Tuesday, July 31, 2007

NOT A FACTUAL DISPUTE - Yevamos 83 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora cites a Mishna which states that if one plants a tree within thirty days of Rosh Hashanah prior to a Shemitah year, the tree must be uprooted. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that a tree takes root within three days. Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon hold that a tree takes root within two weeks of its being planted.

The Chasam Sofer (Y”D 284) comment that this is not a factual dispute as to how many days it takes for a tree to take root for everyone holds that it takes root in three days or less and the facts can attest to this. The argument is regarding a case where for some reason the tree did not take root. After how long can it be stated with a certainty that the tree will not take root any longer.

Interestingly, the Chazon Ish (Shvi’is 17:28) explains exactly the opposite. He also comments that there is no factual dispute amongst the Tannaim and everyone agrees that a tree can only begin to take root within three days. The argument is if that little bit is considered taking root or is a much firmer attachment to the ground necessary.

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HOW SHOULD WE RULE? - Yevamos 83 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora cites a Mishna which states that if one plants a tree within thirty days of Rosh Hashanah prior to a Shemitah year, the tree must be uprooted. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that a tree takes root within three days. Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon hold that a tree takes root within two weeks of its being planted.

The Rambam and other poskim all rule in accordance with Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon. The Sfas Emes questions as to why the Rambam does not rule regarding lands outside of Eretz Yisroel in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda who holds that three days is sufficient. There is a principle that we rule outside of Eretz Yisroel in accordance with the viewpoint which is most lenient in Eretz Yisroel.

The Shagas Aryeh (14) and the Noda Beyehuda (kamma Y”D 88) answer that whenever the Gemora rules explicitly like the Tanna who is stringent, the principle of ruling in Chutz La’aretz in accordance with the lenient opinion does not apply.

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Daf Yomi - yevamos 83 - Highlights

(Rabbi Yochanan maintains that Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon hold that an androgynous is a definite male. Rish Lakish held that they maintain that he is possibly a male.)The Mishna had stated: An androgynous may marry a woman. This would indicate that he is a definite male and his marriage is a full-fledged one.
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The Gemora answers: Let us learn the Mishna to mean that if an androgynous marries, the marriage takes effect (to the extent that she will need a divorce to get married again, because an androgynous is a possible male).

The Gemora asks: But the Mishna says that the androgynous may marry outright?

Rish Lakish counters: And according to you, what does the next statement of the mean when it states the following: An androgynous may not be taken in marriage by a man? It obviously is referring to even after the fact; the androgynous may not remain married to the male. Just as the second statement refers to after the fact, so too, the first statement of the Mishna means after the fact.

The Gemora objects to this explanation: They said: No. The first statement of the Mishna means that the androgynous may marry a woman outright, and the second statement means that the androgynous may not be married to a male even after the fact. (This would be inconsistent with Rish Lakish’s viewpoint.)

The Gemora asks on Rabbi Yochanan: The Mishna concluded with the following ruling: Rabbi Eliezer says: One is liable to stoning on account of cohabiting with an androgynous, as with a male. This would indicate that the Tanna Kamma was uncertain as to the status of an androgynous.

The Gemora answers: Both the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Eliezer maintain that an androgynous is certainly a male. The difference between the two opinions is whether a male will be liable to stoning for cohabiting with the androgynous in two places (through his anus or his female organ). The Tanna Kamma maintains that he will be liable for stoning from either of two places. Rabbi Eliezer holds that he will be liable for stoning only when he cohabits with the androgynous in the manner of a male (through his anus, for only then will it be classifies as homosexual relations). (82b)

Rav said: Rabbi Yosi’s ruling in the Mishna (that an androgynous entitles his wife to eat terumah) cannot be correct because Rabbi Yosi taught differently in the following braisa: Rabbi Yosi said: An androgynous is a being unto itself, and the Chachamim could not determine whether it is a male or a female.

The Gemora asks: On the contrary? Let Rav say that Rabbi Yosi’s ruling in the braisa is not correct because he taught differently in the Mishna?

The Gemora answers: By the fact that Rabbi Yosi deserted his partner Rabbi Shimon in the braisa, this would indicate that he retracted from his ruling of the Mishna.

Shmuel said: Rabbi Yosi’s ruling in the braisa cannot be correct because Rabbi Yosi taught differently in the Mishna.

The Gemora asks: On the contrary? Let Shmuel say that Rabbi Yosi’s ruling in the Mishna is not correct because he taught differently in the braisa, since we have heard that Shmuel is concerned for the individual opinion when it is a stricter one (even when it is opposed to a majority opinion)?

The Gemora answers: He is only concerned for an individual stricter opinion if a Mishna will not be uprooted because of it; here, where we would be compelled to uproot a Mishna, Shmuel is not concerned for the individual opinion. (82b – 83a)

They said in the Beis Medrash of Rav in the name of Rav: The halacha follows Rabbi Yosi with respect to an androgynous and with respect to grafting. Shmuel said: The halacha follows Rabbi Yosi with respect to a woman bleeding in labor and with respect to rendering unfit.

The Gemora explains: When Rav said that the halacha follows Rabbi Yosi with respect to an androgynous, he is referring to the halacha cited above (an androgynous entitles his wife to eat terumah).

When Rav said that the halacha follows Rabbi Yosi with respect to grafting, he was referring to the following Mishna: One is not permitted to plant a tree, nor bend a vine and insert it into the ground, nor graft during the year preceding Shemitah, less than thirty days before Rosh Hashanah (since it takes thirty days for all types of planting to take root). If one does plant a tree within thirty days of Rosh Hashanah prior to a Shemitah year, the tree must be uprooted. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that a tree takes root within three days. Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon hold that a tree takes root within two weeks of its being planted. Rav Nachman rules in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha that according to all these opinions, you must add an additional thirty days to satisfy the requirement of adding from the ordinary onto the holy.

The Gemora now explains Shmuel’s statement: When Shmuel said that the halacha follows Rabbi Yosi with respect to a woman bleeding in labor, he was referring to the following Mishna: How many days can a woman’s labor last in order that we will attribute her discharges to the impending childbirth (and not render her a zavah, which would make her tamei)? Rabbi Meir says: Even forty or fifty days before childbirth. Rabbi Yehudah says: Only a month prior to childbirth. Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon say: Labor will never be longer than two weeks.

When Shmuel said that the halacha follows Rabbi Yosi with respect to rendering unfit, he was referring to the following Mishna: One who spreads his vines over the grain of his friend, has rendered the grain unfit on account of kilayim of the vineyard and he will be liable to pay; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon say: A person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him. (83a – 83b)

The Gemora inquires: What would Shmuel hold regarding an androgynous?

The Gemora answers: Come and hear from what Shmuel said to Rav Anan: Rabbi Yosi’s ruling in the braisa cannot be correct because Rabbi Yosi taught differently in the Mishna.

The Gemora inquires: What would Shmuel hold regarding grafting?

The Gemora answers: Come and hear from what Shmuel said to Rav Anan: The law should be taught according to the one that said: “three and thirty.”

The Gemora inquires: What would Rav hold regarding a woman in labor?

The Gemora says: Let this matter remain unresolved (until Eliyahu comes).

The Gemora inquires: What would Rav hold regarding rendering unfit?

Rav Yosef says: Come and hear from that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: The halacha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosi. (83b)

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yehudah says: A tumtum (undetermined sex) that was torn and was found to be a male, does not submit to chalitzah, because he is classified as a saris.

Rav Ami said: What would Rabbi Yehuday say regarding the tumtum of Biri, whom they performed a surgery and tore open his genital covering, and afterwards, he fathered seven children?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yehudah would say to you: Go check and see from where his children came (his wife probably committed adultery). (83b)

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah said: A tumtum should not perform a chalitzah because he might be torn open and found to be a saris-chamah.

The Gemora asks: Is every tumtum that is torn open a male?

The Gemora answers: The following is what he meant to say: A tumtum should not perform a chalitzah because he might be torn open and found to be a female; and even if he is found to be a male, perhaps he will be found to be a saris-chamah. (83b)

Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah said in the name of Rabbi Abba the brother of Rabbi Yehudah bar Zavdi, who said the name of Rabbi Yehudah, who said it in the name of Rav: A male will be liable for stoning for cohabiting with an androgynous from either of two places (his anus or his female organ).

The Gemora asks from the following braisa: Rabbi Eliezer says: One is liable to stoning on account of cohabiting with an androgynous, as with a male. When is this ruling applicable? Only when a male cohabits with the androgynous through his male organ; however, if he cohabits with the androgynous through his female organ, he will be exempt from punishment.

The Gemora answers: This is a matter of a Tannaic dispute, and Rav said his statement according to the Tanna who maintains that he will be liable for either of two places. (83b)

[END]

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Monday, July 23, 2007

NINTH OR THE TENTH?

Rabbi Yochanan said as follows: "Were I living in those days, I would have ordained the fast for the 10th of Av; for on that day the greater part of the Beis Hamikdosh was burned." The Chachamim maintained that the day when the calamity began should be observed as a fast-day.

