Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 25 - Highlights

The Mishna states: Only a mourner of a close relative may rend his garments, reveal their shoulders or get served the mourner’s meal. The mourner’s meal is served on an upright bed (the people who are comforting the mourner). (24b)

The Gemora states that the laws discussed in the Mishna apply to a Torah scholar that passes away, as well.

The Gemora asks: The halacha is that we rend our garments on the loss of a righteous person, as well; it is written in a braisa: One who cries and mourns over a righteous person will have all his sins forgiven; why does the Mishna state the halacha of rending garment only by a close relative? The Gemora answers: The Mishna is referring to a case where the deceased was not a righteous person.

The Gemora qualifies the Mishna further: The Mishna is referring to a case where the people were not there at the time the soul departed, for otherwise, they would be obligated to rend their garments. (25a)

When Rav Huna departed, they intended to place a sefer Torah on his bier (as if to say: He has fulfilled what was written here). Rav Chisda said to them: Shall we now act against his will? Has not Rav Tachlifha said: I once observed when Rav Huna wanted to sit down on a cot on which a sefer Torah was lying, and he turned over a pitcher on the ground, placing the sefer Torah on it and only then did he sit down? It is evident that he was of the opinion that one must not sit on a cot on which a sefer Torah is placed?

When the bier was to be removed from the house, they realized that it could not pass through the door; and they intended to remove it through the roof opening. Rav Chisda said to them: We have a tradition from Rav Huna that the proper respect for a deceased Torah scholar demands that he be removed through the door opening. They then wanted to place him on a bier of smaller dimensions, but Rav Chisda again remarked: We have a tradition from him that the proper respect for a deceased Torah scholar demands that he be removed in the first bier he was placed on. They broke open the doorway, and passed him through.

Rabbi Abba began the following eulogy: Our teacher was worthy that the Heavenly Presence should rest upon him, but the fact that he resided in Bavel prevented it. (The Gemora asks from Yechezkel who received prophecy outside Eretz Yisroel. The Gemora answers that this was an exception to the rule or that he was initially in Eretz Yisroel.)

When his corpse arrived in Eretz Yisroel, Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Assi were informed that Rav Huna had arrived. They said (under the impression that he was alive): When we were in Bavel, we could not raise our heads on account of him (we were embarrassed of ourselves on the account of his great learning), and now he has followed us here. They were then told: His coffin has arrived. Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Assi went out (to accompany the coffin). Rabbi Aila and Rabbi Chanina remained behind (they continued their studying). Others, however, said that only Rabbi Chanina remained. What was the reason of those who went out? The Gemora cites a braisa: When a coffin is being removed from one place to another, those present must form a row and must pronounce the mourning benediction and the words of consolation. The reason, however, of those who did not go out is from the following braisa: When a coffin is being removed from one place to another, those present need not form a row and they are not required to pronounce the mourning benediction and the words of consolation. The Gemora asks: These two braisos contradict each other? The Gemora answers: One braisa refers to a case where the skeleton is still intact; the other where it does not. Rav Huna's skeleton was still intact but they were not aware of that.

They then began to deliberate where to bury him and they concluded to place him alongside of Rabbi Chiya. They said: Rav Huna disseminated Torah as much as Rabbi Chiya.

The question arose: Who should enter Rabbi Chiya’s crypt in order to bury Rav Huna? Rabbi Chaga said to them: I will do it, for I was an established student at the age of eighteen. I never experienced a seminal emission, and I have served Rabbi Chiya and know his deeds. It once happened that one of his tefillin straps turned over without him realizing and he fasted forty days because of it.

Rabbi Chaga brought in the coffin into the crypt, he noticed that Yehudah, Rabbi Chiya’s older son was lying at the right of his father and Chizkiyah, Rabbi Chiya’s younger son at his left. He heard Yehudah say to his brother: Rise, for it would not be proper for Rav Huna to stand and wait to be buried. When Chizkiyah arose, a pillar of fire arose with him. Rabbi Chaga became frightened, lifted up the coffin of Rav Huna to protect himself from the fire and then left the crypt. (25a)

When Rabbah bar Huna and Rav Hamnuna died in Bavel, they were brought on camels to Eretz Yisroel. They came to a narrow bridge, where the two camels could not pass at once, the camels remained standing. An Ishmaelite merchant was surprised and asked the sages to explain to him why the camels stopped. They told him: Each of the deceased wishes to respect the other and let him go first. The merchant said: My opinion is that Rabbah bar Huna should have preference because his father was Torah scholar, as well. He had hardly concluded his remarks, when the camel bearing Rabbah bar Huna passed the bridge. As a punishment for not paying proper respect to Rav Hamnuna, the molars and front teeth of the Ishmaelite fell out. (25a – 25b)

The Gemora quotes two eulogies which were said in honor of Rabbah bar Huna and Rav Hamnuna. (25b)

Rav Ashi asked Bar Papik the eulogizer: What will you say about me when I die? He replied: I will say: If upon cedar trees a flame has fallen, what shall the hyssops of the wall do? A Livyasan was lifted from the sea with a fish hook; what shall the small fry do? Into a rushing stream dryness descended; what shall the stagnant pond waters do?

Another eulogizer, named Bar Avin, said to Bar Kipuk: Heaven forbid that a fish hook or a flame should be used in orations over the righteous. Bar Kipuk asked Bar Avin: What, then, would you say? Bar Avin replied: I would say: Weep for the mourners but not for the lost (deceased), for he is destined to go to Gan Eden and the mourners will be left sighing.

Rav Ashi felt discouraged (for one eulogizer used the words fish hook and flame and the other used the word lost, when in fact the soul of the righteous is not lost at all), and as a result, their feet became inverted. When Rav Ashi died, neither of these eulogizers came to eulogize him.

This is what Rav Ashi meant when he said: Neither Bar Kipuk nor Bar Avin are fit to perform the ceremony of chalitza. (since the Gemora Yevamos 103a states that those who have inverted feet are not fit to perform chalitza). (25b)

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 24 - Highlights

The students were sitting in front of Rav Papa and they said over in the name of Shmuel: A mourner who engages in marital relations during the period of mourning is liable to death (through the hands of Heaven). Rav Papa said: It is forbidden (but he will not be liable to death). Rav Papa continued: If you heard a law regarding mourning in the name of Shmuel, perhaps this is what you heard: A mourner who does not let his hair grow or does not rend his garments is liable to death. (24a)

Rav papa issued various rulings regarding a mourner on Shabbos: A mourner is obligated to uncover the wrappings from his head on Shabbos; he must turn his torn garments to the back; he should turn his bed the right side up on Shabbos (otherwise, these activities would be considered displaying mourning in public and that is prohibited on Shabbos). It is optional for a mourner to adhere to the following prohibitions on Shabbos: wearing leather shoes, engaging in marital relations and washing his hands and feet with hot water (that was heated prior to Shabbos) on Shabbos. Rav said: Uncovering the wrappings from his head is also optional (since others appear in that manner, as well). Shmuel maintains that a mourner must cover his head in the same manner that the Ishmaelites cover their head (and therefore it would be recognizable that he is a mourner). (24a)

Shmuel said: In order to fulfill the obligation of rending his garments, it must be done on the day of the relative’s death.

The Gemora asks on Shmuel by citing certain incidents where we see that an Amora rent his garments many days after the death of his teacher.

The Gemora answers: The death of a teacher is different since every day their teachings are mentioned (the loss is felt every day) and it is considered like the day of the death. (24a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: A mourner displays his rent garment in the front during the shiva period and if he wishes to change his garments, he may do so, but he is required to rend the new garment, as well. On Shabbos, the rent garment should show in the back and if he wants to wear a new garment, he may do so, but he should not rend the new garments.

This braisa is seemingly inconsistent with Shmuel who maintains that the rending must be done on the day of the relative’s death. The Gemora answers: The braisa is referring to the death of a parent, where Shmuel agrees that one can rend his garments even on days after the death.

The Gemora presents a dispute if the garments which were rent to honor his parent (the first day, there is an obligation; afterwards, it is done to honor them) may be sewn together afterwards or not. (24a)

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Eliezer says: Once the Beis Hamikdosh was destroyed, the festival of Shavuos (which is only one day) has the same halachos as Shabbos (in regards to the days of mourning). Rabban Gamliel says: Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur (even though they are both only for one day) have the same halachos as the other festivals. The Chachamim maintain that Shavuos has the halachos of a festival (since one can offer the festival korbanos for seven days after Shavuos) and Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur have the same halachos as Shabbos.

Rav Gidel the son of Menashye said in the name of Shmuel: The halacha follows the opinion of Rabban Gamliel.

The Gemora cites another version of Rav Gidel the son of Menashye’s statement.

The Gemora presents a dispute among the Tannaim in regards to death of a child.

A baby under 30 days old is carried out for burial in someone's arms (without a bier or coffin). The burial does not require ten men present; it is sufficient with one woman and two men. One man and two women should not bury him (the cemetery was generally outside the city and would be regarded as a forbidden seclusion). Abba Shaul does permit this (they are preoccupied with the mourning and it will not result in sin – Tosfos). They do not form a row to console the mourners; they do not recite the mourners’ blessing and they do not comfort the mourners.

If the child was over thirty days old, he is carried out for burial in a coffin. Rabbi Yehudah says: It should not be a coffin that is carried on the shoulders, but rather, one that is carried in their arms. They form a row to console the mourners; they recite the mourners’ blessing and they comfort the mourners.

