his mind. He is given only one opportunity to let her drink the Mei Sotah. Once he forfeits that opportunity, he may not bring her to the Beis ha'Mikdash to drink the Mei Sotah.

This novel proposal is problematic. As Tosfos himself points out, there is no source for such a law. Moreover, if this is the intention of the Gemara, the Gemara should not need to mention that her husband may prevent her from drinking the Mei Sotah in one of two ways -- by giving her a Get, or by declaring that he does not let her drink the Mei Sotah. The Gemara does not need to add that he can prevent her from drinking the Mei Sotah by giving her a Get; giving a Get is essentially the same as refusing to let her drink, and they are not two distinct ways of preventing her from drinking the Mei Sotah.

(b) RASHI makes no mention of the requirement that the husband be "Menukeh me'Avon" in order for his wife to be allowed to drink the Mei Sotah. ("Menukeh me'Avon" is the rule that Tosfos invokes to explain why the husband may not have his wife drink the Mei Sotah once he has had relations with her after she became a Sotah.) Rashi apparently follows his own view as expressed elsewhere (58b and 85b; see Insights there). Rashi maintains that there is a Tana who does not agree with the requirement that the husband be "Menukeh me'Avon" in order to have his wife drink the Mei Sotah. Rather, even after he lives with his wife he may give her the Mei Sotah to drink. Several Sugyos seem to follow the opinion of that Tana.

Accordingly, the Gemara here means that the husband is able to give the Mei Sotah to his wife even after he lives with her, in which case the original question returns: Why does the Gemara initially assume that when the husband lives with her, he causes her to become prohibited to the Bo'el? She already is prohibited to the Bo'el because she is a Safek Sotah!

The Gemara must mean that in a normal case of a Safek Sotah, when the husband does not live with his wife wrongfully, it is assumed that he plans to give her the Mei Sotah so that her innocence will be proven and she will become permitted to him again. An additional consequence of proving her innocence is that she becomes potentially permitted to the Bo'el. When, however, the husband has relations with her before her innocence is proven, he shows no regard for the fact that she is a Sotah and that he has no intention to give her the Mei Sotah to drink. Consequently, she remains prohibited to the Bo'el. The fact that her husband lives with her and shows that he does not care that she is a Sotah establishes a Chazakah that he will not give her the Mei Sotah. In that sense, he prohibits her to the Bo'el by having relations with her.

When the Gemara rejects the suggestion that it is the husband's act of relations which prohibits her to the Bo'el, because "even if he says, 'I will not give her to drink,' and even if he divorces her" she is still prohibited to the Bo'el, the Gemara means that she is prohibited to the Bo'el merely by virtue of her status as a Safek Sotah, without any act on the part of her husband. The husband's act does not create a prohibition to the Bo'el.

"Even if he divorces her" and permits her to all other men in the world, the Bo'el may not marry her, even if her husband did not live with her after she became a Sotah. "Even if he says, 'I will not give her to drink'" means that even if the husband dies without agreeing to give her the Mei Sotah, and she now becomes permitted to the rest of the world, she is still prohibited to the Bo'el. (See Rashi, end of DH Iy Neima.)

Consequently, according to Rashi (in contrast to Tosfos' understanding of the Gemara), the Gemara provides no proof that a husband may not change his mind when he declares that he does not want his wife to drink the Mei Sotah. (The Gemara also provides no proof that the husband may not give her the Mei Sotah to drink after he divorces and remarries her; see Tosfos to 85b, DH ul'Rebbi, and Insights there.) The Gemara merely says that if he does not give her the Mei Sotah to drink and, as a result, she does not prove her innocence, she becomes prohibited to the Bo'el simply because of her initial act of Stirah with him. The fact that her husband had relations with her and shows that he does not intend to give her the Mei Sotah does not create any new prohibition to the Bo'el; it just shows that he does not plan to give her the opportunity to become permitted. That is why the Gemara rejects the suggestion that the Bo'el is "the one who made her prohibited to him (the husband) in the first place."

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 95 - Highlights

WILL THE WIFE BECOME FORBIDDEN IF HE COHABITS WITH HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW OR HIS WIFE’S SISTER?