The Kotzker Rebbe asked from that famous Nimukei Yosef in Bava Kamma. Rabbi Yochanan holds that one is liable for sending out a fire because it is akin to shooting an arrow (isho mishum chitzov). The Nimukei Yosef explains that this is why one is permitted to light candles Friday afternoon even though they will be burning on Shabbos; since the candles were lit from before Shabbos, that is when he shot the arrow. According to this, why is Rabbi Yochanan stating here that he would have declared the fast on the tenth of Av if the fire started on the ninth?

The answer is that regarding Shabbos and damages, we are concerned with the action; when it occurred and how it happened. Regarding the Beis Hamikdosh being destroyed; we are not concerned with the action, rather with the result and it was burned on the tenth of Av. This is why Rabbi Yochanan said that if he were living in those days, he would have ordained the tenth of Av as the fast day. (Margaliyos HaShas)

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TWO RESURRECTIONS

The Gemora stated: Kol hamisavel al Yerushalyim zocheh vroeh bsimchasa – Anyone who mourns for Jerusalem will merit witnessing her joy.

The Ritva states that there are actually two periods of resurrection. One period is at the end of the era of our world, after the arrival of the Messiah, but an earlier one is at the time of building the Beis Hamikdosh. At that time, all those who died in exile will be woken up to take part in the rebuilding of the Beis Hamikdosh. Those who did not drop a tear will not be woken. There still exists a possibility that they may be woken at the end of time.

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LEARNING ON TISHA B'AV

We learned in a braisa: All ordinances applicable to a mourner are effective for everyone on Tisha B’Av. One must not eat, drink, anoint himself, wear leather shoes, or engage in marital relations. One is not permitted to read from the Torah, Prophets or the Writings. The Mishna, Gemora, Medrash, Halachos and Aggados may not be discussed. One may read from Scriptures or study from the Talmud in a place that he is not familiar with. He is allowed to read from Lamentations, Iyuv and from the unpleasant verses in Yirmiyah. Schoolchildren must not learn on that day because it is written: "The precepts of Hashem are upright, rejoicing the heart." Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and maintains that one may not even read nor study anything that he is not familiar with.

It is said in the name of the Maharsham that if a person thought of a novel idea in Torah on Tisha B’Av, he is permitted to write it down in an abbreviated manner in order that he does not forget it by the time nightfall arrives.

Aruch HaShulchan (554:5) rules that one is permitted to rule on a Torah related issue that is necessary for that day and he is allowed to settle a dispute after midday, where the litigants are advocating for an immediate resolution.

Maharil Diskin writes that even though the Rav is permitted to issue a ruling on Tisha B’Av, he is forbidden to accept payment.

The Maharsham writes that he compelled himself to conclude a response regarding a heter agunah on Tisha B’Av since the Bach writes: “Kol hamatir agunah achas ke’ilu banah achas mi’churvos Yerushalayim” – Whoever releases one agunah, it is regarded as if he built one of the ruins of Yerushalayim. (Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha)

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WASHING ON TISHA B'AV

We asked Rabbi Doniel Neustadt as to the practical halachos regarding washing on Tisha B’av. Here is his response.

Washing any part of the body on Tishah B’av is forbidden. Washing is permitted in the case of…
*Dirty or soiled hands or other parts of the body. Any substance or discharge (e.g., a glutinous gel in the eye) may be rinsed off . [If soap is needed, it may be used. ]
*Awakening in the morning. One may wash netilas yadayim three times on each hand , but the water should reach only until the knuckles . After the hands are wiped but remain slightly damp, they may be passed over the face or the eyes .
*After using the bathroom and/or after touching a part of the body that is normally covered, but the water should reach only until the knuckles .
*Rinsing the mouth, but only in case of great discomfort . Care must be taken not to swallow the water. Mouthwash should not be used .
*Preparing food . If warm water is necessary, it may be used .
*Medical needs . Hot water may be used when needed .
*Preparation for davening . Some say that only the tips of the fingers [until the first joint ] should be washed .
*Washing dishes [after midday], if leaving them unwashed will attract insects , etc. It is proper not to use warm water.
*Eating bread, for those who are allowed to eat on Tishah b'Av. The hands should be washed to the wrists in the usual manner . Several poskim mention that one may also wash with mayim acharonim if he is always particular to do so .
*A baby who is bathed daily .
*A bride, who is allowed to wash her face up to 30 days after her wedding .

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LEARNING THROUGH HARDSHIPS - Yevamos 81 - Daf Yomi

The Mashgiach of Kaminetz, Rabbi Moshe Aharon Stern zt”l related the following incident: The Netziv once visited the Reshash, who was twenty-three years the Netziv’s senior. The Reshash posed to the Netziv a very difficult question that he had raised on Tosfos to Yevamos (81b) The Netziv, after pondering the question for some time, was able to resolve the difficulty by emending a word in Tosfos. The Reshash was satisfied with the answer of the Netziv, and the Reshash quotes the Netziv in his gloss on the Gemora. The Reshash concluded his comment with the praise (Mishlei 24:26): Sfisayim yishak, the lips of one who responds with proper words should be kissed.

Upon hearing the answer of the Netziv, The Reshash wondered why he did not merit providing the correct answer to his difficulty. The Netziv replied that the Reshash was wealthy, whereas the Netziv lived a life of poverty. The Netziv said: “When one studies Torah despite living a life of hardship, Hashem opens for him the wellsprings of Torah.”

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TERUMAH FACTS - Yevamos 81 - Daf Yomi

Rashi and many other Rishonim maintain that the requirement to separate terumah from figs and other fruits from a tree is only Rabbinical even in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh. The Biblical obligation of terumah only applies to grain, olives and grapes. The Gemora, that mentions Rabbinical terumah in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh can be referring to figs.

The Rambam (Terumos 2:1) holds that there is a Biblical obligation to separate terumah from all fruits on a tree. The Gemora, that mentions Rabbinical terumah in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh can be referring to vegetables or terumah from any land outside of Eretz Yisroel.

It emerges from our Gemora that there is an argument between Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish if there is a Biblical requirement to separate terumah nowadays. The Rambam (ibid. 26) rules in accordance with Rish Lakish that there is only a Rabbinical obligation to separate terumah nowadays. The Ra’avad disagrees, and states that the halacha follows Rabbi Yochanan.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 81 - Highlights

The Mishna states: A saris-chamah (sterile from birth) Kohen who married the daughter of an Israelite, entitles her the right to eat terumah. Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon say: An androgynous (hermaphrodite) Kohen who married a daughter of an Israelite entitles her the right to eat terumah. Rabbi Yehudah says: A tumtum (undetermined sex) that was torn and was found to be a male, does not submit to chalitzah, because he is classified as a saris. An androgynous may marry, but may not be married by a man. Rabbi Eliezer says: One is liable to stoning on account of cohabiting with an androgynous, as with a male. (81a)

The Mishna had stated: A saris-chamah (sterile from birth) Kohen who married the daughter of an Israelite, entitles her the right to eat terumah.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t this halacha obvious? (If she is permitted to marry him, she should be entitled to eat terumah.)

The Gemora answers: One might have thought that only a Kohen who is capable of fathering children can entitle others to eat terumah; the Mishna teaches us that even if he does not have the ability of fathering children, he may still entitle others to eat terumah. (81a)

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon say: An androgynous (hermaphrodite) Kohen who married a daughter of an Israelite entitles her the right to eat terumah.

Rish Lakish said: He entitles her to eat terumah, but not the breast and the thigh from the shelamim. Rabbi Yochanan said: He even entitles her to eat the breast and the thigh from the shelamim.

The Gemora asks on Rish Lakish: What is the difference between the breast and the thigh and terumah? Both of them are Biblically prohibited for non-Kohanim!

The Gemora answers: We are discussing terumah of nowadays (after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh), which is only a Rabbinical requirement (since we are uncertain if the androgynous is a male or female, we apply the principle of acting leniently when there is uncertainty regarding a Rabbinic law).

The Gemora elaborates: Nowadays, the androgynous entitles his wife to eat terumah because separating terumah is only a Rabbinical requirement. However, in the times when the Beis Hamikdosh was in existence, he does not entitle her to eat the breast and thigh, and even Rabbinic terumah (from fruits and vegetables) because we are concerned that he will provide her with Biblical terumah as well. (81a)

Rabbi Yochanan said: An androgynous even entitles his wife to eat the breast and the thigh from the shelamim. Rabbi Yochanan said to Rish L:akish: Do you really hold that terumah nowadays is only a Rabbinical requirement?

Rish Lakish replied: Yes, I do, for I have learned in a braisa that if a round cake of pressed figs (of terumah) became mixed with other round cakes of pressed figs, the mixture is permitted. (If one cake of terumah was mixed up with a hundred non-consecrated cakes of the same size, or if a cake of terumah that was tamei was mixed up with a hundred such cakes of terumah that is tahor, the entire quantity is permitted. This proves that terumah at the present time is only a Rabbinical requirement, since such nullification, had the requirement been Biblical, would not, owing to its significance, (based on the fact that it is commonly counted when sold) have been permitted. Though the terumah of figs, like that of all other fruit of trees, is at all times a Rabbinical requirement only, its nullification would not have been permitted at the present time had there been any Biblical terumah in existence at the same time. The nullification of the Rabbinical terumah would have been forbidden as a preventive measure against the possible assumption that the Biblical terumah also might be nullified.)

