Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - To Shake or not to Shake -That is the Question

The Mishna rules that we shake the lulav by ‘hodu’ and ‘ona Hashem.’ There is a debate between Bais Shammai and Bais Hillel if we shake by ‘hatzlicha no.’ The Gemora explains the significance of the shaking of the lulav and esrog. We bring it in front of us and behind to indicate that Hashem resides in all four directions. We shake it up and down to signify that the heavens and the earth belong to Hashem.

Does anyone have an explanation as to why Bais Hillel maintains that we shake the lulav by ‘hoshia no’ and not ‘hatzlicha no’?

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - Hoshanos Clip for $3.75

The Gemora rules that the lulav should be held in the right hand and the esrog in the left. It was the custom and still is that during hallel and hoshanos, we hold all of the four species in our right hand. The Taz 651:14 states that this is not a concern and one fulfills his mitzvah in this manner. It is assumed that this was the always the method of holding the lulav and esrog.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - Foresight and Prophecy

The Mishnah states that Rabbi Akiva said, “Tzofeh hayisi beRabban Gamliel,” I was watching Rabban Gamliel. Why does the Mishnah use the word tzofeh and not the conventional word for sight, roeh? The word tzofeh is often associated with prophecy, as it is said in Yeshaya (52:8) kol tzofayich nasu kol, the voice of your lookouts, i.e. prophets, they raised their voice. Perhaps Rabbi Akiva was alluding to the idea that although the Bais HaMikdash would be destroyed and salvation would appear distant, he saw in a form of prophecy that the words of the prophets who predicted the Ultimate Redemption would be fulfilled. This idea is consonant with the Gemara in Makkos that records an incident where Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues passed by the site of the Bais HaMikdash. The rabbis cried and Rabbi Akiva laughed. Rabbi Akiva explained his enigmatic actions by quoting Scripture that foretells of the ultimate rebuilding of Jerusalem and the Bais HaMikdash.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - More Hadas Aroma

The Gemara rules that one is prohibited from smelling and deriving pleasure from the fragrance of the hadassim that are used for the mitzvah. The Acharonim challenge this ruling from the Gemara that states that sound, sight and aroma are deemed inconsequential and one who inhales a fragrance from an item in the Bais HaMikdash will not have violated the prohibition of meilah. Why, then, is there a concern if one were to smell the hadas? HaRav Elyashiv Shlita explains that the above-mentioned principle only applies when one smells, sees or hears something incidentally and one was not intending for the smell, sight or sound. One who inhales the hadas for its aroma, however, is acting deliberately and this is forbidden. Harav Elyashiv cites a proof to this from the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah which discusses if one can fulfill his obligation of shofar with a shofar that one is forbidden to derive benefit from. The issue in the Gemara there is if the benefit that one derives while performing a mitzvah is deemed a prohibited benefit or not. Although sound is normally deemed inconsequential, regarding shofar it is obvious that he intends for the sound and this intention is thus taken into consideration.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - Hadas Sniffing

The Gemora rules regarding the hadasim which are being used for the mitzvah, it is forbidden to smell it and derive pleasure from its fragrance; however one is permitted to smell the esrog. The Gemora explains the distinction between them and states that the anticipated use of a hadas is for its smell and therefore it is set aside from before Yom Tov for the mitzvah and not for smelling, however an esrog’s predictable use is for eating and therefore it is forbidden to eat and not for smelling.

Rashi adds that it is forbidden to derive any benefit from the hadas all seven days akin to the halacha that we learned previously regarding the wood of the sukkah. The Kapos Temorim asks that the words of Rashi are superfluous since the Gemora explicitly states the reason for the prohibition is because of ‘haktzoah,’ something which is set aside before Yom Tov and not because of deriving pleasure?

The Pri Megadim answers that Gemora is teaching us that even if the hadas would become disqualified from use on Yom Tov and hence would not have the prohibition of deriving pleasure from it similar to the halachos of the wood of the sukkah that fell during yom Tov, it would still be forbidden to smell it because of the halachos of ‘haktzoah.’

This can explain the opinion of the Mordechai who rules in the second Perek of Pesachim regarding something that is forbidden to have pleasure from, one would be permitted to smell it if it is something that is not intended for smelling. He cites our Gemora as a proof to this for only the hadas has the prohibition and not the esrog. The Shach questions this proof from the fact that ur Gemora is not discussing pleasure but rather what it was set aside for from before Yom Tov. According to the Pri Megadim, the Gemora is involving itself in both issues and therefore the Mordechai has a proof.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 36 - Highlights

1. The Gemara rules that if there is a hole that goes through the entire esrog, the esrog will be invalid even if the hole is miniscule. If the hole does not go through the entire esrog, then the esrog is only invalid if the hole is the size of an issar coin. (36a1)
2. The Gemara lists other criteria that could invalidate an esrog. If the esrog is bloated, spoiled, steeped in vinegar or mustard, it is invalid. If one grew the esrog in its formative stage inside a form that has a different shape than an esrog and the fruit subsequently grew into the shape of the form, the fruit is invalid for use of the mitzvah. (36a2)
3. Rabbi Chanina would dip his esrog into a sauce, eat part of it and then he would fulfill the mitzvah with the partially eaten esrog. The Gemara states that the reason this was permitted was because a hole in an esrog is only invalid on the first day of Sukkos whereas Rabi Chanina fulfilled his obligation with a partially eaten esrog on the second day of Sukkos or afterwards. (36b1)
4. The Mishna cites a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Meir if the lulav should be tied to the other species with the leaves of the lulav or if the lulav can be tied with any material.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 36 - Biblical Injunction

Rabbi Yehudah maintains that the maximum measurement of an esrog is the size at which one can hold two esrogim in one hand. Rabbi Yose maintains that an esrog is valid even if one needs two hands to hold one esrog. Rav Yosef Engel lists approximately twenty instances throughout Shas where we find that the Torah states that something is not allowed and the prohibition is due to a concern that one will violate a different transgression. One example that he cites is the Ran in Pesachim who suggests that perhaps the reason the Torah prohibited one to see chametz on Pesach is because the Torah was concerned that a person will eat the chametz, as chametz is something that a person usually does not stay away from. Another example that Rav Yosef Engel cites is a Medrash in Parshas Naso that states that the Torah prohibited a nazir from drinking vinegar wine because the Torah was concerned that the nazir may come to drink regular wine. In the Sefer Ma’adanei Chaim, Rav Chaim Cohen wonders how Rav Yosef Engel, with all his erudition and scholarship in Shas and Poskim, did not cite our Gemara as one of the examples. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that an esrog cannot be too large as there is a concern that he may have mistakenly placed the lulav bundle in his left hand and the esrog in his right hand, and when he attempts to reverse them, he may drop the esrog. Rashi (based on the explanation of the Sfas Emes) and the Ritva explain that if one drops the esrog, it may cause the esrog to become deficient and the person may not realize it, and he will unknowingly not have fulfilled the mitzvah of taking the four species. Although the measurements for the four species are derived from a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai which is a Biblical requirement, it is nonetheless apparent that the rationale for the maximum measurement of an esrog is due to a concern that perhaps one may drop the esrog. The Sfas Emes maintains that based on this Gemara, we must say that Rabbi Yehduah’s requirement regarding the size of an esrog is only rabbinical in nature.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 36- Gold and humility

The Mishnah states that the people of Jerusalem would bind their lulav bundles with gold strings. The Chachamim said to Rabbi Meir that they would first bind the lulav with material of the same specie in order to fulfill the mitzvah properly and then they added the gold strings as decoration. It is interesting that the word that the Mishnah uses for these gold strings is gimoniyos, which Rashi explains is derived from the word ki’agmon, which means bent. Perhaps the Mishnah is teaching us that the people of Jerusalem would glorify the mitzvah of lulav with gold fibers, which usually can be interpreted to be a display of arrogance. Nonetheless, the people of Jerusalem acted for the sake of Heaven, and their actions were done “bent over,” i.e. in a humble fashion.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35 - Highlights

1. An esrog is a fruit whose fruit and bark have the same taste. Rebbi maintains that an esrog tree is unique in that it has small ones and large ones growing at the same time. Rabbi Abahu maintains that this can be derived from the word hadar, which can be read as haddar, which refers to a fruit that can dwell on the tree from one year to the next. (35a1-35a2)
2. There is a dispute in the Gemara as to why an esrog from an orlah tree is invalid. One opinion maintains that it is invalid because it cannot be eaten. Another opinion maintains that it is invalid because it has no value as it is forbidden to derive pleasure from it. (35a2)
3. The Gemara offers several reasons as to why one should not use an esrog of terumah for the mitzvah outright. One of the reasons offered is because the esrog will become susceptible to tumah when it becomes wet. Another reason offered is because handling the esrog will eventually cause the outer peel to become ruined and one is forbidden to ruin fruit that is terumah. (35b1)
4. There is a discussion in the Gemara regarding chazazis, boils, on an esrog. There is a distinction between a spot that is in one location and if there are spots in two or three locations. (35b3)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35 - Magnifying Glass

Rashi and the Ran write that the reason that small spots at the top of the esrog invalidate the esrog whereas spots on other parts do not invalidate the esrog is because the top of the esrog is the area which is clearly visible to the eye. The Magen Avrohom in Orach Chaim 648:16 quotes the Mabit who writes that a discoloration at the top of the esrog will only invalidate the esrog if it is visible to all. If the discoloration is so small that one can see it only by gazing intently and others cannot even see it, the esrog will still be deemed as hadar. The Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha writes that this ruling is the source for those who maintain that a black spot or discoloration which can only be viewed with a magnifying glass will not invalidate an esrog. It is noteworthy that there are those who use the magnifying glass to validate a spot that others expressed concerned about.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35 - Esrog Joining the Lulav

The Gemora offers several reasons as to why l’chatchila one should not use an esrog of terumah for the mitzvah. One of the reasons given is because it will make it susceptible to become tamei. Rashi explains this based on a Mishna later which states that the wife takes the lulav from the husband and can return it to water on Shabbos. This would be done in order that it shouldn’t become dry. Subsequently when the water will touch the esrog, it will now be susceptible to become tamei. Tosfos states that the water might drip onto the esrog.

Rav Elyashiv understands this to be an argument between Rashi and Tosfos. Rashi holds that the esrog will certainly become wet and Tosfos maintains that it is a possibility that might occur but it is not a certainty.