The Gemora cites a braisa which cites a Scriptural source indicating that one’s wife is not Biblically forbidden to him even if he willingly cohabits with her sister. A source is necessary, for otherwise we would have derived from the following kal vachomer (literally translated as light and heavy, or lenient and stringent; an a fortiori argument; it is one of the thirteen principles of biblical hermeneutics; it employs the following reasoning: if a specific stringency applies in a usually lenient case, it must certainly apply in a more serious case) that she would be prohibited to him: If one cohabits with a married woman, which is a lenient prohibition (since a married woman becomes permitted if she gets divorced), and nevertheless, the one who causes this prohibition becomes prohibited (the woman is now forbidden to remain with her husband); how much more so, when one cohabits with his wife’s sister, which is a strict prohibition (even if the husband divorces her, her sister is still forbidden to him), the who causes this prohibition (the man’s wife) should become forbidden herself. (The Torah teaches us that this indeed is not the case, and the wife remains permitted to her husband.)

Rabbi Yehudah said: Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel do not argue in the following case: If one cohabits with his mother-in-law, his wife becomes forbidden to him (and he is required to divorce her). They do argue however, if one cohabits with his wife’s sister. Beis Shamai say: His wife becomes disqualified from remaining with him. Beis Hillel maintains that his wife remains permitted to him.

Rabbi Yosi disagrees: Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel do not argue in the following case: If one cohabits with his wife’s sister, his wife does not become disqualified from remaining with him. They do argue however, if one cohabits with his mother-in-law. Beis Shamai say: His wife becomes disqualified from remaining with him. Beis Hillel maintains that his wife remains permitted to him.

Rabbi Yosi explains why everyone agrees that if one cohabits with his wife’s sister; his wife does not become disqualified from remaining with him. Originally (before the husband and the wife were married), all the women of the world were permitted to him, and all the men of the world were permitted to her. When he married her, he imposed a prohibition upon her and she imposed a prohibition upon him. The prohibition, however, which he imposed upon her, is greater than the prohibition which she imposes upon him, since he caused her to become forbidden to all the men of the world, while she caused him to become forbidden only to her relatives.

Based on the above distinction, Rabbi Yosi presents the following kal vachomer: If he, that caused her to become forbidden to all the men of the world; if she cohabited unwittingly with one who was forbidden to her, she does not become forbidden to the man who was permitted to her (her husband); how much more so, regarding her, who caused him to become forbidden only to her relatives; if he cohabited unwittingly with one who was forbidden to him, he certainly should not become forbidden to the one (his wife) who was permitted to him.

This argument is applicable to one who acted unwittingly. How do we know that the same halacha is applicable to one who acted deliberately? It is written [Bamidbar 5:13]: And a man lay with her. This teaches us that cohabitation with her only causes her to become prohibited; cohabitation with her sister (by her husband), however, does not cause her to be prohibited.

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source for Rabbi Yehudah’s argument that everyone agrees if one cohabits with his mother-in-law, his wife becomes forbidden to him.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: The halacha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah.

The Gemora records an incident: There was a man who cohabited with his mother-in-law. Rav Yehudah administered lashes to him. Rav Yehudah said: Had Samuel not stated that the halacha was not in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah, I would have prohibited your wife to you forever. (95a)

LENIENT PROHIBITION

The Gemora above cites a kal vachomer, that if not for a specific verse in the Torah, we would have thought that one’s wife would become forbidden to him if he willingly cohabits with her sister. The following was the kal vachomer: If one cohabits with a married woman, which is a lenient prohibition, and nevertheless, the one who causes this prohibition becomes prohibited (the woman is now forbidden to remain with her husband); how much more so, when one cohabits with his wife’s sister, which is a strict prohibition, the who causes this prohibition (the man’s wife) should become forbidden herself.

The Gemora asks: What is the lenient prohibition mentioned in the kal vachomer?

Rav Chisda said: It is referring to the prohibition of one who remarries his divorcee. (It is regarded as lenient because it does not involve kares.)

The Gemora explains the terminology of the kal vachomer accordingly: When the second husband cohabited with her, he caused her to become forbidden to the first husband, and when the first husband subsequently cohabits with her (after her second husband had divorced her), he causes her to become forbidden to the second husband.

The Gemora asks: How can the two prohibitions (marrying one’s divorcee and cohabiting with one’s wife’s sister) be compared? The prohibition of marrying one’s divorcee is a case where her body has been defiled, and her prohibition lasts forever (which is not the case by cohabiting with one’s wife’s sister, and it cannot be classified as a lenient prohibition).

