Daf Yomi - Yevamos 91 - Highlights

PENALIZE THE DAUGHTER OF A LEVI

The Mishna had stated: If she was the daughter of a Yisroel, she is disqualified from the Kehunah.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t this halacha obvious? Any woman who commits adultery is disqualified from the Kehunah?

The Gemora answers: This ruling was stated only as a means to introduce the next ruling that if she was the daughter of a Levi, she is disqualified from ma'aser, which is indeed a novel teaching.

The Gemora asks: Is this ruling correct? But we learned in the following braisa: A daughter of a Levi that was held captive or cohabited promiscuously, we provide her with ma’aser and she is permitted to eat it.

Rav Sheishes answers: In the case of the Mishna, it was a Rabbinic penalty since she was lax and relied on one witness without investigating the matter thoroughly. (The case of the braisa is relatively uncommon, so the Rabbis did not institute a decree.) (90b – 91a)

KESUVAH FOR THE MALE CHILDREN

The Mishna had stated: And the heirs of neither this one, nor of this one inherit her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: Why are we mentioning kesuvah here? The Mishna had already taught us that she does not receive a kesuvah.

Rav Papa answers: The Mishna now is referring to the kesuvah conditions for the male children. (Stipulated in the kesuvah is that her sons are entitled to receive her kesuvah from their father's estate when he dies, even if their mother died first and their father married again and had sons with his second wife. They receive her kesuvah in addition to their shares in their father's estate to which the sons of both the first and the second wife are equally entitled. In the case spoken of in our Mishna, however, the sons of the first wife lose their claim to her kesuvah.)

The Gemora asks: But isn’t this also obvious? If there is no kesuvah, there are obviously no conditions in the kesuvah either?

The Gemora answers: If the Mishna would not have explicitly taught us this halacha, we would have thought that she forfeits her rights to the kesuvah because she transgressed a prohibition; however, her shildren, who did nothing wrong, perhaps they should be entitled to their portion of the kesuvah. The Mishna teaches us that they also do not have a claim in the kesuvah. (91a)

THREE LENIENT TANNAIM

The Mishna had cited three Tannaim who dissent from the Tanna Kamma of the Mishna. They are more lenient than him regarding the penalties imposed on the woman. The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yosi says: Her first husband’s estate is responsible for her kesuvah. Rabbi Elozar says: The first husband is entitled to an object she finds and to her earnings, and he is authorized to annul her vows. Rabbi Shimon says: Cohabitation with her or her chalitzah to the brother of the first husband exempts her co-wife from chalitzah or yibum, and the child born from the first husband is not a mamzer.

The Gemora presents a dispute among two Amoraim in their explanation of these various viewpoints. Rav Huna said: The latter agree with the former (Rabbi Yosi), but the former do not agree with the latter. Rav Huna explains: Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rabbi Elozar since he (Rabbi Shimon) does not penalize the woman in the case of cohabitation which constitutes the main prohibition, how much more so with respect to being entitled to an object which she finds and to her earnings, which are only monetary matters. Rabbi Elozar, however, does not agree with Rabbi Shimon since it is only in respect to the objects she finds and to her earnings, which are monetary matters, that he does not penalize her, but in respect to cohabitation, which constitutes the main prohibition, he does penalize her. And both of them agree with Rabbi Yosi since they do not penalize the woman in respect of those matters which are applicable while she continues to live with her husband, how much more so with respect of the kesuvah, the purpose of which is for the woman to take it and depart, they certainly would not penalize her. Rabbi Yosi, on the other hand, does not agree with them since it is only in respect of the kesuvah, the purpose of which is for the woman to take it and depart that he does not penalize her, but in respect of those matters which are applicable while she continues to live with her husband, he does penalize her.

Rabbi Yochanan disagrees: The former agree with the latter (Rabbi Shimon), but the latter do not agree with the former. Rabbi Yochanan explains: Rabbi Yosi agrees with Rabbi Elozar since he does not penalize the woman in respect of the kesuvah, which has to be taken from the husband and given to the wife, how much more so with respect to being entitled to an object which she finds and to her earnings, which have to be taken from her and given to him, he certainly would not penalize her. Rabbi Elozar, however, does not agree with him since it is only in respect to an object which she finds and to her earnings, which have to be taken from the woman and given to the husband that he does not penalize her, but in respect of the kesuvah, which has to be taken from him and given to her, he does penalize her. And both of them agree with Rabbi Shimon since they do not penalize her in respect of matters which are applicable while her first husband is alive, how much more so with respect of cohabitation with the yavam, which takes place after his death. Rabbi Shimon, however, does not agree with them since it is only in respect of cohabitation, which takes place after her husband's death that he does not penalize her, but with respect of those matters which are applicable while he is alive, he does penalize her. (91a)

RAV AND RABBI SHIMON

The Mishna stated: (Rabbi Shimon said:) If she married without permission (there were two witnesses that her husband died), she is permitted to return to him (since she was not expected to investigate and clarify the matter).

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: Like so is the halacha.

Rav Nachman said to him: Why do you act surreptitiously? If you hold in accordance with Rabbi Shimon (even though he is in the minority), why don’t you say overtly that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon? And if you will respond that if you would say that, it would imply that the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon even with respect to his first ruling in the Mishna, why Don’t you say that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon only in regards to his last ruling?

The Gemora remains with a difficulty.

Rav Sheishes said: It would seem that Rav said this when he was drifting off to sleep (for otherwise, he would never have said it). For by stating that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon, he is implying that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon and penalize a woman who remarried on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses that her husband died. Now, how could that be? What should she have done (there is no better proof than two witnesses); it is a case of unavoidable circumstance?