If the child was over twelve months old, he is carried out for burial in a bier. Rabbi Akiva maintains that he is carried out for burial with a bier only if he is either actually two years old or developed like a two-year old. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar says: If the child is carried out for burial in a bier, the people grieve over him; otherwise, they are not required to grieve. Rabbi Elozar ben Azarya says: If the child was known to people in his lifetime, they are required to come to the burial and comfort the father; otherwise, they are not required to get involved.

The braisa continues: When do we eulogize a child? Rabbi Meir said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: If the deceased child came form a poor family, he is eulogized if he was over three years old. If the deceased child came form a rich family, he is eulogized if he was over five years old. Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: If the deceased child came form a poor family, he is eulogized if he was over five years old. If the deceased child came form a rich family, he is eulogized if he was over six years old. The children of the elderly are regarded as children from a poor family.

Rav Gidel the son of Menashye said in the name of Rav: The halacha follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah who said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael. (24a – 24b)

Rabbi Anani bar Sasson expounded in front of the house of the Nasi: If one day of mourning was observed prior to Shavuos and then Shavuos passes, it is considered that mourning has been observed for fourteen days.

Rabbi Ami heard of this and he became angry. He said: Is this his own? This was stated by Rabbi Elozar in the name of Rabbi Oshaya.

A similar incident occurred when Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha expounded in front of the house of the Exilarch and Rav Sheishes heard of this and he became angry. He said: Is this his own? This was stated by Rabbi Elozar in the name of Rabbi Oshaya.

Rabbi Elozar said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: One is obligated to bring a shelamim offering on the first day of Shavuos (similar to the other festivals). He cites a Scriptural verse that there is a seven day compensation period for anyone that didn’t bring the korban. (24b)

Rav Papa accompanied Rav Avia the elder and expounded: If one day of mourning was observed prior to Rosh Hashanah and then Rosh Hashanah passes, it is considered that mourning has been observed for fourteen days.

Ravina said: Accordingly, one day prior to Sukkos, and then Sukkos and Shmini Atzeres passes, it is considered that mourning has been observed for twenty-one days. (24b)

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 23 - Simcha on Shabbos

Tosfos states that on Shabbos, the laws of mourning can apply because Scripture does not write regarding Shabbos that it is a day of simcha, happiness and therefore mourning will not be in direct contrast to the Shabbos. There is an obligation to rejoice on a festival and that is why the laws of mourning do not apply then.

Tosfos in Kesuvos (7b) writes that one should enhance the Shabbos with rejoicing and feasting. This would indicate that there is an obligation of simcha on Shabbos.

The Nimukei Yosef (19a) states explicitly that there is an obligation for oneg, pleasure on Shabbos but not simcha. The Gemora Shabbos (62b) states that there is a clear distinction between oneg and simcha.

The Sifri in Parshas Bahaloscha expounds on the verse U’veyom simchaschem, this is referring to Shabbos. The Zohar constantly refers to Shabbos as a yuma d’chedvasa, a day of happiness. The Taz (O”C 688:8) cites a Yerushalmi that one has an obligation to conduct himself with simcha on Shabbos.

The Toras Chaim (at the end of Chulin) concludes that there is no obligation to be b’simcha physically on Shabbos (such as eating and drinking), but there is an obligation for a spiritual simcha. The Sefer Chasidim writes that this can be accomplished through the studying of Torah as it is written Pikudei Hashem yeshrim mesamchei leiv.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 23 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a braisa: If a Torah scholar dies, his Beis Medrash should stop its regular classes. If the head of the Beis Din dies, all the places of learning in his city should stop their regular classes and when they enter the synagogues, they should all change their seats from where they usually sit. If the Nasi dies, all of the places of learning should stop their regular classes and they should enter the synagogues on Shabbos to read the Torah (they would not pray together with a minyan, but rather, they would each pray in their own house). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korchah said: The people would not stroll in the market, but rather, they would stay at home and remain silent. They would not discuss Torah matters in a house of mourning, (but rather, they would sit and remain silent). It was said regarding Rabbi Chananya ben Gamliel that he did discuss Torah matters in a house of mourning. (22b – 23a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: A mourner should not leave his house during the first week of mourning. The second week, he is permitted to leave, but he should not sit in his regular place (but rather, in the place reserved for mourners – Meiri, nowadays the custom is to move his seat to another place). The third week, he may sit in his regular place, but he should not talk publicly. During the fourth week, he should conduct himself like a regular person.

Rabbi Yehudah says: It is not necessary for the Chachamim to rule regarding the first week that he shouldn’t leave his house since that is the week that everyone comes to console him; rather it is the second week that he shouldn’t leave his house. The third week, he is permitted to leave, but he should not sit in his regular place. The fourth week, he may sit in his regular place, but he should not talk publicly. During the fifth week, he should conduct himself like a regular person. (23a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: A mourner should not marry during the sheloshim. If it is his wife that died, he should not get married until after three festivals (in order that he shouldn’t forget the love for his first wife – Tosfos). Rabbi Yehudah maintains: He is permitted to marry after the second festival has passed. If he did not yet have any children, he is permitted to marry immediately since otherwise, he would be neglecting the mitzva of being fruitful and multiplying. If he has young children, he is also permitted to marry immediately in order for the children to have a woman to sustain them. (23a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: The mourner is prohibited from wearing pressed clothing during the sheloshim, whether they are new clothes or old ones. Rebbe says: The prohibition is only applicable to new clothes. Rabbi Elozar the son of Rabbi Shimon says: It is only applicable to new, white clothes. (23a)

The Gemora presents a dispute between the people of Yehudah and the people from the Galil whether the laws regarding private expressions of mourning apply to the Shabbos during the shiva period.

The Gemora attempts to prove that this argument is in fact a dispute among the Tannaim. The Gemora cites a braisa: One whose deceased relative lies before him (to be buried – he is now an onein) has the following halachos: He should eat in another room (eating in front of the dead is tantamount to mocking them); if no other room is available to him, he should eat in a friend’s house; if that is not an option, he should build a separating wall in the height of ten tefachim and eat there; if that cannot be accomplished, he should turn around (away from the deceased) and eat there. When he is eating, he should not recline (reclining was a symbol of royalty and it is not proper to display royalty while he is an onein); he should not eat meat or drink wine; he should not recite the blessing before the meal or afterwards; others should not recite the blessings for him; he should not participate in the zimun (three people join together to recite the blessing after the meal); he is exempt from reciting krias shema, shemoneh esrei, donning tefillin or any other mitzva.

The braisa continues: On Shabbos, he may recline in his usual manner and eat meat or drink wine; he can recite the blessings before the meal and afterwards; he may participate in a zimun; he is obligated to recite krias shema, Shemoneh Esrei, don tefillin and all other mitzvos. Rabban Gamliel says: Once he is obligated in these mitzvos, he is obligated in all other mitzvos, as well.

The Gemora proceeds to explain the dispute between the Tanna Kamma and Rabban Gamliel. The argument must be if it is permitted for the mourner to engage in marital relations during the Shabbos of shiva. The dispute is dependent on whether there is an obligation to observe the laws of mourning on Shabbos or not.

The Gemora rejects this explanation: Perhaps the Tanna Kamma prohibited the mourner from engaging in marital relations only because the deceased is lying before him; and perhaps Rabban Gamliel permitted it because it was before the burial and the laws of mourning did not yet take effect. (23b)

Rabbi Yochanan inquired of Shmuel: Is a mourner obligated to observe the laws of mourning on Shabbos? Shmuel responded: The laws of mourning should not be observed on Shabbos, even in the privacy of his home. (24a)

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 22 - GROWING HAIR FOR THREE MONTHS

The Gemora states: If one is mourning for a parent, he should not take a haircut until his friends criticize him on account of his long hair.

The Rama (O”C 390:4) cites that there is a dispute among the poskim as to how long a mourner should wait until he takes a haircut. The custom is to wait three months.

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe Y”D 3:156) explains: Even though it would seem from the Gemora that the mourner must wait until his friends criticize him on the account of his long hair, this is just an indicator as to how long he should let his hair grow.

If his friends criticize him before three months, he may take a haircut then. (The Mishna Berura and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch agree to this ruling of Reb Moshe. There are those that argue.)

Maharam Schick (371) writes: The three months do not commence at the time of death, rather, it begins from his last haircut. He explains: The three months of growing his hair is not a measurement of mourning, rather it is an indicator to the length of his hair.

He concludes that the poskim do not specifically say this and therefore he cannot rule leniently in this matter unless there are other reasons to combine with this one.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 22 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a braisa discussing the laws of a mourner arriving at the place where the other mourners are sitting shiva within the first three days of mourning: If he was within a days distance when he heard about the death, he may count the days of shiva together with them; if he came from a faraway place, he must count the days of shiva himself. If he arrives after three days, he must count the days of shiva himself. Rabbi Shimon says: If he was within a days distance when he heard about the death, he may count with them even if he arrives on the seventh day of shiva.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba says in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The arriving mourner can count together with the other mourners only when the senior member of the family is sitting shiva already.