Rish Lakish says: The lenient prohibition is referring to cohabiting with a yevamah.

The Gemora analyzes this explanation: Perhaps the braisa is referring to a case where the yevamah cohabited with another man, and the braisa is following the viewpoint of Rav Hamnuna. For Rav Hamnuna stated: A yevamah who is awaiting yibum, who has an illicit relationship with another man is prohibited to be married to the yavam. This cannot be the case, because if so, the kal vachomer can be refuted as follows: How can the two prohibitions (a yevamah marrying another man and cohabiting with one’s wife’s sister) be compared? The prohibition of a yevamah marrying another man is a case where her body has been defiled, and her prohibition is applicable to many men (which is not the case by cohabiting with one’s wife’s sister, and it cannot be classified as a lenient prohibition).

Perhaps the braisa is referring to a case where the yevamah cohabited with one of the brothers of her deceased husband (after a different brother performed ma’amar with her).

The Gemora explains the terminology of the kal vachomer accordingly: When one of the brothers performed ma’amar with her, he caused her to become forbidden to the other brothers, and when one of the other brothers subsequently cohabits with her, he causes her to become forbidden to the first brother.

The Gemora asks: What compelled the braisa to state a case where the second brother cohabited with her? Even if he only performed ma’amar with her, she would become forbidden to the first brother.

The Gemora answers: The braisa can be following Rabban Gamliel’s opinion, who maintains that there is no validity to a ma’amar performed after another ma’amar.

The Gemora asks: But even if the second brother gave a letter of divorce to her, or submitted to chalitzah from her, the first brother would become prohibited to her. What compelled the braisa to state a case where the second brother cohabited with her?

Rabbi Yochanan says: The lenient prohibition is referring to cohabiting with a suspected sotah (adulterous wife).

The Gemora analyzes this explanation: Perhaps the braisa is referring to a case where the sotah cohabited with her husband. The Gemora explains the terminology of the kal vachomer accordingly: When the husband subsequently cohabits with her before she drinks the bitter waters, she becomes forbidden to the suspected adulterer (since her innocence cannot be proven any longer).

The Gemora asks: What compelled the braisa to state a case where the husband cohabited with her? Even if he gave her a letter of divorce, or even if he merely said that he doesn’t want her to drink the bitter waters, she would still become forbidden to the suspected adulterer.

Rather, the braisa is referring to a case where the sotah cohabited with the adulterer. She becomes prohibited to her husband.

The Gemora asks: How can this case be classified as a lenient prohibition? This is a strict prohibition of cohabiting with a married woman.

Rava said: The lenient prohibition is referring to cohabiting with a married woman. And so said Ravin in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. Why is the prohibition of a married woman classified as a lenient prohibition? It is because her husband does not cause her to become forbidden to other men for his entire lifetime (since a married woman becomes permitted if she gets divorced).

The Gemora cites a braisa that supports this interpretation of the kal vachomer. Abba Chanan said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: If one cohabits with a married woman, which is a lenient prohibition because her husband does not cause her to become forbidden to other men for his entire lifetime, and nevertheless, the one who causes this prohibition becomes prohibited (the woman is now forbidden to remain with her husband); how much more so, when one cohabits with his wife’s sister, which is a strict prohibition because the sister is prohibited during the duration of the husband’s lifetime, the who causes this prohibition (the man’s wife) should become forbidden herself. The Torah teaches us that this indeed is not the case. It is written [Bamidbar 5:13]: And a man lay with her. This teaches us that cohabitation with her only causes her to become prohibited; cohabitation with her sister (by her husband), however, does not cause her to be prohibited. (95a – 95b)

RABBI YOSI’S RULING

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yosi says: Whoever disqualifies others, disqualifies himself as well, and whoever does not disqualify others, does not disqualify himself either.

The Gemora asks: What is the meaning of Rabbi Yosi’s statement?

