Daf Yomi - Yevamos 84 - Highlights

The Mishna states: There are those women that are permitted to remain with their husbands, but if the husband dies childless, they are forbidden to their yavams. There are some that are permitted to their yavams, but they are prohibited to remain with their husbands. There are some that would be permitted to both, and there are some that are forbidden to both.

The Mishna explains: There are those women that are permitted to remain with their husbands, but if the husband dies childless, they are forbidden to their yavams: An ordinary Kohen who marries a widow, and he has a brother who is a Kohen Gadol (she is forbidden to him because a Kohen Gadol may not marry a widow); a Kohen, who is a chalal marries a legitimate woman, and he has a brother who is a legitimate Kohen (she is forbidden to him because she becomes a chalalah by cohabiting with a chalal, and a legitimate Kohen may not marry a chalalah); A Yisroel that marries the daughter of a Yisroel, and he has a brother who is a mamzer; a mamzer married a mamzeres, and he has a brother who is legitimate.

The Mishna explains the second category: There are some that are permitted to their yavams, but they are prohibited to remain with their husbands. A Kohen Gadol who betrothed a widow, and he has a brother who is an ordinary Kohen; a legitimate Kohen who married a chalalah, and he has a brother who is a chalal; a Yisroel who married a mamzeres, and he has a brother who is a mamzer; a mamzer who married the daughter of a Yisroel, and he has a brother who is a Yisroel.

The Mishna explains the last category: The following women are forbidden to both: A Kohen Gadol who married a widow, and he has a brother who is a Kohen Gadol, or an ordinary Kohen (she is forbidden to him because she becomes a chalalah through cohabitation with the Kohen Gadol); an ordinary legitimate Kohen who married a chalalah, and he has a legitimate brother; a Yisroel who married a mamzeres, and he has a brother who is legitimate; a mamzer who married the daughter of a Yisroel, and he has a brother who is a mamzer; these women are prohibited to their husbands and to their yavams.

All other women are permitted to their husbands and to their yavams.

The Mishna continues: There are secondary arayos that are only forbidden on account of a decree by the early Sages. If a woman is a secondary ervah to her husband, but not a secondary ervah to the yavam, she is prohibited to the husband and permitted to the yavam. If she is a secondary ervah to the yavam, but not a secondary ervah to the husband, she is prohibited to the yavam and permitted to the husband. If she is a secondary ervah to both of them, she is prohibited to both of them. She does not receive her kesuvah, or fruits (The husband does not pay her for the fruits that he consumed from her usufruct property. Even though the husband's right to the fruits of his wife's melog property is a compensation for his obligation to ransom her if she is taken captive by non-Jews, and he is not required to ransom this wife who is prohibited to him, and it therefore would be proper that he pay her for what he consumed of the fruits of her melog property, nonetheless the Sages punished her and she cannot collect from him the fruits he consumed, just as she does not collect her kesuvah.), or sustenance, or depreciation (if the husband made use of her melog property until it was worn-out, he is not required to pay her its monetary value), and the child is legitimate, and they compel him to divorce her.

The Mishna concludes: If a widow is married to a Kohen Gadol, a divorced woman or a chalutzah to an ordinary Kohen, a mamzeres or a nesinah to a Yisroel, the daughter of a Yisroel to a nesin or to a mamzer, they receive their kesuvah. (84a)

Rav Pappa asks: If the halacha is in accordance with the following ruling that Rav Dimi reported in the name of Rabbi Yochanan when he came from Bavel: If a second-generation Egyptian convert married a first-generation Egyptian convert, their son is regarded as a second-generation Egyptian, our Mishna should also have taught: If a second-generation Egyptian convert married two Egyptian women, one of the first, and the other of the second-generation, and he had sons from the first and from the second, if they (the sons) married in the proper manner (i.e., if the son of the second-generation Egyptian woman, who thus belongs to the third and is permitted to enter the congregation, married the daughter of an Israelite, while the other who belongs to the second generation married a second-generation Egyptian), the two wives are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yavams. And if they married in the reverse (forbidden) order (i.e., if the son of the second-generation Egyptian woman married a second-generation Egyptian, while the while the other who belongs to the second generation married the daughter of an Israelite), the wives are permitted to their yavams and forbidden to their husbands. The Mishna’s category of women that are permitted to both the husband and the yavam could be represented by an ordinary female convert who married one of the brothers. The Mishna’s category of women that are prohibited to both the husband and the yavam could be represented by an aylonis who married the brother who is a second-generation Egyptian convert.

The Gemora answers: The Tanna taught some cases and omitted others.

The Gemora asks: What else did he omit that he should have omitted this also?

The Gemora answers: He omitted the case of the petzua daka.

The Gemora asks: If this is all that can be pointed out, the case of the petzua daka cannot be regarded as an instance of an omission, since those that are subject to the penalty of negative precepts were already mentioned?

The Gemora answers: Were not several specific cases mentioned of those that are subject to the penalty of negative precepts? Surely it was stated: An ordinary Kohen who marries a widow and then again the Mishna stated: A Kohen, who is a chalal marries a legitimate woman?

The Gemora counters that this case (a chalal who marries a legitimate woman) was required for the specific purpose of informing us that the halacha is in agreement with Rav Yehudah’s ruling that he reported in the name of Rav, for Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: Women of legitimate status (daughters of Kohanim) were not forbidden to be married to chalalim. (The Torah’s prohibition against a Kohen marrying a chalalah is applicable only to the man, but the woman is permitted to marry a chalal.)
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The Gemora attempts to disprove again that the negative precept of the widow to the Kohan Gadol mentioned in the Mishna includes other negative precepts as well. Didn’t the Mishna state the case where a chalal married a legitimate woman and then again the Mishna stated: A Yisroel that marries the daughter of a Yisroel, and he has a brother who is a mamzer?

The Gemora counters that these two cases are necessary. The Tanna taught us first regarding a negative precept which is not applicable to all (the case of the chalal is applicable only to Kohanim) and then he taught us regarding a negative precept which is applicable to all.

The Gemora answers: Why then, did the Tanna have to state two cases dealing with a mamzer? The Mishna states first: A Yisroel that marries the daughter of a Yisroel, and he has a brother who is a mamzer, and then the Mishna stated: A mamzer married a mamzeres, and he has a brother who is legitimate.

The Gemora concludes: It has thus been proven that the Tanna taught some cases while others he omitted. This indeed proves it. (As a result, nothing can be proven regarding the Mishna’s omission of the cases involving the Egyptian converts.) (84b)

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