Rabbi Yochanan said to Rish Lakish: But I have learned in a braisa that if a piece of tamei chatas meat became mixed with pieces of tahor chatas meat, the mixture is permitted. (This proves that even Biblically prohibited foods, which are commonly counted when sold, may nevertheless become nullified.) Did we learn in the Mishna that anything that is commonly counted is considered significant and cannot be nullified? (This seemed to have been Rish Lakish’s reading of the Mishna because pressed figs are commonly counted when they are sold, but sometimes, they are sold by estimation.) We learned in the Mishna that anything which is exclusively counted is considered significant and cannot be nullified! (This is why the pressed figs and the meat slices can become nullified.)

The Gemora cites the Mishna: If a man had bundles of fenugreek of kilayim (the prohibition against planting together different species of vegetables, fruit or seeds) of the vineyard, they must be burned (one cannot derive any benefit from the growths and they must be burned). If these became mixed up with other permitted bundles, they must all be burned; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Chachamim say: The prohibited bundles may become nullified in a mixture of two hundred and one (if the permitted food is two hundred times the quantity of the forbidden kilayim). For Rabbi Meir would say the following: Anything that is commonly counted is considered significant and cannot be nullified. And the Chachamim said: There are only six items which cannot be nullified (since they are big, expensive and the best of their species). Rabbi Akiva said: There are in fact seven. The following are the items: Nuts from Perech, pomegranates from Badan, sealed jugs of wine, shoots of beets, cabbage roots and Greek gourds. Rabbi Akiva adds loaves of homemade bread. Of these items, those which are subject to the law of orlah (applied to newly-planted trees for a period of three years during which their fruits must not be eaten) impart the prohibition of orlah and those which are subject to the law of kilayim of the vineyard impart that of the kilayim of the vineyard.

Rabbi Yochanan said: The correct version of Rabbi Meir is that anything which is exclusively counted is considered significant and cannot be nullified. Rish Lakish said: The correct version of Rabbi Meir is that anything which is commonly counted is considered significant and cannot be nullified. (81a – 81b)

The Gemora asks: What is the braisa regarding the pieces of chatas meat that Rabbi Yochanan mentioned above?

The Gemora answers: It was taught in a braisa: If a piece of tamei chatas meat became mixed with one hundred pieces of tahor chatas meat, and likewise, if a piece of tamei lechem hapanim (showbread; twelve loaves that were on the Shulchan from Shabbos to Shabbos) became mixed with one hundred pieces of tahor lechem hapanim, the mixture is permitted. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that it does not become nullified (because in his opinion, something which is intermingled with its own kind cannot become nullified). But if a piece of tahor chatas meat became mixed with one hundred pieces of unconsecrated tahor meat, and likewise, if a piece of tahor lechem hapanim became mixed with one hundred pieces of tahor unconsecrated breads, everyone agrees that they do not become nullified. (Nullification would have removed the Biblical prohibition of eating consecrated food by a non-Kohen. As, however, the entire mixture, which consists of pieces that are sometimes counted, may be eaten even without recourse to nullification by a Kohen to whom it could be sold, though this might have to be done at a reduced cost, the law of nullification, which is applied even in such circumstances whenever the prohibition is Rabbinical, as in the case of the cake of figs is not applied here where it is Biblical.)

Rabbi Yochanan concludes his proof from the braisa: The first portion of the braisa states that the piece of meat can become nullified even though it is commonly counted.

Rabbi Chiya the son of Rabbi Huna said: The braisa is discussing a piece of meat that dissolved. (Even Rish Lakish will agree that it can become nullified because it is not commonly counted.)

The Gemora asks: Why does Rabbi Yehudah rule that the piece of meat cannot become nullified?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yehudah maintains that something which is intermingled with its own kind cannot become nullified. (81b – 82a)

[END]

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Sunday, July 22, 2007

EIGHT-MONTH BABIES - Yevamos 80 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that a child born in its eighth month will not survive. In today’s day and age, that does not seem to be the case. How are we to understand this?

Rabbi Gil Student wrote an essay regarding the halachic responses to scientific development. Here is an excerpt from his discussion. (It can be found in its entirety here: aishdas)

As we already mentioned, the Talmud claims that babies born in their eighth month from conception are not viable. The Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 155:4) explains that the sages observed that babies born in their seventh month rarely survived. However, a small but significant percentage lived. In the eighth month, the survival rate dropped even lower. But in the ninth month, the survival rate rose sharply. This phenomenon is reflected in other ancient medical works such as those by Hippocrates and Galen (see J. Preuss, Biblical and Talmudic Medicine, 14:14). Keep in mind that until recently infant mortality was very high. Many newborns never lived past their first month. Indeed, this is reflected in halacha in that parents do not fully mourn a baby that dies in its first month alive. Before the month passed, there was a strong likelihood that the baby would not survive.

To explain this drop in infant survival in the eighth month, the sages adopted the medical explanation that babies develop along two paths - a seven month path and a nine-month path. Babies in the seven-month path progress at a rate so that they are fully developed after seven months while babies in the nine-month path are only fully developed after nine months. A nine-month baby born in its seventh or eighth month cannot survive because it is not sufficiently developed. However, the rabbis observed that there were still some very few babies born in their eighth month who survived. These babies, it was explained, were seven-month babies who were born late.

With all this in mind, we can understand the following from Tosefta Shabbat 16:4.

Who is an eight-month [baby]? Any [baby] who has not completed his months. Rebbe says: His signs identify him - his hair and fingernails... Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Whoever has lasted thirty days is not a stillborn...

According to the first anonymous opinion, any baby born in its eighth month, i.e. who has not completed its nine-month development period, is considered to be an eight-month baby that will not survive. According to Rebbe, only a baby that is born in its eighth month and is not developed enough to have fingernails and hair is considered to be an eight-month baby. Even if a baby is born in its eighth month, if it is fully developed it is deemed viable and treated appropriately. According to R' Shimon ben Gamliel, any baby that survives its first thirty days is deemed viable. In Shabbat 136a, Shmuel rules like R' Shimon ben Gamliel. Whether R' Shimon ben Gamliel is coming to add to Rebbe's criteria, so that even a partially developed eight-month baby is deemed viable if it survives thirty days, or he is coming to subtract from Rebbe's criteria, or a number of other possibilities is discussed by the commentaries. For summaries of these discussions see R' Aharon Yaffen's footnotes to Mossad HaRav Kook's edition of the Ritva on Yevamot 80b and Minchat Yitzchak 4:123:3. Regardless, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 330:7-8, Yoreh Deah 266:11) rules that a baby born in its eighth month that has fingernails and hair is considered viable in regard to the laws of Shabbat. What is significant is that the rabbis recognized that a baby born in its eighth month can live a full and long life. However, based on their observations and medical knowledge, they said that the overwhelming majority does not.

Halachic Ramifications

The non-viability of an eight-month baby has halachic ramifications. A widow whose only child is a non-viable eight-month baby is considered childless in regard to the levirate marriage. If she had given birth to a viable child she would not be obligated to perform the levirate marriage or chalitzah ceremony. However, since her child's chances of living are so remote she is considered childless and is prohibited from remarrying until she fulfills the necessary biblical requirements (Yevamot 80a-b).

Additionally, the needs of a seriously ill person may be cared for even if they require violating the laws of Shabbat. A newborn baby, in particular, requires great care. While most of those needs do not require violating Shabbat, if they did Shabbat could be violated. However, for a non-viable baby that has essentially no chance of survival, Shabbat may not be violated. The concerns of an eight-month baby that does not have fully grown fingernails and hair do not override Shabbat (Shabbat 136a).

Today, modern science gives us a different understanding of a fetus' development than that of the sages. Babies develop steadily until their last month. Those born in their seventh month are less likely to survive than those born in their eighth month. Premature babies can suffer from difficulty in modulating temperature and underdeveloped capillaries and lungs which can be alleviated with respirators and incubators. Today, babies born in their eighth month routinely survive. How should halacha respond to this change?

Defining an Eight-Month Baby

Before we address this question, let us first discuss an often overlooked issue - a definition of terms.

What is an eight-month baby?

The Talmud says that a normal (nine-month) gestation period is approximately 271 days from conception. Modern medicine places the due date of a baby at approximately 280 days from the mother's last menstrual cycle. Since a religious woman may only have marital relations beginning with 12 days after starting to menstruate (after she immerses in a mikva), the 271 days translate into approximately 283 days, which is essentially equal to modern medicine's 280.

Modern medicine divides the 280 days into ten months of 28 days. What is generally called the ninth and final month is really the tenth month - from weeks 36 to 40. The eighth month is from weeks 32 to 36 and the seventh month is from weeks 28 to 32.

Halacha divides the 271 days into nine months of about 30 days each (Responsa Rashbash 513). Translating that into the weeks we used above (from the last menstruation), the ninth month is from weeks 35.7 to 40. The eighth month is from weeks 31.4 to 35.7 and the seventh month is from 27.1 to 31.4.