The Gemora attempts an explanation: If you will suggest that the Tanna Kamma was saying that if a man's wife and his wife's sister's husband went overseas (and on the strength of the testimony of one witness who testified that they were both dead, be had married his wife's sister, and subsequently they both returned), the sister is forbidden to her husband, but his own wife is permitted. Rabbi Yosi said to him: Just as his own wife is permitted (since he was not compelled to give the sister a letter of divorce because everyone knows that one may not marry his wife’s sister, they therefore realize that he was not married to her), so too, the sister is also permitted to her husband (because it does not appear as if he is remarrying his divorcee). If so, why would Rabbi Yosi use have used the following expression: “Whoever does not disqualify others, does not disqualify himself either”? He should have said the following: “Whoever does not disqualify himself (from returning to his wife), does not disqualify others (the sister from returning to her husband) either.”

Perhaps Rabbi Yosi meant exactly the opposite: Just as the sister is forbidden to her husband, so too, his wife is forbidden to him.

The Gemora asks: If so, what is the meaning of the expression “Whoever does not disqualify others”?(The Tanna Kamma ruled that the sister is forbidden to her husband!)

Rav Ami answers: This expression is stated with respect to the ruling of an earlier Mishna (87b), which stated the following: If she married with the consent of Beis Din (through the testimony of one witness), she must leave both men (if the husband returns), and she is exempt from an offering (since a person who sins in consequence of a ruling of Beis Din is exempt from a sin-offering). If she did not marry with the consent of Beis Din (there were two witnesses that her husband died), she must leave both men, and she is liable to bring a sin-offering. Such is the power of Beis Din that it exempts her from an offering.

The Tanna Kamma of our Mishna said: The wife may return to him irrespective of whether the marriage (of the husband with the wife’s sister) took place based on the testimony of two witnesses (who testified that his wife and his wife’s sister’s husband both died) where his wife’s sister is permitted to remain with her husband, or whether it took place based upon a decision of the Beis Din (the testimony of one witness) where his wife’s sister is forbidden to remain with her husband.

Rabbi Yosi said to the Tanna Kamma: If they married based upon a decision of the Beis Din (the testimony of one witness), where he disqualified others (his wife’s sister is forbidden to remain with her husband), he disqualifies himself as well (and his wife is forbidden to remain with him). However, if they married based on the testimony of two witnesses, where he does not disqualify others (his wife’s sister may remain with her husband), he does not disqualify himself either (his wife is permitted to remain with him).

Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha presents an alternative explanation of Rabbi Yosi’s statement: Rabbi Yosi is actually referring to the latter part of the Mishna, where the sister remarried based on the testimony of one witness. Rabbi Yosi’s two statements are referring to two scenarios of this case. One is where his arusah (the woman he betrothed) and his wife’s sister’s brother went overseas, and the other case is where his nesuah (the wife that he consummated the marriage with) and his wife’s sister’s brother went overseas.

Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha proceeds to explain the argument. The Tanna Kamma maintains that it doesn’t make any difference whether the case is discussing his nesuah and his wife’s sister’s brother went overseas, or whether it was his arusah and his wife’s sister’s brother. In both cases, his wife’s sister’s brother is forbidden to remain with her husband, and his wife is permitted to remain with him.

Rabbi Yosi said to the Tanna Kamma: If the case occurred with his nesuah and his wife’s sister’s husband, where there is no concern that he made any conditions upon the nisuin (and therefore the marriage with her sister is obviously not valid), and therefore he doesn’t disqualify others, he is not disqualified either. However, if the case occurred with his arusah and her sister’s husband, where there is a concern that he made a conditions upon the marriage (and therefore the marriage with her sister could possibly be valid), and therefore he does disqualify others, he disqualifies himself as well.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: The halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi. (95b)

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SHARDS AND PEARLS

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: Rabbi Elozar could have expounded from this verse a pearl, but instead, he expounded from it only a shard (it is obvious that a letter of divorce received from a man to whom the woman is not married to is pointless, and it would not render her ineligible to marry a Kohen).

(The Mishna had stated: If they said to her, “Your husband died,” and she became betrothed to another man, and afterwards her husband came back, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the latter one gave her a bill of divorce, he did not disqualify her from the Kehunah. This was expounded by Rabbi Elozar ben Masya: It is written [Vayikra 21:7]: And nor shall the Kohanim take in marriage a woman divorced from her husband. This teaches us that a woman who is divorced from her legal husband is forbidden to be married to a Kohen, but a woman divorced from a man who is not her husband will not disqualify her.