This argument can be based on an argument in Shulchan Aruch 651:11 if one is required to have the esrog touch the lulav during the shaking of the lulav. Rashi maintains that in order to fulfill the obligation of shaking the lulav, the esrog must be touching the lulav and therefore it is a certainty that the esrog will become wet. Tosfos would hold that it is not required to do so and thereby it is only a possibility that the esrog will become wet.

See before where we discussed the reason behind the joining of the esrog to the lulav.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35- Lekavod Shabbos

The Gemara states that an esrog is described in the Torah as a pri eitz hadar, the fruit of the hadar tree, and the word hadar can be interpreted to mean haddar, that dwells. Thus, the esrog is a fruit that dwells on its tree from one year to the next year. It is noteworthy that the Rishonim write that the word esrog is derived from the Aramaic word merogeg, which means desire. Similarly, we find that the Zohar states that regarding Shabbos it is said the Children of Israel shall observe the Shabbos, to make the Shabbos an eternal covenant for their generations. The Zohar states that the word ledorosam can be interpreted to read lederosam, for their dwelling places. Furthermore, it is said thus the heaven and the earth were finished, and all their array, and the Targum Yerushalmi interprets the word vayechulu, were finished, as vechamad, and He desired. Thus, the esrog and the Shabbos both share the same characteristics in that they are desired items and that they both have a permanent dwelling.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34 - Chatzotzros Growing

The Gemora states that there are three words that their names changes since the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh. One of the words is chatzotzros (trumpets) to shofar and vice versa. The Gemora proceeds to state that the relevance of this is regarding the shofar of Rosh Hashana. Rashi explains that a shofar is bent and chatzotzros are straight and not obtained from a ram.

It would appear from Rashi that although the chatzotzros are not from a ram, they are indeed derived from a different animal. This is very problematic because the torah explicitly states that the chatzotzros are made from solid silver.

Tosfos in Avoda Zora 47 asks this precise question on a Gemora there that speculates as to what the halacha would be with the horns of animal to be used a schatzotzros in an instance where someone would bow down to an animal as avoda zora. Tosfos asks that chatzotzros were made out of silver and not obtained from an animal? He answers that although the chatzotzros that the kohanim used were made from silver, there were also chatzotzros that the leviim used as musical instruments and these were indeed obtained from an animal.

The Kapos Temorim asks that it seems from Rashi that the chatzotzros are disqualified to be used for Rosh Hashana because it is straight and not from a ram. This, he asks, is not the halacha. Using a ram’s horn is only a preference and if the shofar is not bent, it is still valid? Actually, the Rambam does rule that one may only use a ram’s horn for a shofar.

The Aruch Lener answers that the explanation in Rashi is that it is unfit to be used for Rosh Hashana because it is metal.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34 - Aravos

Abba Shaul learns from the words in the possuk ‘arvei nachal’ that there are two separate mitzvos of arovos, one together with the lulav and one for the Mikdash. Rashi explains that the second one was used to circle the mizbeach. It would appear from Rashi that they circled the mizbeach with the arovos. In actuality, there is an argument later on daf 43 if they circled the mizbeach with the arovos or with the lulav.

The Kapos Temorim mentions this as a question on Rashi because l’halacha we hold that they circled the mizbeach with the lulav and not with the arovos? He answers that when Rashi states the words ‘to circle the mizbeach,’ he actually is referring to the lulav and the arovos would be leaned against the mizbeach as the Gemora in daf 45 explains this opinion.

It seems a bit odd that the Kapos Temorim is compelled to force this explanation into Rashi when the simple explanation would be to say that Rashi is going according to the opinion that maintains that the aravos were used to circle the mizbeach and not the lulav?

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Connectivity Issues

We are currently undergoing connectivity problems - we hope to be able to post soon. At that time, there will be posts on daf 34, 35, 36 and 37. Please stay tuned. Thanks and a gutten Moed to you.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34 - A perfect game

The Gemara derives from the word ulekachtem, and you shall take, that the four species are essential to each other, i.e. that one must have all four species available when he is prepared to fulfill the mitzvah. It is noteworthy that the Gemara derives this ruling from the word ulekachtem. The sefarim write that the festival of Sukkos is corresponding to Yaakov, regarding whom it is said and Yaakov journeyed to Sukkos. The Medrash states that on Rosh Hashanah the Jews and the gentiles enter into judgment, and it is not discernable who the victor is until the Jews exit from judgment waving the lulav on Sukkos. It is said regarding the Yom Kippur service, the he-­goat will bear upon itself all their iniquities, and the Medrash states that the word for their iniquities is avonosam, which is an acrostic for the words avonos tam, the sins of Yaakov, who is referred to as tam, the perfect one. Thus, Yaakov is victorious on Yom Kippur when the he-goat, symbolizing Esav, carries away Yaakov’s sins, and this victory is reflected in the Jewish People waving the lulav on Sukkos. The statement of the Gemara here is thus complemented by the statement of the Medrashim that the sins of the tam are removed and Yaakov is then able to perform a lekicha tama, a perfect taking of the lulav.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34 - Hadasim, Aravos, and Bar Kochba Coins

Whereas the Lulav of the First Revolt includes many twigs of willow and myrtle, the Lulav of the Second Revolt has just one twig of each. Was there a reason for this or was it just a whim of the engraver?

See here for a fascinating explanation.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34- To tie the esrog or not

The Gemara derives from the word ulekachtem, and you shall take, that the four species are essential to each other, i.e. that one must have all four species available when he is prepared to fulfill the mitzvah. Nonetheless, one is not required to tie the esrog together with the other species, because the verse states the fruit of a hadar tree, (vekapos) the branches of date palms, and it does not state (kapos) and the branches. This teaches us that one is not required to tie the esrog together with the other three species. The Shulchan Aruch in Orach Chaim 651:11 rules that one must hold the esrog next to the lulav while waving the species and one must waive them all together. The Bikkurei Yaakov quotes the Taz who rules that if one ties the lulav together with the esrog, it is invalid because it is said regarding the lulav kapos and not vekapos. The Bikkurei Yaakov questions the words of the Taz, because our Gemara merely states that from the fact that the Torah did not write vekapos we derive that is not required to tie the esrog even according to the opinion that maintains that one is required to bundle the species. We maintain, however, that one is not biblically required to bundle the species at all, so why should bundling the esrog with the other species be forbidden? The Bikkurei Yaakov offers other proofs to his thesis and concludes that if one bundles the esrog with the other species, he has fulfilled the mitzvah.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34- Highlights

1. The words brook willows refer to aravos that grow by a brook whereas a tzaftzafah grows in the mountains. (34a1)
2. Hashem desired that the Jewish People should be like an aravah that is taken from many waters but they made themselves to be like a tzaftzafah that grows in the mountains. (34a1)
3. An aravah has a red stem, a straight leaf, and its leaves are smooth, whereas a tzaftzafah has a white stem, rounded leaves and the edges of its leaves are serrated like a sickle. (34a2)
4. Rav Chisda maintained that three things had a change in name from when the Bais HaMikdash was destroyed, and they are the aravah, the shofar and the pesorsa, which is a table. The change in name of aravah and chilfa has relevance regarding the willows that are used together with the lulav. The practical difference between a shofar and chatzotzarta is regarding the shofar of Rosh Hashanah. The practical difference between pesorsa and pesora is regarding one who wishes to sell a table. Abaye maintains that a part of the stomach called the bei casei is now called huvlila and what was called huvlila is now called bei casei. The practical difference in this name change is regarding a needle that was discovered in the thick wall of the beis hakosos, the reticulum of an animal. Rava bar Yosef maintains that the place that was called Babylonia is now called Bursif and the place that was called Bursif is now called Babylonia, and the practical difference regarding these names is related to a bill of divorce. (34a2-34a3-34b1)
5. There is a dispute regarding the requirement of quantities for the taking of the four species. Rabbi Yishmael maintains that one must take three hadassim, two aravos, one lulav, and one esrog. The hadassim are valid even if two of the hadassim are clipped and there is only one hadas that is not clipped. Rabbi Tarfon, however, maintains that even if all three hadassim are clipped, they are valid. Rabbi Akiva maintains that one is only required to take one hadas and one aravah, similar to the requirement of taking one lulav and one esrog. (34b1)
6. We derive that the four species must all be taken together for one to fulfill the mitzvah, because it is said ulekachtem, and you shall take, which teaches us that it should be a lekicha tama, a complete taking. (34b2)
7. Shmuel maintained that the Halacha follows Rabbi Tarfon who rules that a clipped hadas is valid. Shmuel told the hadassim merchants that they should not raise the prices for hadassim and if they do, he would rule publicly like Rabbi Tarfon that clipped hadassim are valid. The Gemara attempts to prove from Shmuel’s threat that he ruled like Rabbi Tarfon, because otherwise Shmuel could have threatened the merchants with a ruling like Rabi Akiva, who maintains that one only requires a single hadas. The Gemara rejects this proof because although the ruling of Rabbi Akiva appears to be more lenient than that of Rabbi Tarfon, in truth the ruling of Rabbi Akiva is more stringent. The reason for this is because it is easier to find three clipped hadassim than to find one whole hadas. (34b2-34b3)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33 - Berries Growing in the Air

In the Sefer Nishmas Adam, he speculates as to what the halacha would be if any of the four species would be grown in a planter without a hole. Would we be able to use them for the mitzva? Some ask on him from our Gemora which states that if a berry grows on the hadas after it is cut from the ground, the hadas is valid even though the berry grew when the hadas was not connected to the ground. This should be analagous to growing a hadas in a planter.

The distinction seems to be obvious and Rabbi Solovetchik in his sefer says like this that here the hadas grew in the ground. The berry which grows afterwards will have the same halacha as the hadas from which it grew. The Nishmas Adam was discussing a case where the hadas did not grow from the ground at all and perhaps it is not a valid type of hadas.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33 - Chovah Vs. Mitzva

The Tur 651 writes that even though we hold that the lulav is not required to be tied to the hadasim and arovos, nevertheless it is a mitzva to do so because it would appear nicer. He cites Rashi that there is an obligation to do so because of the possuk zeh keli v'anvehu. The Beis Yosef comments that our Rashi does not say that there is an obligation, rather it is a mitzva to do so and the explanation can be like the Tur that it is because of beauty.