Additionally, the simple understanding of the Talmud is that an eight-month baby is one born after eight full months, i.e. after 35.7 weeks. This is the understanding of most commentators with only the Ramban dissenting (Responsa Rivash 446).

It is a daily occurrence for babies to be born at 36 weeks and survive without the assistance of respirators or incubators. With their assistance, the survival rate is greater than 95%. How should the halachic community react to this undeniable reality?

The first point that needs to be made is that halacha only needs to address those babies born without fully grown fingernails and hair. Only those born between 35.7 and 40 weeks who are under-developed are an issue. Never the less, the problem remains.

2b. Nature Changed

The Rashbash (R' Shlomo ben Shimon Duran; early 15th century) quotes the authors of Tosafot as saying that already by their time nature had changed. While in the days of the Talmud babies' months were determined by how many months had been completed, they are now calculated by which month the baby is in. While for the Talmud a baby born in weeks 35.7 to 40 (after eight months) was premature, this baby would now be considered full-term (a nine-month baby). Now, only babies born in weeks 31.4 to 35.7 (in their eighth month) are considered premature (Responsa Rashbash 513). This is how the Rama ruled in Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 156:4). The Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 155:4) continued along this line and noted that today a significant number of babies born in their eighth month are viable on their own. This must mean that nature has changed, although he does not speculate as to whether it is due to better prenatal care, healthier diets, or other causes. Since nature has changed and eight-month babies are no longer inherently at risk, the halacha as it relates to current nature is different than it is in regard to talmudic nature. Since eight-month babies are deemed viable, Shabbat may be violated for their needs and women who give birth to such a baby are not considered childless.

There were two issues that we pointed out above. One is that babies born after eight months are not only viable but are more viable than those born after seventh months. The other is that with modern medical care even premature babies can survive. The Chazon Ish solved both issues by ruling that nature has changed and that eight-month babies are no longer born non-viable. Any baby that can survive, whether on its own or with medical help, is considered a viable baby.

Alternate Solution

The Minchat Yitzchak (4:123:19-20) refused to go that far. He was not ready to say that the talmudic understanding of the development of babies is no longer true. Of the two issues above, he only addressed the second. Even though eight-month babies are inherently less viable than others, modern medical care can help those babies survive. Since these babies become viable through medical assistance they are therefore viable. It is not that nature has changed. Rather, modern medicine has found techniques to help the non-viable survive.

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SORAH WAS AN AYLONIS - Yevamos 80 - Daf Yomi

The Torah relates that Sorah died at the age of 127. Rashi notes that the Torah mentions “years” after each component of her age (“100 years and 20 years and 7 years”) in order to teach that each of these units of her life had a unique significance. At the age of 100, Sorah was just as free of sin as she had been when she turned 20, as the Heavenly Court doesn’t punish a person for his sins until he turns 20. Although a person doesn’t receive punishment, his transgressions are still considered sins – as evidenced by the fact that somebody under the age of 20 is still required to bring a sacrifice in order to atone for his transgressions – so how can Rashi write that a person who turns 20 is free of all sins?

Reb Oizer Alpert cites the Brisker Rov who answers that the Gemora in Yevamos (64b) states that Sorah was an aylonis – a woman who is unable to have children. Such a woman never develops the physical signs of adulthood. The Gemora in Yevamos (80a) rules that when a woman turns 20 without becoming physically mature, she is declared an aylonis and legally considered to be an adult from that time onward. Therefore, although sins which are committed before a person turns 20 are indeed considered sins even if they aren’t punishable at that time by the Heavenly Court, the transgressions of Sorah were indeed not considered sins, as she was legally viewed as a minor until she turned 20!

Rashi additionally writes that Sorah was as beautiful at the age of 20 as she had been at the age of 7. In what way is this comparison considered praiseworthy, as a woman is typically expected to be considered prettier at 20 than she was at 7? We may similarly answer by noting that the Gemora in Yevamos (80b) lists the signs commonly associated with an aylonis, all of which are features traditionally viewed as being ugly. The Gemora in Sanhedrin (49b) states that women in these early generations were able to give birth as young as 8. As this was the age at which their bodies began to develop and mature, this was also the age at which an aylonis began to exhibit signs of ugliness. Although most women are expected to be prettier at age 20 than they were at age 7, Sorah became a full-fledged aylonis at age 20, so Rashi notes that she was nevertheless just as beautiful as she had been at age 7 before her condition developed!

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 80 - Highlights

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain. A saris-adam (one who became sterile after birth) submits to chalitzah, and they submit to chalitzah from his wife, because he had a time of fitness.

The Gemora asks: We have learned that Rabbi Akiva treats women prohibited by a negative precept the same as women with the penalty of kares (cohabitation with any of these women would render the children mamzeirim), and women who are subject to a penalty of kares are exempt from yibum and chalitzah (so why should the saris-adam be required to submit to chalitzah)?

Rabbi Ami answers: The Mishna is referring to a case where the brother had married a convert, and Rabbi Akiva holds like Rabbi Yosi that the congregation of converts is not regarded as the congregation (therefore there is no prohibition against marrying the petzua daka).

The Gemora asks: If so, why don’t we let him perform yibum?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Akiva in fact allows him to perform yibum; he only mentioned chalitzah because of Rabbi Yehoshua.

This explanation is supported by the following words of our Mishna: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Beseira testified about ben Megusas, a saris-adam who was in Yerushalayim, and his wife was married by yibum, thus confirming the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbah objects to this explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s ruling based on the following braisa: One, who is a petzua daka or a kerus shafchah, a saris-adam, or an old man, may either perform chalizah or yibum. What is the case? If these died childless and were survived by wives and brothers, and those brothers performed a ma'amar to the wives, or gave them letters of divorce, or performed a chalizah, their actions are legally valid. If they cohabited with them, the widows become their lawful wives. If the brothers died and they performed a ma'amar to their wives, or gave them divorce, or performed a chalizah, their actions are valid. If they cohabited with them, the widows become their lawful wives, but they may not retain them, because it is written [Devarim 23:2]: One with wounded or crushed testicles or with a severed member shall not enter into the Congregation of Hashem. We see that we are discussing a member of the congregation, and nevertheless, Rabbi Akiva (the author of this braisa; based on the fact that the braisa states if the petzua daka performs yibum, he acquires her) rules that there is a zikah-attachment for chalitzah and yibum.

The Gemora offers a different explanation: Rabbi Akiva is discussing a case where she fell to yibum when he was healthy, and then he became a saris-adam. There would still be a requirement for chalitzah in this case.

Abaye asked: Why doesn’t the prohibition of petzua daka come and negate the positive commandment of yibum? Didn’t we learn similarly in the following Mishna: Rabban Gamliel says: If two brothers were married to two sisters, one an adult woman and one a minor, and the husband of the adult sister died childless. (He may not perform yibum because he is Rabbinically married to her sister. There is a Biblical zikah-attachment.) If she refused, she refused (this is referred to as mi’un, which would nullify her marriage retroactively); and if not, she waits until she comes of age, and then the other is exempt on account of being the wife's sister. It emerges that the prohibition against marrying one’s wife’s sister can come and negate the positive commandment of yibum (even though the prohibition was not in existence at the time that she fell for yibum). Here too, why don’t we say that the prohibition of petzua daka should come and negate the positive commandment of yibum?

Rav Yosef offers a different explanation: This Tanna maintains that Rabbi Akiva holds that only a child born from a union with a woman prohibited by a negative precept because or relatedness is a mamzer, but if the woman is prohibited by a regular negative precept, the child will not be a mamzer (therefore, the yevamah will still have a zikah-attachment to the petzua daka). (79b)

The Gemora asks: What is a saris-chamah?

Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: One, who has not experienced a moment of life in a state of fitness.

The Gemora asks: How is this determined?

Abaye answers: By observing whether an arch is formed when he urinates.

The Gemora asks: What is the cause for this condition?

The Gemora answers: The child's mother baked at noon (the heat of the oven combined with the heat of the day obviously affected the generative organs of the fetus) and drank strong beer while she was pregnant with him.

The Gemora asks: Let us be concerned that he became healthy in the interim?

The Gemora answers: Since we have determined that he was born afflicted, and he is presently afflicted, there is no reason to assume that he was healthy in between. (79b – 80a)

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Eliezer said: Not so, but rather a saris-chamah submits to chalitzah, and they submit to chalitzah from his wife, because he has a cure.

The Gemora asks a contradiction from the following Mishna in Niddah (47b): If a man dies childless and leaves a brother who at the age of twenty did not produce two pubic hairs, they (the relatives of the widow who wish to exempt her from chalizah and yibum) must bring evidence that he is in fact twenty years of age and that he is a saris (by a display of the required symptoms). If that happens, he neither submits to chalizah nor performs yibum. If a man dies childless and leaves a wife who at the age of twenty did not produce two pubic hairs, they must bring evidence that she is in fact twenty years of age and that she is an aylonis. If that happens, she does not require chalizah or yibum; these are the words of Beis Hillel. Beis Shamai maintains that a saris and an aylonis is established at the age of eighteen. Rabbi Eliezer said. In the case of the male, the halacha is in accordance with Beis Hillel and in the case of the female, the halacha is in accordance with Beis Shamai because a woman matures earlier than a man. (It emerges that Rabbi Eliezer holds that a saris-chamah does not perform yibum or chalitzah.)