The Gemora states: If the senior member of the family went to the cemetery and returned to the rest of the family within the first three days of mourning, he counts together with them; if he returns after three days, he counts by himself. (21b – 22a)

Rabbi Shimon had stated: If he was within a days distance when he heard about the death, he may count with them even if he arrives on the seventh day of shiva. Rabbi Chiya bar Gamda said in the name of Rabbi Yosi ban Shaul in the name of Rebbe: This is the halacha provided that there are still people consoling the mourner on the seventh day. The Gemora rules that the halacha follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. (22a)

The Gemora states distinctions between the burying and mourning of one’s parent and the burying and mourning for other relatives.

One is considered praiseworthy if he buries his relatives quickly; however, if he buries his parents quickly, that is regarded as degrading (since he should eulogize them abundantly).

If it was on a Friday or the day prior to the festival, or it was raining, it is considered praiseworthy if he buries them quickly since he is doing that out of respect for his parents.

One who is mourning for other relatives is not required to limit his business activity (if he is working in order to prevent a loss); however, if he is mourning for a parent, he should limit his business activity.

One who is mourning for other relatives is not required to reveal his shoulder after rending his garment; however, if he is mourning for a parent, he should reveal his shoulder.

One who is mourning for other relatives may take a haircut after the sheloshim; however, if he is mourning for a parent, he should not take a haircut until his friends criticize him on account of his long hair. (22a – 22b)

One who is mourning for other relatives is permitted to enter a house of celebration after the sheloshim; however, if he is mourning for a parent, that is prohibited until after twelve months.

Rabbah bar bar Chanah qualifies this ruling to be referring to a celebration for friendship; however, it will be forbidden for a mourner to participate in a joyous celebration, like a wedding even after the sheloshim.

The Gemora cites a braisa which indicates that a mourner can participate in a joyous celebration, like a wedding after the sheloshim.

Ameimar cites another version: Rabbah bar bar Chanah qualifies this ruling to be referring to a joyous celebration: however, for a celebration for friendship, the mourner can participate immediately.

The Gemora asks that this is inconsistent with the braisa which states that mourner can participate in a friendship celebration or a joyous celebration after the sheloshim.

The Gemora answers: The mourner must wait until after the sheloshim to participate in a celebration for friendship; however, it is permitted for him to host the reciprocal celebration (all the friends hosted this celebration on a rotating basis). (22b)

One who is mourning for other relatives is obligated to rend his garment for the length of a tefach; however, if he is mourning for a parent, he should rend his garment until he reveals his heart.

One who is mourning for other relatives is obligated to rend only his outside garment; however, if he is mourning for a parent, he is obligated to rend all his garments.

One who is mourning for other relatives may temporarily repair the rent garment after the shiva and sew it completely after the sheloshim; however, if he is mourning for a parent, he should not repair the garment until after the sheloshim and it should never be sewn together.(22b)

Ravin says in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: One who is mourning for other relatives may rend his garments with his hand or with a utensil; however, if he is mourning for a parent, he is obligated to rend his garments with his hands.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba says in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: One who is mourning for other relatives may rend his garments on the inside (in privacy); however, if he is mourning for a parent, he is obligated to rend his garments in public view. (22b)

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 21 - A MOURNER STUDYING TORAH

The Gemora states that a mourner is forbidden from studying Torah. Rashi explains: The studying of Torah makes one happy and a mourner is required to be in a state of anguish.

The Ramban asks: Doesn’t every person have an obligation to learn everyday? He answers: One can fulfill this mitzva with the recital of krias shema in the morning and in the evening. .

The Ritva is uncertain whether a mourner is permitted to learn those topics (Iyuv, certain parts of Yirmiyah) that one is allowed to learn on Tisha b’Av. He cites from Rabbeinu Yitzchak that he is permitted. Tosfos HaRosh writes that it is customary for a mourner to study Moed Katan where it discusses the laws regarding a mourner.

The Meiri cites an opinion that a mourner is forbidden from studying any Torah since he is required to remain silent and it is not dependant on learning which results in joy to the heart. He adds that it is also permitted for a mourner to glance at seforim which lead a person to repentance.


The Chacham Tzvi rules that if someone is accustomed to reciting Mishnayos by heart and he is concerned that he will forget them if he interrupts this learning, he may continue to do so.

The Aruch Hashulchan cites a Yerushalmi: If someone is literally sick without studying Torah, he is permitted to learn. He concludes: the poskim do not bring this down because it is highly unlikely in our generations. The Rogatchover Gaon applied to himself.

It is said that the Chasam Sofer wrote his teshuvos regarding mourning while sitting shiva for his mother.

Chazal say that Esau was waiting for Yitzchak to die until he would kill Yaakov. The Keli Yakar explains: Esau understood that Yaakov will be protected by the studying of Torah; once Yitzchak dies, Yaakov will be mourning and will be forbidden to learn and this would be the opportunity he was anxiously awaiting for.

The Beis Yisroel asks: Couldn’t Yaakov be protected with the learning of the topics that are permitted to learn? He answers: It is the joy from the learning that protects a person and a mourner doesn’t have that joy.

[Once again, thanks to Hagaos Yosef Anonymous for his Daf blurbs.]

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 21 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source establishing that the mourner must rend his garments while he is standing. (20b – 21a)

The Gemora cites a braisa which delineates the laws of the mourner. A mourner is forbidden to engage in labor; nor can he wash or anoint himself; he cannot have marital relations; he cannot wear leather shoes; he is forbidden from studying Torah, Prophets, Writings, Mishna, Medrash, halachos, Talmud and Aggadah. If the public needs him, he should not refrain from teaching them. There was an incident and the son of Rabbi Yosi from Tzipori’s son died and he went to the Beis Medrash and taught Torah to his students the entire day.

The Gemora states: Although we allow a mourner to teach Torah if the public needs him, he should not set up an interpreter (to demonstrate that he is in mourning). (21a)

The Gemora states: Rabbi Eliezer said: A mourner is forbidden to don tefillin the first three days of mourning. From the third day and on, he is permitted to don tefillin and even if a new person arrives (and he might think that this is the mourner’s first day), he is not required to remove the tefillin. Rabbi Yehoshua said: A mourner is forbidden to don tefillin the first two days of mourning. From the second day and on, he is permitted to don tefillin and even if a new person arrives, he is required to remove the tefillin. The Gemora cites the Scriptural sources for these halachos.

Ula states: The halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer regarding the removal of the tefillin (if a new person arrives from the third day and on, he is not required to remove the tefillin) and the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua regarding the donning of the tefillin (from the second day and on, he is permitted to don tefillin). The Gemora concludes according to Ula: If a new person arrives on the second day, he is required to remove the tefillin.

Rava rules: Once he dons the tefillin on the second day, he is not required to remove them. The Gemora asks: Isn’t Rava the one who holds that the primary mourning period lasts three days? The Gemora answers: Since it is a mitzva to wear tefillin, we allow him on the second day of mourning to wear them and he is not required to remove them. (21a – 21b)

The Gemora cites several braisos that discuss the stringencies of the first three days of the mourning period: He is prohibited from working even if he is a poor person who is sustained through charity. Afterwards, he may work in private. A poor woman mourner, after the third day, may spin with her spindle in private.

A mourner does not leave his house the first three days of mourning even to comfort another mourner. Afterwards, he may go out to comfort them, but he sits together with the mourners and not with the consolers.

A mourner during the first three days of mourning should not greet his friend and should not respond to his friends greeting. From the third day of mourning through the seventh day, he may respond to his friends greeting but he may not greet them. Afterwards, he may greet them in the usual manner.

The Gemora cites an incident with Rabbi Akiva where he greeted the public who attended the eulogy for his sons. The Gemora answers: This was permitted for he was displaying respect to the public. (21b)

The Gemora cites a braisa: After sheloshim, one can greet mourner in a regular way, but he should not console him. The Gemora cites another braisa which contradicts this: One may console a mourner during the first twelve months but he should not offer greetings, afterwards, he should greet him but he should not console him. The Gemora answers: The latter braisa is referring to a person who is mourning on the loss of his father or mother; the period of mourning lasts longer and the mourner should not be greeted until a year after the death. The former braisa is referring to a person who is mourning on the loss of other relatives; he may be greeted in the regular way after the sheloshim. (21b)

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 20 - SOURCE FOR THE LAWS REGARDING MOURNING

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source establishing that the primary period of mourning is for seven days.

Tosfos asks: Why didn’t the Gemora cite the verse where Yosef mourned for his father Yaakov in Breishis [50:10]: And he made for his father a mourning of seven days?

Tosfos answers: That verse is referring to the period of mourning prior to the burial.

It is noteworthy that the Ibn Ezra on that verse comments that the mourning mentioned here is referring to the period after the burial. Rabbi Aharon Levine in his sefer Hadrash V’haeyun wonders why the Ibn Ezra explained the verse in that manner, when it is evident that our Gemora does not learn that way. The Rif (Brochos) does derive the laws of mourning from Yaakov.

Tosfos cites a Yerushalmi that answers differently: We cannot derive the laws of mourning from the death of Yaakov because that was prior to the giving of the Torah.

This seems a bit perplexing because there are many halachos (time for the Minchah prayer) that are derived from verses in the Torah even though the incidents transpired prior to the giving of the Torah?

The Chasam Sofer answers: It is written regarding the laws of mourning ‘Banim atem,’ You are My children. When did Klal Yisroel get the status of being children of Hashem? After receiving the Torah. It is for this reason that the laws of mourning must be derived from a verse which occurred after the Torah was given.