It would seem from the way the Beis Yosef is discussing the Tur that that the Tur is making a distinction between the word 'chovah' and 'mitzva.' Chovah is more of an obligation and mitzva in this context would connote a nice thing to do.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33 - Highlights

1. The Mishnah rules that if the top of a hadas was cut off, it is invalid. Ulla learned that if a bud grows at the top of the hadas, it is valid. Rabbi Yirmiyah queried regarding a case where the top of the hadas was cut off prior to the festival and a bud grew on the hadas on the festival. The query was, do we say that once a mitzvah was rejected, i.e. the hadas was unfit from the onset of the festival, the hadas will remain rejected permanently, or do we say that that it is only a temporary rejection. This query is based on the principle of dichui, rejection, regarding sacrifices, i.e. an animal was slaughtered for an offering and subsequently one could not offer the animal for whatever reason. Since the animal was rejected as an offering, it can no longer be offered, so the question here is whether this principle will also apply to a mitzvah. The Gemara does not resolve the question. (33a1-33a2)
2. The Mishnah ruled that if there are more berries than leaves on a hadas, the hadas is invalid. Rav Chisda initially qualified this ruling to be referring to a case where the berries are in one place. If, however, the berries are spread out on the hadas in two or three places, it will be valid. Rava challenged Rav Chisda, and the Gemara revised Rav Chisda’s statement, stating that Rav Chisda learned that black berries will invalidate the hadas but if the berries are green and are the same color as the leaves, the hadas will be valid. Rav Pappa ruled that red berries are similar to black berries and red berries will thus also invalidate the hadas. (33a4-33b1)
3. The Mishnah ruled that if there are more berries than leaves on a hadas, the hadas is invalid. One is permitted to validate the hadas by removing the berries but one cannot remove the berries on the festival. There is a dispute between Tanaaim if the hadas will be valid if one removes the berries from a hadas on the festival. The Gemara offers several approaches to explain this dispute. (33b2-33b3)
4. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that one is permitted to remove the berries on the festival. The Gemara qualifies this ruling to be referring to a case where he plucked the berries with the intention of eating them. Rabbi Eliezer permits this because he rules in accordance with the opinion of his father Rabbi Shimon who maintains that one is permitted to perform a permitted act although he may unintentionally perform a forbidden act in the process. An example of this is when one drags a chair across the dirt on Shabbos where he may make a furrow in the ground. His intention is to move the chair and not to cerate the furrow, so even though he is aware that he may cerate a furrow, Rabbi Shimon maintains that this is permitted. The Gemara questions this because even Rabbi Shimon agrees that if the prohibition will inevitably occur, it is forbidden to perform the permitted act. The Gemara answers that we are referring to a case where the person has another hadas and when he plucks the berries from this hadas, he does not care whether the hadas is valid. Thus, we do not deem the plucking of the berries to be a repair and he has not committed a prohibited act at all. (33b2-33b3)
5. The Mishna rules that a stolen or dry aravah is invalid. An aravah used for idolatry is also invalid. If the top of the aravah was cut off, its leaves were torn or if it is a tzaftzafah, a willow with rounded leaves, it is invalid. If the aravah was withered, some of its leaves fell off, or if the aravah grew from a field and not near a stream, the aravah will be valid. (33b3-33b4)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33- Humble in a group

The Gemara states that Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one is required to bundle the lulav with the other species, and he derives this ruling from a gezeirah shavah of taking, taking, from the case of the bundle of eizov, hyssop, that the Jews took prior to departing from Egypt. That verse estates and you shall take a bundle of eizov. We can interpret the verse homiletically to mean that if one desires to be a part of the bundle, i.e. the group, he should humble himself like the hyssop, which is a low branch.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33 - Letters on the Side of a Book on Shabbos

The Mishna ruled that if there are more berries than leaves on the hadas, it is invalid. One can remove the berries before the festival but one is forbidden to remove the berries on the festival. The reason for this ruling is because removing the berries is deemed to be repairing the hadas, and one is prohibited from repairing a utensil on the festival. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it would be permitted to remove the berries on the festival. The Gemara qualifies this ruling to be referring to a case where he plucked the berries with the intention of eating them. Rabbi Eliezer permits this because he rules in accordance with the opinion of his father Rabbi Shimon who maintains that one is permitted to perform a permitted act although he may unintentionally perform a forbidden act in the process. An example of this is when one drags a chair across the dirt on Shabbos where he may make a furrow in the ground. His intention is to move the chair and not to cerate the furrow, so even though he is aware that he may cerate a furrow, Rabbi Shimon maintains that this is permitted. The Gemara questions this because even Rabbi Shimon agrees that if the prohibition will inevitably occur, it is forbidden to perform the permitted act. The Gemara answers that we are referring to a case where the person has another hadas and when he plucks the berries from this hadas, he does not care whether the hadas is valid. Thus, we do not deem the plucking of the berries to be a repair and he has not committed a prohibited act at all.Tosfos explains that the answer of the Gemara is predicated on the principle of melacha sheaina tzricha legufa, an act that was not performed for a defined purpose. Normally we say that it is rabbinically prohibited to perform an act where one does not desire the forbidden outcome. However, when there is a mitzvah involved, one is permitted to perform the act outright. [Tosfos seems to maintain that the person plucking the berries has intention for the mitzvah.] Teshuvos Imrei Yosher rules based on the words of Tosfos that one would be permitted to study on Shabbos from a sefer that has letters and words on the side of the pages. This would be permitted even though when he turns the pages he is in effect forming or erasing words. The reason for this ruling is because when one is preoccupied with a mitzvah, the Chachamim were not concerned with the prohibited act that will result if the result is unintended and undesired. The Mishna Berura rules that one can even read from a book with letters on the side even if he is not engaged in Torah study. The reason for this ruling is because one is not deemed to be writing or erasing as the pages of the book are meant to be turned. This would be analogous to opening and closing a door which would not be deemed building or destruction because a door is meant to be opened and closed.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33 - Appeasement

If the top of a hadas leaf is cut off, it is disqualified. Ula learned that if a fruit grows in its place, it is kosher. Rabbi Yirmiah posed a shaila as to what would be the halacha if the top was cut off from before Yom Tov and the fruit grew on Yom Tov. Is there a concept that once the hadas was disqualified on Yom Tov, it cannot be revived and become kosher because once it is pushed away from the mitzva it remains in that state or do we say that now it is valid? There is the principle of dichuy by korbanos where once a korban is deemed to be invalid, it cannot become qualified to be used as a korban later. Do we compare mitzvos to korbanos? This question remains unresolved.

The Pnei Yehoshua writes that this p'sul can only be Rabbinic in nature for we have a principle throughout Shas that we cannot learn from kodshim to chulin.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B'halacha speculates that perhaps this concept will only apply by mitzvos whose purpose is appeasement and to bring about ritzuy, similar to korbanos, however other mitzvos, it would not apply. This is why Rabbi Yirmiah contemplates that dichuy should apply by the mitzva of the arbah minim which is similar to korbanos that it comprises a concept of appeasement.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 32 - Requirement for Shofar and Lulav to be a Tefach

The Gemora states that the spine of the lulav must be one tefach higher than where the hadassim end. The Gemora Niddah lists five things where the measurement is a tefach. Included in the listing is the third wall of a sukkah, the size of a shofar and the tefach of the lulav. Seemingly, the measurement for the lulav and shofar would be required Biblically just as the third wall of a sukkah must be at least a tefach and that was learned from a halacha l'Moshe misinai.

It is interesting to note that the L'vush 650 writes that the measurements of the height of the lulav, hadassim and arovos are all biblical in nature as they are halacha l'Moshe misinai, however the requirement for the shofar to be at least a tefach is only Rabbinic in nature.

Reb Meir Arik in Tal Torah asks on the L'vush as to where is the source to distinguish between the shofar and the lulav? From the Gemora in Niddah, it would seem that they are both Biblically required?

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 32 - Himnik

Rav Papa states that the Mishna which rules that a lulav which is cracked is disqualified is referring to a case where it split and the two leaves are going in opposite directions. This is called a 'himnek' and Rashi explains that it is similar to a scribe's quill. The Rambam rules that it is invalid if the two parts of the leaf are dstanced from each other to such a degree that they appear like two separate leaves. The Reoh states that the leaf is opened a lot.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B'halacha states that the bochurim from Yeshiva who ask him about lulavim, showing him that there is a split on the top and they inquire if the lulav is disqualified because of being a himnik. He rules since it can only be seen after gazing at the top of the lulav for a long time and the leaves are only separated a fraction from each other, this is not what the Gemora had in mind and therefore it is a valid lulav.

There is no picture in that sefer, however the poskim do not rule like him and the defining factor seems to be if the leaves are heading in two opposite directions. Make sure you bring your lulav to a Rav for an individual ruling.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 31 - 36 Esrog Video!!!

Please see here for a demonstration as to how to look for an esrog. Most of you may have picked one out already, but it's a great video on the subject and the points will stay with you for next year iy"H. Once again, we thank Rabbi Mordechai Kornfeld and his entire staff for doing such a gevaldeke job at disseminating Torah.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 31 - Highlights

1. There is a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Chachamim regarding a stolen Sukkah and regarding one who constructs his Sukkah in a public domain. The dispute is predicated on a dispute as to whether one can fulfill the mitzvah of Sukkah in a Sukkah that is not his. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of Sukkah in a Sukkah that is not his and for this reason a stolen Sukkah is invalid. (31a1)
2. The Gemara relates a story that a certain elderly woman went to Rav Nachman and claimed that the Reish Galusa and all the Chachamim were sitting in a stolen Sukkah. Her claim was that the servants of the Reish Galusa stole wood from her and used it to build their Sukkah. Rav Nachman, however, did not pay attention to her claim. The woman persisted with her claim and she said that a woman whose father had three hundred and eighteen servants is screaming before you and you refuse to listen to her. Rav Nachman told his students that the woman did not have a valid claim as once the Sukkah is constructed with stolen wood, the wood does not to be returned. This is based on a rabbinic decree referred to as takanas hashavim, the decree for the returnees, and therefore the Sukkah is deemed to be valid. This decree was enacted so that thieves would be inspired to repent their ways. If a thief was compelled to demolish his structure to return the stolen property, he would not seek to repent. (31a2)
3. There is a dispute in the Gemara if a lulav is required to be hadar, beautiful in its halachic requirements, similar to an esrog, or perhaps a lulav does not have this requirement. (31a)
4. One is not allowed to add a fifth specie to the four species and one is prohibited from taking less than four species. One cannot substitute any of the four species from those that are listed in the Torah, and this is true even if one the species are not available. (31a3-31b1)
5. One cannot use a lulav that is from an asheirah tree from the times of Moshe. The reason for this ruling is because an asheirah must be burned and the asheirah is deemed to have been burned already and subsequently the lulav from the asheirah tree does not have the requisite measurements for a lulav to be considered valid. (31b2-31b3)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 31 - An Old Woman Raving and Avrohom's 318 Servants

The Gemora relates a story that a certain old woman went to Rav Nachman and claimed that the Reish Gilusa and all the chachamim are sitting in a stolen sukkah. Her claim was that the servants of the Reish Galusa stole wood from her and used it for the s'chach on their sukkah. Rav Nachman paid no attention to her claim. She persisted and said that a woman whose father had 318 servants and you refuse to listen to her. Rav Nachman responded that there is no valid claim here for once the sukkah is constructed with stolen wood, the wood does not to be returned based on a Rabbibic decree and therefore the sukkah is deemed to be valid. This decree was issued in order to inspire the thiefs to repent. If they would be compelled to deconstruct their building to return the stolen property, they would not repent.