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Eliezer retracted his position stated in the Mishna in Niddah, for we learned in a braisa that states the following: Rabbi Eliezer said: A saris-chamah submits to chalitzah, and they submit to chalitzah from his wife, because he has a cure in Alexandria of Egypt.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers: Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna in Niddah was only discussing at what age does he or she become an adult in respect to being liable for punishment (he was not getting involved with the halachos of chalitzah or yibum). (80a)

The Gemora states: If one ate cheilev when he was between the age of twelve and eighteen, and he later developed the symptoms of a saris, and afterwards he produced two pubic hairs; Rav says: He is regarded as a saris retroactively at twelve years old (he is therefore liable to bring a korban chatas). Shmuel said: He is regarded as a minor at that time.

Rav Yosef asked on Rav’s opinion: According to Rabbi Meir (who exempts the seducer of a minor from the payment of the fine), an aylonis should be entitled to a fine (because, since it was later established that she was sterile, she should be regarded as an adult retroactively)?

Abaye answered: She passes from her minor status directly into becoming a bogeress (generally, a girl is a minor until she produces two hairs; at that time, she becomes a na’arah for six months; she then achieves the final status of adulthood, called bagrus; the aylonis skips the na’arus stage and goes directly into bagrus).

Rav Yosef said to him: Indeed, you are correct, but those fine statements should be said over in my name. It was taught in the following brasia like you: A saris is not judged as a ben sorer umoreh (a rebellious son) because a prerequisite to be judged as a ben sorer umoreh is having pubic hair; and an aylonis is not judged as a betrothed na’arah (who will be subject to stoning if she commits adultery, unlike a married woman who is judged with strangulation) because she passes from her minor status directly into becoming a bogeress. (80a)

Rabbi Avahu said: The identifying marks of a saris, aylonis, or an eight-month child (born in the eighth month of conception. who, as a rule, is not viable) are not decided upon until they have these marks at the age of twenty.

The Gemora asks: Can an eight-month child in fact survive? Did we not learn the following braisa: An eight-month child is regarded as a stone, and he may not be moved on Shabbos (classified as muktzah). His mother may lean over and nurse him because of the danger involved (the child might otherwise die of starvation before his time, and the mother might contract serious illness through the accumulation of superfluous milk in her breasts).

The Gemora answers: We are discussing a case where the identifying marks that he will survive have developed, for we learned in the following braisa: Who is an eight-month child? Any child whose months of conception were not completed. Rebbe says: A child whose hair and nails were not developed would indicate that he is unviable. The Gemora infers from Rebbe that if the hair and nails of the eight-month child were developed, we would say that he is in fact a seven-month baby (who is viable), but delayed inside his mother’s womb. (Rabbi Avahu, referring to such a case, teaches that, even according to Rebbe, no definite decision can be arrived at before the child has attained the age of twenty.)

The Gemora asks: Rava Tosfaah ruled regarding the following case: There was a woman whose husband went overseas and remained there for twelve months. She then gave birth to a child and he ruled that the child is legitimate. Was this ruling issued according to Rebbe, who maintains that a child can delay inside the mother’s womb (why would he rule according to the minority opinion)?

The Gemora answers: He ruled in accordance with Rebbe since Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel agrees with Rebbe, and it is therefore regarded as the majority opinion. It was taught in a braisa: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: A child that lives for thirty days (even a known eight-month baby) is definitely not a non-viable child. (80a – 80b)

The Rabbis taught the following braisa: Who is saris-chamah? Any person who is twenty years of age and has not produced two pubic hairs. Even if he produced them afterwards, he is deemed to be a saris in all respects. The following are his characteristics: He has no beard, his hair on his head is soft and his skin is smooth. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said in the name of Rabbi Yehudah ben Yair: Any person whose urine produces no froth. Some say: He who urinates without forming an arch. Others say: He whose semen is watery. Some say: He whose urine does not putrefy (when left in a vessel). Others say: He whose body does not steam after bathing in the winter season. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar said: He whose voice is thin so that one cannot distinguish whether it is that of a man or of a woman.

The braisa continues: Who is an aylonis? Any woman who is twenty years of age and has not produced two pubic hairs. Even if she produces them afterwards, she is deemed to be an aylonis in all respects. The following are her characteristics: She has no breasts and suffers pain during cohabitation. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: One whose lower abdomen does not protrude over her genital area like other women. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar said: One whose voice is deep so that one cannot distinguish whether it is that of a man or of a woman. (80b)

The Gemora states: Rav Huna said: One is not classified as a saris until he has all of the identifying marks. Rabbi Yochanan said: He is a saris even with only one of the identifying marks.

The Gemora explains this dispute: If he has two pubic hairs, everyone agrees that he will not be classified as a saris until he has all of the identifying marks. The argument is only when he does not produce the two pubic hairs. (80b)

[END]

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Friday, July 20, 2007

FOOD FOR THOUGHT - Yevamos 79 - Daf Yomi

*** Why did Dovid wait another year to investigate other sins; as soon as he saw that it wasn’t because of idol worship, he should have checked if it was because of promiscuous behavior?

*** Why did Dovid wait three years until inquiring of the Urim Vetumim?

*** According to the opinion that maintains that a eulogy is for the sake of the living, why were the Jewish people punished for not eulogizing Shaul correctly? They obviously were mochel it?

*** What happens if there is a person that only has one or two of the characteristics of a Jew, but he doesn’t have all three?

*** Why does the Gemora state that it is better to uproot one word in the Torah etc.? They uprooted an entire verse.

*** How did they accept one hundred and fifty thousand converts after this incident? We previously learned that they didn’t accept converts in the times of Dovid and Shlomo.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 79 - Highlights

The Mishna had stated: The Nesinim are prohibited from marrying into the congregation.

Rav Chana bar Adda said: Dovid decreed that the Nesinim may not marry into the congregation (this Gemora is following Rava’s initial understanding on Daf 76a that the Torah prohibits the Nesinim while they are idolaters, but after they convert, they are permitted to marry a Jew; Dovid issued a Rabbinic ordinance against marrying the Nesinim even after they converted) at it is written [Shmuel II, 21:2]: And the king called the Gibeonites and said to them - now the Gibeonites were not of the children of Israel. This alludes to the fact that they were not permitted to marry into the congregation.

The Gemora asks: Why did Dovid issue this decree?

The Gemora answers: For it is written [ibid. v.1]: And there was a famine in the days of David for three years, year after year. During the first year, Dovid said to the Jewish people: “Perhaps there are idol worshippers among you? For it is written [Devarim 11: 16-17]: And worship strange gods and prostrate yourselves before them….and He will close off the heavens, and there will be no rain etc.” They checked, but they could not find anyone worshipping idols. During the second year, Dovid said to the Jewish people: “Perhaps there are sinners who engage in promiscuous behavior among you? For it is written [Yirmiyahu 3:3]: And the rains were withheld, and there has been no latter rain, and you had a harlot's forehead; you refused to be ashamed.” They checked, but they could not find anyone engaging in promiscuous behavior. During the third year, Dovid said to the Jewish people: “Perhaps there are men who announce specified sums for charity in public but do not give them? For it is written [Mishlei 25:14]: Clouds and wind, but no rain-so is a man who boasts with a false gift.” They checked, but they could not find any such people. Dovid said: “It must be my fault.” Immediately, And David sought the face of Hashem [Shmuel II, 21:1]. What is the meaning of this? Rish Lakish said: He asked the Urim Vetumim.

Hashem answers Dovid: [ibid.]: And Hashem said: “It is for Shaul, and also for his bloody house, because he put to death the Gibeonites.” The Gemora explains: “It is for Shaul” is referring to the fact that Shaul was not eulogized in a manner befitting him; and “for his bloody house” is referring to Shaul’s sin, “because he put to death the Gibeonites.”

The Gemora asks: Where do we find that Shaul killed the Gibeonites?

The Gemora answers: Since he killed the residents of Nov the city of Kohanim who supplied the Gibeonites with water and food, it was considered as if Shaul killed them.

The Gemora asks: Hashem demanded justice for Shaul because he was not properly mourned for, and simultaneously demanded justice because he put to death the Gibeonites?

The Gemora answers: Yes! For Rish Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written [Tzephaniah 2:3]: Seek Hashem all you humble of the land, who have fulfilled his law? When there is judgment, there can also be found his righteous deeds. (78b)

Dovid said: “In regards to fixing the sin of not eulogizing Shaul properly, twelve months have already lapsed since Shaul died, and it is no longer fitting to eulogize him. However, in regards to the Nesinim, let us summon them and appease them. Immediately they were called, as it is written [Shmuel II, 21, 2-3]: And the king called the Gibeonites and said to them … “What shall I do for you, and with what shall I make atonement so that you shall bless the inheritance of Hashem?” The passage continues [ibid. v.4-6]: And the Gibeonites said to him: “We have no matters of silver and gold with Shaul, or with his house, and we don’t care to put to death any man in Israel … Let there be delivered to us seven men from among his sons, and we will hang them for the sake of Hashem etc.” Dovid tried to pacify them, but they were not appeased. Dovid said: “There are three distinguishing characteristics of the Jewish people; they are merciful, bashful and benevolent. Whoever has these three characteristics are fitting to cleave to this nation (as the Gibeonites displayed a spirit of revenge and vindictiveness they were excluded from, and forbidden even to enter, the assembly of Israel).”