Rav Elyashiv answers: While it is true that we could have learned many of the laws of mourning from Yaakov and Yosef, there are some laws that we would be incapable of deriving from there. A mourner cannot study Torah, nor can he don tefillin on the first day and before the burial he cannot perform any mitzvos. If the source of the laws of mourning would be from Yaakov and Yosef, we would say that those laws were included in the mourning period for the mourners who did not have these obligations (the Patriarchs before the Torah was given); however we, who have an obligation to study Torah, don tefillin and perform mitzvos, cannot be subject to these prohibitions. It was for this reason that the Gemora found the source for the laws of mourning from a verse in Amus, after the Torah was given.

[Once again, my anonymous friend pointed me in the right direction.]

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 20 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Eliezer states: If one overturned his bed (as a sign of mourning) for three days prior to the festival, he is not required to overturn his bed after the festival. The Chachamim maintain: Even if he overturned his bed just for one moment prior to the festival, he is not required to overturn his bed after the festival.

The Gemora states that this is indeed a dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel. Rav Chavivah asked Ravina: Who is the halacha according to? He answered him: Even if he overturned his bed just for one moment prior to the festival, he is not required to overturn his bed after the festival. (20a)

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source establishing that the primary period of mourning is for seven days. (20a)
The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Akiva states: If one hears a current report (within thirty days of the death) that one of his close relatives had passed away, he should observe the days of shiva and the sheloshim from that day on. If it was a belated report, he should observe one day of mourning. The Chachamim rule that he should always observe the days of shiva and sheloshim.
The Gemora cites a braisa: There is a distinction between a father or mother and the other relatives. If one’s father or mother passes away, he should always observe the days of shiva and sheloshim even if it was a belated report and even according to Rabbi Akiva. (20a)
The Gemora records that when the son of Rabbi Achiya died in Bavel and Rav Achiya heard the tragic news in Eretz Yisroel more than thirty days later, he observed shiva and sheloshim.

The Gemora asks from the following incident: Rav was the son of Rav Chiya’s brother, whose name was Aivu, and Rav was also the son of Rav Chiya’s sister whose name was Ima. Rav was the son of Rav Chiya’s half brother and also the son of Rav Chiya’s half sister. When Rav went to Eretz Yisroel, Rav Chiya queried Rav if Aivu was live, to which Rav responded, “Is Ima alive?” Rav responded thus because he did not want to declare explicitly that Aivu had died. When Rav Chiya queried Rav if Ima was alive, Rav responded, “Is Aivu alive?” Rav Chiya thus understood from Rav’s responses that his brother Aivu and his sister Ima had passed away, so Rav Chiya instructed his attendant to remove his shoes and take his clothing after him to the bathhouse.

We learn from Rav Chiya’s actions three laws regarding mourning. Rav Chiya instructed his attendant to remove his shoes, and we learn from this that one who is in mourning is forbidden to wear shoes. We also learn that if one is in mourning based on a delayed report, he is only obligated to mourn for one day. A third ruling that is derived from Rav Chiya’s actions is that regarding mourning, part of a day is akin to a whole day. This ruling is derived from the fact that after removing his shoes as a sign of mourning, Rav Chiya instructed his attendant to take his clothing to the bathhouse, and Rav Chiya did not wait until the next day to go to the bathhouse.

The Gemora answers that Rabbi Achiya holds that one should observe shiva and the sheloshim when hearing a belated report but Rabbi Chiya maintains that only one day of mourning shall be observed. (20a – 20b)

The Gemora cites a dispute among the Amoraim whether one who hears a belated report about a death in the family if he should rend his garments or not. (20b)

The Gemora cites a braisa: All the relatives that are mentioned in the Torah that the kohen must contaminate himself for (even though a kohen has a prohibition against contracting tumah from a corpse), a mourner mourns for them, as well. These are those relatives: His wife, his father, his mother, his brother and sister, his son and daughter. The Chachamim added his maternal brother, maternal virgin sister and his married sister (even though a kohen would not contaminate himself for these relatives).

Rabbi Akiva adds secondary relatives, as well. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar says: He mourns only for his son’s son and his father’s father. The Chachamim say: If he would mourn by the death of a particular relative, he mourns by that relative’s relative.

The Gemora asks: It emerges that Rabbi Akiva and the Chachamim have the identical opinion?

The Gemora answers: The Chachamim maintain that he only mourns for a relative’s relative if the relative is with him in his house. (20b)

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TEFILLIN ON CHOL HAMOED
by Rabbi Howard Jachter

Kol torah

Introduction

There are three prevalent customs regarding wearing Tefillin during Chol Hamoed. Some do not wear Tefillin, others wear Tefillin and recite the Beracha (albeit quietly), and others compromise and wear Tefillin but do not recite the Beracha. In this issue, we will explain the basis for each of these practices.

Why We Should Not Wear Tefillin on Shabbat and Yom Tov

The Gemara (Menachot 36) presents a dispute whether one should wear Tefillin on Shabbat and Yom Tov. The accepted opinion is that we do not wear Tefillin on Shabbat and Yom Tov. The Gemara presents two Braitot that present reasons why we should not wear Tefillin on these days.

The first Braita cites a Pasuk (Shemot 13:10), which states that one should wear Tefillin Miyamim. Literally, this means “from among the days.” The Braita explains that this means that on some days we wear Tefillin and on others we do not. Shabbat and Yom Tov are days that we do not wear Tefillin.

The second Braita notes that the Torah in a number of places writes that Tefillin serve as an Ote, a sign. The Braita explains that one wears Tefillin only on those days when one requires an Ote. One does not wear Tefillin on Shabbat and Yom Tov because Shabbat and Yom Tov constitute an Ote.

Next, we shall present the arguments regarding wearing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. We shall focus on the arguments that Tosafot (Moed Katan 19a s.v. Rabi Yosi) presents.

The Argument for Not Wearing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed

The Behag (cited by Tosafot Moed Katan 19a s.v. Rabbi Yosi) rules that we are forbidden to wear Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. Many Rishonim agree with the Behag’s assertion. These Rishonim include the Rambam (as interpreted by the Kesef Mishna to Hilchot Yom Tov 7:13), the Rashba (Teshuvot 1:690), and the Ri (cited by the Haghot Maimoniot Hilchot Tefillin 4:9). These authorities believe that if Yom Tov is excluded from wearing Tefillin, Chol Hamoed should also be excluded from wearing Tefillin. They believe that Chol Hamoed constitutes a Yom Tov, and therefore constitutes an Ote.

Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (Shiurim L’zeicher Abba Mori Zal 1:118-120) further explains this opinion. The Rav notes that there are four components of the Kedushat Hayom (the holiness of the day) of a Yom Tov. These are the Korban Mussaf, the unique Mitzvot of the day (such as the Mitzva to eat in a Sukkah or to avoid Chametz), the obligation on individuals to bring the Korbanot of the Festivals (Re'iya, Chagiga, Shalmei Simcha), and the prohibition to engage in Melacha (forbidden labor). All four components pertain to Chol Hamoed. Although certain Melacha is permitted on Chol Hamoed, the Rav explains that fundamentally, the prohibition to perform Melacha applies to Chol Hamoed. However, the Gemara (Chagiga 18a) explains that the Torah permits us to engage in certain Melacha on Chol Hamoed. Hence, Chol Hamoed enjoys the full status of Yom Tov. The Rav cites Rav Chaim Soloveitchik’s assertion that Chol Hamoed is as holy as any Yom Tov. There merely exists permission to engage in certain Melacha on Chol Hamoed.

The Argument for Wearing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed

Many Rishonim, on the other hand, believe that one must wear Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. These authorities include the Rosh (Hilchot Tefillin 16), Or Zarua (1:589), and the Maharam of Rothenberg (cited by the Mordechai). They argue that Chol Hamoed does not constitute an Ote, since we are permitted to perform certain Melacha on Chol Hamoed. This argument is particularly cogent according to the Rishonim who believe that on a Torah level all Melacha is permited on Chol Hamoed and the restrictions that exist in regard to performing Melacha on Chol Hamoed were instituted by Chazal.

Moreover, they argue that the word in the Torah Miyamim excludes only Shabbat and Yom Tov where the prohibition to engage in Melacha profoundly distinguishes these days from all other days. A ramification of the permission to perform certain labor on Chol Hamoed is that the difference between Chol Hamoed and other days is not pronounced.

These Rishonim cite as proof to their position the fact that the Gemara permits writing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. They argue that Chazal would not have permitted writing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed had there been no use for the Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. The other group of Rishonim argues that this passage in the Gemara represents the rejected opinions that believe that one may wear Tefillin on Shabbat and Yom Tov.

The Compromise View — Tefillin and No Beracha

Both sides of the arguments presented by the Rishonim are compelling. Thus, we already find Rishonim that advocate adopting a compromise view — to wear Tefillin but to refrain from reciting the Beracha. The Tur (Orach Chaim 31) notes that there are a number of Rishonim who are uncertain whether one must wear Tefillin on Chol Hamoed and therefore advocate wearing Tefillin but refraining from reciting a Beracha. These authorities include the Ritva (Eruvin 96a), the Smak (153), and the Meiri (Moed Katan 18b). The advantage of this compromise is that one avoids violating very serious transgressions. Chazal write that not wearing Tefillin (see Rosh Hashana 17a and Tosafot ad. loc. s.v. Karkafta) and reciting an unnecessary Beracha (see Berachot 33a and Shavuot 39a) are very serious violations of Torah Law. It is possible that the potential prohibition to refrain from wearing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed is more severe than a potential prohibition to wear Tefillin on Chol Hamoed.