Rashi explains that the woman was referring to Avrohom Avinu and his 318 servants. The commentators offer various explanations as to what was the meaning in this woman's words and the analogy to Avrohom's servants.

The Chasam Sofer cites the Gemora in Chulin 89a which states how harsh stealing is and proves this from the servants of Avrohom who stole from Sdom and Avrohom could not return that which they stole. The old woman thought that the Rabbinic decree of not returning stolen objects which are used in the construction of a building would only apply when there are many stolen objects and it would be very cumbersome to deconstruct the building to return those beams, however when the stolen wood is few in number and only being used for s'chach, perhaps the decree does not apply and the sukkah should be disqualified. Rav Nachman finally responded and ruled that the decree applies in all cases. Whenever wood is stolen and subsequently used in a building, whether it's a lot of wood or few and whether it's a mansion or a sukkah, the thief acquires the wood and owes money instead.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 31 - Stolen S'chach

If one steals wood and uses it for s'chach, it is valid. One of the reasons for this is because the thief dos not have to return the wood, rather the value of the wood. thisis because there was an injunction issued on anyone who steals something and uses it as part of his house or building that he acquires it and he only owes the original owner the value of the stolen object. The sages were concerned that otherwise (if he would have to return that particular beam) the robbers would not repent and return that which they stole.

A question is asked on our Gemora. Biblically, one does not acquire the stolen object - it is only a Rabbinic decree that the wood does now belong to the theif. If so, how can the robber fulfill his Biblical obligation with something that is not Biblically his?

The Shar Hamelech equates this case with a Gemora in Bava Basra 47b that states if one forces someone to sell something, the sale is considered final and deemed valid. Over here where one is obligated to listen to the Sages, it is as if the thief purchased the wood from the owner and now owes him money for it. It is a completely valid sale even Biblically and hence he will fulfill the obligation of sukkah with that s'chach.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 30 - Highlights

1. One cannot use a stolen lulav even on the second day of Sukkos because it is a mitzvah that is brought about through the violation of a negative prohibition and is thus invalid. There would be no distinction whether the owner despaired of recovering the lulav or not, because even if the owner despaired of recovering the lulav, the mitzvah is invalid because it was brought about through the violation of a prohibition. (29b4-30a1)
2. Rabbi Yitzchok maintains that just like one could fulfill his obligation with a borrowed lulav on the second day, he can also fulfill the mitzvah with a stolen lulav. (30a2)
3. Rav Huna told the merchants who purchased hadassim, myrtle branches, from gentiles that they should ensure that the gentiles cut the branches and give the branches to the merchants. Rav Huna did this because he was concerned that the gentiles had stolen the land from a Jew and land cannot be deemed stolen. This means that even if the original owner of the land despairs of recovering the property, the thief is not considered to be the owner and the original owner retains ownership of the land. Rav Huna intended that the gentiles should cut the branches and give the branches to the merchants so the abandonment of the owner regarding the produce would occur while the branches were in the hands of the gentiles, and there would be a change of ownership when the merchants received the branches. This procedure would thus allow the merchants to acquire the branches in accordance with the principles regarding acquisition of stolen objects. (30a2-30b1)
4. There is a principle that allows a thief to acquire stolen property if there is a physical change in the stolen object. The Gemara asks that since according to one opinion, one is required to tie the lulav together with the other two species, the tying should constitute a physical change and thus the merchants should be permitted to acquire the hadassim in this manner. The Gemara answers that Rav Huna follows the opinion that maintains that the lulav does not have to be tied with the other species and therefore no physical change occurs to the hadassim. Alternatively, even if Rav Huna requires the lulav to be tied with the other species, this tying is not deemed to be a change because the change can be reversed and the rule is that a change that can be reversed and the object will revert to its original form is not deemed to be a change. (30b1-30b2)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 30 - Mitzvah performance with more intention

The Gemara discusses the concept of a mitzvah that is brought about through one who violates a prohibition. The Rishonim explain that this principle only applies when the mitzvah cannot be performed unless one violates the prohibition. This principle teaches us a profound lesson regarding mitzvah performance. Very often we catch ourselves performing mitzvos by rote and we attempt to understand how this could have happened. The Gemara informs us that a mitzvah should be a conscientious effort, not just a mere performance of a daily ritual. If one can invalidate a mitzvah by performing it through a transgression, certainly one can enhance a mitzvah by performing it with the proper intention. We have been taught that HaShem rewards one for performing a positive action five hundred times more than for performing a negative action. If we would just improve our mitzvah performance even slightly, we would already be the beneficiaries of a great reward.

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Lekavod Yom HaKadosh G'mar Chasima Tova

The Day of Yom Kippur is upon us, and it is worth examining the essence of the day, so we can enter into this Holy Day in the proper frame of mind. Yom Kippur literally means the Day of Atonement. We will be receiving atonement for our sins that we have committed throughout the year. Yet, one must wonder what would happen if he did not receive atonement. The Gemara tells us that as long as one repents, Yom Kippur will serve as atonement for his sins. Apparently, it is not merely a day of atonement. It is a day of atonement predicated on repentance. Furthermore, there are many Jews who on the surface do not appear to repent, yet they live out the following year in peace. How is this possible? In the preamble to Kol Nidrei that we recite on Yom Kippur eve, we recite a very enigmatic declaration. The words we recite are: with the knowledge of the congregation, and with the knowledge of the Omnipresent, we are permitted to pray with the transgressors. This permit begs for an explanation. The Gemara teaches us that the ketores was comprised of eleven spices, and one of them was called the chelbanah, galbanum. This particular spice had a very foul odor, yet was included in the spices of the ketores, which was the most cherished of all services that were performed in the Bais HaMikdash. The Gemara teaches us that from here we derive the ruling that we include the wanton sinners of Israel in our fast days. Why is the ketores the object of this teaching? When Yaakov came before his father Yitzchak to receive the blessings, it is said and he smelled the fragrance of his clothing, and he blessed him. The Gemara states that the word for clothing, begadav, can be interpreted homiletically to mean bogdodv, his rebellious ones. The Gemara states that even the wanton sinners of Israel emit a wonderful fragrance. Thus, at the onset of Jewish history, the wicked were already incorporated into the blessings of the righteous. When one begins to understand the theme of Yom Kippur, it will become very clear why even the wicked of Israel are granted atonement. We can adopt the approach that our preamble refers to the wicked that do not even come to synagogue to pray on Yom Kippur, but then we will be left wondering how they earn atonement. It would be more plausible to assume that even amongst the worshipers on Yom Kippur there are those who may have not yet repented from their sins, and it is regarding those Jews who we address the declaration that we are permitted to pray with the wanton sinners. The Gemara tells us that even a Jew who sinned is still considered a Jew. If every Jew is always considered a Jew, then every Jew can gain atonement on Yom Kippur. This is accomplished by every Jew in the synagogue accepting upon himself responsibility for every Jew. Even those who emit a foul odor, and even those who rebel against HaShem, are still incorporated into the Yom Kippur service. A wanton sinner can receive the blessing of the righteous, as long as he is connected to the greater body of Israel. Let us enter into this Yom Kippur with the knowledge that we are functioning as the Kohen Gadol in the Bais HaMikdash, who sought atonement for the sins of all of Israel. When we bear this weighty responsibility in mind, we will surely be focused on the holiness of the day, and HaShem will once again declare the word salachti, I forgive. HaShem should grant us all a G’mar Chasima Tova.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 30 - Sukkah in a Public Domain

The Magen Avraham in Orach Chaim 637:3 discusses whether it is permitted for one to construct a Sukkah in a public domain without permission. The Magen Avraham writes that such a Sukkah may be deemed a stolen Sukkah and will be invalid. One cannot say that the local population forgo their rights to the land because the entire populace, including gentiles, have a share in the land. The Magen Avraham quotes Rashi on Daf 30 who implies that the only concern of a stolen Sukkah is regarding stealing from a Jew but not when stealing from a gentile. Although one is normally forbidden to steal from a gentile, if one steals from a gentile it is not considered a mitzvah that was brought about through a transgression. The Magen Avraham also quotes the Yerayim who posits the exact opposite approach. The Yerayim maintains that even according to the opinion that maintains that stealing from a gentile is permitted, the stolen object does not belong to the Jew. The Magen Avraham concludes his ruling based on the opinions of the Rashba and the Bais Yosef that one cannot construct a Sukkah in a public domain and if one went and constructed the Sukkah anyway, the Sukkah is invalid and one who recites a blessing in such a Sukkah is reciting the Name of Hashem in vain.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 29 - Highlights