The passage continues: It is written [ibid. v.8-9]: And the king took the two sons of Rizpah the daughter of Ayah, whom she bore to Saul, Armoni and Mephibosheth; and the five sons of Michal the daughter of Saul, whom she bore to Adriel the son of Barzilai the Meholathite. And he delivered them into the hands of the Gibeonites, and they hanged them in the mountain before the Lord, and they fell all seven together. And they were put to death in the days of the harvest, in the first days, at the beginning of the barley harvest.

The Gemora asks: Why were these seven men chosen?

Rav Huna answers: Dovid passed Shaul’s descendants before the Holy Ark. He whom the Ark detained was condemned to death, and he whom the Ark did not detain was spared for life.

Rav Chana bar Katina asked him from the following verse [ibid. v.7]: But the king took pity on Mephibosheth, the son of Jonathan the son of Shaul. How could Dovid have mercy on him if it was determined by the Holy Ark?

The Gemora answers: Dovid did not pass him before the Ark.

The Gemora asks: It would seem that Dovid is showing favoritism by holding him back?

The Gemora answers: He did pass him before the Ark, and the Ark detained him. Dovid begged for mercy on his behalf, and the Ark released him.

The Gemora asks: It would seem that Dovid is still showing favoritism?

The Gemora answers: Dovid begged that the Ark should not detain him.

The Gemora asks: But is it not surely written [Devarim 24:16]: The fathers shall not be put to death for the children and sons shall not be put to death because of fathers?

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: It is better that a letter be uprooted out of the Torah than that the Divine Name shall be publicly profaned. (78b – 79a)

The passage continues: It is written [Shmuel II, 21:10]: And Rizpah the daughter of Aiah took the sackcloth and she spread it for her upon the rock, from the beginning of the harvest until water was poured upon them from heaven; and she allowed not the birds of the heaven to rest on them by day, nor the beasts of the field by night.

The Gemora asks: But is it not written [Devarim 21:23]: His body shall not remain for the night on the gallows?

Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: It is better that a letter be uprooted out of the Torah and the Divine Name shall be publicly sanctified. For passersby would inquire, “What kind of men are these?” They would be told, “These are royal princes.” The passersby would then ask, “And what have they done?” They would be told, “They laid their hands upon unaccepted converts.” Then they exclaimed: “There is no nation in existence which one ought to join as much as this one. If the punishment of royal princes was so great, how much more so of that of common people; and if such was the justice done for unattached converts, how much more so for accepted converts.” Immediately, one hundred and fifty thousand converts joined the Jewish people. (79a)

The Gemora asks: Was it Dovid who issued the decree against the Nesinim? Didn’t Moshe already decree against them?

The Gemora answers: Moshe only decreed for his generation; Dovid decreed for all future generations.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Yehoshua decree against them for all future generations?

The Gemora answers: Yehoshua’s decree was only applicable during the time that the Beis Hamikdosh was standing; Dovid’s decree was for afterwards as well.

The Gemora records: In the times of Rebbe, they wished to release the Nesinim from their slave status, and thereby permitting them to marry into the congregation. Rebbe said to them: “Our portion we can release, but we cannot release the Mizbeach’s portion (they were designated as slaves for the people and for the Mizbeach).”

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba disagrees: He said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The portion of the people is forbidden forever (unless the Beis Din would renounce their ownership), but the portion belonging to the Mizbeach is only forbidden during the time that the Beis Hamikdosh is standing. (79a – 79b)

The Mishna states: Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard that a saris (a man who is sterile) submits to chalitzah, and they submit to chalitzah from his wife. I also heard that a saris does not submit to chalitzah, and they do not submit to chalitzah from his wife, and I cannot explain it (the two contradictory rulings). Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain. A saris-adam (one who became sterile after birth) submits to chalitzah, and they submit to chalitzah from his wife, because he had a time of fitness. A saris-chamah (one who was born sterile) does not submit to chalitzah, and they do not submit to chalitzah from his wife, because he did not have a time of fitness. Rabbi Eliezer said: Not so, but rather a saris-chamah submits to chalitzah, and they submit to chalitzah from his wife, because he has a cure. A saris-adam does not submit to chalitzah, and they do not submit to chalitzah from his wife, because he does not have a cure. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Beseira testified about ben Megusas, a saris-adam who was in Yerushalayim, and his wife was married by yibum, thus confirming the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

A saris does not submit to chalitzah, and he does not perform yibum. And similarly, an aylonis does not perform chalitzah, and she is not married by yibum. If a saris submitted to chalitzah from his yevamah, he does not disqualify her. If he cohabited with her, he disqualifies her, because it is an illicit cohabitation. And similarly, if brothers submitted to chalitzah from an aylonis, they have not disqualified her; if they cohabited with her, they disqualify her, because cohabitation with her is an illicit cohabitation. (79b)

[END]

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A MAMZER WILL NOT SURVIVE - Yevamos 78 - Daf Yomi

Rish Lakish said: A mamzeres is permitted to marry into the congregation after ten generations. The Gemora cites the Scriptural source for this.

They asked Rabbi Eliezer: What is the halacha regarding a mamzeres after ten generations?

He said to them: If you would give me a third-generation mamzer, I will render him pure. (This scenario is not possible, because Heaven does not allow third-generation mamzeirim to be in existence, in order that the ordinary Jews will not unknowingly marry them.)

Rav Huna said: Mamzeirim do not survive.

The Gemora asks: But we learned in our Mishna that the prohibition regarding mamzeirim is eternal? It would seem that they do survive, and they have future generations.

Rabbi Zeira answers: Rav Yehudah explained to me the following: A known mamzer survives (since there is no danger of intermarriage with them or their descendants). An unknown mamzer does not survive. A mamzer that is known, but unknown (it is not common knowledge) will survive until three generations, but not longer (by that time, everyone will have forgotten).

Reb Yonasan Eibshitz explains: Up until ten generations, the strength of the father still exists in his descendants.

The Vilna Gaon states: A father and mother are equal partners in a child. A grandson would have twenty-five percent from the father. The third generation will have an eighth. The fourth will have a sixteenth. The fifth will have one thirty-second from the original mamzer. The sixth will have one sixty-fourth. The seventh generation will only have one out of one hundred and twenty-eight. The eighth will have one out of two hundred and fifty-six. The ninth will have one out of five hundred and twelve. The tenth generation will only have one out of one thousand and twenty-four from the original mamzer.

The portion of the mamzer that exists in the tenth-generation descendant has now become nullified. The Yerushalmi states that a berya, a complete creature can become nullified if it is intermingled among a mixture of more that nine hundred and sixty.

The Yerushalmi states that an unknown mamzer will not survive even for thirty days. The Aruch lener explains: This is only true when he is halachically classified as a mamzer (there were witnesses), but it is not public knowledge. Since he is forbidden to enter into the congregation, and people do not know this, there is a decree from heaven that he will die. However, in a case where there is a doubt if he is a mamzer, he will survive, because the halacha is that an uncertain mamzer is permitted to enter into the congregation. (Reb Elchonon disagrees with this.)

The Beis Shmuel (E”H, 2:18) cites a Sefer Chasidim who states that a mamzer will not survive twelve months, similar to a tereifah.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 78 - Highlights

The Mishna had stated: An Egyptian convert and an Edomite convert are prohibited only for three generations, both males and females. Rabbi Shimon permits the females immediately. Rabbi Shimon said: This can be derived by means of a kal vachomer: If in the case where the males are prohibited eternally (an Ammonite convert and a Moabite convert), the females are permitted immediately, in the case where the males are prohibited only for three generations, shouldn’t it stand to reason that the females should be permitted immediately! They said to him: If it is a halacha (a tradition from your teachers), we shall accept, but if you derived it through the kal vachomer, there is a refutation. He said to them: It is not so (there is no refutation), but regardless, I am stating a halacha!

The Gemora asks: What was the objection that the Rabbis could have advanced to refute Rabbi Shimon’s kal vachomer?

Rabbah bar bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: They could have said that the Torah’s prohibition of arayos (illicit relations under the penalty of kares) indicates that the kal vachomer is incorrect. The Torah prohibits relatives until three generations, and yet the prohibition of arayos is applicable to males and females.

Rabbi Shimon would answer: The prohibitions cannot be compared. Arayos carries the penalty of kares (and perhaps that is why the females are prohibited; marriage with an Egyptian is merely a negative precept).

The Rabbis would answer: The prohibition regarding a mamzer indicates that even when there is no penalty of kares, both males and females are prohibited.