What is the pearl that he could have expounded? He could have expounded that which we learned in the following braisa: It is written [Vayikra 21:7]: Nor shall the Kohanim take a woman divorced from her husband. This teaches us that even if she was divorced from her husband alone (if the husband inserted in the letter of divorce a clause forbidding her to marry anyone else), she becomes disqualified from marrying a Kohen. And this is what is meant when it is stated: The scent of the divorce can disqualify a woman from marrying a Kohen.)

How could Rav refer to Rabbi Elozar’s exposition of the verse as a shard? His exposition is also halachically correct. Just because it is not as novel of a ruling, is that grounds to degrade it? Furthermore, the Gemora states elsewhere that one should not say that this teaching he likes, and this one he does not; one who does say that is discarding the glory of the Torah.

Ohel Moshe explains that Rav meant to say like the Gemora Bava Metzia (17b) states: If I had not lifted the shard for you, you would not have found the pearl underneath. Rav was saying that Rabbi Elozar could have expounded the second exposition, which is a deeper one and more novel of a ruling, but Rabbi Elozar was compelled to initially “lift the shard,” by expounding the verse according to its simple interpretation, and only afterwards could we “find the pearl,” and expound the verse with a more novel ruling.

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ONE WITNESS IS BELIEVED TO PERMIT THE HUSBAND TO MARRY HIS WIFE’S SISTER (explanation of Tosfos) - Yevamos 94 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states: If one’s wife and his wife’s sister’s husband both went overseas and he heard that they died, and he went and married his wife’s sister. They both subsequently returned. The halacha is as follows: His wife’s sister is forbidden to remain with her previous husband (as we previously learned, that a woman who marries on the basis of testimony that her husband died, and then he returns, she cannot return to her husband), but his own wife is permitted to him. We do not say that since his wife’s sister is forbidden to remain with her husband, his wife should be prohibited to him.

Rashi learns that the wife’s death became known through the testimony of one witness. Tosfos Rid and Maharsha ask that a single witness is only believed to permit a woman to remarry because we do not want her to remain an agunah; how can Rashi write that the husband married the sister on the basis of the testimony of a single witness?

The Maharsha answers that the husband erroneously thought that a single witness is believed that his wife died, and he is therefore permitted to marry her sister.

Additionally, he suggests that Rashi maintains that just as a single witness is believed to permit a married woman to marry because we do not want her to remain an agunah, so too, the Rabbis permitted the prohibition of a wife’s sister because of agunah.

The Netziv disagrees and says that in general, a single witness would not be believed to permit the prohibition of a wife’s sister; however, in a case where he is believed that the husband died for the purpose of allowing the wife to remarry, he is also believed that the wife died, thus permitting the husband to marry her sister.

Tosfos s.v. v’af al gav states that there were two witnesses that his wife died because otherwise, he would not be permitted to marry her sister. He does cite two opinions regarding how many witnesses there were testifying that his brother-in-law died. This would depend on the dispute between the Chachamim and Rabbi Shimon regarding the permission granted to the wife to return to her husband if there were two witnesses testifying. Since the Gemora rules that the wife is forbidden to remain with her husband, the Gemora is either referring to a case that two witnesses testified, and the Gemora is following the opinion which maintains that the Rabbis dispute Rabbi Shimon and hold that she would still be forbidden; or the case of the Gemora is where there was only one witness.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 94 - Highlights

BELIEVING ONE WITNESS TO PERMIT THE YEVAMAH TO MARRY ANOTHER MAN

There are those that say that one witness is certainly believed to enable a woman to fall to yibum, for even the yevamah herself would be believed, as we learned in the following Mishna: A woman that said her husband had died is permitted to remarry. If she said that her husband had died, she is permitted to the yavam. The inquiry to Rav Sheishes was the following: Do we accept the testimony of one witness to permit the yevamah to marry another man (he claims that the only yavam died)? What is the reason that we accept the testimony of one witness? Is it because something that is likely to be revealed to the public, he would not lie about; here too, the witness would not lie. Or perhaps, we believe the single witness because the woman will investigate before she remarries; here, she might not investigate because she hates the yavam.