1. One should not bring large serving pots into the Sukkah unless the pots will be used during the meal. The Mishna Berura writes that according to some opinions these pots should not be brought into the Sukkah even during the meal. One can, however, bring small pots into the Sukkah. One should remove plates and pans from the Sukkah after the meal has ended so as not to belittle the sanctity of the Sukkah. One can, however, leave drinking cups inside the Sukkah. (29a1)
2. One may leave a lamp inside the Sukkah, unless the Sukkah is so small that there will be a concern that that the walls of the Sukkah will catch fire from the heat of the lamp. (29a1)
3. One who is sitting in the Sukkah can leave the Sukkah if it begins to rain, provided that the rain is coming down hard enough to spoil his food. The Rema rules that the amount of rain that is required to allow one to exit his Sukkah is the same amount of rain that would cause a person to exit his house if he had a leak in his roof. (29a1)
4. If one was eating or sleeping in the Sukkah and it began to rain and he exited the Sukkah, he does not need to return to the Sukkah even if the rain ceased. The reason for this ruling is because it is considered distress for one to have to return to the Sukkah. One who insists on eating in the Sukkah while it is raining is deemed to be a hedyot, a commoner, and he does not earn reward for the mitzvah. (29a1-29a2)
5. The Mishna rules that all four species, i.e. lulav, esrog, hadas, and aravah are invalid if they are stolen, regardless of whether the owner had despaired from having the item retuned to him. (29b3)
6. If the spine or the majority of a Lulav’s leaves became dried out, the lulav is invalid. A lulav is deemed to be dry when instead of being a natural green, it turned white. (29b3)

Thank you to Rabbi Jay Spero for providing us with the highlights http://jbuff.com/daf_yomi_halacha.htm

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 29 - Alive and praising HaShem

The Mishnah states that a dry lulav is invalid, and the Gemara explains that the reason why it is invalid is because the Torah requires that the four species be hadar, beautiful, and a dry lulav is not beautiful. The Yerushalmi states that the reason why a dry lulav is invalid is because it is said (Tehillim 115:17) the dead cannot praise HaShem. What is the connection between the four species and praising HaShem? It is said (Ibid 96:12-13) the field and everything in it will exult; then all the trees of the forest will sing with joy. Before HaShem, for He will have arrived, He will have arrived to judge the earth. The Medrash states that these verses allude to the idea that after the judgment of Rosh HaShanah and Yom Kippur, one takes the trees of the forest, i.e. the lulav. It is said that the trees of the forest will sing with joy, and this alludes to the idea that the lulav is used to praise HaShem. Additionally, Rabbeinu Bachye (Vayikra 23:40) writes that the four species are fresh and alive, and the Torah and its recipients are alive, and we take the four species that have life and we praise HaShem, Who is referred to as the Living G-d.

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Daf Yomi -Sukkah 28 - Highlights

1. One should not sleep in a study hall. (28a1)
2. One should be careful not to speak unnecessary words in a study hall. (28a1)
3. One should not speak or even entertain thoughts of Torah in an unclean place i.e. near a garbage dump or near refuse. (28a1)
4. One should commence the Pesach Seder as soon as possible so that the children will remain awake and interested. One must even exit the study hall early on Ever Pesach so that he can commence the Seder on time. (28a1)
5. The Mishna cites a dispute between Bais Shammai and Beis Hillel regarding the minimum dimensions that are required for the Sukkah to be valid. Bais Shammai maintains that the Sukkah must be large enough to accommodate ones head, most of his body and his table. Bais Hillel maintains that it is sufficient even if the Sukkah cannot accommodate the table. Bais Hillel and Bais Shammai also disagree regarding a large Sukkah that is adjacent to a house and the table is inside the house. Bais Shammai maintains that one does not fulfill his mitzvah in this manner as we are concerned that he will be drawn after his table that is in the house and Bais Hillel disagrees. (28a3)
6. Women, slaves and children are exempt from the mitzva of Sukkah. (28a3)
7. Throughout the seven days of Sukkos, one makes his house a temporary dwelling place and his Sukkah a permanent dwelling place. The Aruch HaShulchan writes that one who wishes to speak with his friend onSukkos should do so inside the Sukkah. (28b2)
8. One should endeavor to study Torah in the Sukkah unless it is more conducive to his studies to learn in the house. (28b3)

Thank you to Rabbi Jay Spero for providing us with the highlights http://jbuff.com/daf_yomi_halacha.htm

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 29 - Four Species and Hashem's Name

Rashi writes that a dry lulav is invalid because the mitzvah must be mehuderes, performed with a beautiful object, as it is said this is my G-d and I shall beautify Him, and we learn from this verse that one should beautify himself before HaShem when fulfilling a mitzvah. Tosfos questions the words of Rashi from the Gemara earlier on Daf 11b that states that the mitzvah of glorifying a mitzvah is only a Halacha l’chatchila, preferable, but the mitzvah is not invalidated if one uses an object that is not beautiful for a mitzvah. The Gemara there states that it is preferable to tie the lulav with the hadassim and the aravos. If one does not tie the lulav with the other species, however, he has still fulfilled the mitzvah. Rav Aharon Yosef Weingarten in the Sefer HaYovel L’Chasam Sofer suggests an answer to resolve the question of Tosfos on Rashi. The Gemara in Gittin Daf 20 states that if one wrote the name of Hashem in a Sefer Torah without the proper sanctity, it is invalid. The Gemara explains that the reason for this is because of the verse that states this is my G-d and I shall beautify Him. The Bais Yosef in Orach Chaim 651 rules that one must join the esrog with the lulav in order to fulfill the mitzvah. The Bais Yosef cites the Rikanti who claimed that this secret was revealed to him in a dream. On the first night of Sukkos, a Chasid by the name of Rabbi Yitzchak appeared to the Rikanti and the Rikanti noticed that Rabbi Yitzchak was writing the Name of Hashem, but Rabbi Yitzchak wrote the letter hey separate from the first three letters. The Rikanti told him that this was incorrect and Rabbi Yitzchak responded that this is what is being done in the community of the Rikanti. The Rikanti protested and wrote the name of Hashem correctly. The Rikanti did not comprehend the meaning of the dream until the following morning when he observed the people in his community holding the esrog distant from the lulav. The Rikanti recalled the Medrash in Parashas Emor that states that the four species allude to the Name of HaShem. Just like the Name of HaShem must be written with all the letters adjacent to each other, the four species must also all be held together. This, then, could be the possible explanation for the opinion of Rashi. A dry lulav will be invalid ex post facto because it is lacking in the mitzvah of this is my G-d and I shall beautify Him, as the mitzvah of lulav is akin to writing the Name of HaShem. This approach is also found in the Sefer Shaarei Orah from Rav Meir Bergman.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 28 - To be as great as Moshe Rabbeinu

The Gemara states that Hillel had many great students, thirty of whom were worthy that the Divine Presence should rest on them like it did on Moshe our teacher. The Rashbam in Bava Basra 134a writes that the reason they did not have the Divine Presence rest on them was due to the sins of the generation. We find in a few instances in the Gemara that one Amora referred to another Amora by the name Moshe, which implies that that Amora was comparable to Moshe in his generation. The Rambam writes (Hilchos Teshuvah 5:2) that anyone amongst the Jewish People has the potential to be as righteous as Moshe Rabbeinu. This is a sobering thought. Even in our generation, which is considered by many to be the lowest generation ever, one can strive to be as great as Moshe Rabbeinu. The Aruch writes that the Gemara in Sanhedrin states that animals do not have the concept of marriage. Nonetheless, the Torah accorded the animals in the times of Noach who did not cohabitate with other species the status of being married. Rabbi Yaakov Galinsky Shlita said that this teaches us that someone in our generation who does not become influenced by the outside world could be as great as Rabbi Akiva Eiger in his generation. Let us take this lesson to heart during the High Holidays, as we each strive to become the best that we possibly can, and our efforts should lead us to inspire all those around us.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 27- Lekavod Shabbos

The Gemara states that Rabbi Yitzchak said that one is obligated to visit his teacher during the festival. This is derived from the verse that states why are you going to him today? It is neither a New Moon nor a Shabbos! This verse was said regarding the woman from Shuneim, who Elisha had blessed with a child and then the child became ill and died. When the woman told her husband that she was returning to Elisha to inform him of the child’s demise, her husband, unaware of what had occurred, inquired why she was going to Elisha. The Gemara states that the verse implies that on the New Moon and on Shabbos one is obligated to visit his teacher. It would seem that the reason for this obligation is because the Zohar states that a Torah scholar is in the category of Shabbos. If one wishes to truly experience the Shabbos, he should visit his teacher on the Shabbos. The Arizal writes that the essential obligation of one visiting his teacher is on Shabbos, because that is when a person has a neshama yeseira, an extra soul, for the whole Shabbos.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 28 - Heoros by Reb Dave (just trying)

28a – it is interesting that the Gemara elaborates at length to describe the greatness of Rav Yochanan, while it gives relatively short shrift to Ravb Yonason, who was greater. That idea is reflected in the notion that great men and greatness do not need advertisements for themselves. Greatness speaks for itself



28a – The Gemara states that Yonasan Ben Uziel was the greatest disciple of Hillel, and this is evident from the fact that when Yonasan sat and studied Torah, a bird that flew over him was immediately burned. The commentators explain this to mean that the moment a foreign idea entered Yonasan’s mind, he immediately vanquished the thought. Thus, a bird is an allegory for a thought or a communication. There are many instances throughout Scripture and the Talmud where we find that a bird is a metaphor for this idea. In the Book of Koheles (10:20) we find the expression for a bird of the skies may carry the sound, and some winged creature may betray the matter. We find further in the Gemara Brachos 3a the expression of a dove whimpering like a heavenly voice. The Gemara in Gittin 45a records an incident of a man who was familiar with the speech of birds. The Gemara in Sota 31a states that we can derive testimony from a flying bird. A related idea to this can also be found in Chullin 124b.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 27 - Arovos Less than a Nickel

The Minchas Chinuch (325) quotes Rashi that whenever a mitzva mandates לכם - it has to be yours, if one owns less than a שוה פרוטה, it is also lacking לכם. He asks that according to that, how will people fulfill the mitzva of ערבה on Sukkos when each stem is valued as less than a שוה פרוטה? (Tell that to our Esrog dealers!!!!) It is answered that Rashi did not intend to say that something can't be yours if you own in it less than a שוה פרוטה. Rashi holds that to be considered a partner with others, you must possess at least a פרוטה. This is evident from a Ritva in Avoda Zara and in Sefer Tal Torah.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 27 - Going to the Rebbe on Yom Tov

A question is asked as to why it is not brought down in Shulchan Aruch the halacha of visiting one's Rebbe on a Yom Tov? The Noda Beyahuda answers that this was only in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh when there was a mitzva of aliyah l'regel, however after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh, the mitzva of going to your Rebbealso became batel. He explains that the Sages did not want that the honor of the student (Talmid chochom) should be greater than that of the Rav (Shechina).