And furthermore, Rav Sheishes asks from the following braisa: All of the women involved in an incestuous marriages forbidden in the Torah, do not require a letter of divorce from the man who married them except a married woman who remarried in accordance with a decision of a Beis Din. This implies that only where she remarried in accordance with a decision of a Beis Din does she require a letter of divorce, but where the marriage took place on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, she would not require a letter of divorce (since it was unavoidable).

Now, whose view is represented here? If you would suggest that it is the view of Rabbi Shimon, would he hold that the woman requires a letter of divorce even where her marriage took place in accordance with a decision of the Beis Din? Surely it was taught in the following braisa: Rabbi Shimon said: If the Beis Din acted based on the testimony of one witness, the marriage is regarded like an intentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman (and she is forbidden to return to her husband if he reappears). If, however, they acted on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, the marriage is regarded as an unintentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman (and she would be permitted to return to her husband if he reappears). In both cases, however, a letter of divorce is not required (Rabbi Shimon did not mention divorce at all). Evidently, it must represent the view of the Rabbis. (This proves that they also admit that a divorce is not necessary where the marriage was contracted in reliance on two witnesses.) Who is it, then, that differs from Rabbi Shimon that it should have been necessary for Rav to declare the halacha to be in agreement with his view?

The Gemora defends Rav’s statement: The first braisa actually represents the view of Rabbi Shimon and the second braisa should be interpreted as follows: Rabbi Shimon said: If the Beis Din acted based on the testimony of one witness, the marriage is regarded like an intentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and the woman consequently requires a letter of divorce. If, however, they acted on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, the marriage is regarded as an unintentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and the woman consequently would not require a letter of divorce.

Rav Ashi offers an alternative explanation to the braisa: The braisa was only concerned with respect to the woman’s prohibition to the husband (and not with respect to whether a letter of divorce is required or not). The following is what the braisa is saying: If the Beis Din acted based on the testimony of one witness, the marriage is regarded like an intentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and she is forbidden to return to her husband if he reappears. If, however, they acted on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, the marriage is regarded as an unintentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and she would be permitted to return to her husband if he reappears.

Ravina offers an alternative explanation to defend Rav’s statement: The braisa was concerned only with respect to liability to a chatas offering. The following is what the braisa is saying: If the Beis Din acted based on the testimony of one witness, the marriage is regarded like an intentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and the woman does not bring a chatas (since only inadvertent transgressions are liable for a chatas). If, however, they acted on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, the marriage is regarded as an unintentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and the woman is required to bring chatas.

Alternatively, however, you could say that the first braisa represents the view of the Rabbis, and the following is what the braisa is saying: All of the women involved in an incestuous marriages forbidden in the Torah, do not require a letter of divorce from the man who married them except a married woman (who remarried based on the testimony of two witnesses) and a married woman who remarried in accordance with a decision of a Beis Din. (It emerges that the Rabbis dispute Rabbi Shimon in the case where she remarried based on the testimony of two witnesses, and a letter of divorce is required; she is not considered blameless. This supports Rav’s statement that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon, for in fact, the Rabbis do dispute this.) (91a -91b)

WHAT SHOULD SHE HAVE DONE?

(Rav Sheishes had questioned Rav’s statement that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon, for he is implying that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon and penalize a woman who remarried on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses that her husband died. Now, how could that be? What should she have done, there is no better proof than two witnesses; it is a case of unavoidable circumstance?)

Ula asked: Do we indeed say this argument “what should she have done”? But we have learned in the following Mishna: If a letter of divorce was dated according to the reign of the Unworthy Kingdom (the Roman Empire), according to the Kingdom of Media, or according to the Kingdom of Greece, according to the building of the Beis Hamikdosh, or the destruction of the Beis hamikdosh, or if he was in the East and he wrote that he was in the West, or he was in the West and he wrote that he was in the East, she must leave her first and her second husband (if she remarried based on this defective document from her husband), and all the penalties (enumerated in the Mishna) are applicable to her. But why? Let it be argued, “What should she have done?”

The Gemora answers: She should have arranged for the letter of divorce to be read by an expert (to determine its validity).

Rav Simi bar Ashi questions Rav Ashi from a different part of the aforementioned Mishna: Come and hear from the following Mishna: If a yavam married his brother’s wife, and her co-wife went and married another man, and then the brother’s wife was found to be an aylonis (incapable of procreation), the co-wife must leave her husband and the yavam and all the penalties (enumerated in the Mishna) are applicable to her. But why? Let it be argued, “What should she have done?”

The Gemora answers: She should have waited (until it has been definitely determined that the yevamah was not an aylonis).

Abaye questions Rav Ashi from a different part of the aforementioned Mishna: Come and hear from the following Mishna: If the co-wives of any of the forbidden relatives concerning whom it has been said that they exempt their co-wives from yibum and chalitzah went and married, and any such forbidden relatives were found to be an aylonis, the co-wife must leave her husband and the yavam and all the penalties (enumerated in the Mishna) are applicable to her. But why? Let it be argued, “What should she have done?”

The Gemora answers: She should have waited (until it has been definitely determined that the ervah was not an aylonis).

Rav Papa desired to decide a case on the principle of “What should she have done?” (He permitted a woman who remarried based on the testimony of two witnesses to return to her husband after he reappeared.) Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua asked to Rav Papa: How can you rule like this? But surely all those Mishnayos were taught that challenged this ruling?

Rav Papa replied: Were they not explained?

Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua said in return: Shall we then rely on explanations in order to render a lenient decision?

Rav Papa accepted this argument and retracted his ruling. (91b)

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