Shulchan Aruch and Commentaries

The Bait Yosef (O.C. 31 s.v. V’cholo) notes that all Sephardic Jews refrain from wearing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. He cites at length from the Midrash Hane’elam to Shir Hashirim that presents a Kabbalistic explanation for refraining from wearing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. In fact, the Zohar strongly advocates refraining from wearing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. We should note that many Kabbalistic themes have been incorporated into the Halachot of Tefillin. For example, see Shulchan Aruch 25:2, 25:11, and 25:13.

Accordingly, Rav Yosef Karo rules in the Shulchan Aruch (O.C.31:2) that it is forbidden to wear Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. The Rama, however, records that the universally accepted practice among Ashkenazic Jews is to wear Tefillin on Chol Hamoed and to recite the Berachot. The Rama adds, though, that the custom is to recite the Berachot on Tefillin quietly on Chol Hamoed. The Mishna Berura (31:8) writes that this is to avoid fighting since the issue of reciting the Berachot on Tefillin is embroiled in controversy. There might be Kabbalistic reasons for this practice as well.

The Taz (O.C. 31:2) encourages one to refrain from reciting the Berachot on Tefillin during Chol Hamoed in deference to the authorities who forbid wearing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. The Vilna Gaon (Biur HaGra O.C. 31:2 s.v. V’yesh Omrim) rules in accordance with the Rishonim who believe that one should refrain from wearing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed.

Late Codifiers and Current Practices
The Mishna Berura (31:8) and the Aruch Hashulchan (O.C. 31:4) follow the recommendation of the Taz, to refrain from reciting the Berachot when wearing Tefillin during Chol Hamoed. The Aruch Hashulchan concludes, however, that one should follow the practice of his ancestors in this regard.

The Aruch Hashulchan notes that “recently” a practice among some Ashkenazic Jews has developed to refrain from wearing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. He is referring to the practice of Chassidim, which was also the practice at the famed Volozhiner Yeshiva (as recorded by the Rav, Shiurim L’zeicher Aba Mori Zal p.119). The Rav (ibid.) also records that Rav Chaim Soloveitchik did not wear Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. In Eretz Yisrael, the ruling of the Vilna Gaon to refrain from wearing Tefillin on Chol Hamoed has been universally accepted. One who publicly dons Tefillin during Chol Hamoed in Eretz Yisrael is inviting a strong protest from his fellow worshippers.

Interestingly, both the Mishna Berura and the Aruch Hashulchan rule that there should not be disparate practices regarding this matter in one prayer hall. They write that such a disparity violates the prohibition of Lo Titgodedu. This refers to the prohibition against allowing disparate ways of observing the Torah to coexist in one locale (see Yevamot 14a). Nevertheless, in many North American congregations on Chol Hamoed, some wear Tefillin and others do not wear Tefillin in one Minyan. Are all these congregations disregarding the Mishna Berura and the Aruch Hashulchan?

One might respond that they are not ignoring these eminent authorities. The Gemara (ibid.) states that the coexistence of Shnei Batei Din Be'ir Echad — two distinct communities maintaining disparate practices in one community — does not violate Lo Titgodedu. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe O.C. 1:158 and 159) notes that in this country Jews have gathered from the various sections of Europe and continue the Halachic practices of their former communities. Subsequent generations continue the practices of their parents. Rav Moshe asserts that American Jewry constitutes “a massive Shnei Batei Din Be'ir Echad” and we do not violate Lo Titgodedu. For example, the Rama (O.C. 493:3) writes that disparate observances of the Omer mourning period in a single community violate Lo Titgodedu. Rav Moshe writes, though, that this does not apply in cities like Brooklyn and Manhattan where the situation of Shnei Batei Din Be'ir Echad pertains. The same might apply to the dispute regarding Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. The Mishna Berura and Aruch Hashulchan addressed a situation in Europe, which radically differs from the situation in North America, as explained by Rav Moshe. However, it appears that one violates Lo Titgodedu if he wears Tefillin in public in Israel on Chol Hamoed.

Conclusion

The Rishonim and Acharonim debate whether one should wear Tefillin on Chol Hamoed. This debate has not been resolved and the various practices regarding this issue persist. This author heard from the Rav that one should follow his father’s practice in this regard. Gerim and Baalei Teshuva should consult their Rav for guidance on which practice to adopt. Either he might advise wearing Tefillin without reciting the Berachot or he might advise following the dominant practice in the local community.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan Daf 19 - Highlights

The Mishna states: One may not write loan documents during Chol Hamoed. If the lender does not trust the borrower (to lend him without a document) or if the scribe does not have what to eat, it will be permitted.

One cannot write a sefer Torah, tefillin or mezuzos during Chol Hamoed. One cannot fix a mistake in a sefer Torah (unless he needs it for Chol Hamoed) even if it is just one letter and even if it is the sefer Torah from Ezra (that was used as the prototype for all other Torah scrolls). Rabbi Yehudah says: One is permitted to write a sefer Torah, tefillin or mezuzos during Chol Hamoed for the fulfillment of the mitzva (but not for selling to others). One is also permitted to spin the techeiles for tzitzis (the biblical obligation of wearing tzitzis is to wear both white threads and threads made out of techeiles, a blue-dyed wool secreted by a land-sea animal called chilazon) on his thigh (which is an unusual manner of spinning threads). (18b – 19a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Meir says: One is permitted to write tefillin or mezuzos during Chol Hamoed for the fulfillment of his mitzva and he may spin the techeiles for tzitzis on his thigh. He is permitted to write tefillin or mezuzos for others as a favor (but he cannot charge them). Rabbi Yehudah says: One is permitted to utilize a ploy and sell his own tefillin and mezuzos and then write for others. Rabbi Yosi says: One is permitted to write tefillin or mezuzos and sell them in his usual manner for the sake of his livelihood. The Gemora concludes by stating that the halacha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosi. (19a)
The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Eliezer states: One may spin the techeiles for tzitzis on his thigh during Chol Hamoed but he may not use a stone. The Chachamim disagree and say that he may use a stone to assist him in the spinning process. Rabbi Yehudah learned this dispute differently: Rabbi Eliezer states: One may spin the techeiles for tzitzis with a stone but he may not use a spindle. The Chachamim maintain that he may use a stone or a spindle. The Gemora concludes by stating that the halacha is in accordance with the opinion of the Chachamim that a stone or a spindle may be utilized. (19a)
The Mishna states: One who buried his dead (one of the seven close relatives) three days prior to the festival, the decree regarding the seven days of mourning (shiva) are cancelled (he is not required to resume the seven days of mourning after the festival). One who buried his dead eight days prior to the festival, the decree regarding the thirty days of mourning (sheloshim) are cancelled. It is said: Shabbos counts for one of the seven days but does not cancel the seven days of mourning; the festival cancels the days of mourning but does not count as one of the days.
Rabbi Eliezer says: Once the Beis Hamikdosh was destroyed, the festival of Shavuos (which is only one day) has the same halachos as Shabbos (in regards to the days of mourning). Rabban Gamliel says: Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur (even though they are both only for one day) have the same halachos as the other festivals. The Chachamim maintain that Shavuos has the halachos of a festival (since one can offer the festival korbanos for seven days after Shavuos) and Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur have the same halachos as Shabbos. (19a)

The Mishna had stated: One who buried his dead eight days prior to the festival, the decree regarding the thirty days of mourning (sheloshim) are cancelled. Rav and Rav Huna say that the decree is cancelled but not the days. The Gemora explains: If he did not avail himself of the opportunity of taking a haircut on the eve of the festival, he is prohibited from doing so after the festival. Rav Sheishes disagrees and maintains that he would nevertheless be permitted to take a haircut after the festival because the festival cancels the decree and the days of the sheloshim. (18a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: One who buried his dead three days prior to the festival, the decree regarding the seven days of mourning are cancelled. One who buried his dead eight days prior to the festival, the decree regarding the thirty days of mourning are cancelled. He may take a haircut on the eve of the festival; if he did not, he is forbidden from taking a haircut after the festival. Abba Shaul disagrees and holds that he would nevertheless be permitted to take a haircut after the festival since in the same manner that three days of mourning prior to the festival cancels completely the seven days of mourning, seven days of mourning prior to the festival cancels completely the thirty days of mourning.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t our Mishna state that eight days of are mourning are required in order for the festival to cancel sheloshim?

The Gemora answers: Abba Shaul maintains that part of the day is like the entire day and the seventh day counts for the last day of shiva (seven days of mourning) and for the first day of the sheloshim (thirty days of mourning). (18b)

Rav Chisda said in the name of Ravina the son of Shila: The halacha follows the opinion of Abba Shaul. The Chachamim agree to Abba Shaul when the mourner’s eighth day of mourning falls out on Shabbos, which was the day prior to the festival; he would be permitted to take a haircut on Erev Shabbos.

