Daf Yomi - Yevamos 89 - Highlights

THE KESUVAH OBLIGATION

The Mishna had stated: If a woman's husband went overseas, and they came (one witness) and said to her, “Your husband died,” and she married, and afterwards her husband returned, she must leave this one and this one and she does not receive her kesuvah from either one of them.

The Gemora explains: The reason that the Rabbis instituted a kesuvah (an obligation for the husband or his estate to pay the wife a certain amount of money in case he divorces her or dies) is in order for it to be not so light in his eyes to divorce her; in this case (when the husband reappears), we want him to separate from her. This is why there is no kesuvah obligation. (89a)

THE CONDITIONS INCLUDED IN THE KESUVAH

The Mishna had stated: She does not receive compensation for the fruits that he consumed from her usufruct property, or sustenance, or depreciation (if the husband made use of her melog property until it was worn-out, he is not required to pay her its monetary value); not against this one and not against this one.

The Gemora explains: All these are conditions that are included in the kesuvah. If she does not receive the kesuvah, she does not receive the conditions either. (89a)

SHE MUST RETURN THE MONEY

The Mishna had stated: If she took any of these payments from this one or from this one, she must return it.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t this halacha obvious? If she is not entitled to these payments, of course she would be required to return them?

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that since she grabbed these monies, Beis Din will not compel her to return them; the Mishna teaches us that we take the money away from her.

SEPARATION OF IMPROPER PRODUCE AS TERUMAH

The Mishna had stated: And the child born from either of these men is a mamzer (the child from the first man is a mamzer Biblically and the child from the second one is a mamzer Rabbinically).

The Gemora cites a Mishna: One may not separate terumah from produce which is tamei for produce which is tahor (since it is not edible, the Kohen will be losing out). If he did so inadvertently, the terumah is valid. If he did so intentionally, (the Chachamim instituted) it has no validity.

The Gemora asks: What does the Mishna mean when it states that it has no validity?

The Gemora answers: Rav Chisda says: It has no validity at all; even the produce which was separated as terumah reverts to its previous status of tevel (untithed produce that one cannot eat until tithing has been performed). Rabbi Nosson the son of Rabbi Oshaya says that it has no validity in regards to rectifying the remainder of the produce; however, the produce that was used to separate the terumah is regarded as terumah.

The Gemora explains why Rav Chisda does not agree with Rabbi Nosson the son of Rabbi Oshaya, for if the produce that was used to separate the terumah is regarded as terumah, sometimes he will be negligent and not separate terumah again for the remainder.

The Gemora asks on Rav Chisda: Why is this case different from that which we learned in the following Mishna: If one separated terumah from cucumbers on other cucumbers, and they were found to be bitter (and not edible). Similarly, if one separated terumah from melons on other melons, and they were found to be spoiled, the terumah is valid, but he must separate terumah again. (We see that even if he separated terumah incorrectly, the terumah is still valid; why does Rav Chisda maintain that the terumah has no validity at all?)

The Gemora answers: The two cases are not comparable. The Mishna is discussing a case where he separated the terumah incorrectly, but inadvertently; hence, the terumah is valid. Rav Chisda is discussing a case where he intentionally transgressed and a forbidden act has been committed.

The Gemora asks from two cases where he acted unwittingly: In the first Mishna, when he unwittingly separated terumah which is tamei, the terumah is valid, but in the other Mishna (in the case of the spoiled cucumbers or melons), he must separate terumah again. What is the reason for this distinction?

The Gemora answers: In the case of the spoiled cucumbers, it is an erroneous act, which is almost a willful one since he should have tasted it first (to determine if they are in fact edible); however, in the case of the terumah which is tamei, there was no way of knowing that the produce was tamei.

The Gemora asks from two cases where he acted willfully: In the first Mishna, when he willfully separated terumah which is tamei, the terumah has no validity. However, contrast this with what we learned in the following Mishna: If a man separated terumah of a non-perforated plant-pot (which is not subject to terumah, since it has not grown directly from the ground) for the produce of a perforated pot (which is subject to terumah because a plant in a perforated pot is deemed to be growing from the ground since it derives its nourishment through the holes of the pot from the ground itself), the former becomes terumah, but he must separate terumah again from the remainder. (Why is the terumah in this case valid, while in the case of the produce which was tamei, it has no validity at all?)

The Gemora answers: In the case of produce grown in two different vessels (the produce designated as terumah grew in one kind of pot while the other produce grew in another kind of pot) a man would obey to separate terumah again; however, in the case of the tamei and the tahor which grew together, he might not obey (to give terumah again, were the portion he has set aside was allowed to retain the name of terumah. He would argue that, in view of the validity of his act, no further terumah should be separated. Hence it was ordained that his act is void and that the quantity he has set aside is not to be regarded as terumah).