A question that is asked on the Noda Beyehuda is from our Gemora and other Gemora's where we see that they went to the Reish Gilusa on Yom Tov and Rashi states it was to fulfill the mitzva of going to a Rebbe on Yom Tov. There was no Beis Hamikdosh then and still they went?

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 26 - No more night

The Gemara states that the sleep of Dovid HaMelech was as long as a horse, and a horse’s nap is sixty respirations. The Zohar states that Dovid did not wish to sleep more than sixty respirations, because sleep is one sixtieth of death, and Dovid did not wish to taste death. Rabbi Yonasan Eibschutz writes in Ya’aros Devash that the Medrash states that when the angels observed Adam HaRishon, they wished to declare on him kadosh, the Holy One i.e. that he was g-dly and thus eternal. For this reason HaShem cast a slumber on Adam, to demonstrate to the angels that Adam was mortal and would eventually die. Nonetheless, had Adam not sinned by eating from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad, he would have lived forever. For this reason, writes Reb Yonasan, in the future there will only be day and no night, because the purpose of night in this world is for sleep, and in the future the righteous will not experience death,. Since sleep is one sixtieth of death, in the future there will be no need for night.

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Dozing with Tefillin

The Gemara cites an opinion that one is permitted to casually sleep while he is wearing his Tefillin. The Rosh asks on this from the Halacha that one is not allowed to divert his attention away from his Tefillin? He answers by quoting a Rabbeinu Yona that states it is considered diverting attention only when one acts with frivolity and lightheadedness. However, standing with trepidation in front of Hashem or being preoccupied with other things is not deemed to be hesech hada’as. The Shagas Aryeh states that this is not the opinion of the Rambam because he rules that one who is under duress is exempt from donning Tefillin because when one is wearing Tefillin he cannot divert his attention away from the Tefillin. He is not acting with frivolity and nevertheless the Rambam rules that this is considered hesech hada’as.Reb Itzele Peterberger in Pri Yitzchok offers the following answer based on ruling of the Magen Avrohom 308:11. According to the opinion that Shabbos is not the time for Tefillin if one dons Tefillin on Shabbos, he does not have to. The explanation for this is that the obligation is only to avoid diverting his attention away from the Tefillin only at the time the person is fulfilling the mitzvah of Tefillin. However, on Shabbos where he is not fulfilling any mitzvah there is no obligation to because there is no prohibition of hesech hada’as.The Gemara in Eruvin 95 state that if one does not have intention to fulfill the mitzvah of Tefillin he does not fulfill the mitzvah of wearing Tefillin according to the opinion that mitzvos require intention. When a person is sleeping and he is obviously not have any intention in fulfilling the mitzvah at this time he will not be fulfilling any mitzvah even according to the opinion that mitzvos do not require attention. Since he is not fulfilling any mitzvah at the time, there will be no prohibition of hesech hada’as.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 26 - Highlights

1. A bridegroom and all the members of his party are exempt from the mitzvah of Tefillah and Tefillin, but they are obligated in reciting Shema. It is said in the name of Rabbi Shila that the bridegroom is exempt from reciting Shema but the members of the bridegroom’s party are obligated in reciting Shema. (25b4-26a1)
2. Scribes of Torah scrolls, Tefillin and mezuzos, along with the merchants and merchants’ merchants, including those who sell tzitzis, are exempt from reciting Shema, from Tefillah and from Tefillin and all other mitzvos. This ruling is based on the principle that one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from performing other mitzvos. (26a1)
3. One who is traveling on the road is exempt from the mitzvah of Sukkah at the time that he is traveling. One is who traveling for the purpose of a mitzvah is exempt even when he is not traveling because he is constantly preoccupied with the fulfillment of the mitzvah. (26a1)
4. The Gemara rules that a sick person is exempt from the mitzvah of Sukkah even if his life is not endangered. The reason for this ruling is because one who is under duress is exempt from dwelling in a Sukkah as the mitzvah of Sukkah is to dwell in a Sukkah in the same manner as one would dwell in his house. (26a3)
5. One is allowed to eat a snack outside of the Sukkah but he is not allowed to nap outside of the Sukkah. The reason why he cannot even nap outside of the Sukkah is because we are concerned that he will fall into a deep sleep. (26a3-26a4)
6. The Gemara discusses the time frame of napping and this is relevant to halachos regarding Tefillin where there are opinions that one can nap even while wearing his Tefillin.(26a4-26a5-26b1)The Mishna states that if one eats food that is less than the size of an egg, he is not obligated to sit in the Sukkah. The Mishna relates an incident where they brought in front of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai and Rabban Gamliel food to taste and they would not taste the food until it was brought into the Sukkah. The Gemara explains that this story indicates that if one wants to be stringent on himself and eat even a snack inside the Sukkah, he is permitted to do so. (26b2-26b3)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 26 - Quoted from the Mishna

The Mishna states that if one eats food that measures less than the size of an egg, he is not obligated to sit in the Sukkah. The Mishna relates an incident where they brought in front of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai and Rabban Gamliel food to taste and they would not taste the food until it was brought into the Sukkah. The Gemara explains that this story indicates that if one wants to be stringent on himself and eat even a snack inside the Sukkah, he is permitted to do so. The Gemara in Yoma 79 cites this Mishna and concludes the citation by stating that the reason that the rabbis ate in the Sukkah was not because the Halacha is like that. Rather, it was because the rabbis wanted to be strict on themselves. The Oneg Yom Tov writes that from the text of the Gemara it would seem that the conclusion is part of the Mishna when in fact, it is an addition of the Gemara. The Oneg Yom Tov writes that this is a rule throughout the Talmud that when a Gemara qualifies a statement of the Mishna, the Mishna can be quoted with the addition of the Gemara as if the addition of the Gemara is part of the Mishna. It is noteworthy that Tosfos in Yoma expresses the same idea as mentioned by the Oneg Yom Tov. Reb Yeshaya Pik in his glosses to the Gemara in Yoma notes that it would seem from the words of Tosfos that Tosfos did not have the same version of the Gemara that we have. Our text explicitly states the words vetoni aloh, and a Baraisa taught concerning this Mishnah. According to our version of the Gemara, there would be no proof to the concept expressed by Tosfos and the Oneg Yom Tov.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 26 - Frummies

The Mishna states that if one eats food that measures less than the size of an egg, he is not obligated to sit in the Sukkah. The Mishna relates an incident where they brought in front of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai and Rabban Gamliel food to taste and they would not taste the food until it was brought into the Sukkah. The Gemara explains that this story indicates that if one wants to be stringent on himself and eat even a snack inside the Sukkah, he is permitted to do so. Mahretz Chayus raises a difficulty with this Gemara from the ruling of the Rema in Orach Chaim 639 who rules that one who is exempt from Sukkah and nevertheless sits in the Sukkah is referred to as a hedyot, a commoner. It seems from the words of the Rema that acting in a stricter manner is not viewed favorably. The Mahretz Chayus answers that the reason one should not be overly strict with regard to himself is so he should not appear haughty. Thus, every situation must be judged individually. Regarding the case of the Gemara where one eats a snack inside the Sukkah, people will say that he is eating a little now but he intends to eat more at a later time and for that reason he is sitting in the Sukkah. Regarding one who sits in the Sukkah while it is raining, however, there is no room to justify his actions and therefore doing so is frowned upon.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 26 - Heoros by David

26a – the Gemara says “the guarantor himself needs a guarantor”. This phrase is repeated in Gittin 28b, and there Rav Reuven Margolios notes that the Rambam attributes this phrase to be an Arabic expression, and did note that the Gemara itself says the same thing.

26a – “he placed his head between his knees”. This was a common position which the early kabbalists used for meditation. See the many books by R’ Aryeh Kaplan z’l on the subject. My own speculation is that it is reminiscent of the fetal position, the same position a baby is in when he learns the entire Torah through an angel, as recorded in Niddah.

26a – Rashi q.v. “holchei derachim”. etc. I think this Rashi implies that there is no problem with working on Cholo shel moed. However, Reb Tzvi Berkowitz shlita does not believe one can draw this inference from this Rashi, and directed my attention to Rashi in Chagigah 18a, which holds explicitly to the contrary.

26a – Rashi q.v. “portzah” – its worthwhile to note that the common word “hedyot” is simply a transliteration of the Greek word “idiot”. It’s original connation simply meant “commoner”, and it’s meaning has since changed. ( Similar to the way word “vulgar” and the Yiddish word “prost” now mean much worse than simply “common”, which was their original meaning).

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Eating Neveila while Performing a Mitzva

Tosfos maintains that one who is busy with the mitzva of returning someone's lost object is exempt from giving tzedaka to a poor person. Busy is defined as being involved and preoccupied with the lost object, such as feeding an animal.

Maharatz Chayus is bothered with a strong question on tosfos. He states that besides for there being a positive commandment of sustaining the poor, there is a lo saaseh of closing one's hand by not giving the poor person. This is why beis din can compel someone to give tzedaka for there is a lav as well. if so, he asks, there cannot be an exemption of giving tzedaka to an oni when he is involved with a lost object for the principle of osek b'mitzva only applies by a positive commandment and not by a neative one?

Would someone who is busy performing a mitzva be permitted to eat neveila?

He leaves this question unresolved.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Travelling to Learn by David

Rashi gives as an example of “osek bemitzvah”, one who is going to study Torah. Now why can’t he study where he is? How is traveling to learn considered involvement with a mitzvah? Is it not, at best, hechser mitzvah, preperatropy to the mitzvah, but not actually the mitzvah itself?