Rav Sheishes cites our Mishna: The Mishna states: If a woman's husband and (only) son went overseas, and they came and said to her, “Your husband died, and afterwards your son died (as the son was alive when his father died, the widow is not subject to yibum or chalitzah),” and she married, and afterwards they said to her, “The reverse was the case (the son died first, so that when his father died afterwards, the widow was subject to yibum or chalitzah),” she must leave her second husband, and the first (before they knew that the order was reversed) and last child is a mamzer.

What is the case of the Mishna? If both testimonies were given by two witnesses, why would we choose to rely on the second set of witnesses more than the first set? And furthermore, the child born from such a union cannot be a definite mamzer; the child can only be a possible mamzer.

Evidently, the case of the Mishna is where initially one witness testified that she was not subject to yibum, and later two witnesses testified that she was subject to yibum.

Rav Sheishes concludes his proof: The reason why the first witness is not believed that the woman was not subject to yibum is because he was contradicted by two witnesses, otherwise, he would have been believed. This is a proof that one witness is indeed believed to permit the yevamah to marry another man.

The Gemora rejects the proof: Really, the Mishna’s case is where two witnesses testified that she is not subject to yibum, and later, two witnesses testified that she is subject to yibum. (Why do we believe the second set of witnesses, and not the first?) Rav Acha bar Minyomi states that our Mishna is dealing with a case of hazamah. ("Eidim zom'min," conspiring witnesses means that two witnesses testify regarding a certain incident and another set of witnesses disqualify that testimony by saying that the first set of witnesses were with them in a different place at the time that the first set of witnesses claim that the act took place. The first witnesses are termed "eidim zom'min.” The Torah commands that the second set of witnesses are believed, rather than the first.)

Rava said: We can derive that one witness be believed in regards to a yevamah from the following kal vachomer (literally translated as light and heavy, or lenient and stringent; an a fortiori argument; it is one of the thirteen principles of biblical hermeneutics; it employs the following reasoning: if a specific stringency applies in a usually lenient case, it must certainly apply in a more serious case): If you have permitted a woman to remarry on the basis of the testimony from one witness, which involves a kares prohibition, how much more so, when it only involves a mere prohibitory law.

One of the Rabbis said to Rava: The laws concerning the woman testifying herself proves the contrary: When we are dealing with a prohibition involving kares, you have permitted her to remarry (based on her own testimony), whereas in a case that only involves a mere prohibitory law, you have not permitted her (to testify that her yavam died). (This disproves Rava’s kal vachomer.) What is in fact the reason that she is not believed? It is because she may sometimes hate the yavam, she might marry another man without thoroughly investigating the matter, so too, in the case of one witness, she may sometimes hate the yavam, she might marry another man without thoroughly investigating the matter. (93b – 94a)

THE SCENT OF A DIVORCE

The Mishna had stated: If they said to her, “Your husband died,” and she became betrothed to another man, and afterwards her husband came back, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the latter one gave her a bill of divorce, he did not disqualify her from the Kehunah. This was expounded by Rabbi Elozar ben Masya: It is written [Vayikra 21:7]: And nor shall the Kohanim take in marriage a woman divorced from her husband. This teaches us that a woman who is divorced from her legal husband is forbidden to be married to a Kohen, but a woman divorced from a man who is not her husband will not disqualify her.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: Rabbi Elozar could have expounded from this verse a pearl, but instead, he expounded from it only a shard (it is obvious that a letter of divorce received from a man to whom the woman is not married to is pointless, and it would not render her ineligible to marry a Kohen).

What is the pearl that he could have expounded? He could have expounded that which we learned in the following braisa: It is written [Vayikra 21:7]: Nor shall the Kohanim take a woman divorced from her husband. This teaches us that even if she was divorced from her husband alone (if the husband inserted in the letter of divorce a clause forbidding her to marry anyone else), she becomes disqualified from marrying a Kohen. And this is what is meant when it is stated: The scent of the divorce can disqualify a woman from marrying a Kohen. (94a)

THE WIFE WENT OVERSEAS

The Mishna states: If one's wife went overseas, and they came and said to him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife returned, she is permitted to return to him. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second one, and the second one is permitted to his relatives. And if the first one died, he is permitted to marry the second.

If they said to him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and afterwards they said to him, “She was alive (when you married the sister), and she died (since then),” the first child (the one conceived prior to his wife’s death) is a mamzer, and the last one (the one conceived after his wife’s death) is not a mamzer.