Rabbi Shimon would answer: You cannot compare to the prohibition of mamzer; a mamzer may never enter into the congregation, whereas an Egyptian may enter after three generations.

The Rabbis would answer: The arayos prohibition proves that females will be prohibited even in prohibitions that are permitted after three generations.

The argument repeats itself, and in conclusion, we can learn from the common characteristic of the two cases. The common characteristic in the two cases (mamzer and arayos) is that they are prohibited, and the prohibition applies to males and females; so too, the prohibition regarding the Egyptian converts will apply to males and females.

Rabbi Shimon would answer: You cannot compare the prohibition regarding an Egyptian convert to these cases. Both of these prohibitions have an element of kares, whereas, regarding an Egyptian convert, there is no kares.

The Rabbis would answer: We can derive the prohibition of the females from the chalal (instead of the mamzer) who is the offspring of a union between those who through it, are guilty of transgressing only a positive commandment (in a case where a Kohen Gadol cohabited with a non-virgin) and in accordance with the view of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov (who maintains that the child from such a union is a chalal). (Thus, it has been proven that even where there is no element of kares, both males and females are included in the prohibition. Similarly, in the case of the Egyptians converts, the females will be included.)

This is what Rabbi Shimon meant when he stated: “It is not so.” I don’t subscribe to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. And as for you, who do hold like Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, I am stating a halacha (a tradition which I receives from my teachers). (77b)

The Gemora cites a braisa: It is written [Devarim 23:9]: Sons who are born to them in the third generation may enter the Congregation of Hashem. This implies that only sons must wait for the third generation, but females are permitted immediately; these are the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehudah says: It is written: Sons who are born to them. The Torah is stating that it is dependent on birth (and females must also wait until the third generation).

Rabbi Yochanan said: If Rabbi Yehudah had not declared that the Torah is stating that it is dependent on birth, he would not have found his hands and feet at the Beis Medrash (his position would have been untenable regarding a different ruling of his). Since he stated that the congregation of converts is considered the congregation (and therefore, a mamzer, an Ammonite and Moabite convert would not be permitted to marry a convert), how would a second-generation Egyptian convert attain purity (allowing the next generation to marry into the congregation)? (If Egyptian women were not included in the prohibition to enter the congregation, then, they would be included in the Congregation of Hashem, and a second-generation Egyptian convert would be prohibited from marrying Egyptian female converts; accordingly, it would be impossible to produce a third-generation Egyptian.)

The Gemora asks: Perhaps the Torah is referring to a case where a second-generation Egyptian convert married illegally (either an ordinary Jewess or a convert)?

The Gemora answers: The Torah does not discuss cases that would only occur if someone violated the halacha.

The Gemora asks: Why, the Torah discusses a case of mamzer, and that can only occur if the halacha was violated?

The Gemora answers: The Torah would discuss cases that would only occur if someone violated the halacha, if it would lead to a prohibition (such as mamzer); however, the Torah does not discuss cases that would only occur if someone violated the halacha, if it leads to permissibility. (77b – 78a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: It is written regarding an Egyptian convert: Sons who are born to them in the third generation may enter the Congregation of Hashem. If it states “sons,” why does it state “generations”? And if it states “generations,” why does it state “sons”?

The braisa answers: If the Torah would state “sons” and not “generations,” I would have thought that the first and the second son of the Egyptian convert are prohibited from marrying into the congregation, but the third son is permitted. It is for this reason that the Torah wrote “generations,” to teach us that all the sons of the Egyptian convert are prohibited (because they are all second-generation Egyptians); the grandchildren are permitted. If the Torah would state “generations” and not sons,” I would have thought that the Torah is referring to those that were standing at Har Sinai (any third-generation Jew would be permitted to marry an Egyptian convert). It is for this reason that the Torah wrote “sons,” to teach us that third generation descending from an Egyptian convert is permitted to marry into the congregation.

The braisa continues by asking the following: Why does the Torah state “to them”? It is to teach us that we follow their disqualification (whether the father is an Egyptian convert and the mother is a Jewess, or whether the mother is an Egyptian and the father is a Jew, the children are in either case ineligible until the third generation).

It was necessary for the Torah to write “to them,” and it was also necessary for it to write “who are born.” For if the Torah would have written only “who are born,” it might have been presumed that the three generations must begin from their children, the Torah therefore wrote “to them,” to indicate that the converts themselves are regarded as the first generation. And if the Torah would have written only “to them,” it might have been presumed that, where a pregnant Egyptian woman converted, she and her child are regarded as one generation (and the three generations would commence with the child), the Torah therefore wrote “who are born,” to teach that any child born after conversion is considered a second-generation Egyptian.

The Gemora continues analyzing the verses: It was necessary to write “for them” by the Egyptian converts, and it was necessary to write “for him” by a mamzer. For if the Torah would have written only “for them,” I would have thought that the restriction (that the ineligibility of any one of the parents causes the ineligibility of the child) might have been assumed to apply only by the Egyptian converts because the child descended from a tainted origin, but it would not apply to a mamzer since he descends from a drop that is genealogically fit. And if the Torah would have written only “for him” by a mamzer, I would have thought that the restriction (that the ineligibility of any one of the parents causes the ineligibility of the child) might have been assumed to apply only by a mamzer because he and all his future descendants are prohibited from entering the congregation, but it would not apply to an Egyptian convert. Both texts were, therefore, required. (78a)

Rabbah bar bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If a second-generation male Egyptian convert marries a first-generation female Egyptian convert, her son is regarded as a third-generation Egyptian convert.

The Gemora infers from here that Rabbi Yochanan maintains that we cast the child after the father.

Rav Yosef asked from the following Mishna: Rabbi Tarfon said: There is a manner in which mamzeirim can be purified. How is this? If a mamzer marries a slavewoman, the child is classified as a slave (and not a mamzer). If the child is freed, he is regarded as a free man, and is permitted to marry into the congregation. It emerges that we cast the child after the mother, and not the father.

The Gemora answers: It is different there (regarding a slavewoman), for the Torah states [Shmos 21:4]: The woman and her children belong to her master. (78a)

Rava asked on Rabbi Yochanan from the following braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: Minyamin, an Egyptian convert was one of my colleagues among the disciples of Rabbi Akiva, and he once told me: “I am a first-generation Egyptian convert and I married a first-generation Egyptian convert. I shall arrange for my son to marry a second-generation Egyptian convert in order that my grandson shall be eligible to enter the congregation.” If Rabbi Yochanan is correct that we cast the child after the father, let him marry even a first-generation Egyptian convert; the grandson will still be classified as a third-generation convert, and he will be eligible to enter the congregation?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yochanan emended thr braisa to read the following: “I shall arrange for my son to marry a first-generation Egyptian convert in order that my grandson shall be eligible to enter the congregation.” (78a)

The Gemora cites a different version of Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling: When Rav Dimi came to Bavel, he said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If a second-generation male Egyptian convert marries a first-generation female Egyptian convert, her son is regarded as a second-generation Egyptian convert.

The Gemora infers from here that Rabbi Yochanan maintains that we cast the child after the mother. (The Gemora initially thinks that Rabbi Yochanan’s reason is based on the concept that a fetus is like a thigh of the mother.)

Abaye asked Rav Dimi from a different statement that Rabbi Yochanan said: If one designated a pregnant animal as a chatas (sin offering), and she gave birth, his atonement may be made, if he desires, with the animal itself, and, if he prefers, his atonement may be made with her offspring. This halacha would be understandable if you would say that Rabbi Yochanan holds that a fetus is not like the thigh of its mother; and therefore, it is as if he designated two chataos as a security for one another (in case one should be lost, the other would take its place). And Rabbi Oshaya said: One who designated two chataos as a security for one another, he atones for his sin with either of them, while the other goes to the pasture (until it develops a blemish, when it is redeemed). But if you would say that a fetus is like a thigh of the mother, then one who designated a pregnant animal as a chatas, the offspring should be regarded as an offspring of a chatas, and the halacha is that the offspring of a chatas is consigned to death. (This proves that Rabbi Yochanan maintains that a fetus is not like the thigh of its mother, and is in contrast to our initiall understanding of Rav Dimi’s ruling in the name of Rabbi Yochanan.

Rav Dimi was silent.

Abaye said to Rav Dimi: Perhaps it is different in the case of the two Egyptian converts, for it is written “sons who are born to them.” The Torah made them dependent on birth (we cast them after the mother, even though a fetus is not like the thigh of the mother).

Rav Dimi said to Abaye: Clever man! I saw your head between the pillars of the Beis Medrash when Rabbi Yochanan taught this ruling (you heard this explanation from Rabbi Yochanan himself). (78a)

The Gemora states: The only reason Rabbi Yochanan cast the children of the Egyptian converts after the mother is because the Torah wrote “sons who are born to them.” Elsewhere, we would cast the children after the father. Accordingly, how we can explain the following ruling? Rava said: If a pregnant idolater converted, her son would not require immersion. If a fetus is not like the thigh of the mother, but rather, the child would be regarded as a separate entity, shouldn’t the child require immersion?