The answer is, “no”. Shulcah aruch in Yoreh Deah 240:25 says that a son has no obligation to respect his fathers wishes to remain behind, if the son feels he will be able to learn better in a particular place, or with a particular teacher. This is true even if the student is not 100% sure. (Pischei teshivah, loc cit). “One cannot always learn from simply anyone” – Eruvin 47b.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Wedding Thoughts by David

What is the factor that weighs on a man’s mind on his wedding night? It cannot simply be his inexperience with conjugal relations, b/c then why would there be no concerns before a man marrying a widow? (Unless we assume that the gemara itself assumes that only a widower or divorcee, ie, an experienced person, would marry a widow). Rather, the factor that weighs on the mind, according to the gemara, is the removal of the hymen. See Berachos 16 a, and the Bertinora.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Osek B'mitzva by Reb Jay

Shluchei mitzva are patur from sitting in the sukka, because of
oseik b'mitzva patur min hamitzva. Rashi writes that this refers
to going to learn Torah, or to see his Rebbi, or pidyon shevuyim.
Tosfos notes that he is patur from the sukka only in a case
where if he would sit in the sukka, he would be dealyed or
unable to perform these other mitzvos, otherwise, there is no
patur of oseik b'mitzva patur min hamitzva. The Ran writes that
while a person is being Oisek bmitzva, he is patur from other
mitzvos, even if it is possible to fulfill both of them. This is the
reason, writes the Ran, that a groom is patur from krias Shema,
as although he could find the time to say it, since he is tarud in a
mitzva, the Torah does not obligate him to do another mitzva. A
nafka mina between Tosfos and the Ran would be
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a person on
the way to do pidyon shevuyim who finds a lost object, and the
owner of the object will be at the destination of the person going
to do pidyon shevuyim. Tosfos would say that since doing the
mitzva of hashavas aveida doess not delay the mitzva of pidyon
shevuyim, he is obligated in the mitzva, while the Ran would
say that since he is involved in the mitzva of pidyon shevuyim,
the Torah is not mechayev him whatsoever in the mitzva of
pidyon shevuyim (today, in any case, we have lost the ability to
be so focused on one mitzva, and even the Ran would agree that
he is obligated in the mitzva). Rav Akiva Eiger asks how can the
Gemara learn the limud of oseik b'mitzva patur min hamitzva
from a groom and from Korban Pesach (that those who were
oisek with the coffin of Yoseph were patur from the Korban
Pesach), both those cases involve a shev v'al tasay, while the
case of sukka involves a lo sa'asay of eating outside the sukka?
Rav Akiva Eiger answers that there is no lo sa'asay of eating
outside the sukka, only an asay to eat in the sukka, and if a
person eats outside the sukka, he is mevatel an asay which is a
shev v'al tasay, so there is no problem. Another answer could
be, that while Korban Pesach is a mitzvos asay, it is an asay
sheyeish bo kares (the only other asay that has a chiyuv of kares
for not performing the mitzva is Bris Milah), which gives it a
similarity to a lo sa'asay, and is thus a good rayah.
Rav Moshe Shternbuch asks why is a person required to stop
davening to answer, or in some cases merely stop davening and
listen to (depending on where he is up to)kedusha, he is Oisek
bmitzva and is therefore patur from other mitzvos? He answers
that a person is patur from a mitzva only when he is being oisek
in a different mitzva, but if it is part of the same mitzva--in this
case tefila--he is chayov.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - A Sukkah in Mourning

Rav Acha rules that a mourner is obligated in the mitzva of sukkah. The Gemora explains why this is a novel ruling for we might thought he would be exempt from the mitzva based on the ruling that one who is suffering is exempt from the mitzva of sukkah and a mourner is in anguish, the Gemora teaches us that he's nevertheless obligated.

The Rosh explains this Gemora by stating that a mourner wants to be in solitude and he would rather be in his house enabling him to think about the recent loss and this is causing him grief, the Gemora teaches that the exemption of sitting in a sukkah due to suffering is only when it comes by itself, however here he is bringing this anguish upon himself and it is incumbent on him to appease his mind, thereby obligating himself in the mitzva of sukkah.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Pe'er-Tefillin shel Rosh only?

Rav Dovid Goldberg quotes Rabbeinu Avraham min HaHar who writes that pe’er of Tefillin is because it is said vrau kol amei haaretz ki sheim HaShem nikra olecho veyaru mimeka, and the Gemara in Brachos states these are Tefillin shel Rosh. Rav Goldberg wonders then why an aveil is exempt from Tefillin shel yad which does not seem to be included in pe'er. Rav Goldberg suggests that the passuk that states veyaru mimeka refers to Tefillin shel Rosh because they are visible, whereas the Tefillin shel yad are not visible. Rav Goldberg concludes that in reality, even Tefillin shel yad are referred to as pe’er. The Meshech Chochmah at the end of Parashas Bo writes that we say in Vehu Rachum on Monday and Thursday ad masai uzcho bashvi vsiferatecho beyad tzar. Oz is Tefillin shel yad, and tiferes is Tefillin shel Rosh. The Meshech Chochmah seems to imply that tiferes-pe’er only refers to the Tefillin shel Rosh. Yet, the Meshech Chochmah himself in parshas Beshalach writes that both oz and pe’er refer to Tefillin. Perhaps when oz and tiferes are written together, one can distinguish between the Tefillin shel yad and the Tefillin shel Rosh. Rashi in Ta’anis 16a and other Rishonim in Mode Katan, Kesubos and Bava Basra seem to imply that pe’er refers only to Tefillin shel Rosh. I also wonder if there is a distinction between tiferes and pe’er, which seem to be the same shoresh, yet imply different connotations. The Mishna Berurah in Hilchos Tisha B’Av quotes the Medrash that states that the passuk that states hishlich mishamayim tiferes Yisroel refers to Tefillin, and that is why we do not wear Tefillin on Tisha B’Av morning.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Yedias HaTorah and Yegias HaTorah

Rav Soloveitchek writes that when the Mishna mentions shluchei mitzvah, Rashi explains that these are people who are going to study Torah, and this refers to the aspect of yegias HaTorah, toiling in Torah. There is another aspect of Torah which is yedias HaTorah, knowing Torah. Rav Soloveitchek writes that the Rambam divides the two aspects of Torah in Hilchos Talmud Torah. I wonder how it is possible for one to fulfill the mitzvah of yedias HaTorah without yegias HaTorah. It seem that Rav Soloveitchek is saying that one can fulfill the mitzvah of yedias HaTorah by studying Torah and one can also fulfill the mitzvah of yegias HaTorah by being yageia in Torah. It is also not clear why according to Rav Soloveitchek one who is going to be yageia in Torah is called a shliach mitzvah as opposed to one who is going to be yodeia Torah.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Oseik bemitzvah derabanan exempting mitvah medoraisa

Rav Elchonen in Kovetiz Shiurim 2:32 and the Sdei Chemed (maareches oseik page 436) discuss whether the principle of one being exempt from one mitzvah when engaged in another mitzvah applies when the mitzvah one is engaged in is derabannan and the other mitzvah awaiting him is deoraisa. The Sdei Chemed quotes the Rashba who writes that from our Gemara it is evident that one who is engaged in a mitzvah derabannan is exempt from a mitzvah deoraisa. The Mitzpei Aisan on Daf 10b wonders why one who is going to receive his teacher, which is only a mitzvah derabannan, should be exempt from dwelling in a Sukkah, which is a mitzvah deoraisa. The Mitzpei Aisan quotes a Ran in Shabbos who writes that a mitzvah derabannan does not override a mitzvah deoraisa even by saying sheiv vaal taaseh. Rather, a mitzvah deoraisa will override a mitzvah derabannan with sheiv vaal taaseh. Reb Dovid Goldberg here quotes the Bikkurei Yaakov who writes that receiving one’s teacher on Yom Tov is a mitzvah deoraisa of es HaShem Elokecha tira, which comes to include talmidei Chachamim.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Hosting guests overrides receiving the Shechinah

The Gemara discusses the halacha of oseik bimitzvah patur min hamitzvah, one who is engaged in the performance of one mitzvah is exempt from performing another mitzvah. The question is raised with regard to Avraham Avinu who was receiving the Shechinah after he had been circumcised. When the angels came to visit him, Avraham left the Shechinah and went to attend to the guests. Why did Avraham not employ the principle of one who is engaged in one mitzvah, i.e. receiving the Shechinah, is exempt from performing another mitzvah, i.e. hosting the guests? I heard from Rav Chaim Uri Freund Shlita that Rav Noach Weinberg asked this questions and Rav Noach suggested that when Avraham was engaged in receiving the Shechinah, he then became aware of the necessity of performing the mitzvah of greeting guests. It is noteworthy that the Gemara in Shabbos states that from Avraham Avinu we derive the principle that receiving guests is greater than receiving the Shechinah. The Gemara should have challenged this principle based on the idea that one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from other mitzvos. The mitzvah of receiving the Shechinah appears to be the mitzvah of uledavka bo, one is obligated to cleave to HaShem. According to the Netziv in Heemek Davar, Avraham was engaged in loving HaShem and receiving the Shechinah, and he was performing the mitzvah of loving HaShem. The Netziv writes that when one is engaged in the mitzvah of loving HaShem, he is obligated to interrupt his thoughts and perform another mitzvah, because the mitzvah of loving HaShem has no time frame. This, the Netziv writes, is the meaning of the Gemara in Shabbos that states that hosting guests is greater than receiving the Shechinah. This means that the action of hosting guests overrides the mitzvah of loving HaShem which has no time frame. (See there further). Receiving guests can be a number of mitzvos, such as gemilus chasadim (Netziv) or even vehalachta bedrachav, one should emulate HaShem. Just as HaShem is compassionate, also you must be compassionate.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 24 - Missile Attack

Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein in his sefer on Sukkah relates a question that came to him during the recent war in Israel with Hezbollah. A man purchased some items on credit from a store before Shabbos. Shabbbos morning, a barrage of missiles rained down on the city and this particular store was demolished, there was nothing salvagable left. The man wanted to know if he was still obligated to pay his debt. He claimed that if he would not have bought those items, they would have been destroyed anyways. The Rav ruled that he is obligated to pay for the debt was incurred before the missile attack.

Rav Zilberstain wondered as to what the halacha would be if the missiles were already launched when the fellow made his purchase.

[The connection to the daf is the Gemora states that there is a concern for the barrel bursting before Shabbos is over thereby preventing the person from separating terumah and maaser after Shabbos.]

