Daf Yomi - Yevamos 90 - highlights

REPAYMENT WITH CHULLIN TAMEI

Rav Chisda attempts again to bring a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: If a non-Kohen inadvertently ate terumah which was tamei, he must repay the Kohen with chullin (unconsecrated) produce that is tahor. (That which he compensates the Kohen with replaces the terumah and acquires terumah sanctity; this is why he pays him with produce that is tahor.) If he paid the Kohen with chullin that is tamei, Sumchos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: If he used tamei produce inadvertently, the repayment is valid (this tamei produce now becomes terumah, and he has no further obligation). If he used tamei produce intentionally, the repayment is invalid (the Rabbis penalized him; the tamei produce is returned to him and he must repay the Kohen with tahor produce). The Chachamim say: Whether he did so inadvertently or willingly, the repayment is valid, and he must repay again with tahor produce (this second repayment does not acquire terumah sanctity).

The Gemora asks on Rabbi Meir: Rabbi Meir ruled that if a non-Kohen inadvertently ate terumah which was tamei, and he inadvertently paid the Kohen with chullin that is tamei, he is penalized, and the repayment is invalid. Why should that be the case? On the contrary, let him be blessed for doing such a noble thing! He ate something that was unfit for the Kohen to eat while he was tamei (for a Kohen is always forbidden from eating terumah tamei), and he is repaying him with something (that he thinks) is fit for the Kohen to eat while he is tamei (in truth, the Kohen will not be able to eat this because the tamei chullin produce becomes terumah tamei).

Rava answers: It is as if the braisa was missing some words, and this is what the braisa is teaching us: If a non-Kohen inadvertently ate terumah which was tamei, he repays the Kohen with anything (even with chullin produce that is tamei). If he ate terumah which was tahor, he must repay the Kohen with chullin (unconsecrated) produce that is tahor. If he paid the Kohen with chullin that is tamei, Sumchos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: If he used tamei produce inadvertently, the repayment is valid (this tamei produce now becomes terumah, and he has no further obligation). If he used tamei produce intentionally, the repayment is invalid (the Rabbis penalized him; the tamei produce is returned to him and he must repay the Kohen with tahor produce). The Chachamim say: Whether he did so inadvertently or willingly, the repayment is valid, and he must repay again with tahor produce (this second repayment does not acquire terumah sanctity).

Rav Chisda presents his proof: In the case where he repaid the Kohen with tamei chullin produce, this compensation is Biblically valid (since we previously learned that tamei produce may be sanctified as terumah), and if the Kohen would betroth a wife using this produce, the kiddushin would take effect. And yet, according to Rabbi Meir, the Rabbis declared that the repayment is invalid, and this married woman (Biblically) is now permitted to marry anyone else. It is apparent that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah.

Rabbah objects to this proof: Rabbi Meir did not mean that the repayment is invalid and that it must be returned; he meant that he must repay again with chullin which is tahor. (The first payment, however, still belongs to the Kohen, and consequently, the woman with whom he betrothed with this produce will remain a married woman.)

The Gemora asks: If so, Rabbi Meir and the Chachamim are ruling precisely the same?

Rav Acha the son of Rabbi Ikka answers: They are only arguing in a case when he repaid inadvertently with tamei chullin. (90a)

KOHEN THROWING TAMEI BLOOD

Rav Chisda attempts to bring another proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: If the blood of a sacrifice became tamei and a Kohen nonetheless threw the blood against the mizbeiach (Altar), the halacha is as follows: If he did so inadvertently, the offering is accepted, but if he did so intentionally, the offering is not accepted.

In the case when he threw the tamei blood deliberately, the offering is accepted Biblically, for we learned in the following braisa: The tzitz effects acceptance (Regarding the tzitz it is said: It shall be on Aharon’s forehead, so that Aharon shall bear a sin of the sacred offerings. This teaches that if the service of an offering is done in a prohibited fashion, the tzitz will atone for the sin and the sacrifice is then acceptable. The sin referred to here is the sin of tumah.) for the blood, meat or sacrificial parts that became tamei. This law applies whether it was done inadvertently or intentionally, through a mishap or willingly, and whether the offering was offered by an individual or by a community. And yet, the Rabbis declared that when he threw the blood intentionally, the offering is not accepted, which will result in the fact that when he brings another offering in its place, he is bringing an unconsecrated animal into the Courtyard for a sacrifice (which is Biblically forbidden). It is apparent that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah.

Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina rejects this proof: When the Rabbis declared that the offering is not accepted, they did not mean that the offering is not accepted, and he will be obligated to bring another in its stead; rather, they meant that the meat of the sacrifice may not be eaten, but the owner has achieved atonement with it.

Rav Chisda responds: But the bottom line is that the Rabbis have uprooted the obligation of eating the meat. It is written [Shmos 29:33]: And they shall eat them, those who gain atonement through them. This verse teaches that the Kohanim eat the offering and then the owner receives atonement. It still emerges that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah.

Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina rejects this as well: He says that a Rabbinical decree which involves sitting and not acting (as is the case with the prohibition against eating the sacrificial meat) is different than decreeing that an active transgression of a Biblical law can be performed (such as Rav Chisda’s ruling in the case of turning consecrated terumah into unconsecrated produce). (90a)

OTHER CASES OF
SITTING AND NOT ACTING

Rav Chisda, (upon hearing the last reply) said to Rabbah: It was my intention to raise objections against your view (that Beis Din does not have the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah) from the Rabbinical decrees regarding the uncircumcised (one who converted on Erev Pesach, and who, by Rabbinic law, is forbidden to participate in the korban pesach, though Biblically it is his duty to bring the korban pesach as an Israelite), sprinkling (Rabbinically, it is forbidden to sprinkle the purification waters on one who is tamei on Shabbos, though Biblically it would be permitted. Should the Sabbath on which such sprinkling is due happen to be ErevPesach, the person affected would, owing to the Rabbinical prohibition, remain tamei and would, in consequence, be deprived of bringing the korban pesach, which is a Biblical obligation.) the knife of circumcision (which is forbidden to carry on Shabbos in Rabbinically prohibited domains even though this will result in the child not being circumcised on the eighth day, a Biblical commandment), the linen garment with tzitzis (there is a Rabbinic prohibition against inserting fringes of wool in a linen garment, and this prohibition sometimes results in the abrogation of the Biblical commandment of tzitzis), the lambs of Shavuos (if Shavuos fell out on Shabbos, and these lambs were not offered for the purpose for which they were designated, the sacrificial blood may not, in accordance with a Rabbinical prohibition, be sprinkled upon the altar, though such sprinkling is Biblically permitted), the shofar (if Rosh Hashanah falls out on Shabbos, the Biblical commandment of sounding the shofar is abrogated by the Rabbis for fear it might be carried from one domain into another), and the lulav (the branches of palm trees which are taken during Sukkos; This Biblical commandment is abrogated on Shabbos for the same reason as in the case of the shofar). Now, however, that you taught us that abstention from the performance of an act is not regarded as uprooting a Biblical law, I have nothing to say since all these are also cases of abstention. (90b)

OBEYING A PROPHET

Rav Chisda cites proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah even if it involves an active transgression of a Biblical law. He cites the following braisa: It is written [Devarim 18:15]: To him you shall listen. Even if a prophet instructs you to transgress one of the commandments in the Torah, such as Eliyahu at Mount Carmel (where he offered a sacrifice on an improvised altar despite the prohibition against offering sacrifices outside the Temple), each case according to the needs of the moment, you must obey him.

Rabbah rejects this proof: There it is different because it says explicitly to listen to him.

Rav Chisda asks: Let us learn from there that the sages can do the same thing?

Rabbah answers: Safeguarding a measure is different. (Eliyahu was compelled to act in that manner to prevent widespread idol worship; the Rabbis cannot issue a decree against a Biblical law only as a preventive measure.) (90b)

ANNULLING A DIVORCE

Rav Chisda attempts to bring a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: If a husband annulled his letter of divorce (that was sent to his wife in the hands of an agent), it is annulled (even though he nullified it in front of a Beis Din in the absence of his wife or the agent); these are the words of Rebbe. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel said: He may neither annul it nor add a single condition to it, since, otherwise, of what avail is the authority of the Beis Din (since Rabban Gamliel the Elder ordained that such an annulment must not be made, since the woman in her ignorance of it might marry again and thus unconsciously give birth to illegitimate children). Now, even though, the letter of divorce may be annulled in accordance with Biblical law, we allow a married woman, owing to the authority of Beis Din, to marry anyone in the world.

Rabbah rejects this proof and states: Anyone who betroths a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis have in this case retroactively revoked the original betrothal. (They accomplished this by transforming retroactively the money of the betrothal given to the woman at her first marriage into an ordinary gift. Since the hefker of money comes within the authority of Beis Din, they are thus fully empowered to cancel the original betrothal, and the divorcee assumes, in consequence, the status of an unmarried woman who is permitted to marry any stranger.)

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is a satisfactory explanation where betrothal was effected by means of money; what, however, can be said in a case where betrothal was effected by cohabitation?

Rav Ashi replied: The Rabbis have assigned to such cohabitation the character of a promiscuous cohabitation. (From the moment a divorce is annulled in such a manner, the cohabitation, it was ordained, must assume retroactively the character of a promiscuous cohabitation, and since her original betrothal is thus invalidated, the woman resumes the status of the unmarried and is free to marry whomsoever she desires.) (90b)

BEIS DIN ADMINISTERING PUNISHMENTS

Rav Chisda attempts to bring a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: Rabbi Elozar ben Yaakov said: I heard from my teachers that even without any Biblical authority for their rulings, Beis Din may administer lashes and death penalties. They may not be done for the sake of transgressing the words of the Torah, but in order to build a fence for the Torah. And it once happened that a man rode on horseback on Shabbos in the days of the Greeks, and he was brought before Beis Din and he was stoned. They didn’t do this because he deserved this penalty, but rather, it was because the times demanded it. And another incident occurred with a man who cohabited with his wife under a fig tree, and he was brought before Beis Din and received lashes. They didn’t do this because he deserved such a penalty, but rather, it was because the times demanded it.

Rabbah responded: Safeguarding a measure is different. (These incidents occurred in times of religious laxity when rigid measures were necessary.) (90b)

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