The Gemora turns its attention to Rabbi Nosson the son of Rabbi Oshaya. He said that terumah which was separated from produce which is tamei has no validity in regards to rectifying the remainder of the produce; however, the produce that was used to separate the terumah is regarded as terumah.

The Gemora asks: What is the distinction between this case and that which we learned in the following Mishna: If a man separated terumah of a perforated plant-pot (which is subject to terumah) for the produce of a non-perforated pot, the terumah is valid, but the Kohanim cannot eat from it until terumah is separated again for the produce of the non-perforated pot. (Why does Rabbi Nosson rule that the terumah is regarded as terumah, whereas in this Mishna, the terumah is regarded as tevel?)

The Gemora answers: The tamei produce is considered terumah because Biblically, it is a valid terumah separation, for Rabbi Ilai said: one who separates terumah from inferior quality produce for a superior quality, his terumah is valid. Rabbi Ilai provides a Scriptural source for this. (89a – 89b)

BEIS DIN UPROOTING SOMETHING FROM THE TORAH

The Gemora returns to Rav Chisda’s opinion: Rabbah asked Rav Chisda: According to you that maintains that one who inadvertently separated terumah which was tamei for produce that was tahor has no validity at all, and even the produce which was separated as terumah reverts to its previous status of tevel; what is your reasoning? It is based on a Rabbinical decree that if the produce that was used to separate the terumah is regarded as terumah, sometimes he will be negligent and not separate terumah again for the remainder. Is it halachically possible for the produce to be terumah under Biblical law, and on account of our concern for negligence, the Rabbis removed it from its terumah status and returned it to its tevel state? Does Beis Din have the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah?

Rav Chisda answered Rabbah: And you do not hold that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah? Did we not learn in our Mishna that the child born from either of these men is a mamzer? It is understandable that the child born from the second man is classified as a mamzer because she is legally married to the first man; but, why is the child born from the first man a mamzer? Isn’t the woman his legal wife, and the child should be regarded as a legitimate child? Nevertheless, the Rabbis decreed that this child is a mamzer, and he would be permitted to marry a mamzeres. This indicates that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah.

Rabbah said to Rav Chisda: Shmuel said that this child is forbidden to marry a mamzeres. Ravin also said this in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. Why does the Mishna refer to him as a mamzer? It is only because he is prohibited to marry an ordinary Jewess. (89b)

BEIS DIN CAN DECLARE THAT SOMEONE’S PROPERTY IS OWNERLESS

Rav Chisda sent the following message to Rabbah in the hands of Rav Acha bar Rav Huna: Do you think that Beis Din does not have the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah? But we learned in the following braisa: When does a husband become entitled to inherit the estate of his wife who is a minor? (The braisa is discussing a case where they were only Rabbinically married; a minor girl’s father died, and her mother or brothers married her off. She can perform mi’un, a refusal, and leave the marriage until she becomes an adult. In this case, she dies before becoming an adult. The braisa is inquiring: At what age may it be definitely assumed that the minor is no longer likely to make a declaration of refusal and may, consequently be regarded as one's proper wife?) Beis Shamai say: When she becomes an adult. Beis Hillel say: After she enters the chupah with him (although she can still perform mi’un, we assume that after nisuin, she will not leave him). Rabbi Elozar says: From after she cohabits with him. According to each of the opinions, it is from that point and on that her husband is entitled to inherit her if she would die, and he may become tamei to her corpse (if he is a Kohen), and it is at that time that she is eligible to eat terumah because of him.

The Gemora explains Beis Shamai to mean that she became an adult and entered the chupah with him; entering chupah as a minor is not effective.

The Gemora explains Rabbi Elozar to mean that she became an adult and she cohabited with him.

Rav Chisda presents his proof: The braisa states that once we are not concerned for mi’un, the husband inherits her even though her father (his heirs) should inherit her from a Biblical standpoint (since she is still not Biblically married to her husband). Nevertheless, the Rabbis decreed that her husband inherits her. This is a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah.

Rabbah objects to this proof: The reason why the husband is the inheritor even though he is not Biblically her husband is not because Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah; rather, it is because Beis Din has a right to declare the person’s property ownerless. (The Rabbis have consequently full authority to transfer the property of the minor from her father's heirs to her husband, and such transfer cannot be regarded as uprooting a Biblical law.)

The Gemora provides two sources that Beis Din has authority to declare a person’s property ownerless, and in fact, it becomes ownerless. (89b)

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