Abaye says: The halacha is in accordance with Abba Shaul regarding the seventh day (part of the day is like the entire day) and the Chachamim agree to Abba Shaul on the thirtieth day (part of the day is like the entire day). Rava says: The halacha is in accordance with Abba Shaul regarding the thirtieth day and the halacha does not follow Abba Shaul regarding the seventh day. They said in Nehardea that the halacha follows Abba Shaul in regards to the seventh day and the thirtieth day since Shmuel states that we always follow the lenient opinion when it pertains to the laws of mourning. (19b)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source that a mourner is not permitted to take a haircut in the initial thirty days of mourning. (19b)

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 18 - HEAVENLY VOICE REGARDING MARRIAGE

The Gemora states: Every day, a Heavenly voice pronounces: “The daughter of this individual is designated for that man.”

Why when it is referring to the woman does it say, “The daughter of this man,” and when it is referring to the man, it says “that man”?

Tal Chaim answers: The Torah gives the right to the father to marry off his daughter and to receive the money; this right does not apply for his son.

Others answer based on Tosfos in Sotah (2a) which states that this Heavenly voice is issued forty days before the formation of the boy. At this point in time, the girl is not in existence yet and therefore it only mentions her father.

Kometz Mincha offers an alternative answer: The Gemora Bava Basra (109b) states that a man should investigate the woman’s father and her family. Regarding a woman, on the other hand, the Gemora in Kiddushin (7a) states: A woman would rather grow old together with a husband than alone, no matter whom the man might be and therefore his family is not mentioned.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 18 - Food for Thought

1. The Gemora states: We rule according to the lenient opinion regarding halachos pertaining to mourning. Where does this principle apply? Only when Tannaim argue? Amoraim? Does this apply nowadays as well?

2. The result of this apparent slip of the tongue was that Shmuel himself soon became a mourner because "there is a covenant for the lips" — a spoken word has the power to effect fulfillment. This is the source of children with living parents not to recite Kaddish (some even by a siyum by the Kaddish in the hadran). In teshuvas of the Divrie Yoel he was uncertain if the children of parents that were in the Holocaust should recite Kaddish if they were not a hundred percent sure that their parents died. (from my Anonymous commenter)

3. Our Patriarch Avraham, on his way to offer his son Yitzchak as a sacrifice, said to the two young men accompanying them. "Stay here and I and the lad will return to you" (Bereishet 22:5), and did indeed result in their both returning. This statement resulted in saving Yitzchak; how can we derive from here that a person should be careful with his words? The Chasam Sofer answers that to Avraham, it was regarded as undesirable since he was unable to fulfill the will of Hashem. (ibid)

4. Rav Shemen bar Abba said: I was once standing in front of Rabbi Yochanan in the Beis Medrash during Chol Hamoed and he was biting his nails and throwing them away. We can learn three things from here: One is allowed to cut his nails during Chol Hamoed; biting nails is not regarded as disgusting; one can throw fingernails into a public area. Why couldn't the Gemora derive a fourth halacha from this incident that on Chol Hamoed, one cannot use a scissors to cut his nails? Perhaps the answer is because he was in a Beis Medrash and no scissors was available.(ibid) Perhaps it is because the Gemora never states: We can derive four halachos from a certain incident; it is always three.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 18 - FINGERNAILS CAUSING MISCARRIAGES

Rav Shemen bar Abba said: I was once standing in front of Rabbi Yochanan in the Beis Medrash during Chol Hamoed and he was biting his nails and throwing them away. We can learn three things from here: One is allowed to cut his nails during Chol Hamoed; biting nails is not regarded as disgusting; one can throw fingernails into a public area.

The Gemora asks from the following braisa: One who buries nails is considered righteous; one who burns them is considered pious; one who throws them into a public area is regarded as a wicked person (since the sight of the nails can cause a pregnant woman to miscarry).

The Gemora answers: This is not a concern in a Beis Medrash since a woman is generally not found there.

The Gemora states: The nails are only dangerous in their original location, but if they have been moved from there, there is no concern any longer.

The Nimukei Yosef explains the reason why a woman might miscarry upon the sight of cut fingernails: Seeing the nails might be repulsive to her and can have a physical effect upon her, ultimately resulting in a miscarriage.

The Ran adds that it could also be on the account of supernatural means.

The Elya Rabbah (O”C 260:7) cites from the sefer Tola’as Yaakov an alternative reason: Prior to the sin of Adam HaRishon, he had a skin of nails which covered his entire body. (We remind ourselves of this at Havdalah on Motzei Shabbos when we use the light of the fire to view our fingernails.) Afterwards, the nails remained only by the fingers and toes. Since it was the woman who caused Adam to sin, we are concerned that the sight of the nails can result in a punishment to the women.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 18 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Yehudah maintains that just as it is forbidden to take a haircut during Chol Hamoed, it is forbidden to cut one’s nails. Rabbi Yosi says: It is permitted. The same dispute applies by a mourner as well.

Ula states: The halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah in regards to a mourner, but follows Rabbi Yosi’s opinion regarding Chol Hamoed. Shmuel disagrees and holds that the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi by Chol Hamoed and in pertaining to a mourner. Shmuel states: Whenever there is a dispute which pertains to the laws of mourning, we always follow the lenient opinion. (17b – 18a)

A word is much more than "just a word", our Sages teach us.
In our Gemora we find that when the Sage Shmuel paid a condolence visit to his brother Pinchas who had lost a child, he asked him why he allowed his fingernails to grow although it was permitted to cut them. The rebuttal of Pinchas that "If such a tragedy as mine had befallen you, would you also show such disregard for mourning?" is described by the Gemora as an example of "an error proceeding forth from the ruler" (Kohelet 10:5). The result of this apparent slip of the tongue was that Shmuel himself soon became a mourner because "there is a covenant for the lips" — a spoken word has the power to effect fulfillment. As proof of this power Rabbi Yochanan cites the statement made by the Patriarch Avraham, on his way to offer his son Yitzchak as a sacrifice, to the two young men accompanying them. "Stay here," he told them “and I and the lad will return to you" (Bereishet 22:5), and did indeed result in their both returning.
(Tosefot raises the question as to why Rabbi Yochanan cited an example of the spoken word achieving a good result as proof that such power existed in regard to achieving a negative result such as in the case of Shmuel. Would it not have been more appropriate to cite the proof brought in another Gemora (Berachot 19a) that "one should never open his mouth to Satan" — not say something of a harmful nature to himself such as declaring that whatever he has suffered is still insufficient to atone for his sins?
Maharsha explains the difference between these two sorts of power of the spoken word. In the case of the Gemora in Mesechta Berachot, the person speaking includes himself in the tragedy of which he speaks, thus giving the prosecuting angel — Satan — the opportunity to accuse him of self-incrimination and thus weakening the ability of the Divine Attribute of Mercy to intervene on his behalf. In the case of Shmuel, as in the case of Avraham, the statement is being made about someone else, for good or otherwise, and is considered as being an unconscious prophecy whose utterance effects its fulfillment. Ohr Samayach by Rabbi Mendel Weinbach) (18a)
Rav Shemen bar Abba said: I was once standing in front of Rabbi Yochanan in the Beis Medrash during Chol Hamoed and he was biting his nails and throwing them away. We can learn three things from here: One is allowed to cut his nails during Chol Hamoed; biting nails is not regarded as disgusting; one can throw fingernails into a public area.

The Gemora asks from the following braisa: One who buries nails is considered righteous; one who burns them is considered pious; one who throws them into a public area is regarded as a wicked person (since the sight of the nails can cause a pregnant woman to miscarry).

The Gemora answers: This is not a concern in a Beis Medrash since a woman is generally not found there.

The Gemora states: The nails are only dangerous in their original location, but if they have been moved from there, there is no concern any longer. (18a)

Avital the scribe said in the name of Rav: A mourner is permitted to shave his moustache. Rabbi Ami said: Permission is granted only to the hair that disturbs his eating. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said regarding himself that he is extremely finicky and his entire moustache disturbs his eating. (18a)

The Mishna had listed different people that are permitted to wash their clothes during Chol Hamoed.

Rav Assi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: One who has only one garment is permitted to washi it during Chol Hamoed.

Rav Yitzchak the son of Yaakov the son of Giyurei said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: One is permitted to wash linen clothes during Chol Hamoed (since they do not require much effort). (18a – 18b)

(Writing is one of the labors that are forbidden to do during Chol Hamoed. The Mishna lists various exceptions to this halacha.) The Mishna states: The following documents are permitted to be written on Chol Hamoed: marriage documents, bills of divorce, receipts, sickbed wills (one who is gravely ill can transfer property with an oral declaration alone but a document is a necessity to record that this actually transpired), a gift and prozbuls (This is a document in which the lender transfers to the Beis Din debts that are owed to him, in order that the Shemitah year will not cancel them. He may write this during Chol Hamoed in a case where the lender desires to embark on a journey, and if he does not write the document now, the Shemitah year will pass and he will not be able to collect the debt.), documents of assessment (evaluating the worth of a particular field), documents of sustenance (detailing the amount a man is obligating himself to support his stepdaughter), deeds of chalitzah (If a man dies childless and his brother refuses to perform yibum to his brother’s wife, he must perform the alternate rite of chalitzah, in which she removes his shoe before the court and spits before him and declares, “so should be done to the man who will not build his brother’s house.”), refusals, document of arbitration (splitting an estate among the inheritors), Court decrees, and letters of the government. (18b)

Shmuel states: It is permitted to betroth a woman on Chol Hamoed for otherwise another man might betroth her first. The Gemora cites a braisa which supports Shmuel’s opinion: One is permitted to betroth a woman on Chol Hamoed but he cannot marry her. (There are two stages to establish a marital bond: kiddushin or erusin (betrothal) accomplishes that the man and woman are considered legally married; nisuin, the second stage, allows them to engage in marital relations.)One cannot make the betrothal party and one cannot perform a yibum (levirate marriage - the act of the brother-in-law marrying his widowed sister-in-law, when the brother died without children) because it is an expression of joy. (18b)

The Gemora asks on Shmuel’s reasoning for allowing one to betroth a woman on Chol Hamoed for otherwise another man might betroth her first; didn’t Shmuel say that every day a Heavenly voice pronounces: “The daughter of this individual is designated for that man,” and “The field of this individual is designated for another.” If so, how can the man lose this woman to another man? The Gemora answers: He might lose her as a result of someone else’s prayer. Another man might desperately want her as a wife and he cannot bear the fact that she will be married to another man; subsequently he will pray that she dies. (18b)

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 17 - PLACING A STUMBLING BLOCK IN FRONT OF A BLIND MAN

The Chazon Ish (Y”D 62:25) wonders if one would transgress the prohibition against placing a stumbling block in front of a blind man if the man subsequently does not fall into the trap. If one would hit his adult son and the son would accept the rebuke lovingly and would not retaliate and hit the father back, is it still regarded that the father placed a stumbling block in front of his son.