Rabbi Yosi says: Whoever disqualifies others, disqualifies himself as well, and whoever does not disqualify others, does not disqualify himself either. (This statement will be explained on Daf 95b.) (94a – 94b)

HIS WIFE AND BROTHER-IN-LAW WENT OVERSEAS

The Mishna had stated: If one's wife went overseas, and they came and said to him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife returned, she is permitted to return to him.

The Gemora comments: This halacha would be correct even if his wife and his wife’s sister’s husband both went overseas. He heard that they died (through two witnesses), and married his wife’s sister. They both subsequently returned. The halacha is as follows: His wife’s sister is forbidden to remain with her previous husband (as we previously learned, that a woman who marries on the basis of testimony that her husband died, and then he returns, she cannot return to her husband), but his own wife is permitted to him. We do not say that since his wife’s sister is forbidden to remain with her husband, his wife should be prohibited to him. (94b)

RABBI AKIVA’S ADDITIONS

The Mishna had stated: If one's wife went overseas, and they came and said to him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife returned, she is permitted to return to him.

The Gemora comments: It would seem that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, for if the Mishna would be following Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, the wife should be forbidden to him on account of being the sister of his divorcee. For it was taught in the following braisa: All of the women involved in an incestuous marriages forbidden in the Torah, do not require a letter of divorce from the man who married them except a married woman who remarried in accordance with a decision of a Beis Din. Rabbi Akiva adds: Even a brother’s wife and his wife’s sister. And since Rabbi Akiva has stated that one who marries his wife’s sister will require a letter of divorce, his wife should be forbidden to him because his wife is now the sister of his divorcee. (This proves that the Mishna does not follow Rabbi Akiva’s opinion. The Tanna of the Mishna would maintain that one who marries his wife’s sister does not require a letter of divorce.)

The Gemora objects to this proof: Did we not learn the Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav Chiya bar Yosef in the name of Rav: What is Rabbi Akiva's case of his brother’s wife? It is where a man's brother, betrothed (but did not consummate the marriage with nisuin) a woman and went overseas, and the husband, upon hearing that his brother died, married his brother’s wife. If the brother should return, Rabbi Akiva rules that the husband is required to issue a letter of divorce to his brother’s wife. The reason that this is required is because people might say that the brother had attached a certain unfulfilled condition to the betrothal and that the husband had lawfully married her. (And so, in order that it should not be suspected that a lawful marriage had been dissolved without a letter of divorce, it was enacted, as a preventive measure, that a letter of divorce be issued.) And what is the case of the wife’s sister? It is where a man betrothed a woman and she went overseas, and the husband, upon hearing that his wife died, married her sister. If the wife should return, Rabbi Akiva rules that the husband is required to issue a letter of divorce to his wife’s sister. The reason that this is required is because people might say that the husband had attached a certain unfulfilled condition to the betrothal of his original wife and that the husband had lawfully married her sister. (And so, in order that it should not be suspected that a lawful marriage had been dissolved without a letter of divorce, it was enacted, as a preventive measure, that a letter of divorce be issued.)

However, in respect to our Mishna’s case, which is dealing with a nisuin, there is no such concern. (It is highly unlikely that a person will attach a condition to a nisuin because nisuin involves marital relations between the husband and the wife. If the condition was not fulfilled, all of their cohabitations would be retroactively rendered illicit.) Even Rabbi Akiva would admit that a letter of divorce is not required. (Our Mishna can therefore be in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.) (94b)

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE
WIFE TRANSGRESSING
AND THE HUSBAND

The Mishna had stated: If one's wife went overseas, and they came and said to him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife returned, she is permitted to return to him.

The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t the wife become forbidden to the husband because he engaged in cohabitation with her sister, in the same manner that a woman whose husband went overseas becomes forbidden to him if she had cohabitation with another man?

The Gemora answers: The two cases are not comparable. If one’s wife willingly commits adultery, she is Biblically forbidden to her husband; therefore, if she transgresses inadvertently, the Rabbis decreed that she is also forbidden to her husband. However, regarding the case of one’s wife’s sister, where his wife is not Biblically forbidden to him even if he willingly cohabits with her sister, the Rabbis did not decree that his wife should be prohibited to him in a case where he transgresses inadvertently. (94b – 95a)

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