Daf Yomi - Yevamos 92 - Highlights

RUMOR THAT THE HUSBAND IS ALIVE

(The Mishna had stated: If a woman's husband went overseas, and one witness came and said to her, “Your husband died,” and she married, and afterwards her husband returned, she must leave this one and this one. The Mishna continued by listing many penalties that the Rabbis imposed on her.)

Rav Ashi said: We are not concerned about a mere rumor (that her first husband is still alive).

The Gemora asks: What kind of rumor is he referring to? If you will suggest that he is referring to a rumor after marriage, Rav Ashi has said this once before, for Rav Ashi stated: We are not concerned about any rumor that originated after marriage.

The Gemora answers: It might have been assumed that since she approached the Beis Din to obtain the authorization for her marriage, the rumor is regarded as one that arose before her marriage to the second husband, and she should therefore be forbidden to him. Rav Ashi taught us that even in such circumstances, a rumor is disregarded. (91b – 92a)

TESTIMONY AND THEN A REVERSAL

The Mishna states: If a woman's husband and (only) son went overseas, and they came and said to her, “Your husband died, and afterwards your son died (as the son was alive when his father died, the widow is not subject to yibum or chalitzah),” and she married, and afterwards they said to her, “The reverse was the case (the son died first, so that when his father died afterwards, the widow was subject to yibum or chalitzah),” she must leave her second husband, and the first (before they knew that the order was reversed) and last child is a mamzer.

If they said to her, “Your son died, and afterwards your husband died,” and she was married by yibum, and afterwards they said to her, “The reverse was the case,” she must leave the yavam, and the first and last child is a mamzer.

If they said to her, “Your husband died,” and she married, and afterwards they said to her, “He was alive (at the time in which you remarried), and he died since then,” she must leave the second husband, and the first child is a mamzer, and the last is not a mamzer.

If they said to her, “Your husband died,” and she became betrothed to another man, and afterwards her husband came back, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the latter one gave her a bill of divorce, he did not disqualify her from the Kehunah. This was expounded by Rabbi Elozar ben Masya: It is written [Vayikra 21:7]: And nor shall the Kohanim take in marriage a woman divorced from her husband. This teaches us that a woman who is divorced from her legal husband is forbidden to be married to a Kohen, but a woman divorced from a man who is not her husband will not disqualify her. (92a)

MAMZER FROM A YEVAMAH

The Mishna had stated: If a woman's husband and (only) son went overseas, and they came and said to her, “Your husband died, and afterwards your son died (as the son was alive when his father died, the widow is not subject to yibum or chalitzah),” and she married, and afterwards they said to her, “The reverse was the case (the son died first, so that when his father died afterwards, the widow was subject to yibum or chalitzah),” she must leave her second husband, and the first (before they knew that the order was reversed) and last child is a mamzer.

The Gemora cites a braisa: The Mishna’s ruling is following the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that kiddushin does not take effect with women who are prohibited by a negative prohibition (the yevamah marrying someone other than the yavam, and therefore the Mishna rules that the child born from such a union will be rendered a mamzer). But the Chachamim say that the child born from the union of a yevamah with another man will not be rendered a mamzer.

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t the Chachamim say that a child born from a woman that is subject to a negative prohibition will not be rendered a mamzer (why did they only mention the case of the yevamah)?

The Gemora answers: This Tanna actually holds like Rabbi Akiva, but he maintains that Rabbi Akiva said that only a union with a relative subject to a negative prohibition will produce a mamzer; a union of a yevamah with someone other than the yavam will not produce a mamzer. (92a)

A YEVAMAH
MARRYING A STRANGER

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: How do we know that kiddushin (betrothal) will not be valid with a yevamah (if she marries someone other than the yavam)? Because it is written [Devarim 25:5]: The wife of the deceased should not be outside to a strange man. The verse teaches us that a stranger cannot marry her. Shmuel said: As a result of our intellectual poverty (we do not know the correct interpretation of the verse), the yevamah would require a letter of divorce from the stranger.

The Gemora explains Shmuel’s opinion: He was uncertain if the verse was coming to teach us that there is a negative prohibition against the yevamah for marrying a stranger, or perhaps the verse was teaching us that kiddushin cannot be effected with her.

Rav Mari bar Rachel said to Rav Ashi: Ameimar said that the halacha follows Shmuel.

Rav Ashi said: Now that Ameimar had said that the halacha is in accordance with Shmuel, if the yevamah married another man, and the yavam was a Kohen, the yavam should perform chalitzah and she is permitted to remain with her husband. (If the man will divorce her in accordance with Shmuel, she will anyway be forbidden to the yavam because a Kohen may not marry a divorcee; she may therefore remain married to the stranger. This halacha is referring to a case where they did not know at the time of the marriage that were committing a transgression, i.e. the case of the Mishna: If a woman's husband and (only) son went overseas, and they came and said to her, “Your husband died, and afterwards your son died (as the son was alive when his father died, the widow is not subject to yibum or chalitzah),” and she married, and afterwards they said to her, “The reverse was the case (the son died first, so that when his father died afterwards, the widow was subject to yibum or chalitzah).” Otherwise, she would not be permitted to remain with him.)

The Gemora asks: Should we allow them to benefit on account of their transgression? If so, it will emerge that we are rewarding a sinner because of a transgression.

Rather, the following was Rav Ashi’s halacha: If her yavam was a Yisroel, the stranger should give her a letter of divorce and then she is permitted to the yavam. (92a – 92b)

KIDDUSHIN; NOT, NISUIN; YES

Rav Giddel said in the name of Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef in the name of Rav: Kiddushin is not effected with the yevamah, but nisuin is. (The Gemora assumes that he is referring to the case of the Mishna where she married based on the testimony of a false witness, and she would not need a letter of divorce if she only underwent kiddushin, but she will need a letter of divorce if she underwent nisuin.)

The Gemora asks: If kiddushin is not effective with her, then nisuin should also not be effected with her?

The Gemora answers: Let us emend Rav’s statement to mean that kiddushin and nisuin is not effective with her.

Alternatively, you can answer that when Rav said “nisuin,” he meant that nisuin should be regarded as an illicit relationship, and he is ruling in accordance with Rav Hamnuna. For Rav Hamnuna stated: A yevamah who is awaiting yibum, who has an illicit relationship with another man is prohibited to be married to the yavam. (A letter of divorce will not be required.)

Alternatively, Rav can be explained like we had though initially: Kiddushin is not effected with the yevamah, but nisuin is. The reason why nisuin is effective with her, and she requires a letter of divorce is because this case might be mistaken for that of a woman whose husband went overseas. (92b)

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