Perhaps you might answer that the child does not require another immersion on account of Rav Yitzchak’s ruling. Rav Yitzchak said: If there is a barrier that covers most of one’s body and one is particular about it, this would invalidate one’s immersion in a mikvah. If, however, the barrier covers most of one’s body, but he is not particular about the barrier, the immersion in the mikvah is valid. (The fetus is covered by his mother’s body, but he is not particular about this; the immersion should be valid.) This explanation would not be sufficient because Rav Kahana said: The immersion is only valid if the barrier covered most of his body, but if it covered his entire body, the immersion will be invalid.

The Gemora answers: A fetus is different because that is the normal way that it grows (and is therefore not regarded as barrier). (78a – 78b)

When Ravina came to Bavel, he said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Concerning other nations, we follow the male; and if they convert, we follow the one who is more tainted.

The Gemora explains the first ruling: Concerning other nations, we follow the male. It was taught in a braisa: How do we know that if a male from any nation (other than the seven nations of Canaan) cohabited with a Canaanite woman and had a child; one is permitted to purchase that child as a slave (and he is not obligated to kill him; there is a requirement to kill anyone from the nations of Canaan)?

The braisa answers: It is written [Vayikra 25:44]: And also from among the children of the residents who live with you, from among them you may purchase slaves. One might have thought that even if a Canaanite male cohabited with a woman from any of the other nations and had a child; one would be permitted to purchase that child as a slave. It is therefore written [ibid.]: ….whom they begot in your land. The Torah teaches us that one may purchase slaves only from those who were born in your land to Canaanite mothers from non-Canaanite fathers, but not from among those children who were born abroad to non-Canaanite mothers from Canaanite fathers, and who later returned to reside in your land with their fathers. (Women, generally remain in the lands of their birth, and that is why, when the Torah states “born in your land,” it is referring to the children of Canaanite mothers. These verses establish that in respect to other nations, we follow the father’s status.)

The Gemora now explains the second ruling: And if they convert, we follow the one who is more tainted. What is this case? If he is referring to a male Egyptian convert who married a female Ammonite convert (and we cast the child after the one who is more tainted, namely, the Egyptian, and hence, the child will be ineligible to marry into the congregation regardless of its gender); I will ask the following: The mother is not regarded as tainted at all, since she is permitted to marry into the congregation.

Rather, he must be referring to a case where a male Ammonite convert married a female Egyptian convert. If the child is a male, we cast him after his Ammonite father (and he and his sons will be ineligible to marry into the congregation). If the child is a female, we cast her after her Egyptian mother (and she would be ineligible to marry into the congregation). (78b)

The Mishna states: Mamzeirim and Nesinim are prohibited from marrying into the congregation, and their prohibition is eternal for males and for females. (78b)

Rish Lakish said: A mamzeres is permitted to marry into the congregation after ten generations. The Gemora cites the Scriptural source for this.

The Gemora asks: Rish Lakish is contradiction our Mishna, which ruled that the prohibition regarding mamzeirim is eternal for males and for females. The Gemora answers: This is actually dependent on a Tannaic dispute regarding laws that are derived through a gezeirah shavah. (78b)

They asked Rabbi Eliezer: What is the halacha regarding a mamzeres after ten generations?

He said to them: If you would give me a third-generation mamzer, I will render him pure. (This scenario is not possible, because Heaven does not allow third-generation mamzeirim to be in existence, in order that the ordinary Jews will not unknowingly marry them.)

Rav Huna said: Mamzeirim do not survive.

The Gemora asks: But we learned in our Mishna that the prohibition regarding mamzeirim is eternal? It would seem that they do survive, and they have future generations.

Rabbi Zeira answers: Rav Yehudah explained to me the following: A known mamzer survives (since there is no danger of intermarriage with them or their descendants). An unknown mamzer does not survive. A mamzer that is known, but unknown (it is not common knowledge) will survive until three generations, but not longer (by that time, everyone will have forgotten). (78b)

[END]

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Thursday, July 19, 2007

YIBUM WITH RUS - Yevamos 77 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora relates the episode with Shaul, Doeg and Avner. Doeg the Edomite said to Shaul: “Instead of enquiring whether he is fit to be king or not, enquire rather whether he is permitted to enter the congregation or not.” What is the reason that he shouldn’t be permitted to enter into the congregation? It is because he descends from Rus, the Moabite. Avner said to him: “We learned in a braisa: An Ammonite is prohibited, but not a female Ammonite; A Moabite is prohibited, but not a female Moabite.”

The Maharsha asks: How could Doeg have thought that Boaz, the Head of the Sanhedrin, the Judge of all of Israel for many years would conduct himself improperly and publicly marry a woman who was forbidden to him? Furthermore, why did Ploni Almoni say to Boaz: “I cannot marry Rus because I am concerned that my children will be tainted”? He should have said that he can’t marry her because he is forbidden to marry an Ammonite woman (according to him)?

The Maharsha answers: The Gemora above (20b) explained the reason why a brother may not perform a yibum with his brother’s wife in a case when she is forbidden to him by a negative prohibition. The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t the positive commandment of yibum override the prohibition? The Gemora answers: He may not perform a yibum in this case because only the first act of cohabitation is permitted (that is the mitzvah of yibum), but not the second act. We are concerned that he might cohabitate with her a second time, which would be forbidden.

The Maharsha says that perhaps this Rabbinic ordinance was not yet in effect in the times of Boaz, and it was permitted to perform a yibum on a women who was forbidden to the brother by a negative prohibition.

The Ramban in Breishis (38:8) states: In the times of our Patriarchs, they would perform the mitzvah of yibum even with other relatives; not only a brother’s wife.

Ploni Almoni (Rus’ closest relative) could have performed a mitzvah of yibum with Rus even though she was a Moabite women, because the positive commandment of yibum would override the prohibition against marrying a Moabite woman. He refused to marry her because the children that would descend from this union would be tainted; they would not be allowed to marry into the congregation because the children would be Moabite’s, just like their mother. He was concerned even about his own children that he fathered beforehand. People might not understand the distinction, and they would claim that all his children are forbidden to marry into the congregation.

Boaz, on the other hand, did not have these concerns. The Gemora in Bava Basra (91a) records that all of his children died already.

This is what Doeg thought. He knew that Boaz would not publicly violate the Torah by marrying Rus illegally. This is why Doeg claimed that Dovid is prohibited from marrying into the congregation. Dovid descends from Rus, and she is a Moabite that has the prohibition of not marrying into the congregation. Boaz was justified to perform yibum with her, but the children will still remain disqualified from entering the congregation.

There are many questions on this explanation. The Kli Chemdah and Yashreish Yaakov ask: The entire premise of the Maharsha is flawed. The Ramban’s explanation of yibum is only prior to the Giving of the Torah. After the Torah was given, yibum can only be performed on a brother’s wife; not with any other relatives.

The Alshich asks: How could there have been a mitzvah of yibum with Rus altogether? Her marriage with Machlon had no validity; she was an idolater.

Furthermore, Tosfos rules that only the initial part of cohabitation would be Biblically permitted with a woman who is forbidden by a negative precept. One is prohibited from completing cohabitation. How was Boaz able to complete cohabitation with Rus, and father a child with her?

The Yashreish Yaakov concludes by saying that the words of the Maharsha were only to be taken as a drush.

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MODESTY OF THE WOMEN FROM MOAB - Yevamos 77 - Daf Yomi

Avner replied to Doeg: “It is different regarding the prohibition against Ammonites and Moabites because the Scriptural text is explicitly stated regarding them [Devarim 23:5]: Because they did not greet you with bread and with water. It is customary for a man to greet travelers with bread and water, but it is not customary for a woman to greet them (the women were, therefore, excluded from the prohibition).”

The Gemora asks: Why are the female Ammonites and Moabites permitted if they should have brought out bread and water to the women?

The Gemora answers: In Bavel, they cited the following verse [Tehillim 45:14]: The very honor of a princess is within. In Eretz Yisroel, they cited the following verse [Breishis 18:9]: And they said to him, “Where is Sarah your wife?” He said: “Behold, she is in the tent.”

The Maharshal asks: Were the women from Ammon and Moab modest? It is written regarding them that they were promiscuous women? What is the justification for them not going out and greeting the Jews?

He explains that it was the modesty of the Jewish women that prevented the women from Ammon and Moab to greet them. The Jewish women remained in their tents, something they had learned from their Matriarch, Sarah.

It is interesting to note that the Chasam Sofer answers that the women from Moab were modest indeed. It was in fact customary even for them to remain inside. It was only after Bilaam’s failure to curse the Jewish people that Balak convinced them to go out and seduce the Jewish men.

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FOOD FOR THOUGHT - Yevamos 77 - Daf Yomi

*** How could Boaz be trusted to rule that a Moabite is prohibited, but not a female Moabite? Didn’t we learn that a Torah scholar that teaches a new halacha at the time of the incident is not believed?

*** The Torah prohibits seeking peace with Ammon and Moav. Does this prohibition apply only to the males, or also to the females?

*** How was Yisra allowed to bring a sword into the Beis Medrash? The halacha is that one may not bring a sword into a Synagogue because one who prays will merit long life, and a sword shortens one’s life.

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