He cites our Gemora which relates the occurrence with the maidservant of the house of Rebbi. The maidservant of the house of Rebbi saw once one beating his grown-up son, and she said: Let that man be excommunicated, for he has transgressed the commandment [Vayikra 19:14]: You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind (the son might retaliate and transgress the prohibition against striking his father).

It would seem that the maidservant excommunicated the father immediately upon seeing the father hit the son even prior to the son retaliating.

Reb Itzele (Peri Yitzchak 2:49) maintains that one is not transgressing this prohibition unless it results in a transgression, but the maidservant nevertheless had the right to rebuke the father immediately since one cannot place someone else in a position where he might transgress a prohibition and this was cause enough for the excommunication.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 17 - Highlights

There was one young scholar who had a bad reputation (rumors were circulating that he was an adulterer). Rabbi Yehudah said: What shall we do regarding this case? Shall we excommunicate him? The rabbis need him (he was a teacher). Shall we not? The name of Heaven will be profaned. He asked Rabbah bar bar Chanah: Did you hear anything about such a case? He answered him: Rabbi Yochanan said: "It is written [Malachi 2:7]: The kohen's lips safeguards knowledge and people seek Torah from his mouth, for he is like an angel of Hashem. That means: If the teacher resembles an angel, Torah may be sought from his mouth, but not otherwise. Thereupon Rabbi Yehudah excommunicated him. Subsequently, Rabbi Yehudah was taken ill and the rabbis made him a sick-call, among whom was also that young scholar. When Rabbi Yehudah saw him, he laughed. He said to Rabbi Yehudah: Is it not enough that you excommunicated me, you still laugh at me? Rabbi Yehudah answered him: I do not laugh at you, but in the World to Come I will be proud to say that I was not biased even towards so great a man as you.

When Rabbi Yehudah died, the young scholar came to the Beis Medrash and asked to be absolved from the ban, and the rabbis answered him: There is not here a man equal in esteem to Rabbi Yehudah to absolve you. Go to Rabbi Yehudah Nesiah, and he may absolve you. He went to him. Rabbi Yehudah Nesiah said to Rabbi Ami: Go and examine his case, and if found favorable, absolve him. Rabbi Ami did so, and was about to absolve him when Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini arose and said: Even when the maidservant of the house of Rebbi excommunicated someone, the sages respected it for three years, how much more so should we respect Yehudah our colleague. Rabbi Zeira said: How did it happen that this elderly man came today to the Beis Medrash after an absence of several years? It is evident that the young scholar should not to be absolved from the ban.

The scholar left weeping, and on the way he was stung by a bee and he died. His corpse was brought to the burial graves of the pious, and they did not accept it; he was then removed to those of the judges, and was accepted. Why was this? For he acted in accordance with Rabbi Ilai’s ruling cited in a braisa: If one cannot withstand the temptation, he shall go to a place where he is not known, and shall dress in black and wrap himself in black and do as he pleases, but shall not profane the name of Heaven openly.

The Gemora proceeds to relate the occurrence with the maidservant of the house of Rebbi. The maidservant of the house of Rebbi saw once one beating his grown-up son, and she said: Let that man be excommunicated, for he has transgressed the commandment [Vayikra 19:14]: You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind (the son might retaliate and transgress the prohibition against striking his father). (17a)

Rish Lakish was watching an orchard, and there came a certain man and ate some of the figs. Rish Lakish shouted to him not to do it, but he paid no attention to him. Rish Lakish then said: Let this man be excommunicated. The man answered him: On the contrary, let that man be excommunicated; for if I am responsible to pay the damages, am I then liable to be excommunicated? When Rish Lakish came to the Beis Medrash, he was told: His excommunication towards you is valid, but not yours. Rish Lakish asked: Is there a remedy? They told him: Go and ask his pardon. But I do not know where to find him, Rish Lakish replied. He was told: You have to go to the Nasi in order to be released, as we have learned in a braisa: One who was been excommunicated and he does not know by whom; he must go to a Nasi in order to be absolved. (17a)

When Mar Zutra the Pious was compelled to excommunicate a young scholar, he first excommunicated himself and then the young scholar. When he entered his residence, he first absolved himself and then the young scholar.

Rabbi Gidel said in the name of Rav: "A scholar may excommunicate himself and afterward absolve himself.

Rabbi Papa said: I may be rewarded since I have never excommunicated a young scholar. What would he do if a scholar was deserving of excommunication? He would do as they did in Eretz Yisroel; they administered lashes to him (they regarded lashes as a less severe form of punishment and were concerned for the honor of the scholar). (17a)

The Mishna had stated: A nazir and a metzora may take a haircut during Chol Hamoed. The Gemora cites a braisa: One who arrives from overseas, or he was freed from captivity, or he left prison may take a haircut during Chol Hamoed provided that he did not have time prior to the festival; a nazir and a metzora can take a haircut during Chol Hamoed even if he did have time prior to the festival since we do not want their korbanos to be delayed any longer.

The Gemora discusses a case where a mourner’s seventh day of mourning falls out on Shabbos, which was the day prior to the festival. One Tanna maintains that part of the day is like the entire day and the seventh day counts for the last day of mourning and the first day of the sheloshim (thirty days of mourning); since he cannot cut his hair on Shabbos, he may cut his hair during Chol Hamoed. Another Tanna disagrees because he holds that a part of the day is not like the entire day and therefore the sheloshim would not begin until Sunday; it emerges that he could not have cut his hair on the seventh day even if it was a weekday. Shabbos did not prevent him from cutting his hair and therefore he cannot cut his hair during Chol Hamoed. (17b)

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 16 - Blasphemous Words Regarding a Beis Din

The Gemora states: The agent of the Beis Din is permitted to report back to the Beis Din the derogatory words of the defendant and it is not considered loshon horah (slander). Scriptural proof is cited from the fact that Dasan and Aviram’s words were reported back to Moshe and Moshe accepted the report as true.

The Chasam Sofer asks: The Yerushalmi states: One is permitted to speak loshon horah on baalei machlokes (people causing arguments); what is the proof that one is allowed to repeat the blasphemous words of the defendant from the fact that the agent informed Moshe regarding Dasan and Aviram’s words; they were involved in an argument and it would be permitted for anyone to speak about them?

Gilyon Hashas answers: The reason why the Yerushalmi permits one to talk about people stirring a dispute is only if it is for the sake of quieting the argument; it is obvious that it is forbidden to talk about them if the intention is to arouse more strife. The agent who told over to Moshe the offensive words of Dasan and Aviram was causing the quarrel to become stronger and therefore it would have been forbidden to repeat if not for the fact that there is a special permission granted to an emissary from Beis Din.

The Ritva explains that the reason for this authorization is because people will become careful not to insult Beis Din and to refrain from saying disparaging remarks regarding the Beis Din.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 16 - UFO's

The Gemora cites proof that a defendant who does not pay attentions to the summons of the Beis din can be excommunicated form the verse in Shoftim [5:23]: Curse Meiroz! Meiroz was excommunicated because he did not listen when Barak and Devorah called on him to battle the Canaanites. According to one version in the Gemora, Meiroz was a star.

I was informed that Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan talks about this Gemora in regards to an alien world. I found this article.

Rabbi Kaplan

ONE OF THE UNIQUE ASPECTS of Judaism is its far-reaching universality. Not only does Judaism provide a lesson for every human being, its teachings extend to the very boundaries of the universe.

It is an axiom of Judaism that the entire universe was created for the sake of man.1 In one place, the Talmud reckons that there are some 1018 stars in the observable universe,2 and explicitly states that they were all created for the sake of man. It goes further to state that all the angels and spiritual worlds also only exist for this purpose.3

Of course, this immediately raises a question that many find quite difficult. How is it possible that man, living on a dust mote called the planet Earth, should be the center of the universe? Our Sages realized the vast number of stars in the universe, and also realized that many of them were many orders of magnitude larger than the Earth.4

Actually, this question was first raised in the eighth Psalm:5

When I behold Your heavens,

The moon and the stars

that You have established;

What is man that You consider him?