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 24 - Huff n' Puff and Blow those Walls Down

The Gemara states that the walls of a Sukkah have to be able to withstand a usual wind. The Rambam in his commentary to the Mishnayos writes that the walls of the Sukkah must be strong enough that the wind will not blow them down. It would seem from the words of the Rambam that it is sufficient if the walls do not fall down, even if they sway in the wind. From Rabbi Yosef Kapach’s edition of the Rambam, however, it appears that the Rambam maintains that the walls cannot sway at all. The Ritva writes explicitly that the walls cannot sway. Sefer Emek Bracha understands the Rambam in Mishneh Torah to be in accordance with the opinion of the Ritva. There is a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai that states that the walls must be sturdy enough that they do not sway in the wind. This would also be the explanation of the Magen Avraham’s ruling that if the Sukkah was enclosed and the walls were such that if the Sukkah was located outside, the walls would fall, the Sukkah is invalid. The reason for this is because there is a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai that states that the walls must be strong and if the walls are not sturdy enough, the Sukkah is deemed to be lacking walls and the Sukkah is thus invalid. Based on this reasoning, we can resolve a question that is posed by some of the Acharonim. The Acharonim wonder what the Halacha would be if a Sukkah has sturdy walls but it cannot withstand an unusual wind. When an unusual wind blows and the walls sway in the wind, is the Sukkah still deemed to be valid while the walls are blowing? We can suggest that the Sukkah would be valid because the requirement of a Sukkah wall is that the wall can withstand a usual wind and a Sukkah with sturdy walls can certainly withstand a usual wind. Although the Sukkah sways in the wind, we are not concerned and the Sukkah is deemed to be valid.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 24 - Canvas

When one uses a canvas Sukkah, there is a concern that the walls will flap in the wind and this will invalidate the walls. The Poskim suggest that one can tie ropes or reeds from one side of the Sukkah to the other. The ropes or reeds must be within three tefachim of each other, thus applying the principle of lavud, and this would obviate the need for the canvas walls. The Chazon Ish rules that the walls cannot sway more than three tefachim. One must wonder if this means that the walls cannot sway three tefachim in each direction or does it mean that the walls cannot sway three tefachim entirely.
I did notice an interesting discussion here and it continues here and concludes here.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 24 - Highlights

1. The Gemara concludes that Rabbi Meir maintains that we are concerned for the possibility of death and for this reason one cannot use an animal as the wall of a Sukkah. Rabbi Meir is not concerned, however, that a barrel will burst, and for this reason one can drink the wine in a barrel on Shabbos. He can then rely on the fact that he will separate terumah and Maaser from the wine after Shabbos. If there was a concern that the barrel might break, we would not permit such a leniency because he may never be able to separate the terumah and Maaser. (24a1)
2. Rabbi Yehudah does not allow one to drink from the wine and rely on the fact that he will separate terumah and Maaser after Shabbos because Rabbi Yehudah does not hold of the principle of breira, retroactive clarification. In this case the principle of breira would dictate that the wine that he will separate in the future for terumah and Maaser is already deemed to have been separated now. (24a1)
3. The Gemara cites two other reasons why an animal cannot be used as the wall of a Sukkah. One reason is because Rabbi Meir maintains that a wall that stands only because of breath is not deemed to be a wall. Alternatively, it is only deemed to be a wall if it is made by man. (24a3)
4. There are several halachos that the Gemara mentions regarding a bill of divorce. Rabbi Yose HaGlili maintains that a bill of divorce cannot be written on an animal. There is a halacha that states that a man can only divorce his wife with a bill of divorce but he cannot divorce her with money. A man cannot divorce his wife by stipulating a condition that will be in effect for her entire life because a conditional divorce of this nature is not deemed to be a separation between a man and his wife. (24b1-24b2)
5. The Mishna rules that if one constructs his Sukkah between trees and the trees are serving as the walls of the Sukkah, the Sukkah is valid. The Gemara states that the walls of the Sukkah must be able to withstand a usual wind. One must ensure that the trees do not sway to and fro because walls that sway are invalid. (24b2)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 23 - Highlights

1. The Mishna rules that if one constructs a Sukkah on top of a wagon or a boat, it is valid and one is permitted to enter the wagon or boat on Yom Tov. If one constructs a Sukkah on top of a tree or a camel, it is valid and one is prohibited to enter it on Yom Tov. (22b2)
2. The Gemara cites a dispute regarding a Sukkah on a boat. Rabban Gamliel invalidates such a Sukkah and Rabbi Akiva validates it. The Gemara relates an incident where Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva were on a boat and Rabbi Akiva constructed a Sukkah. The next day, a gust of wind blew the Sukkah off the boat. Rabbi Gamliel then said to Rabbi Akiva, “Akiva, where is your Sukkah now?” (23a1)
3. Abaye explains that if the Sukkah would not be able to withstand a usual wind on dry land, the Sukkah is invalid according to all opinions. If the Sukkah could withstand an unusual wind, it is certainly valid. The dispute is regarding a case where the Sukkah can withstand a usual wind blowing on dry land but the Sukkah would not be able to withstand a usual wind on the sea. (23a1)
4. The Gemara cites a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah whether a Sukkah constructed on top of an animal is valid or not. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a Sukkah must be fit to be used for all seven days and since this Sukkah cannot be used on Shabbos or Yom Tov because of the Rabbinic injunction against riding on an animal, this Sukkah is invalid. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that the Sukkah is valid because the Sukkah is Biblically fit for all seven days and the fact that it is not rabbinically fit does not invalidate the Sukkah. (23a1-23a2)
5. There is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah if one is allowed to use an animal as a wall for a Sukkah. Rabbi Meir maintains that such a Sukkah is invalid, whereas Rabbi Yehudah maintains that such a Sukkah is valid. Rabbi Meir enumerates many instances where the use of anything that is alive is invalid for use. (23a2)
6. There is a dispute regarding the reason Rabbi Meir invalidates a Sukkah where the animal is used as a wall. Abaye maintains that we are concerned that the animal will die and the Sukkah will be without one of its required walls. Rabbi Zeira maintains that we are concerned that the animal may run away, thus leaving the Sukkah without one of its required walls. (23a2-23a3)
7. Abaye understands that Rabbi Meir is concerned for the possibility of death. The Gemara questions this thesis from a Mishna in Gittin that states that if a daughter of a non-Kohen was married to a Kohen, we do not have to be concerned that her husband might die when he has traveled abroad and the woman is permitted to eat terumah. Abaye maintains that the Mishna in Gittin is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, and this would seem to contradict Abaye’s position in our Gemara. The Gemara answers that we reverse the statement of Abaye regarding the Mishna in Gittin and Abaye really answered that the Mishna in Gittin is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah who maintains that we are not concerned with the possibility of death. (23b1-23b2-24a1)

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Litveshe Kasha / Chasidishe Vort

Ben Azai maintains that "mehalech K'omed" one who carries an object four amos in a public domain does not violate the Biblical prohibition of carrying for every step he takes. The moment he places his foot down it is considered as stopping and therefore, he is not walking four amos continuously. The only way for him to transgress this prohibition is to jump four amos at one time.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks that according to Ben Azai, there should not be any injunction against blowing the shofer on Shabbos because the sages were concerned of one carrying the shofer four amos in a public domain and according to Ben Azai this would not be a violation of Shabbos. It is not logical to assume that one might take the shofer and jump four amos?

Reb Leibel Eiger answered that in the person's excitement to for the mitzva of shofar, how can he not jump!

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Practically Speaking

Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank in Mikroei Kodesh (32) writes that Reb Akiva Schlesinger maintained that even nowadays there is an obligation to blow shofar in Yerushalayim when Rosh Hashana occurs on Shabbos. There are those who maintain that Rabbi Schlesinger actually practiced in accordance with his opinion and when Rosh Hashanah occurred on Shabbos, Rabbi Schlesinger blew shofar. Rav Frank wonders if there is any reason for one to hear shofar blasts nowadays if he knows of someone who was blowing shofar when Rosh Hashanah occurs on Shabbos. The first question that needs to be addressed is if Rabbi Schlesinger’s opinion is halachically valid. Even if the halacha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Schlesinger, perhaps one fulfills a biblical obligation of hearing the shofar blasts even if the one blowing shofar is violating a rabbinical prohibition. Rav Frank initially compares this issue with our Gemara. If one does not fulfill his obligation of dwelling in a Sukkah when sitting in a Sukkah that is on top of an animal, this would be proof that one cannot fulfill his biblical obligation if there is a rabbinical prohibition involved.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 23 - Shofar on Shabbos

The Gemara cites a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah whether a Sukkah constructed on top of an animal is valid or not. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a Sukkah must be fit to be used for all seven days and since this Sukkah cannot be used on Shabbos or Yom Tov because of the Rabbinic injunction against riding on an animal, this Sukkah is invalid. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that the Sukkah is valid because the Sukkah is Biblically fit for all seven days and the fact that it is not rabbinically fit does not invalidate the Sukkah. This issue of something that is biblically fit but is rabbinically unfit has halachic ramifications in other areas as well, such as regarding one who performs a mitzvah in a manner that was rabbinically prohibited if we can still say that he fulfilled his biblical obligation. This issue was previously discussed on Daf 3 here regarding sitting in a sukkah that has the table situated outside of the sukkah regarding sitting in a Sukkah where the table is placed outside the Sukkah. The question will arise regarding Rosh Hashanah that occurs on Shabbos where there is a Rabbinic injunction against blowing the shofar as one may come to carry the shofar four amos in a public domain to learn from an expert. What would be the halacha if one were to violate the rabbinical prohibition and blow shofar on Shabbos? Would one be rewarded for performing a mitzvah because he has fulfilled the biblical obligation or perhaps one does not even fulfill a biblical obligation when he is rabbinically prohibited form blowing shofar on Shabbos? This question would not present a problem according to the opinion of the Yerushalmi that maintains that one is biblically prohibited from blowing shofar on Shabbos. Rabbi Akiva Eiger rules that in such a situation one has fulfilled his biblical obligation of blowing shofar. Tosfos in Rosh Hashanah writes that blowing the shofar on Shabbos is rabbinically prohibited because it is considered a chachmah, an art, and not an act of labor. Rabbi Ezriel Cziment writes in a pamphlet called Zmanei Sasson that it is evident that even according to Tosfos, the Chachamim did not invalidate the shofar blasts, because then Rabbi Akiva Eiger would not have ruled that one fulfills his biblical obligation of blowing shofar. It is clear that if the only rabbinical injunction against blowing shofar on Shabbos was because of the concern that one may come to carry four amos in a public domain, the shofar blasts would not be invalidated. The novelty here is that even if the rabbinical injunction would invalidate the shofar blasts, this would be different than a Sukkah that the Chachamim invalidate when the table is outside.

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