Or the son of man that You think of him?

Yet You have made him a little lower than the angels,6

You have crowned him with glory and honor,

You made him master of Your creation,

You placed all under his feet.

It should be quite simple to understand that size and quantity alone are meaningless to an infinite God. There is absolutely no question that the human brain is vastly more complex than the greatest galaxy, and furthermore, that it contains more information then the entire observable inanimate universe. Beyond that, man is endowed with a Divine soul that towers over even the highest angels.7

Although the creation of such a vast universe for the sake of man does not defy logic, we still need to seek out a reason for its necessity. Some sources8 state that by contemplating the greatness of the universe, one can begin to comprehend that of God, and thereby fear Him all the more. However, if we speak of the possibility of extraterrestrial life, we must explore the question somewhat further.

One of the first to discuss the question of extraterrestrial life in general was Rabbi Chasdai Crescas.9 After a lengthy discussion, he comes to the conclusion that there is nothing in Jewish theology to preclude the existence of life on other worlds.

As possible evidence for extraterrestrial life, he then quotes the Talmudic teaching that God flies through 18,000 worlds.10 Since they require His providence, we may assume that they are inhabited.

Of course, this Talmudic quotation is by no means absolute proof, for it may be speaking of spiritual worlds, of which an infinite number were created.11

One could also attempt to support this opinion from the verse (Psalms 145:13), "Your kingdom is a kingdom of all worlds"12 However, here, too, this may be speaking of spiritual universes.

The exact opposite opinion is that of Rabbi Yosef Albo, author of the Ikkarim.13 He states that since the universe was created for the sake of man, no other creature can exist possessing free will. Since any extraterrestrial life would neither have free will nor be able to serve a creature having free will (as terrestrial animals and plants serve a terrestrial man), they would have no reason for existing and therefore be totally superfluous.14

One could bring some support to this second opinion from the Talmudic teaching that every land where it was not decreed for man to live was never subsequently inhabited.15 However, here again, it is not absolute proof, since this may only refer to our planet.16

Between these two extremes, we find the opinion of the Sefer Habris17 who states that extraterrestrial life does exist, but that it does not possess free will. The latter is the exclusive possession of man, for whom the universe was created. The 18,000 worlds mentioned earlier, in his opinion, are inhabited physical worlds.

The proof that he brings for his thesis is most ingenious. In the song of Deborah, we find the verse Judges 5:23), "Cursed is Meroz ... cursed are its inhabitants." in the Talmud"18 we find an opinion, that Meroz is the name of a star. According to this opinion, the fact that Scripture states, "Cursed is Meroz ... cursed are its inhabitants" is clear proof from the words of our Sages for extraterrestrial life.

Of course, even this proof is subject to refutation. For the Zohar19 also follows the opinion that Meroz is a star, yet states that "its inhabitants" refers to its "camp," that is, most probably, to the planets surrounding it. Nevertheless, the simple meaning of the verse seems to support the opinion of the Sefer Habris.

The Sefer Habris goes on to say that we should not expect the creatures of another world to resemble earthly life, any more than sea creatures resemble those of land.

He further states that although extraterrestrial forms of life may possess intelligence, they certainly cannot have freedom of will. The latter is an exclusive attribute of man, to whom was given the Torah and its commandments. He proves the latter thesis on the basis of the above mentioned Talmudic teaching that all the stars in the observable universe were created for the sake of man.

One may ask: if the inhabitants of extraterrestrial worlds, such as Meroz, have no free will, why were they cursed? However, we do find that beings, such as angels, can be punished for wrongdoings even though they do not have free Will.20

However, the basic premise that of all possible species only man has free will, is well supported by the great Kabbalist, Rabbi Moshe Kordevero in his Pardes Rimonim.21 Using tight logical arguments, he demonstrates that there can be only one set of spiritual worlds. Although God would want to maximize the number of recipients of His good, His very unity precludes the existence of more than one such set. Since this set of worlds deals specifically with God's providence toward man because of his free will, this also precludes the existence of another species sharing this quality.

The basic premise of the existence of extraterrestrial life is strongly supported by the Zohar. The Midrash teaches us that there are seven earths.22 Although the Ibn Ezra tries to argue that these refer to the seven continentS,23 the Zohar clearly states that the seven are separated by a firmament and are inhabited.24 Although they are not inhabited by man, they are the domain of intelligent creatures.25

We therefore find the basic thesis of the Sefer Habris supported by a number of clear-cut statements by our Sages. There may even be other forms of intelligent life in the universe, but such life forms do not have free will, and therefore, do not have moral responsibility.

Freedom of will, however, is not at all an observable quantity. Even its existence in man has been hotly debated by the secular philosophers. Indeed, the main proof that man does indeed have free will comes from the fact that God has given him moral responsibility, namely the Torah.26 It is in this sublime, yet unobservable quality, that man is unique.

However, if we assume this to be true, we would return to the basic question of Rabbi Yosef Albo, mentioned earlier: If such creatures never have any utility for man, what is their reason for existence?

We find a most fascinating answer to this question in the Tikunei Zohar.27 Speaking of the verse (Song of Songs 6:8), "Worlds28 without number" the Tikunei Zohar states, "The stars certainly are without number. But each star is called a separate world. These are the worlds without number."

The Tikunei Zohar further states that every Tzaddik (righteous man) will rule over a star, and therefore have a world to himself.29 The 18,000 worlds mentioned above would therefore be that number of stars, presided over by the 18,000 Tzaddikim that are alluded to in the verse (Ezekiel 48:35), "Around Him are eighteen thousand."30 However, these may only refer to those worlds visited daily by the Divine Presence, but there may be innumerable worlds for the lesser Tzaddikim.

We therefore have a most fascinating reason why the stars were created, and why they contain intelligent life. Since an overcrowded Earth will not give the Tzaddikim the breadth they require, each one will be given his own planet, with its entire population to enhance his spiritual growth.

Once we know that the stars and their planets were created as an abode for the Tzaddikim, we might naturally wonder how they will be transported to them. However, the Talmud even provides an answer to this question. Discussing the passage (Isaiah 40:31), "They shall mount up with wings as eagles," the Talmud states that in the Future World, God will grant the Tzaddikim wings to escape the Earth.31 The Zohar goes a step further and states that "God will give them wings to fly through the entire universe."32

In a way, this teaching predicts the event of space travel. But more than that, it provides us with at least one of the reasons why space flight would be inevitable as part of the prelude to the Messianic age. This, of course, could bring us to a general discussion of the role of modern technology in Torah hashkafah (perspective), a lengthy subject in its own right.



NOTES

1. Bereshis Rabbah 1:6, Koheles Rabbah 1:9, Tanna DeBei Eliahu Rabbah 14; Emunos VeDeyos 4. Cf. Sanhedrin 4:5 (37a).
2. Berachos 32b. The exact number given there is 1.0634 x 1018, very close to the number of stars in the observable universe.

3. Cf. Chagigah 12b, Chulin 91b, Esther Rabbah 7:18.

4. Pesachim 94a, Yad,, Yesodei HaTorah 3:8.

5. Cf. Malbim ad loc., Akedas Yitzchak 5 (43a).

6. Cf. Zohar 1:57b top.

7. Cf. Emunos VeDeyos 4:2, Shaarei Kedushah 3:2. Nefesh HaChaim 1:10.

8. Zohar 1: 1 lb, Reshis Chochmah 1:2; Yad, Yesodei HaTorah 2:2, 4:12@ Cf. habbos 32b, Berachos 57a.

9. Or HaShem 4:2, Rabbi Chasdai Crescas was the mentor of Rabbi Yosef Albo, author of the ikkarim.

10. Avodah Zarah 3b.

11. Cf. Etz Chaim 3:1.

12. Cf. Targum ad I(>c.

13. Quoted in Sefer HaBris 1:3:4.

14. Cf. Emunos VeDeyos 1:1, Kuzari 1:67, Moreli Nevuchim 2:13.

15. Berachos 31 a.

16. Cf. Kol Yehudah on Kuzari 2:20 (34a).

17. 1:3:3.

18. Moed Katan 16a.

19. Zohar 3:269b end.

20. Cf. Bechaya on Genesis 3:6, Exodus 23:21; Sefei Chasidim 530.

21. Pardes Rimonim 2:7. Cf. Shefa Tat 1:3.

22. Vayikra Rabbah 29:9, Shir HaShirim Rabbah 6:19 Avos OeRabbi Nassan 37. Cf. Pirkei DeRabbi Eliezer 18, but see HaGra on Sefer HaYetzirah 4:15 that these refer to spiritual worlds.

23. Ibn Ezra on Gen. 1:2.

24. Zohar 3:10a.

25. Ibid. 1:9b, 1:157a, Pardes Rimonim 6:3. See also Tosafos, Minachos 37a "O Kum." The Chida in his Pesach Eynayim, ad loc., states that since he did not live on this earth, he was exempt from all Mitzvos.

26. Cf. Yad, Tshuvah 3:4.

27. Tikunei Zohar 14b.

28. The Hebrew word here is Almos, young maidens. However, it can also be vocalized as Olamos or worlds.

29. Sli'mos Rabbah 52:3. Cf. Uktzin, end.

30. Succah 45b. Cf. lyun Yaakov (on Eyen Yaakov) Avodah Zarah #5.

31. Sanhedrin 92b.

32. Zohar 1: 1 2b.

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